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Thursday, September 30, 2021

Distribution of self-reported health in India: The role of income and geography

by Ila Patnaik, Renuka Sane, Ajay Shah and S. V. Subramaniam.

In health research, we study the causes and consequences of health at the individual level. This requires measurement of the health status of individuals. One simple path lies in asking a person: "Are you feeling well today?". This `self-reported health' (SRH) is a measure that is easy to implement, and has limitations in that psychological factors are present. A significant global literature has emerged, which draws on this measure to explore the causes and consequences of health.

The CMIE CPHS is an important new dataset which has longitudinal data for about 170,000 households, measured three times a year. They measure SRH for each individual in each wave. This measurement of SRH, alongside a rich array of household characteristics, makes possible many interesting research projects. In a new paper, Distribution of self-reported health in India: The role of income and geography, we discern some new facts and phenomena about health in India, through this data.

We use data for calendar 2018 and 2019, which works out to 3.5 million observation of a person in a wave. These years were chosen in order to obtain a baseline description of health in India, while avoiding the pandemic of 2020 and the possible impact of demonetisation in 2017.

What do we find? On average, ill health is observed in 3.25% of the records. On average, people in India are unwell for about 12 days a year. There is a U-shaped curve in age, with higher ill health rates for the young and the old.

We get a nice map of the variation of the ill-health rate across the country. This is interesting, in and of itself, as it shows us something about health care requirements. However, some of this variation reflects geographical heterogeneity in income and age structure.

We estimate logit models which explore correlations between standard socio-economic measures and the ill-health rate. The important sources of variation turn out to be age, income and location.

We then focus on an approximately modal person. Model-based predictions for the ill-health probability are constructed for this individual. This yields a map of the predicted ill-health rate --  


 

This shows the variation of ill-health in the 102 `homogeneous regions' (HRs), after controlling for income, age structure and other standard socioeconomic characteristics. It is an interesting and new map. These results do not conform with the standard stereotypes of north vs. south. Epidemiological research is required in understanding what is at work in each of the difficult HRs. Major gains in the health of the people could potentially be obtained by focusing on these hot spots and finding the right public health interventions.

We then ask: are rich people healthier than poor people? As the rich fare better on nutrition, housing quality, knowledge and access to health care, we expect there would be such a correlation. This is indeed the case in the overall aggregate data. However, there is strong geographical variation in this correlation. Ill health and poverty are positively correlated in only half of the country. There are even HRs where the relationship is reverse -- where poor people report better health than the rich. Further, the two maps (the map of ill health of the modal person, and the map of the places where ill health is not positively correlated with income) show different patterns. They are distinct phenomena that invite further exploration.

Tuesday, September 21, 2021

Instant cross-border payments vs. current account inconvertibility

by Ajay Shah and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah.

The Reserve Bank of India announced a project that may potentially link an Indian payments system, UPI, with PayNow, a peer-to-peer payment system operated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. A UPI-PayNow linkage will facilitate instant peer-to-peer cross border payments. It would be a striking solution to the long-standing problems of high transaction costs faced by cross-border transactions. It would help increase India's internationalisation.

In this article, we examine the legal foundations for making this project a reality for the end consumer and merchant. We argue that connecting Indian payment systems with cross-border payment systems would face significant procedural complexities involving current account transactions. While UPI-PayNow connectivity is desirable -- as is connectivity between diverse cross-border payments systems -- barriers to convertibility on the current account can render this connectivity illusory.

Current account inconvertibility

What does a desirable cross border payments system look like? It should allow economic agents to make and receive payments with high speed and low cost. It should impose the minimum inconvenience upon every user. In the field of international trade, there is a clear distinction between tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers, in recognition of the idea that there can be substantial barriers to trade even when an overt tariff barrier is absent.

As per India's commitment to the IMF's Articles of Agreement, Indian residents enjoy full current account convertibility. This means that Indian residents should be able to exchange Indian currency, free of restrictions, for any foreign currency of their choice at market determined or pre-fixed (in case of managed currency regimes) rates. Article VIII(2) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement codifies the obligation of full current account convertibility for its members, thus:

Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 2, no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.

Section 3(b) of Article VII deals with the replenishment of scarce currency. Section 2 of Article XIV deals with transitional arrangements. None of these provisions, which are more exceptional in nature, apply to normal circumstances.

A multilateral treaty such as the IMF's Articles of Agreement is given binding effect by enacting domestic law to that effect. In India, the International Monetary Fund and Bank Act, 1945 ("IMF Act"), was enacted to give effect to the IMF's Articles of Agreement. However, at the time of its enactment, the IMF Act excluded the said Article VIII(2) as India was not a fully current account convertible country at that time.

When India graduated to current account convertibility in 1993, the Foreign Exchange Regulation (Amendment) Act, 1993 amended FERA to reflect a more liberalised current account regime. However, it allowed the RBI to wield considerable discretion in introducing frictions for making and receiving cross-border payments on the current account. At the same time, the IMF Act was not amended to give binding effect to the said Article VIII(2) of the IMF's Articles of Agreement as domestic law.

After FERA was replaced by the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, more transactions in foreign exchange became feasible for Indian residents than was once the case. However, the economic notion of full current account convertibility of being able to buy and sell foreign exchange, free of all restrictions, for current account transactions, was not realised in the new law. The FEMA, six years after the 1993 announcement, allows the Central Government to impose restrictions on current account transactions. The current account is less restricted than the capital account. But in 2021, Indian residents continue to face barriers to realising the benefits of `full current account convertibility'. Several barriers, both substantive and procedural, exist that make current account transactions difficult or costly for the average Indian retail consumer and merchant, that are not found in countries that have current account convertibility. These barriers are of two types:

  1. Some hurdles are explicitly imposed by the foreign exchange law and its ad hoc enforcement.
  2. India has restrictions on capital account convertibility. To ensure that the payments ostensibly made or received for current account transactions are not applied towards settling obligations arising from restricted capital account transactions, banks are appointed as gatekeepers. Banks, in turn, have implemented an elaborate procedural machinery to effectively vet each foreign exchange transaction made by a consumer. This creates frictions that hinder current account transactions.

The IMF Articles of Agreement envisage this possibility and attempt to pre-empt it. Article VI(3) of the IMF Articles of Agreement, which allows members to impose controls necessary to regulate international capital movements, specifically provides that, "no member may exercise these controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments."

There is a third set of rules and regulations under FEMA that violate the spirit of current account convertibility, even if not the strict text of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. These rules and regulations mandate exporters and earners of foreign exchange to repatriate their foreign exchange earnings within a certain period after their realisation. While this period is generally in the range of six to nine months, again, like all other provisions of FEMA, this too is amenable to revision by the RBI and the Central Government.

Barriers to instant peer-to-peer cross-border payments

While the technicalities may differ across transaction type, the bank in question, the merchant and the jurisdiction of the counter-party involved, the hurdles that consumers and merchants face when making cross border payments for current account transactions can be broadly classified into three categories:

Legal restrictions on current account transactions

In exercise of the power conferred on the Central Government under the FEMA, the Central Government has enacted the Current Account Transaction Rules, 2000. These rules prohibit some current account transactions altogether. For example, they prohibit remittances for "hobbies" or the purchase of banned magazines. They also mandate the prior approval of the Central Government for certain types of current account transactions, such as remittances for cultural tours or publishing advertisements in foreign print media. For a third set of transactions, the rules impose caps that may be revised by the RBI from time to time. This effectively means that authorised dealers in foreign exchange must check the rule book when undertaking current account transactions, for they may fall in any of these categories. Particularly, since the restrictions are imposed by rules and legislation made by agencies (not the Parliament), the frequency of revisions is likely to be higher and allow for lesser transition time as they often take effect overnight.

Restrictions linked to payment instruments

Several restrictions against current account convertibility operate through rules about the payment instrument or payment service provider even when it is used for current account transactions.
The Current Account Rules, 2000 impose restrictions on the usage of international credit cards (ICCs) from an Indian issuer. Some of these are in the letter of the law. For example, the rules explicitly prohibit the usage of an ICC for making payment to foreign airlines in a currency other than INR. Other restrictions manifest themselves through enforcement processes. For example, there have been instances of the RBI having issued enforcement letters to holders of ICCs for availing cloud computing services by a foreign company not having operations in India. The basis of the enforcement actions was that the ICCs were meant to be used for current account transactions 'while on a visit outside India'. The outcomes and due process underyling the enforcement actions undertaken by the RBI are rather opaque. The RBI does not issue reasoned orders for its enforcement actions, unlike most other regulators in India. Owing to this opacity, we are not able to know whether holders of ICCs actually ended up paying fines for having used their credit cards for certain current account transactions and the legal foundations of such enforcement actions.
Similarly, until 2015, Indian residents could use the services of online payment gateway service providers (OPGSPs) for the receipt of export proceeds of upto USD 10,000. Later, in order to promote online e-commerce, the RBI allowed Indian importers to use the services of OPGSP to make payments of upto USD 2,000 for imports. Additionally, the RBI mandated OPGSPs that wish to facilitate cross border payments from or to India to set up liason offices in India.

Transaction vetting by banks

RBI has vested banks with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers for ensuring that payments ostensibly made for current account transactions are not used for engaging in capital account transactions. Technically, this requires banks to vet every single cross border transaction in order to judge its compliance with the FEMA.
To make cross border outward remittances easier for Indian individual residents (as distinguished from corporate bodies and other artificial juridical entities), the RBI issued a `Liberalised Remittance Scheme', which sets annual caps on the amount of foreign exchange that Indian residents can repatriate outside the country, for both capital and current account transactions. This means that making outward remittances requires a payer to fill up atleast one form swearing compliance with the limits and the terms and conditions of the LRS.
Counter intuitively, the friction is exacerbated for inward remittances in the INR denominated bank account of the recipient. To comply with the letter of the law, banks have put in place a system that requires the beneficiary to furnish the bank with a whole bunch of information, such as the purpose of the inward remittance, the bill numbers where the remittance is on account of exports, etc. This form is required to be filled up and submitted for every transaction. Depending on whether the recipient bank is a public sector bank or not and its operational efficiency levels, these forms may require to be furnished in hard copy by visiting a bank branch. It may involve a couple of phone calls from bank representatives asking this, that or the other clarification. For a first time or the occasional recipient of a foreign payment, this practically puts inward remittances on a T+1 settlement cycle!

Current account convertibility means that there is no difference between going onto an e-commerce website and buying from an Indian merchant vs. buying from an overseas merchant. But Indian residents are often asked to perform know-your-customer checks, uploading images of identity documents, when buying from an overseas merchants. In contrast, domestic purchases only require supplying money and not the burden of KYC procedures. This violates globally accepted notions of full current account convertibility, and will be a significant hurdle to making instant cross-border payments a reality for the average Indian consumer.

The problem of convertibility on the current account

Current account convertibility means that cross-border transactions, for the purpose of current account activity, are as frictionless as domestic transactions. Many people believe that India is fully current account convertible; it is sometimes claimed that India has achieved current account convertibility in 1993 and is now inching towards convertibility on the capital account. This is an inaccurate depiction of where India is. There are explicit prohibitions, restrictions or tarriff barriers. There are procedural barriers that drive up the cost of cross-border transactions. There are threats of ad hoc enforcement or disparity across payment instruments or payment service providers.

At first blush, UPI-PayNow connectivity is a sweet and logical idea, there is the possibility of obtaining a quantum leap in reducing transactions costs for cross-border payments. However, it requires the invisible infrastructure of current account convertibility, which is at present lacking in India. The project of building UPI-PayNow connectivity is a great opportunity to re-open these questions and remove all the frictions, whether on paper or in practice, described above. Our objective should be to make India-Singapore payments on the current account as frictionless as (say) payments between the UK and the US.

This situation is not unique to the UPI-PayNow connection. The `fintech revolution' is limited by infirmities of financial regulation in numerous dimensions. Many ideas that first appear eminently sensible tend to break down when placed into the Indian policy environment [example: regulatory sandbox].



Ajay Shah is a researcher at xKDR Forum and Jindal Global University. Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah is a doctoral candidate at the National University of Singapore.

Monday, September 13, 2021

Management takeover under SARFAESI Act - A zombie law

by Pratik Datta.

Introduction

Ever since Caballero et al (2008) coined the phrase, ‘zombie firms’ have attracted much attention in both academic and policy circles. Macey (2021) recently extended the concept to a wholly new genre of zombies - ‘zombie laws’. Freedom from the clutches of zombie laws is a policy priority for India. The Prime Minister himself highlighted the challenge in his recent Independence Day speech. This piece will use the phrase ‘zombie laws’ broadly to refer to provisions of statutes, regulations, and judicial precedents that continue to apply after their underlying economic and legal bases dissipate. Although there are many obvious examples of zombie laws strewn across the Indian legal landscape, this post will illustrate the problem using a slightly more nuanced example. It will explain why section 13(4)(b) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’) has become a zombie law since the enactment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in 2016. To appreciate the original rationale behind this provision, it would be useful to set out the broader legislative backdrop.

Background

Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 allows only some mortgagees the right to sell the mortgaged property (security) without court intervention. This right is not available where the mortgagor is of native origin or where the mortgaged property is situated outside presidency towns or any notified area. This legislative design at the time was meant to ensure that the law does not inadvertently empower unscrupulous moneylenders (as mortgagees) against vulnerable native mortgagors in mofussil towns and villages across India. In contrast, European mortgagors in presidency towns were presumed capable enough to take care of their own interests.

Post-independence, this limited right to sell mortgaged property without court intervention proved unsatisfactory for a state-led financial system. Instead of reforming the general law, the Transfer of Property Act, special statutes were enacted to vest the power of sale without court intervention in certain financial institutions like Land Development Banks and State Finance Corporations (‘SFCs’). For example, section 29 of the State Finance Corporations Act, 1951, empowered an SFC to take over the management, possession, or both, of the borrower industrial concern for recovery of its dues. If the borrower still didn’t pay up, the SFC could sell the unit to recover its dues.

In late 1990s, demands were made to extend similar powers to banks and financial institutions to tackle the fledgling non-performing assets problem. This demand resonated with the Andhyarujina Committee, which in March 2000 recommended a special law to empower banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities anywhere in India and sell them for recovery of loans without court intervention. The SARFAESI Act 2002 was the result of this policy thinking.

Section 13 of SARFAESI Act empowers a secured creditor (bank or financial institution) to enforce a security interest created in its favour without court intervention anywhere in India. On default by a borrower, the creditor may serve a notice in writing to the borrower to repay in full within 60 days of receiving such notice. If the borrower fails to comply, the creditor may take recourse to various measures under section 13(4). Clause (b) of section 13(4) initially empowered banks and financial institutions to take over management of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale and realise the secured assets.

In 2004, section 13(4)(b) was amended to empower banks and financial institutions to take over not only the ‘management of the secured assets’, but the entire ‘management of the business’ of the borrower company without court intervention. This includes the right to transfer by way of sale for realising the secured assets. These powers were not originally envisaged by the Andhyarujina Committee.

A Zombie law

In 2000, the Andhyarujina Committee had envisaged the SARFAESI Act as an exception to the general foreclosure law contained in the Transfer of Property Act. Consequently, SARFAESI Act was designed as a special foreclosure law. Like any other foreclosure law, it dealt only with transfer of security (mortgaged property) and not transfer of corporate control of the borrower’s business from shareholders to creditors (or an administrator). The latter is the subject of corporate insolvency law.

When a corporate debtor faces financial distress, shareholders have a perverse incentive to engage in risky strategies. If the strategy pays off, shareholders benefit. If the strategy fails, the creditors bear the losses. To address this moral hazard inherent in the structure of a limited liability company, corporate insolvency law shifts the power to decide on the future of a financially distressed company from its shareholders to its creditors. The creditors could use insolvency law to either restructure their debt in the company or sale the business as a going concern to a third party. This enables the business to exit financial distress with minimal value destruction.

To achieve this outcome, corporate insolvency laws usually provide sophisticated rules to facilitate collective bargaining by the company’s creditors for debt restructuring, appoint an administrator (resolution professional) to monitor a sale, and market the business publicly to maximise the sale value. They also provide various safeguards to check against unfair wealth transfer away from vulnerable claimants of the corporate debtor such as dissenting financial creditors and operational creditors. These safeguards include several unique provisions dealing with preferential transactions, avoidance transactions, wrongful trading, cram down provisions etc. Implementing these safeguards require court supervision.

Foreclosure laws do not require such complicated rules and safeguards since they simply deal with transfer of security and not transfer of corporate control. As a result, court supervision is not as relevant in foreclosure laws. Since SARFAESI Act was initially designed as a special foreclosure law, neither did it provide for the usual safeguards necessary during transfer of corporate control nor did it mandate court supervision to protect vulnerable claimants during such transfers.

The 2004 amendment fundamentally altered this basic design of SARFAESI Act as a foreclosure law. The amended section 13(4)(b) empowered a secured creditor to take over control of the corporate debtor’s business and decide on its future through a sale, a function akin to that of a corporate insolvency law. Yet, unlike a corporate insolvency law, the amendment did not introduce any safeguard or court supervision during takeover of management and subsequent sale of the distressed business. Effectively, the 2004 amendment inserted selective features of corporate insolvency law within a foreclosure law. As a result of this legislative mashup, the amended SARFAESI Act vested disproportionate powers with secured creditors, without safeguarding the interests of other claimants of a corporate debtor. This is not expected of either a foreclosure law or a corporate insolvency law.

This hybrid section 13(4)(b) of SARFAESI Act could have been justified in 2004 as a mechanism to achieve going concern sale of distressed businesses in the absence of a modern corporate insolvency law in India. In 2016 however, India got a comprehensive corporate insolvency law - the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (‘IBC’). The IBC now provides a well-defined mechanism to take over management of a distressed corporate debtor to achieve a going concern sale.  On triggering the IBC, the promoter loses control of the corporate debtor. A resolution professional takes over the management, invites plans from potential investors, and places the eligible plans before a committee of financial creditors. This committee can approve a resolution plan by not less than 66% voting share. Such a resolution plan becomes binding only after it is approved by the court (adjudicating authority). Given such elaborate mechanism (with appropriate safeguards) to achieve going concern sales under the IBC, the underlying economic and legal bases for section 13(4)(b) of SARFAESI Act have dissipated. Yet, when SARFAESI Act was amended in 2016 to harmonise it with the IBC, section 13(4)(b) was not revisited. This provision lives on in the statute book only as a zombie law.

Continued existence of such a zombie law is not only unnecessary but it can also be harmful. For instance, the IBC provides stringent safeguards to prevent unfair wealth transfer from dissenting financial creditors and operational creditors. In contrast, section 13(4)(b) of the SARFAESI Act is designed to protect only the interests of secured creditors. It does not offer any credible safeguard for other claimants of a distressed corporate debtor. Therefore, continued use of this section of the SARFAESI Act to take over the management of a distressed corporate debtor without court intervention is detrimental to a wide range of corporate stakeholders.

This problem could be resolved simply by amending section 13(4)(b) to revert to its pre-2004 position. Banks and financial institutions should be able to use section 13(4)(b) only to take over the ‘management of the secured assets’ of the corporate debtor without court intervention and not the management of its entire business. The latter should be permissible only under the IBC. This legal architecture would restore the character of the SARFAESI Act as a special foreclosure law, as originally recommended by the Andhyarujina Committee.

Conclusion

Section 13(4)(b) of SARFAESI Act became a zombie law with the introduction of the IBC. Many such zombies remain scattered across the Indian legal landscape. The government had in 2014 taken a conscious initiative to repeal such laws. Such initiatives are mostly ad hoc. There is no institutional mechanism to tackle the menace. While highlighting this lacuna, former Finance Secretary Dr. Vijay Kelkar suggested that every new economic legislation should ideally have a sunset clause. Incorporating such clauses could nudge the development of requisite institutional capacity to periodically review parliamentary laws and check the rise of the zombies.


Pratik Datta is a Senior Research Fellow at Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co. All views expressed are personal. The author thanks Rajeswari Sengupta, Ajay Shah and two anonymous referees for their useful suggestions.