Registration of security interest: A peculiar Indian problem

by Pratik Datta.

When a lender extends credit to a company, it often secures repayment by way of a security (often referred to as a “charge”) created over certain assets or properties of that company. Company law usually requires such security to be registered with an agency. For instance, in the UK, company charges are registered with the Companies House. Registration of security could serve three different purposes:

1. the purpose of registration of security could be to publish the existence of such security to make it available for public inspection. This gives potential lenders to the company information about the extent of prior lending to the company which may rank ahead of their own contemplated advances. Such information may also be of interest to credit analysts, resolution professionals, shareholders and investors.

2. registration may be necessary for ‘perfection’ of the security. That is, registration may be treated by law as a necessary part of the process whereby a person obtains a security interest against the company. Without registration, the person in question would fail to obtain security interest and so would not be able to rely on it against the unsecured creditors of the company during the company’s insolvency.

3. registration could be used in law as a way of determining priority among secured creditors. For example, the law could require that priorities among secured creditors be determined by the date of registration of the security instead of the date of creation of security.

In India, we have a peculiar situation. When a bank or notified financial institution extends a secured credit facility to a company, three different registrations are necessary under three different laws for the same security.

1. Under section 77 of Companies Act 2013, a company creating charge on its assets or properties is required to register the particulars of such charge with the Registrar of Companies (‘RoC’). This involves providing the relevant information in Form No. CHG-1 (for charges other than debentures) or Form No. CHG-9 (for debentures), getting it signed by both the company and the charge holder, and then filing the Form along with the underlying credit agreement with the ROC.

2. Under section 23 of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’), the particulars of every transaction (involving banks and notified financial institutions) creating security interest must be filed with the Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India (‘CERSAI’). This involves filing Form I with CERSAI.

3. Under section 215(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (‘IBC’), a financial creditor (which typically includes banks and regulated financial institutions) is mandatorily required to submit financial information and information relating to assets, in relation to which any security interest has been created, to an Information Utility (“IU”). Unlike RoC or CERSAI, IUs are required to authenticate and verify information of default, and issue a record of default in Form D to its registered uses.

As a result of these legal provisions, every single secured credit transaction in India has to be mandatorily registered with the RoC, the CERSAI as well as an IU. More than increasing compliance burden, this institutional overlap increases the legal uncertainties around security creation and enforcement, with potentially adverse implications for the entire secured credit landscape. A recent case illustrates the point.

Case in point

In Bizloan Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr. Amit Chandrashekhar Poddar (“Bizloan judgment”), the NCLAT was seized of a unique situation where a corporate credit transaction was registered only with CERSAI but not with RoC. Bizloan Private Ltd. (“Bizloan”) provided financial credit facilities to Autocop (India) Pvt. Ltd. (“Autocop”) in the form of sales bill discounting and purchase bill discounting of Rs. 1 crore in aggregate. Subsequently, Autocop went into corporate insolvency resolution process (“CIRP”) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (“IBC”). Bizloan filed its claims in Form C during CIRP, which were admitted in full without indicating if they were secured or unsecured. It was only when Bizloan received the final resolution plan for Autocop that it realized that Bizloan had been classified as an unsecured financial creditor. Bizloan challenged this classification but by then Autocop had been put into liquidation. The NCLT dismissed Bizloan’s challenge. Consequently, Bizloan approached NCLAT in appeal.

Bizloan’s arguments

1. Bizloan argued that proving security interest in liquidation proceedings under IBC should be governed by Regulation 21 of the IBB (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, which states:

The existence of a security interest may be proved by a secured creditor on the basis of -

1. the records available in an information utility, if any;
2. certificate of registration of charge issued by the Registrar of Companies; or
3. proof of registration of charge with the Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India.

Evidently, proof of registration of charge with CERSAI is sufficient for proving security interest in a liquidation by virtue of Regulation 21(c) of the Liquidation Regulations.

2. Bizloan further argued that section 238 of the IBC overrides provisions of other statutes. Therefore, if there is any inconsistency between IBC and any other statute, IBC and the regulations issued under it should prevail.

Liquidator’s arguments

1. The Liquidator relied on section 77(3) of the Companies Act 2013, which states:

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no charge created by a company shall be taken into account by the liquidator appointed under this Act or the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), as the case may be, or any other creditor unless it is duly registered under sub-section (1) and a certificate of registration of such charge is given by the Registrar under subsection (2).

The underlined portion of the above provision was inserted through the Eleventh Schedule of the IBC itself, which came into effect from November 15, 2016. The liquidator highlighted that the words “shall” makes him duty bound to follow the above provision. Further, if there is any conflict between section 77 of Companies Act 2013 and Regulation 21 of the Liquidation Regulations issued under the IBC, the former will override the latter since section 77 is a specific provision dealing with the particular situation (that is, registration of charges) and it explicitly uses the words ““notwithstanding anything contained in any other law”. Since Bizloan’s charge was not registered with the RoC under section 77 of the Companies Act 2013 and only registered with CERSAI, Bizloan cannot be treated as a secured financial creditor in liquidation governed by the IBC.

2. The liquidator further argued that Regulation 21 is an outcome of section 52(3)(b) of the IBC, which states:

Before any security interest is realised by the secured creditor under this section, the liquidator shall verify such security interest and permit the secured creditor to realise only such security interest, the existence of which may be proved either – (a) by the records of such security interest maintained by an information utility; or (b) by such other means as may be specified by the Board.

The liquidator argued that section 52(3) applies only before a secured creditor chooses to “realise” its security interest, which does not come into the picture in Bizloan’s case since Bizloan had effectively “relinquished it security interest to the liquidation estate” and was to receive the sale proceeds in terms of section 53 of IBC.

3. The Liquidator further highlighted that Regulation 21 uses the words “may prove”, which is discretionary and not mandatory. In contrast, section 77 uses the word “shall” which is mandatory and binding.

4. Additionally, the Liquidator argued that if there is a conflict between section 77 and Regulation 21, Regulation 21 of the Liquidation Regulations issued under section 240 of the IBC will have to give way to section 255 of the IBC, which amended section 77(3) of the Companies Act explicitly giving more weightage to section 77 of Companies Act 2013 in matters of registration of charges on a company’s assets or properties.

5. The Liquidator also drew attention to section 20(4) of the SARFAESI Act 2002, which reads:

The provisions of this Act pertaining to the Central Registry shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any of the provisions contained in the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (44 of 1958), the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970), the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), and the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000) or any other law requiring registration of charges and shall not affect the priority of charges or validity thereof under those Acts or laws.

Accordingly, the Liquidator argued that SARFAESI Act 2002 is ‘only in addition and not in derogation of’ the provisions of Companies Act 2013 and any other law. Therefore, registration with CERSAI under SARFAESI Act 2002 cannot affect the priority of charges or validity thereof under those other Acts or laws.

NCLAT’s judgment

The NCLAT noted the well-established principle of statutory interpretation that a latter law prevails over an older law. Accordingly, it observed that the IBC came into effect on December 1, 2016 while the amendment to section 77(3) of Companies Act 2013 came into effect earlier on November 11, 2016. Further, Regulation 21 of the Liquidation Regulations came into effect on December 15, 2016, after the amendment to section 77(3) of Companies Act 2013. Therefore, NCLAT concluded that the IBC will override the amended section 77(3) of Companies Act 2013. Consequently, it was held that security interest of a creditor can be proved if the same is available only in CERSAI. It is not completely and exclusively dependent on charge registered with RoC under section 77 of Companies Act 2013. As a result, Bizloan should be treated as a secured financial creditor based on its CERSAI registration pursuant to Regulation 21 of the Liquidation Regulations.

Analysis of NCLAT’s reasoning

The NCLAT’s reasoning is problematic. The general principle of statutory interpretation that a new law overrides an old law is based on the assumption that if both laws have been enacted by the Parliament at different points in time, it is reasonable to assume that the latter law reflects the latest policy intent of the Parliament and therefore, should prevail over the earlier law.

When IBC was enacted by the Parliament, section 255 of IBC amended section 77(3) of Companies Act 2013 to clarify that a liquidator appointed under IBC must take into account a charge created by a company only if such charge was registered under section 77 of Companies Act 2013. The Parliamentary intent was clearly to ensure that only charges registered under section 77 of Companies Act 2013 are taken into account in a liquidation under IBC.

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) notified different provisions of IBC at different points in time because of administrative convenience. Parliamentary intent cannot reasonably be determined based on whether a provision of IBC was notified before another provision of the IBC by the MCA, that too within a span of a month. Therefore, the fundamental basis of NCLAT’s reasoning stands of unsure footing.

Policy issues

The NCLAT noted that RoC and CERSAI registrations serve different purposes. Registration of charges with RoC under section 77 of Companies Act 2013 is relevant for determining priority of claimants of a company during liquidation under IBC or winding up under Companies Act 2013. In contrast, CERSAI registration under section 20 of SARFAESI Act 2002 is relevant for realization of security interests by banks and notified financial institutions through the SARFAESI Act 2002. It is also noted that CERSAI registration helps in fraud prevention by allowing lenders to check if the asset being offered as security is already hypothecated or mortgaged.

On closer examination, these stated purposes do not appear to be mutually exclusive. When a bank or a notified financial institution extends secured credit to a company, the borrower company is mandated by law to register the charges with the RoC under section 77 of Companies Act 2013. This RoC data is available for public inspection. Potential lenders to the company can use the RoC data to check if the company has already given any of its assets or properties as security to any prior lender(s). Clearly, fraud prevention in corporate lending by banks and notified financial institutions cannot be a reason for setting up CERSAI.

CERSAI becomes relevant only for fraud prevention in the case of loans extended by banks or notified financial institutions to non-corporate borrowers such as individuals, sole proprietorships, societies, partnerships etc. The RoC does not have information on prior borrowings by such non-corporate borrowers or the existing security on the assets or properties of such borrowers. In such cases, CERSAI plays a legitimate role in fraud prevention.

The problem in the current institutional design lies is the overlap between RoC, CERSAI and IUs with respect to corporate secured lending. Banks and notified financial institutions have a strong incentive to register security interests in corporate lending transactions with CERSAI because it enables them to enforce such security interests through the special out-of-court enforcement mechanism under SARFAESI Act 2002. These lenders also have an incentive to get the same information filed with an IU so that they can rely on the IU’s record of default in insolvency proceedings under IBC. And the corporate borrower is anyways legally mandated to register the security with RoC under Companies Act 2013. Overall, these laws have created layers of institutions over one another for the same purpose, muddying the functional clarity between RoC, CERSAI and IUs.

Conclusion

The blurring of functionalities between the RoC, CERSAI and IUs not only creates avoidable transaction cost in corporate secured credit transactions, it also leads to legal risks around security creation as the Bizloan judgment illustrates.

Registration of a particular security interest against assets or properties of a particular corporate debtor should be done only once. Let’s assume that the registration agency is RoC. The corporate debtor should register a particular security interest only once with the ROC. In case of default, that RoC registration alone should be enough for banks and notified institutions to use enforcement rights under SARFAESI against such corporate debtors. Similarly, the same ROC registration alone should be adequate proof of security interest against a corporate debtor for the purposes of IBC. The law should not require the same security interest against the same corporate debtor to be registered with CERSAI or any IU.

CERSAI would, of course, remain relevant for registration of security interests against non-corporate borrowers. The case for IUs is more nuanced. The BLRC had envisaged an open competitive industry in the market for information required for insolvency and bankruptcy. This should be achieved by enabling multiple private competing businesses to perform the role of RoC, which would require a fundamental rethinking of the RoC as a state monopoly under Companies Act 2013. Adding an additional layer of IUs over the existing RoC to perform exactly the same function is not exactly the reform that the BLRC had envisaged.

The legal mechanics of achieving these outcomes is not particularly complex. Suitable amendments would be required to Companies Act 2013, SARFAESI Act 2002 and Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 and some subordinate legislations issued under these statutes. But first of all, the MCA (for RoC and IUs) and Ministry of Finance (for CERSAI) need to recognize the problems with the current laws on registration of security interests and agree on the policy pathway ahead.

The author is a lawyer.

The consequences of criminalising cheque bouncing

by Shubho Roy and Ajay Shah

Many countries (e.g. New Zealand, Poland, Germany, Norway) have discontinued paper cheques. In other countries (e.g. the U.K., the U.S.), the use of cheques is declining. But in India, the use of paper cheques in India has stabilised in terms of value and number over the last five years. This is despite the extent to which digital and instantaneous payments are now feasible. Why might this be the case?

Prior to 1988, cheques were primarily used as a tool of payment. In that age, there were delays in clearing. Paper cheques had to be transported to the bank branch where the cheque issuer had an account. In that branch, the issuer's signature would be verified against a sample. If the signatures matched, the balance would be cleared (assuming the issuer had adequate funds). This process took seven working days, even when the issuer and recipient had banks in the same city. If the parties were in different cities, the process would take 15 working days, on average.

Today, a cheque issuer can send a secure document showing that the issuer's bank account has adequate funds to honour the cheque. However, in 1988, there was no such system, and the cheque recipient faced the risk that the issuer was writing a cheque that her account could not honour.

Some technical mistakes can always happen, where a person fails to anticipate the date on which funds are required and there are unpredictable delays in the money moving in and out of the account. Alongside this, many unscrupulous people knowingly wrote bad cheques. This made sellers mistrust cheques and prefer cash. While cash as a payment mechanism has the virtues of instantaneity and privacy, it comes with difficulties on physical security.

The 1988 change of the law

In this setting, the Parliament criminalised the bouncing of cheques in 1988. Now, the cheque writer could be sent to jail if the cheque did not clear. The law also stated that every cheque is presumed to be written to clear a debt. This change helped the recipient of cheques because the recipients did not have to prove any underlying transaction. The recipient only had to demonstrate that the cheque was not honoured.

In 2016, the Supreme Court ratified the practice of using cheques as collateral in the case of Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited. Sampelly Satyanarana Rao (Mr. Rao) had written post-dated cheques as security for a loan from the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA). Mr. Rao did not take the loan personally but wrote the cheques as a director in the company that borrowed the money. The borrower company failed to pay the instalments when they became due. In response, IREDA (the creditor) initiated criminal proceedings against Mr. Rao under the 1988 law. Mr. Rao defended the claim by stating that the cheques were written before the creditor (IRDEA) disbursed the loan amount. IREDA pointed out that the cheques were deposited after the borrower (the company) had failed to pay the instalments, and therefore, the penal provisions of the 1988 Act applied. The Supreme Court agreed with the creditor and allowed for the criminal prosecution of Mr. Rao. This judgement provides legal certainty to the use of post-dated cheques as security. This date, i.e. 2016, is an important milestone in the journey, over and beyond the amendment of the N. I. Act in 1988.

The role of cheques in India today

The threat of imprisonment restored some faith in cheques. Anecdotally, it seems to have worked well in the initial years after the amendment. Cheques became more acceptable in commercial transactions and helped reduce frictions in economic activity. Many a cheque recipient was willing to take the risk of delivering goods without waiting one or two weeks for a cheque to clear.

These considerations do not exist in the present landscape. Instantaneous payment systems are ubiquitous in India, ranging from small value payments to the largest amounts possible. Any problem of trust between buyers and sellers can be readily solved by resorting to NEFT or RTGS. By this reasoning, the number of cheques written in India should have declined sharply. It has not.

People responded to incentives

Alongide this, the rest of the Indian legal system which enforces contracts works poorly. Ordinarily, a loan dispute would be resolved as a contract dispute through civil law, and, in some cases, bankruptcy law may be involved in situations where the debtor is insolvent. In 2020, in enforcing contracts, India ranked 163 out of 190 countries, while its overall rank was 63 (a difference of 100 ranks). India's rank in resolving insolvency was 52. Hence, creditors are unconfident about ordinary credit enforcement mechanisms.

One strand of credit enforcement systems is seizing assets that are pledged as collateral. This tends to work poorly in India. While the SARFAESI Act of 2002 is reasonably effective in getting collateral into the hands of the lender, many assets are hard to sell. Many land titles have encumbrances, and the land market works poorly, which hinders the recovery rate.

These weaknesses of the ordinary (civil) credit enforcement systems made criminal proceedings under S.138 attractive to creditors. Under S.138, a debtor faces up to two years of imprisonment if the debtor is convicted. In reality, the creditor does not even have to wait for the end of the litigation to get the debtor imprisoned. The debtor can be arrested at the beginning of the litigation so that the debtor can be produced before the court. In some cases, the debtor can also be imprisoned for the duration of trial under S.138. In contrast, a civil case proceeds without the debtor, if the debtor chooses not to appear. Most people will pay up to avoid being imprisoned, which gives heart to creditors.

When faced with legal difficulties around land title, it is better for the creditor to threaten imprisonment, and have the borrower solve the problem of selling the land, instead of seizing collateral and then facing legal difficulties in liquidating them.

As a consequence, after the new law was established in 1988, creditors started using cheques as a security. Creditors frequently demand that the debtor provide post-dated cheques for loan amounts. These cheques are payable deep into the future -- sometimes extending to multiple years. In such cases, both parties are aware that the cheque drawer does not have the money in the bank account at the point in time when the cheque was signed. Creditors sometimes demand a separate cheque for each instalment of loan repayment. Consequently, a debtor for a five-year loan may write 60 post-dated cheques. On a similar note, landlords sometimes asked for post-dated cheques for the payment of rent at multiple time points in the future.

Modern economies do not have a debtors prison: the choice of filing for bankruptcy is always there, in which case the creditor gets a low recovery rate. On one hand, in India, there is no legal framework for personal bankruptcy. When threatened with jail time, the borrower may reach into her web of relationships, and borrow from the community. This increases the resources available to the lender.

Weighing the pros and cons

The introduction of S.138 has thus exerted many complex impacts upon the working of the economy.

An increased level of violence in society

More people go jail, and more threats of incarceration are bandied about. This is a less civilised society.

Increased interest in lending

When lenders are given greater certainty about recoveries, they are likely to be more willing to lend to persons that might otherwise be excluded from the credit market.

Diminished interest in borrowing

When borrowers are shown the possibility of jail time, they will be more cautious and avoid borrowing. That has its own welfare consequences.

Conditions for state failure

The prospect of jail time is a `high stakes' situation where the policing system gets to make decisions which have a high impact upon the life of a citizen. This increases the incentives for corruption.

Hindering the emergence of a modern economy

All advanced economies have moved away from debtor's prison, and evolved civil mechanisms around borrowing, collateral and bankruptcy. These pathways reduce the extent of violence in society and increases user confidence in borrowing.

The threat versus the cash

Jail time is indeed a potent threat and creates strong incentives for the borrower to obtain cash, either by borrowing from someone else or by liquidating opaque assets. But once a person goes to jail, all future payments to the lender are stopped. With more civil processes of collatoral and bankruptcy, there is the strategy of keeping the delinquent active in economic life, and obtaining a stream of cashflows to the lender.

Incentives for policy makers

Lenders that got comfortable with the use of S.138 were less inclined to persuade policy makers of the need for the institutional apparatus of the credit market.

Conclusion

The introduction of S.138 into the N.I. Act in 1988 was a response to a problem of the time. Some other countries, like Taiwan, had also criminalised cheque bouncing. However, most countries have walked back since then because credit systems have improved and the use of cheques have declined. In those countries, cheques are not used as collateral for loans.

There is a strong argument for repealing this section. The consequences of such a repeal will, however, also be far reaching, particularly in the context where the institutional apparatus for contract enforcement remain weak. It is interesting to look at the list, presented above, of the consequences of criminalising cheque bouncing. We can then ask: Which of these would flip around and arise, in reverse, when cheque bouncing is de-criminalised.

Shubho Roy and Ajay Shah are researchers at XKDR Forum.

Resolving municipal distress in India

by Adam Feibelman and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah.

In recent years, municipal bodies in India have been increasingly accessing the public debt markets. In the four year period beginning 2017 to August 2021, nine municipal corporations made bond issuances aggregating to Rs. 30 billion. In contrast, in the immediately preceding two decades, ten municipal bodies had issued bonds aggregating to less than half this amount. This is generally a positive development. Tapping financial markets expands the resources available to cities for critical services and development. Like firms that access the public markets, municipal bodies that subject themselves to market discipline are held up to higher standards of transparency and local governance. A key missing element in this story, however, is the lack of clarity about municipal creditors' rights in the event of a default by a borrowing municipal body. In a chapter published in the 2021 annual publication of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India titled Quinquennial of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, we argue that the time is ripe for policymakers in India to develop a re-organisation framework for financially distressed municipal bodies. We evaluate the potential of a formal bankruptcy regime as the model for such a framework.

The case for a municipal re-organisation framework

We make three arguments. We begin by demonstrating the weak state of municipal finances in India. For example, in the decade beginning 2007-08, municipal revenues stagnated at 1% of the GDP, significantly lower than comparable countries. Municipal bodies (urban local bodies or ULBs) are disproportionately reliant on state governments for grants in aid and loans. They are shown to have consistently under-invested in capital infrastructure. The pandemic has exacerbated the weak state of municipal finances in India. The size of the municipal debt market is, therefore, likely to grow as municipalities seek additional resources.

Second, we argue that the current legal regime in India provides neither opportunities for collective action against municipal debt default nor clarity on the treatment of creditors (bond holders, banks and financial institutions, state lending agencies, employees and vendors) in the event of the borrowing municipal body's insolvency. Very few municipal bonds are guaranteed by the state government. At one end of the spectrum, this creates the possibility of aggressive sale of public assets, owned and operated by the ULB for the benefit of the public, by 'powerful' creditors of the ULB. On the other end of the spectrum, this deprives the system of the benefits of early recognition of financial distress in ULBs. It minimizes the possibility of salvaging a ULB's operations through a mutually negotiated and court-supervised re-organisation exercise. The growing levels of municipal borrowing from the public markets and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic reinforce these concerns.

Third, the standard re-organisation framework applicable to private borrowers does not apply to ULBs as they provide public goods, and most of their assets are presumably for public use. Several countries have enacted differently designed re-organisation frameworks for resolving distressed municipal bodies. We highlight the key features of one such framework, namely, Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code. To be sure, Chapter 9 has its critics. However, with more than 100 municipal entities having used Chapter 9 for their resolution, it has proven to be a viable municipal bankruptcy regime. It is a rule-bound process, but one that is flexible enough to be able to address the complex problems of government financial distress, which inevitably combine important commercial concerns with essential necessities of social well being. At the least, it helps frame a number of threshold and critical questions that should be part of any discussion on the reorganization of distressed municipal entities.

Key legal and institutional challenges

We conclude by underscoring some key legal and institutional challenges to the idea of a municipal bankruptcy law in India. First, while bankruptcy and insolvency is in the concurrent list of the Constitution, municipal governance is an intrinsically State subject. A union municipal bankruptcy legislation will raise complex questions of federalism and will require provisions that allow states to retain their autonomy in applying a union legislated bankruptcy law to their ULBs. What might be the institutional tools for preserving such autonomy?

Second, experience from the US suggests a pro-active role for courts in administering a municipal bankruptcy. Any framework in India will need to determine whether the court or administrator heading the process will have the power to supervise the functioning of public services during the ULB's insolvency proceedings. If so, this would be a fundamental departure from the design of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which seeks to minimise court intervention in the insolvency proceedings and provides for the appointment of Insolvency Professionals for running the debtor's operations. Similarly, the scope of relief that the process can legitimately provide in a ULB's bankruptcy proceeding will need to be considered. Can a resolution plan for a ULB contemplate an increase in taxes? Can it provide for the sale of the ULB-owned public property? How can it do so without impinging upon decisions that are the prerogative of a city level legislature or the state's power?

Enacting a municipal bankruptcy law will require the resolution of these questions and prolonged negotiations with states much like the enactment of the GST framework. However, this should not deter policymakers from beginning the process. The gains of a clear municipal bankruptcy framework, in the face of the severe impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the deteriorating state of India's cities, should provide a motivation for doing so. The fact that municipal bonds are set to become an important asset held by Indian households adds an additional imperative and responsibility to ensure that there is a framework in place for addressing municipal financial distress in India.

Adam Feibelman is a Professor of Law and Director of the Center on Law and the Economy at Tulane Law School. Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah is a doctoral candidate at the National University of Singapore.

Sudden Rise of the Floaters

by Rajeswari Sengupta and Harsh Vardhan.

The first two months of 2021-22 have witnessed a remarkable new trend in the corporate bond market—a sudden rise in the issuance of floating rate bonds or “floaters” and the use of the 91-day treasury bill yield as the reference rate in these bonds, instead of the yields on dated government securities (G-Secs).

We conjecture that one possible reason behind this new development could be an increase in the perception of interest risk on the part of the bond market participants. This in turn may have been a result of the active yield curve management undertaken by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). If indeed dated government bonds such as the 10-year G-Secs have lost relevance as benchmark securities then this can lead to serious mispricing of risk in the economy, an unintended consequence of the RBI’s bond market intervention.

An interesting development in the bond market

Over the three-month period from April to June 2021, about 7 percent of the total corporate bond issuance of Rs 1.02 trillion consisted of floating rate bonds. While this percentage looks small, it is important to keep in mind that for the previous ten years or more, the share of floating rate bonds in the total issuance of corporate bonds has been less than 1 percent.

It is also important to note that the firms issuing these bonds and the investors investing in them are not a new class of issuers and investors. They are the same issuers and investors who were issuing and buying fixed-rate bonds until recently. In particular, 100 percent of the floating rate bond issuers now are non-banking finance companies (NBFCs) who were earlier issuing fixed rate bonds, and the investors are the same mutual funds and banks who were investing in fixed rate bonds earlier. This could imply that their behaviour has now changed due to external developments. It is as if the bond issuers and investors have suddenly developed a taste for floaters.

Corporate bonds are typically issued with a maturity of more than one year, along with a coupon, which is the rate of interest to be paid on the bond. Most bonds have a ‘fixed’ coupon—the rate of interest on the bond is decided at the time of issuance of the bond and remains fixed over the life of the bond.

This rate is a function of two factors – (i) the prevailing risk-free interest rate for the maturity matching that of the bond, and (ii) the credit risk spread that is added to compensate the investors for the default risk associated with the issuer.

The risk-free reference rate is ideally the interest rate on the government security of similar maturity. The credit spread is the function of the credit rating of the issuer. For example, if a AAA-rated issuer wants to issue a 5-year maturity corporate bond, then the risk-free reference rate will be the rate for a 5-year government security (let’s say 5.7 percent). If the credit spread of the AAA-rated issuer is an additional 100 basis points (1 percent), then the bond will be issued with a fixed coupon of roughly 6.7 percent. Note that this rate will apply to all the future interest payments by the issuer until the bond matures even if the underlying risk-free rate changes. This means that the investor in this bond is taking the interest rate risk. The secondary market price of these bonds reacts to changes in the underlying interest rates – the bond prices fall if the risk-free interest rate increases and bond prices go up if the risk-free rate decreases.

In the case of a floating rate bond, the main components of determining the coupon remain the same—a reference rate and a credit risk premium. The crucial difference is that the reference rate is no longer fixed but changes over time. Hence, these bonds are referred to as ‘floating’. The coupon on these bonds clearly specifies the reference-floating rate.

If the bond in the example cited above were a floating rate bond, then the coupon on it will not be a fixed rate of 6.7 percent. Instead, it will be the rate on 5-year government security at the time of interest payment plus 1 percent. In other words, for a floating bond, the applicable interest is computed at the time of payment of interest. If the 5-year government security rate moves up by 0.5 percent in a year then the interest rate payable will become 7.2 percent. The investor in such a bond is more protected from interest rate risk and the prices of these bonds in the secondary market fluctuate much less with movements in interest rates.

In the last two months, floating rate bonds worth Rs 70 billion have been issued in the corporate bond market, almost entirely by private companies. Overall, bonds worth Rs 793 billion have been issued by the private sector including NBFCs. The floating rate bond issues in these two months thus represent around 10 percent of private sector bond issuance.

An interesting feature of these floaters issued in the last two months is that all of them have used the yield on 91-day treasury bills (T Bills) as the reference rate. Notwithstanding the fact that these corporate bonds have maturities ranging from 2 to 4 years, yields on dated government securities (i.e., G-Secs with maturity of more than 1 year) have not been used as a reference.

What might explain this sudden preference on the part of the issuers and investors for these floating bonds?

What might be going on?

One possibility could be a heightened perception of interest rate risk. Bond investors might be harbouring the belief that the interest rates on dated G-Secs are unlikely to remain at their current levels. As discussed earlier, issuing floating rate bonds is one way to mitigate interest rate risk. This raises the next question – why would the perception of interest rate risk suddenly go up now?

We conjecture that this could be a result of the manner in which the RBI has been managing interest rates in the government bond market. The Covid-19 pandemic presented the Indian economy with an unprecedented challenge. A combination of falling tax revenues and rising expenditure on account of fiscal stimulus resulted in a massive increase in the fiscal deficit of the government, and a corresponding rise in government borrowing from the bond market. In 2020-21 the consolidated government borrowing was a whopping Rs 21.5 trillion and the planned borrowing for 2021-22 is roughly Rs 19.6 trillion. The overall government debt to GDP ratio is roughly 90 percent, the highest ever.

The RBI on its part has taken multiple steps to ensure that interest rates are kept low in the bond market so that the government’s cost of borrowing remains under control. It has allowed several primary auctions of G-Secs to devolve on primary dealers and has even canceled auctions when it did not receive bids at rates that were low enough. In addition to its standard open market operations (OMOs), it initiated the Operation Twist program whose objective was to bring down interest rates at the long end of the yield curve and push up rates at the short end. This meant that the RBI was buying long-dated G-Secs and selling shorter maturity bonds.

In March 2021 the RBI launched a program called the G-SAP wherein for the first time it pre-committed to buying a specific amount of G-Secs. These bond market interventions are mostly aimed at capping the interest rate on the benchmark 10-year G-Sec at 6 percent. As a consequence of these actions, the RBI has ended up owning a substantial amount of the 10 year benchmark government bonds (link).

It is possible that bond investors believe that the RBI will not be able to suppress the interest rates for too long, and the rates will rise sharply and suddenly. This could be either because of the large volume of G-Secs the government needs to issue to finance its deficit or because of growing inflationary concerns in the Indian economy (CPI inflation has exceeded the upper limit of 6 percent of the RBI’s targeted inflation band in both May and June 2021), or because of external factors such as rising inflation in the US.

This is akin to a spring that has been forcefully compressed but can bounce back anytime. If the rates suddenly go up, holding fixed coupon bonds will lead to losses, as explained earlier. This increased risk perception might be one possible explanation as to why the investors now prefer floating rate bonds.

Arguably, another unintended consequence of the steps taken by the RBI to lower the long-term G-Sec yields and suppress the organic evolution of the yield curve in response to market forces may have been that the bond market participants have lost confidence in the yield curve.

In the past whenever inflation went up, 10-year G-Sec yields would also go up, implying a positive correlation between the two variables. The underlying idea is that rising inflation is usually followed by a tightening of the monetary policy stance which in turn leads to higher long term bond yields.

For instance, figure 1 below plots the 10-year G-Sec yield alongside CPI (consumer price index) inflation from 2004-05 to 2013-14. This was a period of high and rising inflation. CPI inflation went up from 3.8 percent in 2004-05 to more than 10 percent in 2012-13. Concomitantly, the 10- year rate went up from 6.6 percent in 2004-05 to more than 8 percent by 2012-13.

Figure 1: CPI Inflation and 10year G-Sec yield, 2004-05 to 2013-14

But recently this correlation seems to have broken down. We can see this clearly in figure 2, which plots the two series using monthly data, focusing on the period from March 2020 to June 2021. CPI inflation began rising from May 2020 onward. It consistently breached the 6 percent upper limit of the RBI’s targeted inflation band during the period April-October 2020, increasing from 5.8 percent in March to 7.6 percent in October. More recently it went up from 4.2 percent in April 2021 to 6.3 percent in June 2021.

Figure 2: CPI Inflation and 10year G-Sec yield, March 2020 to June 2021

However, this time around, rather than increasing, the 10-year G-Sec yield actually fell from 7.5 percent in April 2020 to 5.8 percent in May, since then holding more or less steady around 6 percent. These developments suggest that G-Sec rate might be distorted by the RBI’s interventions, which in turn might explain why some investors are turning to the T Bill rate as a preferred reference rate.

Other explanations are, of course, possible. The rise of floaters could also be a result of companies expecting interest rates to come down, in which case they would not want to issue long-term debt at higher rates. This however seems unlikely. Given that inflation continues to be a concern, interest rates are more likely to go up rather than down, and sooner or later RBI would need to start normalising the surplus liquidity situation that the financial system is currently in.

Alternatively, floaters could be issued if the private sector is tapping a new class of investors, who are interested in buying bonds but do not want to run any interest rate risk. But the issuers of and the investors in the floaters are exactly the same entities that were participating in fixed-rate bond transactions earlier.

Finally, it is also possible that the funding requirements of the NBFCs (the sole issuers of floating rate bonds right now) have undergone some changes which might have increased their preference for these bonds.

Conclusion

We are observing an interesting new development in the corporate bond market. The rise of floating rate bond issuances by private NBFCs, and the use of the 91day T Bill rate as the reference rate seem to indicate a change in the preferences on the part of both issuers and investors.

We conjecture that one reason that might explain this development is the intervention in the bond market by the RBI to control G-Sec yields. Specifically, it is possible that the RBI’s persistent interventions have caused some market participants to lose trust in the yield curve. This possibility needs to be explored further in the future.

If there has indeed been an erosion of credibility in the yield curve, then this would be a serious problem. The yield curve is a fundamental construct in a market economy, as it defines the interest rate structure that is used to price debt. As a result, if the yield curve is distorted, then interest rate risk is being mispriced. The associated misallocation of resources could prove to be costly, damaging the economy just as it struggles to recover from the Covid crisis.

Harsh Vardhan is Executive in Residence at the Center for Financial Studies (CFS) at the SP Jain Institute of Management and Research. Rajeswari Sengupta is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR). The authors thank Josh Felman and an anonymous referee for their useful suggestions.

How large is the payment delays problem in Indian public procurement?

by Pavithra Manivannan and Bhargavi Zaveri.

Payment delays are endemic in government contracts in India. Businesses generally factor payment delays into the price of public sector contracts. Measuring the size and extent of overall payment delays from the government to vendors and contractors has, however, been a challenge. In this article, we use a novel data-set put together from public sources to ascertain the size of the payment delays problem in Indian public procurement.

When a private entity delays contractual payments, the delay is factored into the price of the next vendor contract or the debt contracted by the private entity. This feedback loop naturally instills payment discipline by aligning the payer's incentives with maintaining payment discipline. This is harder to achieve for government contracts, as information about payment delays in public procurement is often sparse, difficult to discern from budgetary statements or missing altogether. The problem is compounded as the state procures goods, services and works at various levels and through various entities owned by it. Payment delays affect the working capital cycle of vendors of all sizes. However, payment delays have a particularly deleterious impact on Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), which often have limited access to formal financial systems to bridge their working capital requirements. Timely payments, therefore, are of crucial importance to MSMEs as they rely on their cash-flow cycle to fund their working capital requirements.

Payment delays in contracts with CPSEs

A significant proportion of overall central government procurement is undertaken by centrally owned public sector enterprises (CPSEs). Most CPSEs are incorporated as companies and many of them are listed. We use the information in the annual results of CPSEs as a proxy to ascertain the scale of payment delays in the public procurement undertaken by the central government. We study the balance sheet and annual reports of listed CPSEs for the last three financial years, 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20 ("study period").

We find that CPSEs had annual average outstanding trade payables of Rs.1.3 trillion as against an annual average procurement value of Rs.1.1 trillion, during our study period. This suggests that the annual average outstanding trade payables of CPSEs were about 18% higher than the annual average procurement undertaken by the CPSEs. We also find that when taken as a percentage of the value procured, CPSEs under some ministries, such as the Railway and Defence Ministries and Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, fare significantly worse than others. Further, we find that on an average, payments worth 8% of the total value procured from MSMEs are delayed for more than 45 days from their due date. Finally, we find that CPSEs demonstrate weak payment discipline towards all their vendors, and that the MSME vendors are not worse-off than the other vendors. This suggests that in the case of government contracts, the imbalance of the relative negotiating power of MSME vendors and non-MSME vendors has limited impact on the behaviour of the payer.

Our work demonstrates the potential to develop an ongoing system to measure payment discipline in public procurement, which could then act as a feedback loop for pricing vendor contracts when dealing with CPSEs and the government departments to which they are aligned.

Data and methodology

Our analysis is based on a hand collected data-set put together from the following two public sources of data:

1. the MSME Sambandh portal set up by the the Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise in 2017, to monitor the implementation of the Public Procurement Policy, 2012;
2. Annual reports and annual balance sheets published by CPSEs.

Our data-set consists of firm level information about CPSEs, such as the year of their incorporation, listing date, industry classification, variables indicative of their financial health and the procurement undertaken by them. We augment the data-set with information on payments delayed by CPSEs to MSME suppliers beyond 45 days from the date on which such payments became due (hereafter, "delayed payments"). The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Act, 2006 (MSME Act)requires all companies that procure goods, services and works from micro, small and medium enterprises to disclose such payments in their annual report in the prescribed format.

Our data-set covers this information for 57 listed CPSEs. We collect the data for these CPSEs for three financial years beginning with the year in which the MSME Sambandh Portal was set up. This gives us data for the financial years, 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20, which is our study period.

These 57 CPSEs are spread across 17 departments or ministries of the Central Government, with the largest number concentrated under the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (19.3%), followed by the Ministry of Power (10.53%) and the Ministry of Steel (8.77%). The CPSEs in our data-set are spread across 34 industries, as per the National Industrial Classification (NIC) scheme prescribed by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI). CPSEs in the business of 'electricity, gas, stem and hot water supply' account for the largest group (12.28%) followed by CPSEs engaged in the business of manufacturing coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (8.77%).

Each CPSE reports a target procurement value at the beginning of the financial year and the actual procurement value at the end of the financial year, on the MSME Sambandh portal. Table 1 shows the aggregate value of goods, services and works targeted and actually procured by the CPSEs in our data-set across different government departments.

Table 1: Procurement by CPSEs

	No. of CPSEs	Target (Rs. crore)	Actual (Rs. crore)
Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals	2	371.66	308.38
Department of Commerce	2	17.28	18.3
Department of Defense Production	3	1963.33	2880.47
Department of Fertilisers	4	2547.34	2641.74
Department of Heavy Industry	4	16392.1	15209.25
Department of Telecommunications	2	0	0
Ministry of Coal	2	5977.39	1774.82
Ministry of Defense	3	5838.79	7066.05
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs	2	12.61	12.67
Ministry of Mines	2	2573	7132.09
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas	11	52175.63	63849.08
Ministry of Power	6	6142.97	6608.55
Ministry of Railways	4	395.07	429.31
Ministry of Science and Technology	1	38	17.49
Ministry of Shipping	3	1725.67	1321.45
Ministry of Steel	5	4556.4	5356.22
Ministry of Tourism	1	125.07	34.85

The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas is the largest procurer in our data-set, both in terms of the number of CPSEs and the value of goods, services and works procured by them. Table 1 also shows that a majority of the CPSEs have procured more than their annual targeted value. We observe this to be true across all the three financial years comprised in our study period.

Findings: CPSEs' outstanding dues

Trade payable are a rough proxy of the amounts due from a firm to vendors and service providers. We use the data on outstanding trade payable from the balance sheets of CPSEs as an estimate of payment delays in public procurement. Table 2 shows the three-year annual average outstanding trade payable due from the CPSEs in our data-set. The second column indicates the corresponding annual average value of procurement undertaken by these CPSEs, and the last column indicates the average outstanding trade payable as a percentage of the average annual procurement undertaken by the CPSEs.

Table 2: Average outstanding trade payable and procurement value

	Procurement value (Rs. crore)	Outstanding payable (Rs. crore)	Payable/ procurement (percent)
Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals	308.38	106.11	34.41
Department of Commerce	18.3	1119.66	6118.36
Department of Defense Production	2880.47	3449.92	119.77
Department of Fertilizers	2641.74	1971.93	74.65
Department of Heavy Industry	15209.25	10297.54	67.71
Department of Telecommunications	0.00	2313.67	0.00
Ministry of Coal	1774.82	1898.59	106.97
Ministry of Defense	7066.05	3031.90	42.91
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs	12.67	2709.40	21384.37
Ministry of Mines	7132.09	1227.54	17.21
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas	63849.08	82830.09	129.73
Ministry of Power	6608.55	7907.65	119.66
Ministry of Railways	429.31	1243.77	289.71
Ministry of Science and Technology	17.49	29.38	167.98
Ministry of Shipping	1321.45	1562.02	118.21
Ministry of Steel	5356.22	8739.99	163.17
Ministry of Tourism	34.85	58.94	169.12
Total	114660.72	130498.11	113.81

While the procurement value of a given financial year does not necessarily mean that the entire value of the contract becomes payable in the same financial year as the procurement contract may span across multiple years, the three year average numbers in Table 3, however, show a systemic break-down in the payment discipline of CPSEs. We speculate that these trade payable would have aggregated over time, and do not necessarily pertain entirely to the study period.

We then look at three departments/ ministries that account for the largest procurement by value in our data-set, to investigate the differences in the payment behaviour of CPSEs towards MSMEs and non-MSME vendors (Table 3). The CPSEs in these three departments also account for nearly 75% of the total outstanding trade payable of all the CPSEs in our data-set.

Table 3: Outstanding trade payable of CPSEs (as percent of value procured)

	2017-18		2018-19		2019-20		Total
	Non-MSME	MSME	Non-MSME	MSME	Non-MSME	MSME	Non-MSME	MSME
Department of Heavy Industry	84.02	7.87	80.87	15.82	110.63	11.81	88.89	12.22
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas	182.65	7.60	187.97	3.56	143.05	4.13	171.49	4.32
Ministry of Power	116.44	14.90	161.54	15.35	292.02	21.73	175.63	17.46

In each of the three cases, the proportion of total outstanding trade payable to the value procured by the CPSEs during the study period is much higher for non-MSMEs than MSMEs. In the case of the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas and the Ministry of Steel, the proportion of outstanding trade payable to non-MSME vendors exceeds 100% of the value procured, on an aggregate basis across the three years. Compared to non-MSME vendors, this proportion is significantly lower for MSME vendors (the highest being 21%).

Findings: Delayed payments by CPSEs to MSME suppliers

The final leg of our measurement involves estimating the 'delayed payments' by CPSEs to MSMEs, that is, payments delayed beyond 45 days from their due date. We aggregate the delayed payments outstanding as at year-end, by CPSEs to MSMEs, government department wise. Table 4 shows the delayed payments as a percentage of their annual procurement value from MSMEs.

Table 4: Delayed payments as percentage of procurement

	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	Average
Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals	6.22	11.73	11.84	10.46
Department of Commerce	0.86	47.38	1.08	17.47
Department of Defense Production	5.82	3.35	5.44	4.78
Department of Fertilizers	7.58	5.25	4.82	5.38
Department of Heavy Industry	7.91	15.92	12.11	12.37
Department of Telecommunications	0	0	0	0
Ministry of Coal	9.11	5.42	8.47	7.19
Ministry of Defense	3.55	3.20	3.98	3.56
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs	6.72	4.86	5.49	5.70
Ministry of Mines	2.79	1.51	2.85	2.37
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas	4.12	4.80	6.18	5.25
Ministry of Power	24.95	25.33	31.87	27.51
Ministry of Railways	11.03	20.58	11.02	13.62
Ministry of Science and Technology	0	0	0	0
Ministry of Shipping	14.36	3.47	2.94	5.62
Ministry of Steel	4.84	10.18	4.81	6.18
Ministry of Tourism	0	0	21.13	21.13
Total	7.36	8.06	8.70	8.16

We find that the delayed payments by CPSEs to MSMEs average at about 8% of the actual value of goods, services and works procured by them from MSMEs during the study period. This percentage has marginally increased from 2017-2018, and is higher than the average in 2019-20.

Conclusion

In this article, we take a sector-agnostic approach to measure the scale of the payment delays problem in public procurement in India. An analysis of the annual returns and balance sheets of CPSEs gives us new insights on the scale of the problem at three levels, namely, at the level of the CPSE, the industry and the government department to which the CPSE is aligned.

Our analysis provides evidence of the popular perception of CPSEs' weak payment discipline to vendors. Taken as a percentage of the average procurement undertaken by CPSEs, the payment delays by CPSEs to their vendors far exceeds their procurement values. Second, while CPSEs demonstrate weak payment discipline to both MSME and non-MSME vendors, the delay seems to be much larger towards large vendors than the small ones. Third, the delayed payments reporting requirements mandated under the MSME Act provides us an illustrative picture on the payment discipline of the CPSEs. For two out of three years of our study period, we notice that the total delayed payments to MSMEs is higher than the three-years average (Rs. 2323.42 crores).

Our approach of understanding payment delays in public procurement in India, through balance sheets of CPSEs demonstrates the possibility of setting up ongoing systems for the measurement of payment discipline of government departments through CPSEs aligned to them. Further, these delays may be indicative of either of liquidity mismatches or solvency issues, at the CPSE, or a mix of both. By approaching this problem from a balance sheet perspective, our study lays the foundation for conducting future work on the possible relationship between the financial health of the procurers and their payment discipline.

The authors are researchers at the CMI-Finance Research Group and thank Susan Thomas for valuable discussions.

The Indian corporate bond market: From the IL&FS default to the pandemic

by Rajeswari Sengupta and Harsh Vardhan.

The banking sector is the most important financial intermediary in India's debt market. Over the last few years the bond market has emerged as an alternative to the banking sector especially for the top rated firms. This trend has been pronounced ever since the banking sector started reporting high levels of non performing assets. Figure 1 below shows the flow of commercial credit in India from various sources and highlights the growing relative importance of bond issuance especially from 2015 onwards.

The bond market has faced two big shocks in recent years: (i) the default by IL&FS (Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited) in September 2018, followed by other relatively low-impact shocks due to problems in companies such as DHFL (Dewan Housing and Finance Limited) and IndiaBulls Housing Finance as well as Yes Bank, and (ii) the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in India since March 2020. As a result of these shocks the risk perceptions in the bond market have gone up. In this article, we take a look at changes in the risk perceptions in the corporate bond market especially in the ongoing context of the pandemic and ensuing economic slowdown. We also highlight the asymmetry in the risk perceptions of the markets towards private sector corporate bonds vis-a-vis public sector unit (PSU) bonds and discuss the likely implications of changes in the risk perceptions, for the future funding model of non-banking finance companies (NBFCs).

Figure 1: Flow of Commercial Credit in India (Source: RBI)

Measuring risk perception

The most important metric for assessing risk perception in the bond market is the credit spread which is the difference between the yield of a corporate bond and of a government security of comparable maturity. Highly rated bonds (with ratings of AAA and AA) are traded relatively actively and their yields reflect changing perceptions of investors regarding the riskiness of these bonds. Movement over time of credit spreads on corporate bonds is therefore a good indicator of the bond market's perception of risk.

We look at the credit spreads of AAA rated bonds of 3 years and 5 years maturity from April 2018 to June 2020. The data is sourced from Bloomberg. The bonds in our data are separated into 3 categories - NBFCs (non-banking finance companies) and HFCs (housing finance companies), private corporations and public sector undertakings (PSUs), which may include public sector NBFCs such as Power Finance Corporation (PFC) and Rural Electrification Corporation (REC). The figures 2 and 3 below show the evolution of credit spreads for these three categories of bonds for the two specific maturities.

The IL&FS default

Figure 2: Credit Spreads on 5 Year AAA Paper (Source: Bloomberg)

As we see from figure 2 above, prior to September 2018, the credit spreads on the NBFC, private corporate and PSU bonds were fairly stable, between 50 and 100 basis points for the 3 year paper and between 40 and 60 basis points for the 5 year paper. In the rest of our discussion we focus on the credit spreads on the 5 year paper. The pattern is more or less the same for the 3 year paper, only the absolute levels of credit spreads are different.

Figure 2 shows that credit spreads on NBFC AAA paper of 5 year maturity nearly doubled between September 2018 and November 2018 and reached 160 basis points by February 2019. This shows that the IL&FS episode that unfolded in the 3rd week of September significantly enhanced the risk perception of the bond market regarding all top rated NBFCs.

After a small dip, the spreads went back to around 140-150 basis points by July 2019 and stayed at this high level, with some fluctuations, till November 2019. During this period, crisis in other NBFCs (such as the Dewan Housing and Finance Limited (DHFL)) as well as in Yes bank, added to the overall risk perception of the bond market. This is reflected in the credit spreads remaining high one year after the IL&FS default.

Private corporate and PSU bonds' credit spreads also widened in the aftermath of the IL&FS default, but not by the same magnitude as the NBFCs. The IL&FS default triggered a liquidity crunch primarily for the NBFC sector. The corporate sector experienced spill over effects owing to a rise in risk aversion in the bond market.

While in the pre IL&FS default period the spreads of all three categories of bonds were closely bunched together, the difference between them began increasing from October 2018 onwards. The difference was particularly acute between the NBFC and private corporate bond spreads on one hand and the PSU bond spreads on the other hand especially in the second half of 2019. This is despite the fact that these bonds were all rated AAA. This reflects the implicit government guarantee enjoyed by the PSU bonds.

The government and the RBI took several actions to deal with the ensuing crisis in the NBFC sector. Government appointed a new Board for IL&FS. RBI took several steps including open market operations to inject liquidity into the system, reducing the risk weights on bank lending to NBFCs, instructing banks to disburse sanctioned but undisbursed credit to NBFCs etc.

These eventually resulted in enhanced credit flow to the NBFCs which reduced the credit spreads in the later part of 2019. For both NBFCs and private corporate sector, the spreads declined by about 50 basis points to settle at about 100 and 50 basis points respectively. These spreads, especially for the NBFCs, were still higher than pre-IL&FS episode but much lower than their peak. We see a similar dynamic with the 3 year maturity bonds as well as shown in figure 3 below, except the absolute levels of the spreads were different.

Figure 3: Credit Spreads on 3 Year AAA Paper (Source: Bloomberg)

The Covid-19 outbreak

Just as the bond market was recovering from the shock of IL&FS default followed by crises in DHFL and Yes bank, the Indian economy got hit by another massive shock in the form of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Credit spreads in the bond market began rising sharply from the middle of March once again reflecting growing risk perceptions. Figure 2 shows the increase in the spreads around the time when the nationwide lockdown was announced on 24 March.

For both NBFC and corporate bonds, the spreads rose by about 30-40 basis points between February 2020 and April 2020. For both categories of bonds the credit spreads reached their peak in the first half of May, close to 180 basis points for NBFCs and 170 basis points for the corporate bonds. The peak of the credit spreads during the pandemic has so far been higher than the peak reached in the aftermath of the IL&FS default episode.

Spreads on PSU paper also went up, but by a smaller amount. The average spread on these bonds in March and April was only 30-35 basis points. The difference between the credit spreads on NBFC and corporate bonds on one hand and PSU bonds on the other widened significantly to about 100 basis points. The large gap in spreads for bonds of the same ratings is worth noting. Similar to the post-IL&FS period, this too is a reflection of the market's perception of implicit government guarantee to the public sector units.

The impact of policy actions on credit spreads

The sharp rise in credit spreads of NBFC and corporate bonds in April 2020 could be attributed to the announcement by the RBI to grant moratorium on loan repayments for all borrowers in order to alleviate the financial stress triggered by the pandemic and the lockdown. Following this announcement, NBFCs had to offer moratorium to their borrowers but at the time it was not clear whether they themselves would also receive a moratorium from banks on their repayment obligations.

In the second half of May, the government announced a package to boost the economy. This included Rs 20 lakh crore of 'benefits' and effectively entailed an outlay of around Rs 3 lakh crore for 2020-21. RBI also adopted several policy initiatives such as cutting the policy interest rates aggressively and establishing new long term targeted repo operations (T-LTRO) that would provide 3 year funding to banks under a repo arrangement. RBI made the repo arrangement `targeted' so as to ensure that the funds raised by the banks were made available to the NBFCs.

These policy actions increased the credit supply to all issuers. Consequently, by the 3rd week of June, the credit spreads on both NBFC and corporate bonds came down from their respective peak levels of mid May by about 50 basis points.

However, the RBI and government actions notwithstanding, the credit spreads for NBFCs and private corporate sector continue to be substantially high. In fact the spreads in June 2020 were similar to the spreads in December 2018 in the aftermath of the IL&FS default. For PSUs the spreads have come down to around the same levels that prevailed before the IL&FS crisis.

This shows that the bond market remains concerned about the riskiness of the corporate sector and the NBFCs. PSUs on the other hand, benefit from implicit government guarantee. The significantly lower credit spreads they are experiencing in the time of the pandemic reflect a `flight to safety' by the bond investors.

Credit spreads and funding costs

As we interpret the bond market data, it is important to understand the difference between credit spreads and funding costs. Credit spreads going up does not necessarily mean that the cost of funding for the issuer is going up. Cost of funding for a company that raises capital in the debt market depends on the market determined yield on the security it issues This yield on debt consists of two components: risk free rate and credit spreads. RBI's monetary policy impacts the risk free rate but not the credit spreads. Credit spreads reflect the premium that the investor charges over and above the risk free rate, taking into account the inherent riskiness of the underlying bond.

Since the IL&FS episode, the risk free rate has been coming down steadily due to the actions by the RBI such as reduction in the policy interest rates (repo and reverse repo rate) and large scale open market operations to inject liquidity in the financial system. Figure 4 below depicts the yield on 5 year and 3 year government securities from the April 2018 to June 2020 period.

Figure 4: Government Securities Yield

The 5 year risk free interest rate has come down from about 8.4% in September 2018 (before the IL&FS episode) to about 5.5% in June 2020 indicating a decline of 300 basis points. The 3 year risk free interest rate has declined even more to about 4.5% over this period, a decline of nearly 350 basis points.

Since RBI's monetary policy does not affect the credit spreads, the impact of policy action on the actual cost of funding will not be the same as the reduction in the risk free rate. If risk aversion in the market goes up, then investors will demand higher price for the credit risk which will result in rising credit spreads. Thus, the net cost of funding for an issuer may decline to a lower extent compared to the reduction in the policy rates.

This is what has been happening since the IL&FS episode. Risk free rate has been declining but owing to high risk aversion, credit spreads have remained elevated. As a result, funding costs of companies have not come down by as much as the risk free rate. This implies that in an environment of high and rising risk perception such as the ongoing Covid-19 period, the effectiveness of policy rate cuts will be constrained.

The widening gap between the credit spreads on PSU debt versus private sector points to lower risk perception for PSU entities which are perceived to have implicit sovereign guarantees. The combined effects of rising risk perception, widening gap between credit spreads of identically rated issuances and reduction in the policy interest rates would mean that the debt market will skew towards government owned issuers who might experience the greatest reduction in funding cost.

Conclusion

Bond market credit spreads provide important information about the risk perception of an important class of investors. Sustained high credit spreads (compared to long term average levels) suggest elevated risk perception and imply heightened risk aversion. Specifically, it also points to the role that individual episodes of corporate defaults and the associated policy responses (or lack thereof) play in shaping risk perceptions.

Wide spreads between bonds of the same ratings issued by private companies and those owned by the government clearly indicates a strong perception of the implicit government guarantee enjoyed by public sector companies. This raises important questions as to whether the debt of government owned companies should be treated as a part of government's debt.

Finally, economic recovery in India in the post Covid-19 period will depend crucially on the flow of credit in the economy. The economic package recently announced by the government depends largely on the financial sector. Nearly 70% of the 'benefits' of Rs 20 lakh crore in the package are expected to be routed through the financial sector. In a recent article we discussed the rise in risk aversion in the banking sector. With both the banks and the bonds markets showing high levels of risk aversion, growth of credit may be less than envisaged in the package. This may dilute the overall effectiveness of government's monetary and fiscal policy actions.

Harsh Vardhan is an Executive-in-Residence at the Center for Financial Studies and an Adjunct Faculty at the SP Jain Institute of Management and Research, Mumbai. Rajeswari Sengupta is an Assistant Professor of Economics at IGIDR, Mumbai.

Holding their breath: Indian firms in an interruption of revenue

by Renuka Sane and Anjali Sharma

India is in a state of lockdown with only essential goods and services getting exemption. This has given a teachable moment on the role of liquid cash in corporate financial policy.

Most firms will see a varying degree of a revenue shock. Expenses such as salaries, rents and interest on debt will continue to be incurred in order to survive. In this article we ask: How many days of liquidity cover is there, in the large non-financial firms, to be able to meet a certain threshold of minimum expenses in the absence of any revenue?

Data

We extract data for all non-financial firms from the CMIE ProwessDX database, updated in December 2019, for three years: 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19. Data on 2018-19 is not yet available for a large proportion of the firms. For most firms, therefore, we rely on the two older years of data.

We drop firms that report negative assets, negative income and negative sales. This yields a sample of 16,300 firms which are observed in the first two, and possibly in the third, year. For each of these firms we extract information from the database on: (1) identity variables such as age, industry, listing status and ownership, (2) income and expenses from the profit and loss statement, and (3) liquid assets i.e. cash and bank balance and marketable securities from the balance sheet.

We do not know the state of the firm in March 2020, when the lockdown came. We estimate the state of the firm using the mean of two or three years seen in the data (depending on data availability). The recent three years have been a period of stability of the nominal values, i.e. low growth, thus making these simple averages more useful.

Assumptions

We make four admittedly extreme assumptions:

1. A 100% sales shock for all non-financial firms. This is an extreme scenario. Most firms will face some degree of sales decline which may vary by the sector the firm is in. However, our assumption gives us a worst case picture for the hurdle that cash holdings will have to overcome.
   
   
2. Liquid assets only include cash and marketable securities. We do not include loans from the banking sector or receivables for the following reasons:
   
   
   • Indian firms are generally credit constrained. In the months prior to the lockdown, banks and non-bank finance companies (NBFCs), which are the mainstay of lending in the economy, were already under considerable stress. Their overall lending, and especially their lending to firms had stagnated, with negative consequences for liquidity in the credit markets. Looking forward, many firms will find it difficult to obtain debt capital, given the difficulties of the financial system. Hence, it's useful to analyse how liquid assets -- alone -- may carry some firms across the shock.
     
     
   • Our rationale for not including receivables is the suddenness of the lockdown. If firms had any notice that a lockdown was imminent, they would have made efforts to accelerate their receivables collection. But since the lockdown was announced and put in force with no notice, we assume that firms were not able to engage in this strategy.
     
     
3. A 50% realisation of the value of marketable securities in the book. Market conditions are also affected by the lockdown; the price and impact cost of marketable securities has deteriorated. The vast majority of liquid assets is cash, therefore the results are not very sensitive to this assumption.
   
   
4. The core expenses required to stay alive. We define the core expenses as: (1) salaries for employees and outsourced staff, (2) rentals, (3) utility costs, (4) other costs such as IT and communication expenses, insurance premiums and auditors fees, and (5) interest costs on debt.
   All firms are looking at ways to reduce the wage expenditure, by cutting wages and headcounts [example]. Our calculation deals with the outer extreme: a firm that makes no adjustment to its wage expenditure.
   Similarly, some firms may be able to contractually avoid paying rentals expenses using the force majeure clause, which also entails legal risk. We assume there are no gains on this score.
   For costs such as utilities and repair and maintenance we assume the expenditure will be 60% of the regular expenses, as these expenses will be lower in the absence of regular operations.
   On interest expenses, individual banks may choose to provide relief in terms of a moratorium on interest payment after the RBI circular on the same. But since this is still a decision that banks have to take, it is useful to understand the ability of firms to cover these expenses using their liquid assets. We do two cases: including and excluding interest costs.
   
   

Methodology

We compute the following variables:

• Liquid assets (LA) = Cash and bank balance + (Marketable securities)*0.5. Liquid assets are 5% of firms' total assets in India, and cash and bank balance accounts for 99.3% of total liquid assets.
  
• Minimum Costs 1 (MC1) = Employee salaries, PF and gratuity + Outsourced staff cost + (Power and water charges)*0.6 + (Repair and maintenance)*0.6 + Lease and rentals + IT and communication costs + Insurance premiums + Auditors fees + Rates and taxes + Financial services expenses including interest cost. In the dataset, the share of these elements is as follows:
  
  
  • Employee salaries: 43%
    
  • Outsourced staff: 12%
    
  • Interest cost: 20%
    
  • Financial service expenses: 4%
    
  • Rest of the expenses: 22%
    
  
  MC1 is 21% of firms' overall cash expenses excluding direct taxes (cash expenses exclude non-cash items such as depreciation and provisions).
• Minimum Costs 2 (MC2) = MC1 - Interest costs. MC2 is 80% of MC1.
• R1: days cover of liquid assets assuming the cost is MC1 = (LA*365)/MC1
  
• R2: days cover of liquid assets assuming the cost is MC2 = (LA*365)/MC2

Results

Figure 1: The fraction of firms that cannot hold their breath for a given number of days

Figure 1 shows the fraction of firms where the liquid assets are not able to pay for a given number of days of zero revenue, going by two definitions of minimum cost (i.e. including or excluding interest payments).

We see that 2.7% of the firms do not have liquid assets to meet MC1 for even 1 day. There are 29.8% (4,870 firms) that have 30 days or less of liquidity cover for MC1 and 54.8% (8,927 firms) that have 90 days or less of liquidity cover for MC1. These firms will be the ones most affected by the current lockdown and any future extension to it.

If we put interest expenses aside, thus assuming that all firms are able to obtain an interest payment moratorium, the results change slightly. Now, 2.3% of firms do not have liquid assets to meet MC2 even for 1 day. Now, 23.4% (3,799 firms) have 30 days or less of liquidity cover for MC2 and 47.5% (7,674 firms) have 90 days or less of liquidity cover for MC2.

Who are the firms who are vulnerable on account of low cash holdings?

Our sample of 16,300 firms has an asset base of around Rs. 164 trillion and annual sales of Rs. 107 trillion. The 8,927 firms which we identify as vulnerable (3 months or less of liquid assets for MC1) account for nearly 60% of the overall sales and total assets.

Around 19% of these are large firms (assets > Rs.5 billion), 27% are medium sized firms (assets between Rs.1 billion and Rs.5 billion) and 53% are small firms (assets less than Rs.1 billion). While the large firms may be able to solve their liquidity challenges by accessing credit, the medium and small sized firms will find it harder, given the weaknesses of the financial system.

Around 2,300 of these are listed firms, which is nearly half of all the listed firms in the country.

About 79% of these firms are old firms, that is they have been in existence for more than 10 years.

These firms are spread across many industries: manufacturing (43%), services (28%), trading (14%) and construction and infrastructure (8%).

Conclusion

Our calculation is admittedly based on extreme assumptions: Zero decline in wage expenditure, zero access to fresh credit, and zero revenues for a certain number of days. More than half of the Indian corporate non-financial balance sheet is unable to hold its breath for 90 days, under these assumptions. About a quarter of the firms will not be able to handle a 30 day interruption of revenues. This highlights the incompatibility of a zero decline in wage expenditure with a sustained period of zero revenue and no fresh borrowing.



The authors are with NIPFP and Finance Research Group respectively. Views are personal. We thank Josh Felman, Radhika Pandey, Ajay Shah, Pramod Sinha, and Harsh Vardhan for useful comments.