Establishing the baseline for the Kollam district court reform

by Siddarth Raman.

An important milestone in Indian legal system reform has been underway in Kollam district for the last year. The High Court of Kerala has launched a court for cheque dishonour cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as its first pilot in the 24x7 ONCourts initiative. PUCAR - of which XKDR Forum is a part - is a knowledge partner to the High Court of Kerala in this.

24x7 ONCourts aims to make the litigant experience efficient, predictable and seamless. Before assessing the intervention's impact, we need a baseline. We estimate five measures of court performance using a random sample of 100 disposed cases filed in 2015-2024. In Kollam, the median case takes 609 days over 12 hearings. Only 19% of hearings are substantive. The first substantive hearing occurs after 240 days. The gap between hearings is 61 days. Stage-wise analysis shows that the most time is spent in getting the litigants to court, and most cases do not reach trial. We compute the same metrics for Thrissur to enable future difference-in-differences analysis.

Motivation

Changing a system is hard. Public policy interventions in India are often guided by conjecture, anecdote and assumption. Too many reforms fail because they are not grounded in data, and their outcomes are not measured. A data-driven process with clear hypotheses on the problem, the solution and the expected outcomes, backed by rigorous measurement and empirical evidence, is needed to distinguish success from failure.

Early in the 24x7 ONCourts journey, we planned for continuous assessment. The first step is to establish a baseline. It fixes the pre-intervention state so later changes can be attributed to the intervention rather than unrelated trends. Publishing a compact, replicable baseline also lets other researchers repeat the measurement after go-live and compare the site of implementation against unaffected locations.

Approach to measurement

Courts and court processes should be judged by their impact on litigants; they are the central stakeholders in the system. In this, there are two types of measures one can develop. There are coarse black-box metrics that give a broad picture of outcomes - like the time to disposal. Alongside this, there can be fine-grained process metrics like the time taken to make payments, extent of delay attributable to postal services or police processes, or the time taken by an accused person to file for bail. These are necessary for continuous improvement of processes. Existing court systems do not capture or publish this type of process data.

We use coarse metrics for our baseline, relying purely on public data, so that anyone can reproduce the numbers without privileged access to court systems. As courts modernize and publish more data in the public domain, we may be able to develop more sophisticated metrics.

Using this approach, we pick five measures of court performance:

1. Time to disposal is the number of days from filing to the court's final order.
2. Hearings to disposal is the number of hearings a case goes through before it ends.
3. The share of substantive hearings is the fraction of hearings that move the case forward towards resolution. For instance, a hearing where the judge is on leave or a summons is re-issued is non-substantive; hearings where evidence is recorded or arguments are heard count as substantive.
4. Time to the first substantive hearing is the wait before meaningful progress begins.
5. Time between hearings is the within-case median gap between consecutive hearings. Lower the time, quicker the next hearing. The inter-quartile range (IQR) across cases is a measure of scheduling predictability. A lower IQR implies less variation in the time between hearings across cases.

A more detailed discussion of these measures and how to use them in evaluating court reforms is available here.

We conducted data collection and analysis in November 2024. Our approach, methodology and data are public, so that others can repeat the measurement for different samples, periods, or districts using e-Courts records.

Methodology

This article reports the pre-reform numerical values for Kollam, using a simple empirical strategy. We construct a baseline for Kollam before the 24x7 ONCourts intervention and compare it with Thrissur, which serves as the control district for future difference-in-differences analysis. We selected Thrissur as the control district after eliminating regions with existing special NI courts. Thrissur mirrors Kollam in judicial capacity (approx. 2,500-2,900 pending cases per judge), economic activity (GDVA per capita ratio of 0.9), and administrative composition (both have municipal corporations).

While Thrissur shares structural similarities with Kollam, direct cross-sectional comparisons of absolute performance levels between the two districts are methodologically unsound. Districts differ in idiosyncratic ways that are difficult to quantify -caseload volume, caseload mix, allocation rules. Consequently, our evaluation strategy avoids asking 'Is Kollam faster than Thrissur?' Instead, we focus on within-district changes over time.

We draw a random sample of 100 disposed Section 138 matters filed in 2015–2024 from Kollam and Thrissur using the public e-Courts database. Cheque dishonour cases are filed before the magistrate's court. In Kerala, these are filed as private complaints (criminal miscellaneous petitions) before becoming criminal cases. For each case, we reconstruct the case lifecycle from hearing dates and order text, tagging hearings by stage and classifying them as substantive or non-substantive.

For the baseline, we report medians and means. Medians describe the typical case; means indicate the influence of long tails. By sampling only disposed cases, we measure the speed of the 'successful' cohort. We acknowledge this introduces survival bias: this metric underestimates the time for difficult cases still stuck in pendency. We aim to address this in future work by using survival analysis to estimate the time to disposal for ongoing cases.

Results

The tables below report the pre-reform baseline values for Kollam and, for comparison, Thrissur. They describe how long cases took, how many hearings they required, and how much of that time and effort was substantive.

1. Time to Disposal (days)

   District	Median	Mean
   Kollam	609	782
   Thrissur	792	1003

2. Hearings to disposal

   District	Median	Mean
   Kollam	12	15
   Thrissur	7	10

3. Share of Substantive Hearings

   District	Median	Mean
   Kollam	19%	26%
   Thrissur	25%	28%

   Note: The dataset spans 2015-2024; COVID-19 lockdowns (2020-2021) introduce exogenous shocks to the metric; it has not been adjusted for here.

4. Time to First Substantive Hearing

   District	Median	Mean
   Kollam	240	446
   Thrissur	276	447

   Note: Changes in procedure resulting from the shift from Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) to the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) may affect this metric.

5. Time Between Hearings

   District	Median	Mean	IQR
   Kollam	61	74	48
   Thrissur	123	121	62

Stage-wise Analysis

We analyse how time and hearings are distributed across case stages, as part of understanding the pre-reform baseline. In S138 cases, the case trajectory is:

• A complainant files a case.
• Post scrutiny and error correction, the case is registered as a miscellaneous petition.
• The judge takes cognizance and the case is now a criminal case.
• On cognizance, a summons is issued to the accused, followed by warrants and other methods to compel appearance of the accused.
• On appearance, the accused pleads not guilty and takes bail.
• Trial follows with evidence and arguments.
• The court delivers a judgement.

Not all cases go through all stages. For cases that reach each stage, we compute the median and mean time and hearings spent at that stage.

Kollam	Time		Hearings		Cases
	Median	Mean	Median	Mean
Filing - Registration	0	4	-	-	99*
Cognizance	149	268	2	4	63
Appearance	312	533	5	7	74
Trial	337	454	11	15	41
Judgement	27	38	1	1	100

Note: *An error on e-Courts for one case reports the registration before the filing, which has been excluded.

Thrissur	Time		Hearings		Cases
	Median	Mean	Median	Mean
Filing - Registration	0	1	-	-	100
Cognizance	235	317	2	2	52
Appearance	721	878	5	8	81
Trial	335	451	8	12	13
Judgement	42	69	1	1	100

In both districts, getting the litigants to court takes the most time. We also observe that most cases do not reach trial. This reaffirms earlier observations in other district courts.

Way Forward

24x7 ONCourts has been running for about a year. It is too early to compare outcomes - only a fifth of cases filed have been disposed. But this benchmark will enable comparison when the court reaches its full load. We aim to track the court through this journey and continue to share updates on the court's performance.

We will continue to refine our methodology. The baseline analysis provides simple statistics from a set of 100 disposed cases. This suffers from the problem of censoring. We are only observing cases where the event of interest has occurred and we do not take into account ongoing cases. In systems like the court, where pendency is common, we should be using methods like survival analysis to account for ongoing cases. Other methods like time series analysis could identify trends. With Thrissur as a control, a difference-in-differences design can attribute average changes to the 24x7 ONCourts intervention. The present benchmark is the starting point; as post-intervention data accumulate, we can apply more demanding econometric checks using these tools.

Data and metrics form the backbone of evidence-based reform. The 24x7 ONCourts dashboard reports case statistics on a public dashboard in near real-time. This openness to measurement and public accountability sets a precedent for judicial reform initiatives across India. Public reporting supports continuous monitoring, mid-course correction and iterative refinement. A steady flow of transparent data, paired with simple, repeatable measures, is the practical route to learning what works.

References

24x7 ONCourts website.

Vision, ONCourts 24x7.

Evolution and Implementation of the 24x7 ONCourts: A Journey of Innovation Through Collaboration, PUCAR, 2024.

In Service of the Republic: The art and science of public policy, Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah, Penguin Allen Lane, 2022.

Approach to evaluate court reforms, Siddarth Raman, Seminar #9 of the series 'Indian Legal System Reform' by XKDR Forum, 2024.

Evaluating contract enforcement by courts in India: a litigant's lens, Pavithra Manivannan, Susan Thomas, and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah, XKDR Working Paper No. 16, 2022.

How substantial are non-substantive hearings in Indian courts: some estimates from Bombay, Pavithra Manivannan, Karthik Suresh, Susan Thomas, and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah, The Leap Blog, 6 December 2023.

Get them to the court on time: bumps in the road to justice, Mugdha Mohapatra, Siddarth Raman, and Susan Thomas, The Leap Blog, 12 June 2025.

Understanding Judicial Delays in Debt Tribunals, Prasanth Regy and Shubho Roy, Working Paper 195, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, 2017.

Making courts transparent: What every litigant should know before filing a case, Pavithra Manivannan, Siddarth Raman, Gokul Sunoj, and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah, Bar and Bench, 2025.

A litigant's guide to courts: How efficient is your court?, Pavithra Manivannan, Siddarth Raman, Gokul Sunoj, and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah, Bar and Bench, 2025.

A litigant's guide to courts: Understanding predictability in India's courts, Pavithra Manivannan, Siddarth Raman, Gokul Sunoj, and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah, Bar and Bench, 2025.

A litigant's guide to courts: Towards a more measurable future, Pavithra Manivannan, Siddarth Raman, Gokul Sunoj, and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah, Bar and Bench, 2025.

The Long Road to Change, Ajay Shah and Amit Varma, Episode #36 of the podcast 'Everything is Everything', 1 March 2024.

Siddarth Raman is senior research lead at XKDR Forum. XKDR Forum is part of PUCAR - Public Collective for Avoidance and Resolution of Disputes. PUCAR is a knowledge partner to the High Court of Kerala in their 24x7 ONCourts initiative.

A Score Card for Pre-Legislative Consultation

by Mallika Dandekar and Antaraa Vasudev.

In 2014, the Ministry of Law and Justice published the 'Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy of 2014', the policy aims to create a framework for effective participation in lawmaking. This policy encouraged Ministries and Departments at the State and Central Levels to proactively publish and seek feedback on draft laws and policies.

Pre-legislative consultation, if implemented to its full potential - is a crucial tool in removing the democratic deficit in law formulation and regulatory functioning. Pre-legislative consultation (or public consultation as is commonly referred to), refers to the process of publishing a draft regulation or legislation for public comment for a period of time to gather feedback from practitioners, academics and the lived experiences of citizens impacted by the law. Consultation leads to further deliberation on the instrument, and re-drafting of certain clauses as needed.

While one may make the case for faster lawmaking, consultation if implemented correctly highlights the practical constraints of a law or policy document, which may not otherwise be visible to an administrator, without adequate input from those impacted by the instrument.

While India's history of consultation (particularly among Parliamentary standing committees and regulators) is long standing - the process continues to be viewed largely as a qualitative or unstructured process to be implemented. This poses challenges as it enables a great amount of discretion in consultation methodologies, and subsequently the input that informs the policy.

The subject of Pre-Legislative Consultation has garnered significant traction in Parliament since 2014. Member of Parliament - Supriya Sule proposed the private member bill the 'Pre-Legislative Consultation Bill, 2019', another private member bill was introduced byMember of Parliament - Jagdambika Pal, titled the 'National Consultation Commission Bill, 2019'. The Finance Minister in budget speeches of 2023-24 and 2025-2026 emphasised on the importance of regulatory consultation and impact assessment. More recently RBI, PFRDA and other regulators have made significant strides in codifying the process of consultation. Borrowing from these examples, as well as international best practices - Civis has aimed to devise a robust methodology to assess and evaluate the procedural integrity of India's pre-legislative consultation methodologies across Central, State Governments and regulatory bodies.

What follows is an exploration of the methodology devised to assess consultations, and an open invitation to assist with contributing to and enhancing the methodology. Annually, these parameters are used to assess consultations culminating in a platform to share recognition with those who excel in implementing the process - an initiative known as CIPCA (Civis' Public Consultation Awards).

The 10-Criteria Matrix of the Methodology:

Building upon a robust theoretical and practical foundation, Civis has codified a methodology. This framework combines academic standards and best practices with Civis' practical experience in fostering public engagement. The core of this methodology is a 10-criteria list, organised under four overarching analysis metrics, designed to provide an assessment of any public consultation.

The methodology to assess public consultations relies heavily on India's 2014 Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, the United Nations Public Consultation Index, OECD's Practitioners Handbook on Public Consultation, and inputs from our jury of practitioners involved in the awards in 2024 and 2025.

A. Quality of Consultation Document

The first set of matrices assess how effectively the government's document presents the proposed policy for public feedback, focusing on its clarity, comprehensiveness, and accessibility.

1. Justification:This criterion looks at whether the consultation document clearly articulates the rationale behind the proposed policy or legal change. Is the problem it seeks to address defined well, with the context in which it is being proposed, including relevant background, existing issues, and the objectives it aims to achieve? A strong justification helps citizens understand the 'why' behind the proposal, enabling more informed and relevant feedback. Assessing the justification required qualitative assessment of the Consultation document. The jury across the first and second edition has retained this criterion as its original conception.

   This criterion is borrowed from the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, particular Section 2 that reads "The Department/Ministry concerned should publish/place in public domain the draft legislation or at least the information that may inter alia include brief justification for such legislation, essential elements of the proposed legislation, its broad financial implications, and an estimated assessment of the impact of such legislation on environment, fundamental rights, lives and livelihoods of the concerned/affected people, etc". This section has also helped shape the next 3 criteria, as detailed below.

2. Essential Elements: This criterion looks at whether the proposed changes, new provisions, or key components of the draft are clearly outlined. Citizens should be able to easily identify and understand what exactly is being proposed, and its key features. These include any proposals being made, key rights and penalties, or any other government intervention or policy decision. The qualitative test is to discern whether these proposals are clear, with no room for ambiguity.

3. Impact Assessment: Has the potential impact of the proposed draft, including financial, social, environmental impact, been analysed and stated within the document? The third criterion looks at this issue in great detail. Transparency about potential impacts, both positive and negative, is crucial for citizens to assess the draft's broader implications and offer feedback after considering these effects. In edition one of the awards, the impact assessment was calculated uniformly across the financial, social and economic impacts flowing from the policy and whether it was articulated. This was an extremely subjective process, validated by each level of deliberation.

   However, as we evolved the criteria for the second edition through fresh deliberations with the jury, it led to a demand for increasing the granularity and detail in how this criterion was evaluated. Hence, we sought support from the Trustbridge Foundation, and the team led by Dr. Renuka Sane, who further refined this criterion to include 25 sub-questions that were answered to arrive at the overall score.

4. Comprehension: This criterion asks the question of whether the draft can be easily understood by an average reader, even if they do not possess specialised domain expertise? This criterion qualitatively evaluates the document's readability, clarity of language, and overall user-friendliness. Is the language unambiguous, avoiding jargon where possible or providing clear explanations for technical terms? Complex technical concepts should be simplified or accompanied by clear explanations, and the document should be free of excessive jargon or overly academic prose.

   In addition to Section 2 of the PLCP, it also follows on the heels of Section 5 of the PLCP - "Every draft legislation or rules, placed in public domain through prelegislative process should be accompanied by an explanatory note explaining key legal provisions in a simple language".

B. Scope of Engagement Opportunities

These matrices evaluate the breadth and effectiveness of the consultation's reach and the opportunities they provided for stakeholders to engage.

1. Duration: Here, we looked at whether a consultation is open for a reasonable period, allowing sufficient time for stakeholders to review the document, understand its implications, and prepare their feedback. An inadequate consultation period can severely limit participation and the quality of feedback. This criterion is derived from Section 2 of the PLCP which reads: "...Such details may be kept in the public domain for a minimum period of thirty days for being proactively shared with the public in such manner as may be specified by the Department/Ministry concerned".

   Across the two editions, the manner of scoring this criterion has evolved through deliberations with the jury. In year one, a more granular approach was adopted, similar to the other criteria, where a range of scores from 1-5 were applicable on a sliding scale based on the number of days a consultation was open for. This looked like:

   • Consultations that gave less than 20 days were marked a 1,
   • Those that allowed between 20 to 29 days were given 2 points,
   • Those that met the PLCP criteria of 30 days exactly received 3 points,
   • Those that allowed for 30 to 59 days received 4 points, and lastly,
   • Those that allowed for 60 days of more for comments received a full 5 points.

   However, the jury in the second edition recommended moving to a binary approach, where only two quantitative scores were possible: 1 for any consultation open for a duration under 30 days, and 5 for any consultation open for 30 days or higher. This was a deviation from our first edition, and it reflects the duration provision contained in the PLCP. In order to have a binary scoring, but not conflict with the scale on the rest of the criteria, 1 and 5 were chosen as the binary scoring indicators.

2. Outreach: Here, we consider if the outreach was comprehensive and diverse through various media and channels to ensure the consultation reached a broad range of relevant stakeholders and the general public. Effective outreach goes beyond merely publishing on a government website; it involves active dissemination through different platforms (e.g., print media, social media, community forums, targeted invitations) to maximise visibility and encourage participation. A compilation of all consultation outreach helped score the efforts undertaken by the relevant department.

   The criterion is derived from Section 3 of the PLCP which reads "Where such legislation affect specific group of people, it may be documented and disclosed through print or electronic media or in such other manner, as may be considered necessary to give wider publicity to reach the affected people".

C. Inclusivity

This set of matrices focuses on ensuring that the consultation facilitated diverse participation and equitable access for all citizens, regardless of their background or location.

1. Feedback Collection: The criterion considers whether multiple, accessible avenues were provided for stakeholders to submit their responses and feedback. This includes online portals, email, postal addresses, and potentially public hearings and interviews. Offering a variety of channels ensures that citizens with differing levels of digital literacy or access can participate effectively.

   This criterion builds on the principle outlined in OECD Practitioner's Guide on Stakeholder Consultations, which recommends evaluating consultations on the "transparency of the process and accessibility of the consultation, e.g., was there an equal opportunity to take part, was the process easily understood by stakeholders".

2. Translations: Here we considered if the consultation document translated into regional languages is relevant to the target audience. In a linguistically diverse nation like India, providing materials in national and local languages is paramount to ensuring true inclusivity, allowing citizens to engage with the content in their mother tongue and participate meaningfully. In addition, braille and sign language transcriptions have also greatly aided the accessibility of some drafts.

   Translation and accessibility of policy documents across languages is emphasised in OECD Practitioner's Guide on Stakeholder Consultations. The Guide recommends that consultation bodies "assure clear and plain language drafting, including in translations".

   Through deliberation, jury members concurred that English and Hindi translations for consultations with a national scope, and English and 1 regional language for a consultation with a regional scope would be scored quantitatively.

D. Open Governance

This final set of matrices examine the transparency and responsiveness of the consulting body throughout and after the consultation process.

Both transparency and responsiveness were created as qualitative criteria on the recommendation of the jury members on our inaugural edition of the awards. These criteria aim to highlight the importance of the completion of feedback loops and providing publicly accessible data, which are higher order asks - but extremely important to determine the responsiveness of policy making.

1. Transparency: Did the consulting body provide a report, a summary, or publish the responses received (in part or in entirety) after the close of the consultation period? Transparency in feedback processing is vital for accountability. It demonstrates that public input was received, analysed, and potentially influenced the final policy, fostering trust between citizens and government. It is also aligned with existing PLCP sections like Section 6 "The summary of feedback/comments received from the public/other stakeholders should also be placed on the website of the Department/Ministry concerned". Additionally, elements of this were also derived from a public consultation index created by UNDP (Page 16 of ASSESSING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS).

2. Responsiveness: The question to be considered here was if the consulting body is responsive to communications made through letters, RTIs, or other means by citizens or civic organizations.

   Responsiveness demonstrates that the government is open to dialogue and willing to address queries and provide information after the consultation process, reinforcing trust and encouraging future participation. Adding to transparency, responsiveness creates an additional avenue to allow government departments to publish and share information regarding the consultation process, i.e. even if they are not shared on their public websites and notices, they are open to sharing this information when specifically requested.

Application of the Methodology - Draft Kerala IT Policy 2023:

To better understand the methodology, we examine the Draft Kerala IT Policy 2023, ("Draft Policy") and through it explore how the methodology to assess Pre-Legislative consultation in India can be improved upon.

The draft policy in question received an overall score of 37 out of a possible 50 on the scale, translating to a 74% effectiveness rating in the last edition of the awards. In order to contextualise the draft as against other draft documents the mean and the standard deviation for the complete data set of 286 consultations has been calculated. This comparison is only illustrative, as the lawmaking procedures and maturity across State Governments, Regulatory Bodies and Central Legislators differ greatly.

This policy, released in September 2023, aims to be a blueprint for the state's IT sector growth and citizen well-being through digital technologies. We will integrate its performance against each criterion to provide a tangible illustration of Civis' methodology in action.

A. Consultation Quality - Draft Kerala IT Policy 2023

1. Justification: The Draft Policy scored outstandingly well (5/5) on this criterion. Sections 1.1 and 2.1 of the policy thoroughly state the need for an IT policy for Kerala. This is further supplemented by details regarding the state's and India's current IT infrastructure and the opportunities for Kerala to contribute to its betterment.

   The policy provides a clear background, detailing Kerala's historical strengths in IT (e.g., establishing Technopark in 1990) and the need for a new policy framework given global and national shifts in the digital landscape. It explicitly states its two-fold objective: leveraging IT, Electronics, and Space sectors for economic growth and adopting digital technologies for equitable, inclusive societal development.

   Mean Score: 2.74
   Standard Deviation: 1.49

2. Essential Elements: On this, the Draft Policy also received an outstanding score (5/5). Chapter II, titled 'Policy Framework,' meticulously lays down all essential elements, including 'Directions for Growth' (differentiating between economic and social development), 'The Enablers,' 'New Policy Framework,' and 'Policy Objectives.' Notably, section 2.2 explains the anticipated outcomes if the policy is implemented, showcasing forward-thinking and depth of thought. Furthermore, the policy addresses cybersecurity concerns through a dedicated section on 'Information Security' (Section 3.4) and discusses the augmentation of IT industry infrastructure via the development of four IT corridors in section 4.3.

   Mean Score: 3.73
   Standard Deviation: 1.12

3. Impact Assessment: The draft policy exceeded the average score here (4/5). The document effectively identifies the need for an IT policy in Kerala, backed by industry trends and growth potential. Stakeholder engagement and impact articulation are strong, as the Draft Policy incentives and investments for each business category separately. However, cost-benefit analysis and alternative strategies were not present explicitly, which was penalised. While implementation details exist, they lack clear timelines. Additionally, environmental impact, long-term evaluation, and rural integration were minimally addressed.

   Mean Score: 2.54
   Standard Deviation: 1.31

4. Comprehension: The policy also received a 4/5 for comprehension. The draft IT Policy is logically structured and emphasises inclusivity, innovation, and social equity. While it provides detailed objectives, strategies, and frameworks, its technical language may challenge non-expert readers slightly, but not significantly. Visual aids or summaries were absent which could have enhanced accessibility, and hence one point was lost. The document maintains clarity throughout, with no apparent contradictions.

   Mean Score: 3.28
   Standard Deviation: 1.03

B. Scope of Engagement Opportunities - Draft Kerala IT Policy 2023

1. Duration: The Draft Policy scored a 5/5 for its duration. The consultation period was from October 27, 2023, to January 31, 2024, for a total of 96 days. This significantly exceeds the recommended 30-day minimum, providing ample time for review and feedback.

   Mean Score: 2.85
   Standard Deviation: 1.23

2. Outreach: The Draft Policy received a 4/5 for its outreach efforts. The Government of Kerala extensively leveraged social media platforms, with posts found by Infopark, Technopark, and Kerala IT on X. Instagram posts were traced on Cyberpark Kozhikode and Infopark pages, and Facebook was utilized by Kerala IT, Technopark Trivandrum, Infopark, and Cyberpark Kozhikode. Several of these government undertakings also created awareness through their LinkedIn pages. The Draft was also available on the Kerala State Information Technology Infrastructure Limited (KSITIL)'s website. Furthermore, the erstwhile Secretary of the Kerala Electronics and Information Technology department utilized digital media to spread information about this policy.

   Mean Score: 1.49
   Standard Deviation: 0.80

C. Inclusivity - Draft Kerala IT Policy 2023

1. Feedback Collection: Here, the Draft Policy needed improvement (2/5). The Draft Policy did not mention any feedback collection mechanism. However, a webpage was created (https://itpolicy.startupmission.in/) to accept feedback in both English and Malayalam. While a digital portal was available, the lack of explicit mention within the policy document itself and potentially limited other traditional avenues for feedback impacted its score.

   Mean Score: 2.40
   Standard Deviation: 0.69

2. Translations: The Draft policy meets average expectations (3/5) in this category. The Draft is available in both English and Malayalam. This demonstrates a decent effort towards linguistic inclusivity, allowing a wider segment of the population in Kerala to access and understand the policy in their state language.

   Mean Score: 1.50
   Standard Deviation: 0.86

D. Open Governance

1. Transparency: The Draft Policy scored very low (1/5) on transparency. No published reports or public comments were found after the consultation period. Despite the general emphasis on e-Governance and proactive data disclosure within the policy, the lack of specific mechanisms for publishing feedback on this particular draft significantly impacts its score significantly.

   Mean Score: 1.59
   Standard Deviation: 1.20

2. Responsiveness: The Draft Policy exceeds expectations (4/5) in responsiveness. The Government of Kerala responded to Civis' RTI request and answered every question about the process individually. They also provided a list of all comments they received and shared that the final version of the document was not out yet, indicating that the consultation process still has the potential to yield changes to the policy. The criterion of responsiveness was only scored for the final 26 nominees, as data gathering for the full data set would be difficult. With that in mind, the scores for the 26 nominees are:

   Mean Score: 3.84
   Standard Deviation: 0.69

Conclusion

Codifying a methodology for assessment is the first step in building the legitimacy of the process of public consultation. Laying out a pathway for greater efficacy in consultations, and an enhancement of procedural trust in lawmaking as a whole.

The methodology outlined above works towards standardising a growing practice of consultation in India. However, there are unique improvements in consultative practices that we can look to from countries like Taiwan - which has institutionalised the platform vTaiwan, an open-source deliberative platform that brings together policy makers and citizens to deliberate national issues. Another example comes from the European Union's Regulatory Fitness and Improvement (REFIT) program which requires stakeholder consultation at all stages of policy formulation i.e., problem definition, solution identification, drafting, and evaluation.

While the domain of consultation is evolving, the authors invite scrutiny and feedback to enhance the parameters and measures of this methodology. With the aim of creating a practical and evolved framework for consultation evaluation and best practices in the country.

We invite suggestions on:

• Strengthening specific parameters of the evaluation framework.
• Defining the guardrails for what may constitute policy paralysis as opposed to constructive deliberation.
• Highlighting other consultative best practices which don't find mention in the methodology.
• Identifying national/international best practices that can be suggested to policy makers in the country.

Mallika Dandekar and Antaraa Vasudev are researchers at Civis.

Get them to the court on time: bumps in the road to justice

by Mugdha Mohapatra, Siddarth Raman and Susan Thomas.

India's district courts currently face a staggering backlog of 4.6 crore pending cases (as of May 2025): 3.5 crore criminal and 1.1 crore civil. Proposals to solve this are familiar: hire more judges, build special courts, adopt new technology. But before rushing to solutions, it is important to understand where cases get stuck in their journey through courts. We hand-collect and analyse the life-cycle of a sample of cases from district courts, with some surprising observations. First, between 50-70 percent of cases are disposed before they get to trial, which is before the judge hears the substantive matter of the dispute. The time spent waiting for parties to appear is over a year. While criminal cases necessarily require strict adherence to due process, even civil cases face delays. These findings challenge conventional wisdom about judicial delays and point to a unexpected bottleneck. If getting people to show up in court is the core source of delays and pendency, strengthening the administrative processes of the court rather than the size of the bench, could lead to more speedy justice delivery from our courts.

The objective of building judicial capacity to achieve judicial efficiency requires an understanding of how cases move through courts, not just tracking pendency rates. This is because the journey of a case moves through deterministic stages, which vary in duration, and imposes varying resource demands from judges and staff. There have been few systematic studies of how a case moves through court. While some studies examine the total time for case disposal, few break this down by stage.

This study analyses stages for two common types of cases that represent a significant portion of the workload of courts: cheque bouncing cases (criminal matters under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act) and motor accident claims (civil matters under the Motor Vehicles Act).

Cheque bouncing cases account for 10-15% of criminal court workloads, while motor accident claims constitute over 10% of pending civil cases. Cheque bouncing cases happen when a cheque issued does not deliver payment as expected. Motor accident claims are filed to claim compensation for damages caused in the accident against the owner of the vehicle involved, with the vehicle insurance company as a co-respondent. Cheque bouncing cases are filed in a magistrate court, and the motor accident claims at the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACT). Across these two types of cases, there are differences in procedures: whether it is for criminal and civil cases, and for different types of courts.

We use this analysis to answer the following questions:

1. What fraction of the cases go through the whole life-cycle?
2. How much time is spent in different stages of the case life-cycle? Is this different for civil and for criminal cases?

Methodology

The analysis examined 200 disposed cases randomly sampled from from the e-courts database for district courts from courts across Maharashtra, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Delhi, Telangana and Rajasthan, filed between 2018-2022. After excluding transfers and circumstances where cases never went a court process, the final sample included 147 cases - 77 cheque bouncing cases and 70 motor accident claims cases.

Each case was tracked through its entire journey by analysing court orders and hearings. Cases go through different stages - filing, admission, summons, warrants, bail, written statements, framing of issues, evidence and others. We classify these different stages of 'Pre-Trial' and 'Trial'. Trial begins after both parties appear before the judge - in cheque bouncing cases, after the accused files for bail; in motor accident claims, after written statements are filed and issues are framed.

Results

1. The first finding relates to the stage at which the cases are disposed. Table 1 shows the number of cases disposed at each stage.

Table 1: Where cases end their journey

Stage	Case type: MV		Case type: S138
	No. of cases	Percentage	No. of cases	Percentage
Pre-trial	38	54 %	55	71 %
Trial	32	46 %	22	29 %

More than half of the cases analysed never reached trial. This is higher for the (criminal) cheque bouncing cases, where 70% of cases are disposed before they reach trial. For the (civil) motor accident claims cases, 54% of the cases are disposed before reaching trial.

2. The second finding relates to the time spent in the two stages

Table 2: Time taken by stage

Case type	Total no. of cases	Pre-trial	Trial
MV	70 (32 reached trial)	9.5 months	4 months
S138	77 (22 reached trial)	12 months	3.5 months

Once all parties are in present in court, cases resolve quickly - usually in 3-4 months. Most of the delay in matters is in the pre-trial stage where the court is waiting for parties to appear (usually the respondent). This takes between 9 months to a year.

These findings align with broader patterns visible in the National Judicial Data Grid for district courts (NJDG). The data shows that 72% of pending cases are stuck before trial: 48% are at the appearance stage, 14% are awaiting service of summons, and 10% are awaiting service of warrants. While the data from the NJDG is useful to know where cases are placed within the judicial system, it does not provide insights on the time spent in different stages. Our analysis quantifies the extent of the bottleneck.

Discussion

The analysis points to two key observations: Most cases that are filed in court do not reach trial, where judicial mind is applied to decide issues of the case. Further, the bulk of the time is spent in getting the parties to court. Once all parties are present, the time to resolution is much lower. The puzzle is in understanding what shapes these features, and how this understanding can be used to improve court efficiency in dealing with case workload.

• Are the delays in court cases inevitable?

The analysis points to the paradox of procedural protections for some cases. Cheque bouncing cases and other criminal matters demand the presence of the accused. This creates an inherent tension between speedy resolution of the matter and judicial procedure. The accused, facing potential imprisonment, has every incentive to delay appearing in court until forced by warrant. The very protections meant to ensure fair process become tools for delay.

In India, these procedures continue to evolve. Under Section 223 of the newly introduced Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, magistrates must now offer the the accused an opportunity to be heard before admitting a complaint as a criminal case. This involves sending a notice by post, a process not unlike the current summons process. While intended to enhance due process, this additional step could further extend the timeline for cheque bouncing cases. The new code also allows for trial 'in absentia' under Section 356. If a person is declared as a 'proclaimed offender', and if the judge thinks that they are absconding to evade trial, the court can proceed without the accused. How these practices are implemented remains to be seen.

• Administrative and judicial functions of the court

The findings expose a fundamental blind spot in how courts actually work. The popular image of justice - a judge hearing arguments, weighing evidence and delivering verdicts - represents only one aspect of the judicial system. Behind every courtroom drama lies an extensive administrative operation of filing documents, scheduling hearings, maintaining records, and getting parties to court. These two systems complement each other, but our understanding of the administrative aspects of the court system is limited, because it is behind the scenes.

Current reform proposals focus heavily on expanding judicial capacity: hiring more judges, creating specialised courts, and implementing new technologies for case management. While these interventions have merit, they miss the core issue revealed by this analysis. The judicial system extends far beyond judges and courtrooms. Delivering summons and notices typically involves police officers, postal services, or process servers. When the simple act of getting parties to court becomes the biggest bottleneck, the solution requires rethinking the entire administrative infrastructure supporting the courts.

What does imply for potential solutions for institutional reforms of the judiciary? Some approaches that could address the summons/notices bottleneck include:

1. Digital service of summons and notices could reduce delays, though this requires updated legal frameworks and reliable technology infrastructure.
2. Police-court integration might improve warrant execution, though this raises questions about optimal resource allocation - should a capacity constrained police forces pursue cheque defaulters or focus on serious crimes?
3. Quicker escalation to warrants may secure attendance faster, but wielding state power to restrict liberty demands careful consideration. A judge's decision to issue an arrest warrant carries real consequences.
4. Penalties for non-appearance could be introduced to create stronger incentives for timely court attendance.
5. Private process servers, as used in U.S. courts, offer another model worth exploring.

Conclusion

The clamour for court reform has been dominated by traditional solutions: more judges, rewritten procedures, and new technology. But when the relatively simple task of getting parties to court becomes the system's biggest bottleneck, a more nuanced approach is essential. Court reform must recognise that efficient justice delivery requires strengthening both judicial and administrative capacity in parallel. Separating court administration from judicial functions, as some countries have done, could allow specialised focus on each component while maintaining their complementary relationship.

The invisible administrative machinery of courts deserves as much attention as the visible judicial functions. Until administrative capacity matches judicial capacity, Indian courts will continue struggling with delays that have less to do with complex legal reasoning and more to do with basic case management. The path to speedier justice may lie not in the courtroom, but in the clerk's office, the process server's route, and the administrative systems that bring cases to life. Only by addressing both aspects of the judicial system can India's courts deliver the swift justice that 4.6 crore pending cases demand.

Siddarth and Susan are senior research lead and senior research fellow at XKDR Forum. Mugdha was a research associate at XKDR Forum. We thank Pavithra Manivannan for insights, Shubho Roy for help with the interpretation, and Ajay Shah for inputs.

An evaluation framework for public procurement processes

by Karan Gulati and Anjali Sharma.

Governments require and use goods and services to operate their machinery and deliver schemes and programs to their constituents. However, self-production cannot meet this need for goods and services. As a result, governments rely on public procurement. However, India does not have an optimal public procurement system. Tenders often undergo modifications, the government incurs significant debt due to payment delays, competition is limited, and contract execution is frequently delayed. Procuring entities also tend to favour large private companies by setting eligibility criteria that exclude small and medium-sized enterprises or providing them with private information that offers a competitive advantage.

Given this experience and the limitations of existing literature, integrating international and best practices can facilitate strategic evolution and ensure that the Indian public procurement system is conducive to achieving broader objectives of efficiency and effectiveness in public resource allocation. By methodically aligning with these practices, India can foster a competitive market environment, attract better vendors, and achieve effective and sustainable procurement outcomes. Specifically, such methodological alignment can help establish an evaluation framework with clear benchmarks and indicators that enable the measurement of procurement processes across departments, identify systematic weaknesses, and explore opportunities for reform.

In a new TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation Working Paper, we propose "An evaluation framework for public procurement processes" that recognises the government's dual role as the state and a market participant throughout the procurement life cycle and can be deployed to evaluate public procurement across sectors and procuring entities. It contributes to India's growing field of evidence-based literature and policy interventions. Based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement, OECD Recommendations of the Council on Public Procurement, the World Bank's Benchmarking of Procurement, FIDIC, ADB, and NEC standard contracts, and relevant literature, the evaluation framework includes the following benchmark:

• Transparency
• Integrity
• Documentation
• Capacity

• Timeliness
• Negotiation
• Monitoring
• Dispute resolution

It divides these benchmarks along two axes. The first pertains to the role of the procuring entities, either as (i) the state or (ii) a market participant. The second pertains to procurement stages: (i) pre-award to award, (ii) award to completion, and (iii) completion to payment. For instance, as the state, procuring entities must ensure transparency before awarding a tender. To evaluate transparency, the framework assesses whether procuring entities publish procurement plans, which aids in planning and reduces the need for emergency procurement. It also evaluates whether the entity conducts pre-bid consultations, which are beneficial for identifying suppliers early in the process.

To assess the effectiveness of the framework, we evaluate the procurement processes of the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), India's largest public procuring entity, with tenders worth over 3,70,000 crore rupees (USD 44.5 billion). Its parent ministry, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, accounts for over half of India's capital expenditure on procurement. This operational experience should have endowed NHAI with expertise that reflects a spectrum of procurement processes and methodologies. Furthermore, the government's focus on infrastructure development, especially in road transport, underscores the NHAI's role as a driver of public procurement by the Indian state. Thus, evaluating NHAI can provide insights into public procurement processes in large-scale procuring entities and the efficacy of our framework.

Through this first-of-its-kind and illustrative evaluation, we identify several areas for improving India's public procurement system, thus optimising the allocation of public resources, curtailing opportunities for rent-seeking, and fortifying public trust. This includes better estimation of project timelines, improving the role of independent monitoring, and conducting performance evaluations. It also highlights that procuring entities need to enhance transparency not just in their operational processes but also in their data collection and reporting practices. These results validate the efficacy of our evaluation framework. Its comprehensive nature, encompassing a range of benchmarks, allows for a detailed evaluation of public procurement processes. Its application to NHAI demonstrates its potential to evaluate and improve procurement processes across procuring entities.

Extending this evaluation framework is essential to building on this foundational work. The task now involves evaluating other large-scale procuring entities. This endeavour is about identifying areas for improvement and understanding the patterns that define public procurement processes. The insights from this work can inform policy-making and catalyse systemic improvements, contributing to enhancing and refining the public procurement system.

References

Anirudh Burman and Pavithra Manivannan, Delays in government contracting: A tale of two metros, Leap Blog, 23 December 2022.

Anjali Sharma and Susan Thomas, The footprint of union government procurement in India, XKDR Working Paper No 10 of 2021.

Charmi Mehta and Diya Uday, How competitive is bidding in infrastructure public procurement? A study of road and water projects in five Indian states, Leap Blog, 29 March 2022.

Karan Gulati and Anjali Sharma, An evaluation framework for public procurement processes, TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation Working Paper No 4 of 2024.

Prasanta Sahu, Forget stimulus, clear your dues: Rs 7 lakh crore unpaid dues to industry by central govt depts and PSUs, Financial Express, 8 September 2020.

Shubho Roy and Anjali Sharma, What ails public procurement: an analysis of tender modifications in the pre-award process, Leap Blog, 26 November 2020.

Yugank Goyal, How Governments Promote Monopolies: Public Procurement in India, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 26 November 2019.

The authors are researchers at the TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation. We are grateful to Akshay Jaitly, Renuka Sane, Charmi Mehta, and participants at the Joint Field Workshop on Public Procurement for their valuable comments. Views are personal.

Offshore wind in Tamil Nadu: from potential to reality

by Akshay Jaitly, Charmi Mehta, Renuka Sane and Ajay Shah.

Foundations

The world of renewables is comprised primarily of solar and wind. Of these, solar electricity suffers from the limitation of dwindling away in the evening, at precisely the time at which electricity demand rises. This makes wind particularly important. There is a good deal of onshore wind generation in India. What is different and potentially superior about offshore wind?

1. Wind speeds tend to be higher offshore than on land. A wind turbine operating at a wind speed of 24 kph can generate twice as much energy as a turbine operating at a wind speed of 19 kph (American Geosciences Institute, 2023).
2. The wind offshore tends to be more consistent, with higher power capture for a greater number of hours per day.
3. Onshore wind requires land resources. Offshore wind is built in the open sea where land rights are cheaper, and it is easier to go to bigger blades.
4. Offshore wind does not impose noise pollution upon the human population.

These benefits, of course, come with a problem, that construction of windmills in the high seas is more difficult when compared with building on land. Windmills are best placed at locations with high wind. Figure 1 shows that Tamil Nadu is a hot spot for offshore wind in India. It is interesting to notice that Sri Lanka is also a hotspot for offshore wind (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Wind speeds off the Indian coast

Source: India Wind Potential Atlas (NIWE, 2019).

Figure 2: Wind speeds off Sri Lanka.

Source: Technical Assessment by World Bank, IFC and ESMAP (2020).

There is an analogy between offshore wind in Sri Lanka, and hydel resources in Nepal and Bhutan. Given the correct arrangement of foreign policy (Subramanian, 2023), the Indian private sector can possibly play a leadership role in building electricity generation in Sri Lanka, as has been the case with Bhutan.

Putting these facts together, there is an important natural resource in Tamil Nadu, and its vicinity, through which vast renewable electricity generation can become possible, given the correct configuration of policies and state institutions that create conditions of investibility. We can dare to hope that very large offshore wind generation can take place off the coast of Tamil Nadu, which would attract energy-intensive firms to operate in the region, and enabling sale of electricity into locations far from Tamil Nadu.

Public economics for offshore wind

We can imagine an uncoordinated rush by the private sector to venture out into the seas and put up wind turbines. They would jostle with each other to build on the best sites. Each wind turbine would have to face the problem of transmitting energy to the mainland. There are three areas where policy makers can be useful:

1. Ownership of the sea-bed and property rights: In a world without clarity on property rights, the private sector would experience conflicts when building wind turbines. There is a negative externality as multiple construction projects which are physically near each other impose a certain amount of chaos upon each other, and the presence of a windmill diminishes the energy production of nearby windmills.The sea-bed should be treated as a scarce natural resource, akin to the electromagnetic spectrum. There is a role for the state in establishing property rights, and auctioning off ownership of the sea-bed to private persons. The coercive power of the state would be used to create property rights for private persons, following which private persons would trade in blocks of sea-bed (akin to transactions in privately owned land or on the electromagnetic spectrum), and the government would enforce against encroachment. The negative externality problem during construction can be addressed by modified property rights which decongest each construction site for the construction period, by expanding the notion of property rights associated with each geographical location, to exclude other persons for the period of construction.
2. Economics of transmission: Each wind turbine would have to face the problem of transmitting energy to the mainland. Every generation company would benefit from more convenient access to high capacity transmission lines. There is a natural monopoly problem in the transmission infrastructure - it is likely that a single transmission company will emerge within each geographical area. There is merit in using state power to coerce this firm on open-access rules (so it cannot deny transportation to any private person) and on price regulation.
3. Data as a public good: The government can add value by spending taxpayer money to construct a dataset on wind speed and releasing this into the public domain. This activity involves no use of coercive power, other than the coercion that undergirds taxation. The government would merely release data on a website as a public good, and in no way preclude private persons from expending resources to create data on their own. For the government released data to be credible, it would have to be collected by trusted agencies, experienced in offshore wind data collection; the role for the government should be one of only contracting-out the construction of the data.

While electricity in India is largely a state subject, the sea-bed falls under the union government jurisdiction through Article 297 of the Indian Constitution through which the Parliament has enacted the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976. Thus we can envision a two-part policy story for offshore wind, where the union government auctions off blocks of sea-bed, and the state government deals with everything connected with electricity. Once the energy reaches landing stations at the shore, it is just ordinary electricity and fits into the mainstream electricity market exactly as with onshore wind turbines.

How the Indian journey has unfolded

The union government has decided that offshore wind production will commence in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. A union government agency named the National Institute of Wind Energy (NIWE) plays an important role in this field including that of being the designated counterparty for contracts. It plays a expansive role, akin to an offshore wind central planner. Transmission will be run by a union government PSU, the Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL). No role is envisaged for state governments.

In 2018, NIWE published its first tender for an offshore wind block auction off the Gujarat coast. However, it did not receive bids and consequently had to be called off after multiple extensions (Deshpande, 2021). Since 2022, the Union Government has released (i) a national Strategy Paper for the Establishment of Offshore Wind Energy Projects and (ii) a draft tender for Sea bed leasing for offshore wind energy projects which pertains to locations off the coast of Tamil Nadu. These releases help improve policy predictability.

The proposed contracting model

Project costs in offshore wind are high, particularly in contrast to developing renewable energy plants onshore. Costs also vary as per the depth of waters and distance from shore. Operating offshore wind turbines involves higher maintenance requirements (Koch, 2012). First movers face higher costs on account of uncertainty and the inevitable mistakes.

NIWE has proposed three alternative contracting models in its strategy paper. Model A is for projects where surveys and assessments have been completed, and the site is ready for development. Model B is model A without viability gap funding ("VGF?). Model C is a fully bundled model with end-to-end responsibility placed upon the project developer, including site identification. The tender released (for the sea bed off the coast of Tamil Nadu) follows model A (NIWE, 2023). Table 1 summarises this proposed contract design.

Table 1: Risk-responsibility allocation across proposed offshore wind contracting models

Factors	Risks/responsibility	Model A
Government support	Bridging financing gaps	VGF (Union; unallocated)
	Transmission charges	Waived
Strategic and commercial risks	Identifying sites for offshore wind farms	Gov (Union)
	Site assessment surveys	Gov (Union)
Local factors	Transmission infrastructure	Gov (PGCIL)
	Evacuation of power	Gov (PGCIL)
	Licenses	Private
	Power offtake guarantees	None

Site characteristics have a substantial impact upon the prospective return on equity. The MNRE/NIWE supplies its assessment of each site. A careful examination of the data released by MNRE/NIWE is required. Potential developers may invest significant time and resources in constructing private sector data if there are limitations in the government-released data.

The selected bidder must set up the turbines offshore and connect each turbine to the offshore agglomeration facility (which will be constructed and managed by PGCIL). While the model mentions accessing VGF from the union government, the mechanism is not adequately spelled out. Is this policy strategy conducive to investibility?

i. Site selection and exclusivity:

Site selection is best done by potential wind farm developers. Developers face the consequences of, and are best placed to take decisions on sites when faced with a certain amount of data. They will commission the creation of additional data optimally. Under Model A, sites have been selected by NIWE. We expect that serious developers will construct their own datasets and may chafe at the locations pinned down by NIWE.

The next issue is that of exclusivity. Developers like to have a certain exclusive period, where no other construction takes place, in order to reduce the complexities of coordination across multiple construction projects. The exclusivity period for the sea-bed is set to five years, with a maximum extension of one year. The average time taken to set up a mid-size offshore wind farm, globally, is four years. In India, this is likely to attain a higher value (MOSPI, 2023).

Auctioning the exclusivity period itself can be a way to decide what a 'sufficient' period should be. In countries where confidence in offshore projects has been high, auctions are witnessing site tenures being awarded based on an auction in which the highest bidder wins the site (Exeter, 2022). For example, the Round 4 auction for sites (held in 2021) in England and Wales saw the highest bidder paying Euro 1bn upwards in option fees, payable annually (for ten years) for exclusive sea-bed rights on an 8 GW of offshore wind.

ii. The problem of transmission:

In offshore wind contracts in Northern Europe, the evacuation infrastructure for the electricity is generally created by the developer (and in some cases such as in the UK, later carved out and sold to a third party) or contracted out (separate from the offshore windfarm contract) to a private transmission service provider. Under Model A, this function has been assigned fully to the state-owned transmission company - PGCIL. PGCIL has no prior experience in developing transmission for offshore wind and it carries the burden of being a public sector organisation.

Whether managed by PGCIL or some other firm, regulation is required so that future developers are provided access to non-discriminatory evacuation infrastructure and services, perhaps using common carrier principles. While one block / site is up for auction today, numerous offshore plants will come up in the future in close vicinity. There may be shortages or exorbitant pricing of transmission, particularly in the absence of non-discriminatory access.

In addition to the risks from power evacuation, risks from unscheduled downtimes can induce losses, and contract terms will determine who bears this risk. For example, in Germany, the costs of curtailments/incapacities were transferred to the consumer. In contrast, costs remained with the project owner in China despite their lack of control over the risk (Gatzert, 2016). The government's decision to manage the complete evacuation responsibility may prove problematic in the event that higher transmission losses or shutouts imposes important risks upon the developer. If the preference is for power evacuation to be managed by PGCIL, contractual provisions on liquidated damages must adequately cover for downtimes that are not caused by the fault of the developer and other transmission losses.

iii. Regulatory burdens

Unlike transmission and distribution, power generation has no market failure problem. It is hence important to envisage a contract design that harnesses private sector expertise, without added layers of government involvement. At present, establishing an offshore wind farm will require a set of seventeen different clearances and licences from a host of ministries, including the prerequisite of block approval from the Ministry of Defence. Seven of the seventeen clearances are necessary even before one can make a bid, and the rest are post-award. The sector also includes a specific licensing regime that extends to how new offshore assets connect and interact with the grid. This requirement for multiple permissions detract from the vision of property rights in the hands of a private person.

Further, approvals and no-objection certificates may be required from State Governments for transmission and evacuation infrastructure-related provisioning and any other clearances as may be legally required to establish and operate offshore power plants - as in the case of oil and gas pipelines (NIWE, 2022a, NIWE, 2022b).

It might be useful to consider if some project-related (as opposed to bidder related) approvals can be obtained ahead of time and made part of the bid package. This will reduce risk for bidders and may lead to more attractive bids.

Lastly, as with any nascent industry, policy and regulatory frameworks are likely to evolve and change over time - and existing concessionaires should be contractually protected from this through adequate 'change in law' and 'change of scope' provisions.

Under the present policy strategy, offshore wind generation requires the firm to have a high level of government engagement, and exposure to policy risk. This problem may encourage foreign firms to find local partners and enhance the required rate of return, i.e. hamper investibility.

iv. The role of the union government:

The present policy strategy suggests a offshore wind industry that is run out of the union government. This vision will sit uneasily with the primary role of the state government in electricity regulation and the electricity business once the energy hits the shore. Since vessel availability and transport infrastructure are critical to offshore wind farm development and often contribute to delays, cost overruns ((Koch, 2012), and litigation, the State's port infrastructure can be adapted to facilitate project management. Proximity of the Thoothukudi port to the proposed site is an advantage, and logistics facilities such as (i) storage areas for component assembly and manufacturing, and (ii) berth infrastructure can be developed to support upcoming offshore wind plants (Auroville Consulting, 2022). Such thinking is downplayed in a union-dominated policy process.

Assessing the outlook

Our analysis suggests that there is a considerable gap between the natural resource potential for offshore wind in South Asia and its tangible translation into RE capacity. The sea-bed lease tender was released in September 2023 with a deadline of 28 November 2023. In our knowledge, no bids have emerged.

Electricity is a concurrent list subject under the Indian Constitution, with both the union government and the state government having the right to make law over aspects of the sector. Sea-bed jurisdiction appears to clearly lie with the union. It would make sense to rely on the state government to a greater extent.

There are significant manufacturing and transportation challenges associated with the bulky parts of offshore wind facilities. Both Tamil Nadu and Gujarat are strong in manufacturing, and are natural sites where a private industry could develop that will undertake this manufacturing, and play a role in offshore wind sites hundreds of kilometres away.

The arguments presented earlier in this article show that thinking from first principles, the role of the state in this field is (a) Establishing property rights with auctions of chunks of sea-bed, including a special kind of exclusivity during construction; (b) Ensuring open access and price regulation for the natural monopoly of transmission; (c) Possibly adding value by constructing and releasing a robust dataset with wind speed. There is merit in evolving the policy strategy towards these three pillars.

References

American Geosciences Institute. 2023. What are the advantages and disadvantages of offshore wind farms?, National Academy of Sciences.

Deshpande, T. 2021. Why India's Offshore Wind Energy Potential Remains Untapped, IndiaSpend. 26 November 2021.

NIWE. 2023. Strategy for Establishment of Offshore Wind Energy Projects, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India. September 2023.

Koch, C. 2012. Contested overruns and performance of offshore wind power plants, Construction Management and Economics, 30:8, 609-622.

Infrastructure and Project Management Division, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation. 2023. Quarterly Report on Mega Projects.

Laido et al. 2022. Impacts of Competitive Seabed Allocation for Offshore Wind Energy, University of Exeter. April 2022.

Gatzert et al. 2016. Risks and risk management of renewable energy projects: The case of onshore and offshore wind parks, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Volume 60. July 2016.

Auroville Consulting. 2022. Unlocking Offshore Wind in Tamil Nadu. Sustainable Energy Transformation Series.

Subramanian, A. 2023. Answers in the offshore wind.The Indian Express. 23 March 2023.

Akshay Jaitly and Renuka Sane are Co-founder and Research Director, respectively, at TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation; Charmi Mehta and Ajay Shah are Research Associate and Co-founder, respectively, at XKDR Forum.

The difficulties of asset monetisation in the transmission sector

by Akshay Jaitly, Charmi Mehta, Rishika R, and Ajay Shah.

Introduction

About 95% of nationwide transmission assets in India are presently owned by the government company, Power Grid Corporation of India Limited (PGCIL). A transformation of electricity transmission systems is required to achieve decarbonisation, reflecting the distributed geography of renewables generation in India, and the eventual de-commissioning of present coal-based power generation. Several estimates suggest a total required investment, for electricity transmission, of over INR 2 trillion over the next five years.

Given the public finance and managerial constraints in the Indian state, private investment is critical to achieve the required investments. Land, compliances and clearances impede pure private greenfield transmission projects, so one method there is for the government to do development and then monetise the assets. Existing assets are relatively straightforward to operate and risk-free, with a steady stream of user charges, where private sector participation is then readily achieved.

While attempts at attracting private investment in this field have taken place from 2006, the outcomes so far have been poor. One response to this was in October 2022, where the Ministry of Power issued guiding principles for states to monetise 14% of transmission assets that are currently owned and operated by state-owned transmission utilities. This involved a new contracting mechanism: the "Acquire, Operate, Maintain and Transfer (AOMT) model".

This is the temporary transfer of asset ownership (i.e. not a sale) to private firms in exchange of an upfront payment. Firms are expected obtain cash from the operations (user charges) of the asset, depending on the model deployed for monetisation. Asset monetisation has twin benefits for governments - first, it provides short-term liquidity to the public sector entity in the form of upfront payment for the asset(s); and second, it allows the government to delegate the operations and maintenance (O&M) to the private sector, enabling public sector entities to harness private sector capabilities and reduce their scope.

How previous asset monetisation models worked

Asset monetisation has been used as a contracting model for O&M since 2018 when the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) began using the toll-operate-transfer (TOT) model, which draws on ideas from Australia, North America and Europe. Besides this, InvITs have been used in the transmission sector. There is significant knowledge and experience around InvITs and TOT contracts in India: they constitute the baseline against which the new AOMT can be understood. Table 1 provides a comparison of the three models on key features.

Table 1: A comparison of key features across contracting models - InvITs, TOT and AOMT.

	InvITs	Toll Operate Transfer	AOMT
Description	Transfer of assets to listed registered trusts regulated by Securities Exchange Board of India which issues units to multiple investors. Comparable to equity for a limited time period.	Temporary transfer of asset ownership for an upfront payment from the private party who is granted this concession. The private party is also granted rights to collect user charges, and other charges to finance the O&M of the asset.	Temporary transfer of ownership of assets for upfront payment from the private party, in turn allowing them to operate and maintain the asset, and generate revenue from it.
Regulation of investment vehicle	Trust to be registered by SEBI; existing licences applicable	SPV/ investor entity regulated by contract terms	Transmission licence transfer/re-registration to be approved by State electricity regulator
Regulation of user charges	Approved by electricity regulator and governed by Transmission Service Agreement	As per National Highway Toll Determination Rules	Approved by electricity regulator and governed by Transmission Service Agreement
Mode of returns	Returns from dividends, interest and capital gains on units	Toll charges	Transmission charges (varied across states)
O&M	Public	Private	Private
Ownership	Pooled; investors	Single or consortium	Single or consortium

The Toll-Operate-Transfer model in Indian Highways

In 2018, the NHAI bundled approximately 500 km of highways for the first auction, and potential investors were to bid the upfront payment they would make for the bundle. In return, investors receive the right to operate the highway and collect tolls generated from it during the concession period. This model provides the awarded party autonomy on operations and revenue generation, eliminating the involvement of the public authority in O&M.

The NHAI has so far attempted to monetise ten bundles (rounds) of assets with varied rates of success. The lack of bids, undervalued bids, and low price recovery led to auctions being stalled, bids annulled and fresh auctions being called, several times. Most recently, the 9th and 10th TOT bundles up for auction were halted as they did not meet the reserve price set by NHAI. Despite using a familiar model, the implementation has not yielded positive outcomes. Large value disputes in highway contracting, low standards of public disclosure and the inability to make accurate revenue growth projections are some of the reasons for its substandard outcomes.

The InvIT model in the transmission sector

In 2020, the PGCIL became the first publicly owned company to set up its own investment trust (InvIT). The PGCIL InvIT holds transmission assets worth INR 7500 crores and it opened for subscription in early 2021. Within two days of the offer, 59% of the units were subscribed. When the session was closed, PGCIL benefited from a 3% premium over the issue price and the initial public offer was subscribed 4.83 times. During this period, investor perception was also positive with analysts predicting that the InvIT would yield steady long-term returns. PGCIL eventually auctioned 27.41 crore units, earning INR 2,736.02 crore in May 2021. However, concerns with the lack of transparent price discovery and taxation norms on long-term capital investments have prompted PGCIL to rethink its InvIT plans. Additionally, the retention of O&M as a function of the public sector entity may create a hesitation to investment by private entities.

Neither of the two distinct asset monetisation models that India has experimented with achieved the outcomes it set out to achieve. On one hand, InvIT provides a diversification of risk but O&M remains with the government. On the other hand, TOT provides autonomy over O&M but ownership is not diversified. This serves as a case study for the design of new models for asset monetisation, and whether it can address the concerns of previous models used.

There is no reason why an InvIT structure cannot be augmented to also include the contracting out of O&M functions to a private entity. This will bring in private sector efficiency and allay the fears of investors. There are two ways in which the InvIT could be presently undertaking O&M: (i) it is possible that PGCIL is charging the InvIT a fee and doing the O&M, or (ii) O&M staff may have been transferred with the assets and the InvIT is doing its own O&M. Either way the function is retained with the government, making it a potential point of concern for investors. To eliminate this friction, a third model is preferable, where O&M functions of an InvIT are contracted out. This could have been a plausible design option since InvITs have been around for a while, instead of opting for a fully different model.

Concerns about the AOMT

The importance of private investment in transmission is well taken. The question lies in the pathway to a solution. We recognise the immense complexities of getting up to a well-functioning institutional mechanism. We also recognise that different sectors may warrant different approaches to doing the same things. There are two main concerns with the AOMT model:

1. The contract design is not suited to state government assets due to problems of state-level electricity governance; the overall lack of control on streams and decisions of revenue (user charges) is a factor that models should solve for; and
2. The unfamiliarity with the model among state governments (and asset monetisation generally). There are two existing mechanisms for doing this, with precedents and understanding within infrastructure, finance and government establishments: InvIT and TOT. These represent natural pathways to take for electricity transmission assets.

It has been over one year since the introduction of the model and it has seen no uptake from states so far. States have expressed concerns with the design and feasibility of the model. When the Ministry of Power proposed AOMT, there was a need for a first principles argument and public consultation, about why a third strategy was proposed. They needed to show the difficulties that would arise through the three existing pathways, and how the modifications chosen under the AOMT model addressed these difficulties.

References

Ministry of Power, Guiding principles for Asset Monetisation in the Transmission sector for state governments, October 2022.

Utpal Bhaskar, Power firms finalize models for asset monetisation plan, Livemint, 2022.

KPMG, Global Infrastructure Asset Recycling and Infrastructure Capital, June 2020.

Charmi Mehta and Bhargavi Zaveri, Monetisation lessons from NHAI, The Business Standard, March 2021.

Surya Sarathi Ray, NHAI cancels two projects on low bids, Financial Express, March 2022.

P Manoj, NHAI annuls highest bid of Sekura Roads for ToT Bundle 10 as it was below reserve price, The Economic Times, Sept 2022.

Charmi Mehta and Susan Thomas, Identifying roadblocks in highway contracting: lessons from NHAI litigation, The LEAP Blog, July 2022.

Shreya Jai, PowerGrid's asset monetisation via InvITs gets Cabinet go-ahead, Business Standard, Sept 2020.

Sundar Sethuraman, PowerGrid Infrastructure Investment Trust ends debut trade at 3% premium, Business Standard, May 2021.

Sunil Shankar Matkar, PowerGrid InvIT IPO opens: Should you subscribe?, MoneyControl, April 2021.

Utpal Bhaskar, PGCIL drops second InvIT tranche plan, LiveMint, Jan 2023.

Akshay Jaitly is co-founder of Trustbridge Rule of Law Foundation and Trilegal, Charmi Mehta is a researcher with XKDR Forum, Rishika R is a researcher with Trustbridge Rule of Law Foundation, and Ajay Shah is co-founder of XKDR Forum.