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Friday, November 20, 2026

Concentration in the market liquidity of Indian equities

by Hasita Pattipaty, Atibhi Sharma, Susan Thomas.

Indian equity markets are some of the most active in the world today. According to the World Federation of Exchanges, order-book trades at the National Stock Exchange (NSE) grew from 1.6 billion in 2010 to 8.2 billion in 2025 (NYSE grew from 2.1 billion to 4.7 billion in the same period). But this trading is strongly linked to the identity of the stock.

For stocks that have a large market capitalisation (market cap) like Infosys, there are always a large number of traders to buy and sell. Traders come with different trading impulses -- speculative, liquidity-motivated or those that want to take out arbitrage -- but their presence generates market liquidity for the shares of that stock. But there are fewer people who want to trade small market cap stocks. Instead, such stocks are traded in response to news or viral events, and mispricing is not easy to correct (Shah and Sharma, 2026). Their order book is often empty, i.e. liquidity is poor. Policy makers see small and medium enterprises as drivers of employment and growth, and exchanges have set up separate platforms for such stocks, but liquidity there remains stubbornly low (Aggarwal and Thomas, 2017).

Economic underdevelopment and low state capability could exacerbate this problem. For example, Shah and Thomas (2003) find that the large firms had 3X the liquidity of small firms on the NASDAQ in 2001, but that on the NSE, large firms had 34X the liquidity of small firms in the same year. With lower trading costs in India, trading firms should be more willing to allocate trader time to small stocks. Algorithmic trading is expected to reshape this problem in a positive direction (Aggarwal and Thomas, 2014). While a small traded product may not justify placing employees, a human controlling computer software may direct trading attention on a large number of small firms.

In this article, we use public data for equity market liquidity, to measure and analyse the evolution of cross-sectional variation in market liquidity in India.

Measuring liquidity

Measuring liquidity is not simple, because it varies across multiple dimensions -- price, quantity, time. A good measure of liquidity is constructed from the limit order book, where hypothetical trades can be simulated and the price impact measured as a function of quantity and time. This was a key innovation that was used in the construction of Nifty. However, this measure requires continuous time snapshots of the limit order book which is not readily available. The poor man's liquidity measure is the `turnover ratio', which is the ratio of the latest one year's traded value divided by today's market cap.

For variation by size, we classify firms by market cap, in each year. Small firms are those at, or below the 10th percentile of market cap, and Large firms are above the 90th percentile. We calculate the market liquidity measures separately for the spot and derivatives, for both the aggregate market as well as for individual stocks.

We select five years across a 20 year span: 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2025. During this period, some events are likely to positively impact liquidity. At the start of this period, single stock futures and options (SSFnO) was thinly traded, but increased subsequently from 2010 onward; the pandemic in 2020 triggered a surge in retail investors trading using mobile phones.

Our analysis draws on two primary data sources. We use daily firm-level data from CMIE Prowess, covering all firms listed on both the NSE and BSE, for spot market data. A total of 6,494 firms in Prowess, traded on the spot market, at least in one of the five years selected for the analysis. Data for single stock derivatives is collected from archived NSE daily Bhavcopy data. For single stock futures, we use the traded value reported in the Bhavcopy, which equals the number of contracts traded x lot size x Bhavcopy price. For single stock options, we calculate traded value the same way, with the price taken as the strike price plus the option premium.

Our SSFnO sample only includes securities whose Bhavcopy ticker matches a firm in CMIE Prowess.1 Out of the 6,494 firms with trading on the spot market, 382 firms trade SSFnO in at least one of the selected five years. Of these, 138 firms stopped trading SSFnO in a later selected year, even though they continued to trade on the spot market. 21 of these 138 firms later started trading SSFnO again.

Table 1: Market cap characteristics of the samples (in nominal Rs. bln)

No. of firms Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Panel A: all firms in the sample
2005 2619 0.0007 0.05 0.18 1.01 1,103.45
2010 3106 0.0008 0.12 0.48 2.70 3,289.68
2015 3495 0.0032 0.14 0.60 4.18 4,829.48
2020 4202 0.0004 0.08 0.38 3.36 8,566.75
2025 5015 0.0002 0.41 1.97 15.41 18,659.96
Panel B: firms with SSFnO trading
2005 43 4.37 52.41 105.79 168.82 1,103.45
2010 213 3.64 24.69 54.61 173.00 3,289.68
2015 133 24.89 103.16 235.39 557.80 4,829.48
2020 186 6.82 92.36 228.12 546.02 8,566.75
2025 239 91.98 379.07 748.11 1,366.95 18,659.96
Panel C: small and large firms by market cap
2005 (Small ≤ Rs.0.02 bln; Large > Rs.4.86 bln)
Small 144 0.0007 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Large 290 4.86 7.46 12.54 32.64 1,103.45
2010 (Small ≤ Rs.0.04 bln; Large > Rs.15.58 bln)
Small 206 0.0008 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Large 332 15.65 26.18 45.12 124.48 3,289.68
2015 (Small ≤ Rs.0.03 bln; Large > Rs.22.02 bln)
Small 183 0.0032 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Large 397 22.14 34.52 63.59 171.39 4,829.48
2020 (Small ≤ Rs.0.03 bln; Large > Rs.30.77 bln)
Small 372 0.0004 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Large 432 31.02 52.29 109.43 238.84 8,566.75
2025 (Small ≤ Rs.0.12 bln; Large > Rs.106.31 bln)
Small 499 0.0002 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12
Large 502 107.08 171.91 311.60 780.48 18,659.96

Panel A in Table 1 shows that the full sample started with around 2500 firms, but this increased to more than 5000 in 2025. From 2010 to 2020, more than half the firms had market cap of Rs.0.5 billion, or more, but a quarter of the firms have market cap less than Rs.140 million.

Firms trading SSFnO (Panel B) are consistently larger. More than 50 percent have market cap more than Rs.200 billion throughout the sample, since 2015. But they are also fewer in number -- typically less than 250 firms each year -- suggesting that there has been limited growth in the number of large firms in the country.

Panel C describes small vs. large firms. In 2005, small firms were 1000 times smaller than large firms. This difference has steadily increased, with small firms being more than 5000 times smaller in 2020, and 2025. Large firm market cap grew faster than small firm market cap.

Our sample captures relative size in a year: small and large firms are the bottom and top market cap deciles of each year. One argument could be that the definition of what are small and large firms will be very different from the start to the end of a 20-year period. As a robustness check, we identify a sample of large vs. small firms by constant real size. This then refers to `small' and `large' firms of the same real size of firm in every year. For this, we first take the median market cap of the bottom and top deciles of the 2026 sample. We deflate these median values to the prices of each of 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2025. For a given year, small firms are those with market cap that fall within 0.95-1.05 times the real bottom decile market cap value for the year, while large firms are those that fall within 0.95-1.05 times the real top decile market cap value. This gives a smaller count of both large and small firms. There are between 25-51 small firms each year, with a median market cap Rs.0.02 billion in 2005 and Rs.0.07 billion in 2025. There are even fewer large firms (4-17 each year), with median market cap of Rs.79 billion in 2005, Rs.282 billion in 2025.

Findings

  1. How has aggregate market liquidity evolved over the last two decades?
  2. Figure 1: Aggregate market turnover ratio (TR) for all firms in the sample, split into spot and SSFnO, selected years

    Figure 1 shows that aggregate market TR increased from 1.99 to 4.45 in the entire 20 year period. Almost all of this rise came after 2015: TR hovered around 2 until 2010, dipped to 1.69 in 2015, and then rose to 2.36 in 2020 and 4.45 in 2025. By itself, spot market TR decreased from 1.13 to 0.67, with most of the fall between 2010 and 2015. Over the same period, SSFnO TR rose more than four-fold, from 0.86 to 3.78. The much lauded growth in market liquidity comes from SSFnO liquidity.

  3. Has spot market liquidity become more or less concentrated?
  4. Figure 2: Box plots of spot turnover ratio (TR) for large and small firms, selected years, with the values on the vertical axes in log scale.

    Relative size

    Constant real size

    Liquidity evolved differently for the small and large stocks. In the top panel (relative size), the median TR of large stocks fell from 0.67 in 2005 to 0.40 in 2020, and recovered to 0.63 in 2025. Small stocks fared much worse: their median TR fell from 0.076 in 2005 to 0.002 in 2020, before a sharp increase to 0.106 in 2025.

    The bottom panel uses constant real size, so that "small" and "large" refer to the same size of firm in every year. The pattern is similar, and sharper for the large firms. The median TR of large firms rose from 0.29 in 2005 to 0.86 in 2020, and then fell to 0.56 in 2025. The median TR of small firms fell from 0.06 in 2005 to 0.004 in 2020, and then rose to 0.12 in 2025. Both groups are small samples (4-17 large firms and 25-51 small firms in each year), so the medians should be read with caution.

    Table 2: Comparison of the large vs. small stock liquidity, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025

    Large firm TR/Small firm TR    2005    2010    2015    2020    2025
    Relative size 9 17 25 163 6
    Constant real size 5 4 34 235 5

    Table 2 shows that in 2005, a typical large firm turned over its market cap about 9 times as much as a small firm. The ratio of large to small stock TR increased steadily between 2005 and 2020, i.e. liquidity grew more concentrated in large firms, but by 2025, this had reverted to 6 times. By constant real size, the liquidity ratio changes in value, but the trend shows the same pattern: that the liquidity differences between large and small firms worsened in 2015 and in the pandemic period of 2020, but in 2025, it has reverted to 2005 values.

Discussion

Liquidity of large firms has grown at a consistent, slow pace while the growth in liquidity of small stocks is volatile. Small stock liquidity dropped sharply compared to a small decline in large firm liquidity between 2010 and 2020. The gap has narrowed in 2025, but it remains to be seen if this is a temporary or a permanent feature of the market. In the meantime, large stocks continue to dominate liquidity in the spot market, and the primary venue for price discovery for these large stocks has moved from the spot market to their derivatives.

Our analysis shows where liquidity is going, but does not, by itself, explain why. We point to two channels that are consistent with the patterns observed.

  1. The first channel is the positive spillover from derivatives to the underlying spot. A stock with actively traded futures and options can be hedged and arbitraged at low cost. These benefits carry over to spot market transactions. This positive spillover has been documented in international markets (Black, 1975; Kumar, Sarin and Shastri, 1998; Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew, 2004), and holds for India as well (Aggarwal and Thomas, 2019). Small stocks do not have the benefit from a similar spillover effect, and suffer from a persistent low market liquidity.

  2. A second channel is algorithmic trading (AT). AT binds SSFnO and spot markets together with higher speed and lower costs, attracting arbitrageurs and hedgers alike. Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) find that AT narrows spreads and reduces adverse selection in large US stocks, but find no significant effect in small stocks. Aggarwal and Thomas (2014) find that SME stocks with higher AT have higher liquidity and lower price volatility, than comparable stocks with less algorithmic trading.

The concentration of liquidity makes for fragile equities markets. It reduces the ability to diversify investments in the economy for returns at lower volatility. A healthy equity market enables firms to move from small to mid to large caps, by enabling access to deeper pools of liquidity. For the majority of firms outside the large firms, liquidity remains thin and growth through equity financing in public markets slim. There is the added dead weight of passive investing. As capital flows into index-tracking instruments, liquidity is directed automatically toward the large firms by weight. This creates a feedback loop: higher market cap attracts passive flows, which raise liquidity, which strengthens the firm's dominance. For policymakers, the concern is that the equity market becomes less a broad barometer of the Indian economy and more a reflection of a few large firms.

Given robust exchange institutions that have become entrenched with the '90s reforms and tested through multiple exogenous shocks since then, it may be time to extend the derivatives channel to cover a larger set of Indian equities, if this mechanism can aid the transition for more firms to grow larger and bring a more diversified pool of equity investments to Indian households.

Conclusion

On paper, the Indian securities markets have a lot of modern features, such as electronic limit order books, single stock futures, a clearing corporation, etc. Under the hood, many features of financial economic policy, tax policy and capital controls have hindered the emergence of a liquid and efficient market (Shah, 2026). While the number of listed firms has grown, and their market cap has grown greatly, spot market turnover has not kept up. About 85% of spot traded value and more than 90% of market cap sit in the large 10% of firms. The concentration of liquidity in large firms during the last 20 years has often been worse than what it was in 2005.

The pattern is consistent with algorithmic trading and cross-market arbitrage deepening price discovery in derivatives, with liquidity spilling over to the underlying stocks that have derivatives. There are benefits to develop a more liquid market beyond a narrow set of existing, large firms. Measures that widen access to liquidity for mid and small firms, such as extending derivatives eligibility, supporting market-making or improving the quality of data on smaller firms, deserve attention. A direct test of the derivatives-to-spot spillover is the next step.

Notes

1 Some SSFnO securities cannot be matched because the ticker in the NSE Bhavcopy differs from the one in CMIE Prowess, which maintains the latest symbol for each firm. Firms that were later renamed or merged appear under their older ticker in the Bhavcopy. For example, of the 247 stocks with SSFnO trading in 2010, 213 can be matched to the spot dataset by ticker. The trading in the unmatched securities is left out of our analysis, which makes our estimate of derivative liquidity conservative. For most years studied, the traded value of the unmatched stocks is small (less than 10% other than in 2005, where it is 24%). ↩

Bibliography

Algorithmic trading and the NSE equity markets: Has the market changed for the better?, Nidhi Aggarwal and Susan Thomas, IGIDR, December 2014.

Response of firms to listing: Evidence from SME exchanges, Nidhi Aggarwal and Susan Thomas, IGC Working Paper F-35313-INC-1, March 2017.

When stock futures dominate price discovery, Nidhi Aggarwal and Susan Thomas, Journal of Futures Markets vol. 39, no. 3, March 2019.

Fact and Fantasy in the Use of Options, Fischer Black, Financial Analysts Journal vol. 31, no. 4, 1975 (pp. 36–41, 61–72).

Informed Trading in Stock and Option Markets, Sugato Chakravarty, Huseyin Gulen and Stewart Mayhew, Journal of Finance vol. 59, no. 3, 2004.

Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, Terrence Hendershott, Charles M. Jones and Albert J. Menkveld, Journal of Finance vol. 66, no. 1, 2011.

The Impact of Options Trading on the Market Quality of the Underlying Security: An Empirical Analysis, Raman Kumar, Atulya Sarin and Kuldeep Shastri, Journal of Finance vol. 53, no. 2, 1998.

Securities market efficiency, Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas, in Globalization and national financial systems, ed. James A. Hanson, Patrick Honohan and Giovanni Majnoni, The World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003 (chap. 6, pp. 145–175).

The Journey of Indian Finance, Ajay Shah, in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern South Asia vol. 2, ed. Latika Chaudhary, Tirthankar Roy and Anand V. Swamy, Cambridge University Press, 2026 (chap. 6).

Chinks in market efficiency: A Melody story, Ajay Shah and Atibhi Sharma, The Leap Blog, 4 June 2026.


Hasita is a research assistant at IIM Ahmedabad. Atibhi is a research associate, and Susan is a senior research lead and senior research fellow at XKDR Forum. We thank Rounak Hande for enthusiastic help and participation in discussions about securities markets liquidity, and Ajay Shah for comments on an earlier draft of the article. All errors remain our own.

Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Financing Better Public Parks in Indian Cities

by Anirudh Burman.

Why urban parks present a public-finance problem

Parks provide places to walk, play and meet, while their trees and open spaces offer benefits beyond those who visit them. Keeping parks accessible requires continuing expenditure on gardeners, cleaning, water, repairs and the replacement of worn-out facilities. Municipal budgets must meet these costs alongside other infrastructure needs. Charging visitors can raise money, but may discourage use and exclude residents who cannot afford to pay.

Indian cities have already sought support through park adoption, donated facilities and commercial uses. They also pay contractors and community organisations to undertake maintenance. These arrangements perform different financial functions. Outsourcing changes who delivers a publicly funded service; mobilising private finance brings additional contributions towards improvements or upkeep. A donated facility or permission to operate a kiosk, however, does not by itself ensure that money will be available for continuing care.

I argue that public finance should help mobilise private resources through commitments that contributors, park managers and public authorities can honour. Contributors need defined benefits and clarity about their obligations. Managers need dependable funding, sufficient continuity and authority to use the receipts on which their maintenance plans depend. Public authorities must preserve access and provide for parks with limited prospects of attracting donations or commercial income. The objective is to increase the resources available for accessible, well-maintained parks while retaining a dependable public commitment to their care.

The essay develops this argument through comparisons with New York and London's Royal Parks and an examination of arrangements in Indian cities. It considers operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards to explain how private contributions can support continuing maintenance. The comparison leads to principles for public finance suited to parks with different costs, donor bases and commercial opportunities.

Principles for a financing architecture

First, I consider the option of free access. The case for public expenditure is straightforward. General revenues can flatten costs and benefits across those who do and do not use parks directly. Where available money falls short of the cost of acceptable care, the authority must increase funding or reduce service standards.

The other usual option is ticketed entry. Charges can contribute to upkeep where visitors are willing and able to pay. However, charging for every visit may discourage regular use and exclude poorer residents, and also leave wider environmental benefits unpaid.

A third option is to combine public and private financing. The city can fund basic maintenance while donors/ licensees of services pay for improvements or contribute to annual upkeep. Companies can support eligible work through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. A licensed cafe can pay fees towards maintenance where commercial demand permits. Public ownership and free entry can continue. The Delhi Urban Art Commission's Park Design Guidelines already discusses such contributions and revenue sources.

This mix addresses the limits of the first two options. In Indian cities, public finances are often inadequate to fund park maintenance alongside competing infrastructure needs. Research on Chennai describes a municipal corporation with few internal resources and neglected parks in poorer neighbourhoods. Ticketing cannot reliably fill this gap. Affordable charges may raise too little, while higher charges exclude users and discourage visits. Where sufficient revenue depends on prices that residents cannot afford, ticketing is infeasible as the main source of maintenance funding.

A workable funding arrangement must meet two requirements. It must provide capital resources to rehabilitate a park and recurring resources to keep it in good condition. Capital resources pay for works such as repairing paths, installing toilets or replacing playground equipment.

Recurring resources must cover gardeners' wages, cleaning, water, electricity and repairs, with provision for eventual replacement of worn-out assets. A donated toilet illustrates the distinction. Its construction may be fully financed, while there may not be any plan or provision for its cleaning, water supply and repairs. This is a general phenomenon observed in Indian city infrastructure in general, and also in parks.

New York and London's Royal Parks illustrate how public payments, donations and commercial income can be combined to meet both requirements.

What New York and London demonstrate

The international and Indian cases were selected to show variation in financing arrangements and governance, not to represent all Indian parks or support a statistical comparison. The essay compares how these arrangements work on paper and in reported practice; it does not rank their performance.

New York

New York combines public ownership of parks with several forms of management. The city's parks department, NYC Parks, provides services directly and contracts with nonprofit organisations for specified responsibilities. The mayor and budget office prepare spending plans, and the City Council approves public expenditure. Nonprofit boards manage their own staff, budgets, fundraising and investments. Commercial concessions require separate public approvals, including review by the city's Franchise and Concession Review Committee where applicable. State law also protects parkland against diversion to non-park uses, generally requiring specific legislative authorisation. Delegating maintenance therefore leaves important decisions over money and land with public authorities.

The Central Park Conservancy which manages the Central Park is one such nonprofit. Formed in 1980, it developed from civic fundraising and restoration into a professional management organisation, with a formal city management agreement from 1998. It employs staff, maintains the park and plans improvements within its delegated role. The city retains ownership and regulatory authority. This continuing relationship enables the Conservancy to accept gifts and undertake obligations extending beyond individual restoration projects.

The city also pays the Conservancy for services. Termination is limited to specified contractual conditions. The Conservancy must raise and spend at least \$16 million annually on specified services. In exchange, the city pays \$16 million a year, reducible in proportion to cuts in the city's operating budget. This payment sits alongside private fundraising and separate public capital projects. It gives the organisation a defined public contribution against which to plan, while leaving it exposed to fundraising risk.

Within this institution, donors can support memberships, commemorative benches and trees, restoration projects or endowments. Recognition, experiences and negotiated project naming offer different reasons to give without conferring ownership or exclusive possession. The money has different uses. Unrestricted gifts can pay salaries and cleaning bills. Restricted gifts have to be used for their agreed purpose. Endowments invest donated capital and provide distributions under spending rules accompanied by a plan for subsequent care. Organised fundraising connects donors to a manager able to explain those obligations and account for their money.

New York's Bryant Park Corporation manages Bryant Park under city agreements, with concessions and business improvement district (BID) arrangements supplying revenue. Under New York's BID framework, a district management nonprofit spends compulsory property assessments on local services under an approved plan. Property owners, tenants and public officials are represented on its board, and the city collects and transfers the assessments. This gives nearby beneficiaries a collective financing arrangement. The assessment is distinct from a voluntary gift or a levy calculated on measured land-value appreciation.

Concessions give operators permission to earn money from specified activities in exchange for contractual payments or services. Public approval determines the permissible use and the how the receipts are allocated. A park manager cannot assume that permission to host a cafe includes permission to retain its income. Bryant Park's combination depends on commercial demand and the surrounding property economy.

These arrangements coexist with ordinary municipal maintenance. For neighbourhood parks, NYC Parks continues to provide core services, supplemented by local fundraising and volunteering. Partnerships for Parks, operated with City Parks Foundation, helps community groups organise, access grants and administer funds through fiscal sponsorship. Groups can therefore share administrative support without establishing a professional conservancy for every park.

London

London's eight Royal Parks, including Hyde Park and Richmond Park, form a Crown estate under the central government's Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), separate from ordinary municipal parks. A 2016 contracting-out order allowed DCMS to delegate its statutory management functions. In 2017, the functions of the government parks agency and a separate fundraising foundation were combined in a charitable company, The Royal Parks Limited. DCMS granted it a ten-year management licence and service contract. The charity manages the estate but cannot sell the parks. The reform addressed restrictions that had prevented the agency from accumulating reserves and retaining surplus receipts across years. Combining management and fundraising with these financial powers allowed the charity to plan beyond the annual budget cycle.

DCMS holds the public management powers and permits the charity to retain park income. Trustees approve budgets, staffing, investment, reserves and commercial strategy within the licence and charitable obligations. The senior managers handle daily operations within delegated financial limits. The Mayor of London appoints some trustees and has adjacent planning responsibilities, but neither general ownership nor annual budget responsibility. Regulators oversee compliance and auditors examine the accounts, while operational decisions remain with the charity.

The charity's wholly owned trading subsidiary conducts commercial activities and transfers available profits to the charity. Concession and event partners operate under approved contracts, park-use restrictions and relevant planning, conservation and safety requirements. Revenue retention allows the charity to keep authorised receipts and spend them on the parks. Carry-forward and reserves let it meet costs in later years. Managing the portfolio together also allows shared administration and planning across parks with different earning opportunities.

This structure supports a predominantly earned-income model. In 2024-25, trading activities generated about GBP 46.3 million, including events, catering concessions, property income, parking and filming. DCMS paid an GBP 11 million cash service fee, which did not meet the full cost of management. Donations and grants contributed about GBP 3 million. Other income included sporting and cultural activities. It supplied no cash for wages. Commercial receipts, philanthropy and the government payment therefore make different contributions to the operating budget.

The contract also allocates risk. The charity bears ordinary operating and asset-maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. Events income fell in 2024-25, showing why commercial receipts require a financial buffer. The trustees set general reserves at GBP 23 million, including GBP 15 million for working capital to meet current bills, while separately designating funds for restoration and maintenance projects.

This comparison explains five factors: operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards. New York's contracts and district arrangements, and London's licence and delegated powers, identify governance and accountability structures allowing for autonomy and diversification. They allow park managing organisations to hire staff, seek gifts and manage receipts while government retains control over public assets. Exceptional donor wealth, property values and visitor demand limit their transferability.

Indian cities already use multiple financing arrangements

Indian cities have also tried to combine public expenditure with community participation, donated facilities and commercial activity. The public bodies responsible for these arrangements differ across cities and sometimes within the same city. Their control over land, maintenance budgets and permissions determines what they can offer a contributor. The existing arrangements show both how public money supports delegated maintenance and how cities seek additional private resources.

Delhi

Delhi has separate arrangements for parks controlled by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). DDA owns the parks offered for adoption, and its horticulture officers sign the agreements and supervise the adopters. MCD maintains municipal parks through its horticulture department and other service providers. A third institution, the Delhi Parks and Gardens Society (DPGS), administers government grants to residents' welfare associations (RWAs) and nongovernmental organisations. A community group using a DPGS grant spends public money, whereas a DDA adopter finances the agreed work from its own resources.

DPGS provides separate grants for routine maintenance, new parks and decentralised sewage-treatment plants. The application process requires permission from the land-owning agency, a tripartite agreement, inspections and utilisation certificates documenting expenditure. Residents organise the work using public grant money. Additional contributions from residents supplement that public funding.

MCD's Standing Committee approved the revival of its stalled RWA scheme in February 2026. The revival followed an earlier interruption and reports of unpaid dues. Under the scheme, the commissioner must approve each adoption, and horticulture staff are responsible for monitoring the work. Under the reported terms, MCD would pay RWAs INR 13,500 per acre each month for gardening, irrigation, mowing and cleaning. MCD retains responsibility for existing lights, gyms, shelters and play equipment. RWAs cannot undertake permanent construction or commercial activities. The arrangement separates routine care from municipal infrastructure obligations, without giving associations a commercial income stream.

DDA's adoption policy (2020), instead, requires adopters to meet the full cost of agreed improvements and maintenance. Adopters can upgrade and maintain a park, maintain an existing park or part of one, or install and maintain a facility. DDA approves improvements and retains control over the park, while adopters must preserve public access, meet prescribed maintenance standards and submit to inspection. The initial three-year term can be renewed with DDA approval in three-year periods up to twelve years, subject to the park remaining under DDA. DDA permits acknowledgement signs and approved public events for up to twenty days a year. The policy contemplates temporary kiosks but does not automatically entitle adopters to retain the receipts. Installed assets vest in DDA when the arrangement ends.

Mumbai

For Mumbai's municipal parks, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) provides funding through its Garden Department and procures maintenance through ward-level contracts. BMC's 2025-26 budget proposed INR 220.12 crore for the department as a whole. The budget also recorded an invitation for volunteer agencies to participate in the proposed Mumbai Public Park without a financial commitment from BMC. The volunteer invitation sought contributions from outside the municipal budget.

BMC has also experimented with adoption and caretaker arrangements. However, this move was derailed due to objections. Public controversy centred on the mingling of private facilities, possession of parkland by the adopters and caretakers, and restrictions on access. A February 2024 report described BMC's withdrawal of a draft offering longer adoption terms after public objections. This history helps explain why the permissions offered to private participants have remained contested.

Kolkata

The Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) provides municipal park services through its Parks and Squares Department. KMC's budget combines parks, squares and urban forestation in one expenditure head. The corporation's published account of its park services identifies maintenance by a private horticultural company at Citizen's Park, or Mohar Kunja.

Commercial use has also occurred without a clear connection to maintenance funding. A report on Vivekananda Park described rentals by clubs, damaged paths, waste and restrictions on public use. It is unclear whther rental receipts accrued to the KMC or paid for upkeep. The Vivekananda Park example illustrates why permission to use public space, revenue collection and maintenance responsibility must be identified separately.

Bengaluru

Responsibility for Bengaluru's parks is divided among the municipal government, the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and the state Horticulture Department. The Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) published a 2024 community-involvement policy for parks under municipal custody. The policy excludes Lalbagh, Cubbon Park and BDA parks. BBMP's 2024-25 performance report records contracted maintenance and Hasiru Mitra inspections, alongside separate provision for upgrades, fencing and new parks.

Under the community policy, companies, RWAs and other contributors can provide facilities and services such as benches, toilets, drinking water, cleaning and security. Contributors must obtain approval and enter into an agreement with BBMP. The municipality retains custody of the parks and supervises the work, while completed assets vest in the city. The policy specifies an eleven-month term and prohibits the direct acceptance of cash under this arrangement. BBMP separately reported 48 adopted parks and medians but did not report the value of adopters' contributions. Formal commencement of the policy and its application after municipal reorganisation remain unconfirmed. The published terms cannot therefore be assumed to govern all reported adoptions.

Chennai

The Greater Chennai Corporation (GCC) organises municipal park maintenance through its own labour force, contractors and adopters. Its City Action Plan records a snapshot of 702 parks: 76 maintained by GCC labour, 533 outsourced and 93 adopted. GCC pays contractors to undertake maintenance, while adoption can bring contributions from outside the municipal budget. These routes coexist within the corporation's portfolio, with different sources of funding and obligations.

GCC's 2023 proposals to improve contractor accountability included smaller maintenance packages and a payment structure with 75 per cent fixed and 25 per cent linked to inspections. A tender reported in December 2024 proposed a INR 46 crore maintenance package covering 595 parks over three years, with digital work logs, biometric attendance and user feedback. The proposals were intended to make work observable and connect public payments to contractors' performance. The tender and proposals do not establish whether monitoring subsequently produced deductions or better maintenance.

The Indian cases show that public agencies already use maintenance contracts, community grants and adoption to organise park care. Contracting and community grants rely on public funds, while adoption can require contributors to pay for both improvements and upkeep. Commercial use of park space raises separate questions about who receives the income and whether the receipts fund maintenance. Mumbai's caretaker disputes also show how private facilities and possession can create the perception, real or imagined, of threatenening public access. The next section compares Indian arrangements with those in New York and London on five grounds: operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards. The comparison examines who can commit public funding, grant revenue rights and enforce maintenance and access obligations.

The successes and constraints of the current arrangements

New York and London show how public support can combine with other income to sustain park management. Central Park pairs city payments with organised fundraising. The Royal Parks charity receives a government payment and retains commercial income. Indian cities also use public contracts, community grants, adoption and contributed facilities. Accountability, clear service objectives and autonomy over authorised spending are relevant institutional conditions. Funding instruments, including maintenance contracts, adoption agreements, gifts and concessions, specify who contributes, what they receive and which obligations they assume. Day-to-day practices determine whether those commitments are fulfilled. A maintenance contract depends on timely payment and credible inspection; an adoption agreement depends on clear maintenance duties and follow-through when work falls short.

The five criteria follow from the need to finance both improvements and recurring maintenance while preserving public access. Operating funding identifies who pays wages, utilities and repairs, and who bears a shortfall. Tenure matters because the duration and renewal conditions affect whether a contributor can plan for the medium to long-term. A capital improvement may last much longer than the agreement under which it was installed.

Donor benefits matter because a contributor may value recognition, experiences or improvements to a public amenity. Revenue rights establish whether the park manager may collect, retain and spend income from permitted activities. A donor's willingness to give and an operator's ability to earn money require different arrangements. Public safeguards concern the controls needed to protect access, verify maintenance and recover control after a breach. The criteria therefore test whether the promised resources and rights can support continuing care while protecting the park's public use.

Table 1. Park financing and management: Central Park, the Royal Parks and DDA adoption

DimensionCentral ParkDDA adoptionRoyal Parks: authority
Operating fundingCity service payments alongside Conservancy fundraising.Adopter bears development and maintenance costs under the policy.DCMS pays a cash service fee; trustees budget retained income.
Tenure2023-2033 management agreement; further renewal requires agreement.Three years, renewable in three-year terms up to twelve, subject to DDA jurisdiction.DCMS licence began in March 2017 for ten years; later terms require confirmation.
Donor benefitsRecognition, experiences, memorials and negotiated project naming.Specified acknowledgement signs and conditional public-event permissions.Trustees manage fundraising within charitable and licence obligations.
Revenue rightsConcession income follows separate authorisations and agreements.Kiosk permission supplies no automatic right to retain proceeds.DCMS permits retention; trustees decide expenditure within the permitted purposes.
Public safeguardsCity ownership, public approvals and contractual service duties.DDA retains control, requires public access and provides termination and asset handback.Government retains public powers; managers implement use restrictions; regulators and auditors oversee compliance.

Central Park: 2024 audited disclosures and published donor arrangements. DDA: policy amended October 2020, not an evaluation of executed adoptions. Royal Parks: 2024-25 accounts and published governance disclosures.

Operating funding

Central Park's management agreement gives the park Conservancy a public service payment alongside its fundraising obligations. In contrast, DDA's adoption policy places the agreed improvement and maintenance costs on the adopter, without a comparable public payment. Both arrangements delegate work, but the adopter under DDA must secure funding for that work. The Royal Parks charity combines retained income with a government service fee. The charity bears ordinary maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. The allocation of costs therefore matters as much as the range of funding sources.

MCD's RWA scheme and Chennai's maintenance contracts involve public payment for services. Their financial credibility depends on whether the authority pays on time. MCD's earlier interruption of the RWA scheme documents this risk. Chennai's inspection-linked payment proposals address the other side of the contract: whether the supplier earns payment by delivering the required work. Both of these are however better described as outsourcing contracts rather than mobilising private revenues for supplementing private ones.

Tenure

The Central Park Conservancy and the Royal Parks charity both manage publicly owned parks under ten-year agreements. Central Park's agreement runs from 2023 to 2033. The Royal Parks charity received its ten-year licence in 2017; the available accounts leave its post-2027 terms unconfirmed. In both cases, the agreement gives the manager a period over which to organise staff, fundraising and maintenance, subject to contractual duties and public oversight.

DDA offers an initial three-year adoption, renewable in three-year periods up to twelve years while the park remains under its jurisdiction. Continuing for the full period therefore requires successive approvals. DDA can also terminate an adoption through the prescribed procedure, and installed assets vest in the authority on termination or expiry. BBMP's published text specifies an eleven-month term, although its implementation status remains unverified.

The difference concerns the period for which a contributor can rely on an agreed role. DDA's three-year renewal cycle requires more frequent decisions about continuation than the ten-year agreements used for Central Park and the Royal Parks. If a donor funds a facility whose upkeep extends beyond the current term, the donor and public authority must agree who will provide that care after expiry. Renewal conditions can protect the public against poor performance, but uncertainty about continuation can complicate long-term commitments.

Donor benefits

Central Park and the Royal Parks both offer donors recognition without transferring ownership or exclusive use of park facilities. Their bench programmes make the offer concrete through published donation amounts and dedication conditions. Central Park also offers memberships, tree memorials and negotiated project recognition. The Royal Parks' bench dedications depend on location, availability and approved inscriptions. The shared feature is a defined offer administered by the organisation responsible for the park, although the range of benefits differs.

DDA already offers acknowledgement signs and approved public-event permissions. BBMP's published policy also provides a route for contributors to supply facilities and services. However, a prospective donor may still need a specific offer linking the contribution sought, the duration of recognition and responsibility for subsequent repairs.

A defined offer lets a contributor assess what the gift will secure and lets the manager explain the associated care obligations. Indian cities could make those terms explicit without giving donors control over public space. The offer must also distinguish charitable giving, corporate sponsorship and commercial investment. An Indian company cannot assume that spending on publicity or employee-only activities qualifies as CSR expenditure. Recognition may help attract support, but neither a better catalogue nor a more generous benefit can guarantee demand where potential donors are scarce.

Revenue rights

In New York and London, public authorities specify the rights under which park managers receive and use commercial income. New York allocates concession rights and receipts through public approvals and separate agreements. The Royal Parks licence expressly permits the charity to retain park income, and trustees can hold reserves and spend across years. Both examples connect permitted commercial activity to a financial arrangement identifying who receives the money and how it may support the parks.

DDA's adoption policy contemplates temporary kiosks, but has no automatic entitlement to operate a concession or retain its proceeds. Kolkata's rental example leaves the recipient and use of receipts unclear. These gaps matter because a park manager cannot budget on the assumption that activity within the park will generate income available for its own bills. The agreement must identify who collects the receipts, what share reaches maintenance and which authority approves that use. The Indian examples establish permissions or rentals more clearly than a dependable flow of usable maintenance income.

Central Park uses restricted gifts and endowments with specified purposes and spending rules. The Royal Parks receives donations and grants alongside commercial income, and maintains reserves for future obligations. Although their funding mixes differ, both have an organisation able to hold money and apply it to park care beyond the year of receipt.

The Indian adoption arrangements described here provide a narrower route. BBMP's published scheme accepts assets and services but prohibits direct cash acceptance under that policy. DDA envisages adopter-funded work but under its scheme there is a risk that a donated facility may leave the authority with future repair bills unless continuing care is separately funded. Collecting cash gifts, investing them and using distributions for maintenance would require an authorised recipient and explicit financial rules.

Bryant Park adds a further source of revenue through compulsory district assessments collected under New York's BID framework. The reviewed Indian policies establish no equivalent park-specific assessment. Introducing one would require its own legal basis and district-governance arrangements, beyond an agreement with an individual donor or adopter.

Public safeguards

Mumbai's caretaker controversies concern control of public land and the risk of restricted access. New York and London retain public ownership and regulate commercial uses. DDA also specifies access, maintenance and handback obligations. The question is whether the responsible authority can inspect performance, require correction and recover control. Chennai's proposed monitoring tools and DDA's service standards do provide mechanisms for supervision. I am however, not able to provide data on enforcement.

Some caveats are necessary. Donor wealth and commercial demand help sustain New York and London parks, and cannot be manufactured by improving contract terms. The same business models do not work for all parks. Professional fundraising, accounts and supervision also have costs that may be difficult for a small park to bear. For some parks, shared support or ordinary municipal provision may be more suitable. Public finance must therefore support dependable care where private resources are scarce, while making payments, revenue rights and maintenance obligations credible where complementary finance is feasible.

What public finance should do

Parks need money for improvements and continuing care, while free access limits how much of that cost can be charged to users. New York and London combine public support with donations and commercial income through organisations authorised to manage those resources. Indian cities already use adoption, contributed facilities and commercial permissions alongside publicly financed maintenance. The comparison in section 5 identifies the terms that make these arrangements workable: dependable operating finance, sufficient continuity, defined contributor benefits, usable revenue rights and enforceable public safeguards.

The task is therefore to connect private contributions to maintenance obligations that public agencies and park managers can honour. Permission to adopt a park, install a facility or operate a kiosk leaves important financial questions unresolved. The contributor needs to know what it will receive and how long its role will continue; the manager needs money it can use for the work promised. The case for complementary finance depends on completing that agreement, while recognising that donor wealth and commercial demand will limit what different parks can raise.

If public finance can support such commitments, private resources could fund rehabilitation, improve facilities and sustain better horticulture, cleaning and repairs without charging for every visit. Continuing gifts or permitted commercial receipts could help meet annual bills, while invested funds and reserves could provide for future care. Public money could then support a larger or better-maintained stock of accessible parks than it could finance alone. Where additional income meets costs at commercially attractive parks, public resources could also support neighbourhoods with fewer donors. These gains depend on contributions reaching maintenance, covering their own administrative costs and preserving public use.

Outsourcing alone does not mobilise private revenue. When a municipality pays a contractor or an RWA to maintain a park, the money still comes from the public budget. Better procurement may improve service or reduce its cost, but a change in provider does not establish an additional source of finance. Mobilisation requires contributions from outside that budget, whether gifts, privately funded work or income from permitted commercial activities. Central Park illustrates how the two functions can coexist: the city purchases services from an organisation that also raises private money. Its public payment and its fundraising perform different financial roles.

Additional income available for recurring care

Public finance should help mobilise resources that can meet recurring bills. A large capital gift cannot pay a gardener unless its terms allow money to be used for wages. Likewise, a busy cafe contributes to upkeep only if the financial arrangement directs usable receipts to maintenance. Central Park's unrestricted gifts and London's retained income show why the permitted use of money matters. The relevant gain is the additional maintenance that private resources can finance after fundraising, administration and supervision costs, accounting also for any public spending or existing income they displace.

A dependable public contribution can make that financing arrangement more credible. It gives a manager a funded service commitment around which to seek supplementary gifts or commercial income. Public authorities must still support essential care where those receipts fall short. The division of risk matters here: London's charity bears ordinary maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. Asking a contributor to meet costs beyond its financial means can leave a park with unfunded obligations despite the apparent transfer of responsibility.

Capital contributions accompanied by continuing care

Public finance should mobilise both improvements and the resources needed to sustain them. A donated toilet brings cleaning, water and repair costs; a restored playground brings inspection and eventual replacement costs. The financial value of the gift depends partly on whether those obligations are covered. Central Park's endowments illustrate one way of supporting future work, while DDA's renewal terms and BBMP's published short term raise the question of who continues care after an agreement ends. Capital funding, recognition and maintenance commitments therefore need compatible durations. A long care commitment can coexist with public ownership and free basic access.

Contributions matched to what participants value

Public finance should enable different contributors to support parks on terms suited to their motives. A commemorative donor may value recognition and lasting care; a company may support eligible environmental work; a commercial operator needs a defined opportunity to earn revenue. Central Park and the Royal Parks make some donor offers concrete through published dedication terms. DDA's acknowledgement signs and event permissions provide an Indian starting point. The principle is to connect each contribution to a clear benefit and a funded public service, while keeping gifts, CSR, commercial sponsorship and concessions distinct. Public authorities must have the power to honour the recognition, income rights or payments they promise.

The ability to receive, manage and sustain contributions

Private finance also requires organisations capable of raising and using it. Central Park's professional Conservancy manages donor relationships and restricted funds alongside park operations. The Royal Parks charity can retain income and hold reserves across years. Public support for accounting, fundraising and supervision may therefore help sustain contributions beyond a single restoration campaign. For smaller parks, shared administration or fiscal sponsorship may be more affordable than a separate organisation. Effective practices can operate within existing institutions. More reliable payments, consistent inspection and clearer donor reporting can improve how existing arrangements function within their authorised powers. Experience with those practices may reveal constraints that justify later changes to delegated powers, financial rules or organisational form. Formal redesign is therefore one possible response to experience, and its value depends on whether it enables better practice at a justified cost.

Different financing models for different parks

Public finance should support different financing models for parks with different earning potential. Large destination parks with visitor demand may combine a public maintenance contribution with concession fees, event income and organised fundraising. Neighbourhood parks with a willing donor base may draw on recurring gifts or adopter-funded care alongside municipal services. Parks with little commercial demand or donor support will need predominantly public finance, whether maintenance is delivered directly or through contracts. For small parks, shared fundraising and accounting may cost less than separate organisations. Where lawful and compatible with donor restrictions, a multi-park arrangement could pool some income to support less commercially attractive sites. The choice must reflect each park's costs, earning potential and public uses. Public allocations should follow service needs, so a park's inability to attract donors does not become a reason for poorer care.

References

Jeet Mashru. 2023. "These Are Some of Our City's 'Parks'". Hindustan Times, 20 April. Opening budget paragraph and "Veer Abdul Hamid Maidan, Dharavi."

Sophiya Mathew. 2024. "Parks and (No) Recreation". The Indian Express, 19 July.

Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 2024-25. "Budget Estimates 2024-2025". Revenue-fund table, "Parks & Squares and Urban Forestation."

Delhi Urban Art Commission. 2020. "Park Design Guidelines". Printed pp. 65-72, sections 4.1-4.3.

Central Park Conservancy. 2024. "Financial Statements, June 30, 2024 and 2023". Note 11, printed p. 24 (PDF p. 25); fund and endowment disclosures.

Central Park Conservancy. n.d.. "Corporate Programme".

Central Park Conservancy. n.d.. "Adopt-A-Bench".

New York City Small Business Services. n.d.. "Business Improvement Districts". Sections on governance, funding and oversight.

The Royal Parks. 2024-25. "Annual Report and Accounts 2024-25". Pp. 65-67, 75-80 and 90-91; note 1(f).

Kolkata Municipal Corporation. n.d.. "Parks and Squares". "PPP Projects."

Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board. 2021.. "Action Plan for Control of Air Pollution in Million Plus City of Tamilnadu (Revised): Chennai U. A.". Section 14.1, p. 65.

Government of NCT of Delhi. 2023-24. "Economic Survey of Delhi 2023-24". Pp. 165-166, sections 8.1-8.2.

Delhi Parks and Gardens Society. 2021. "Application for Financial Assistance". September; application and payment workflow.

Drishti Jain. 2026. "Municipal Corporation of Delhi Brings Back RWA Partnership to Maintain Parks amid Staff Shortage". The Indian Express, 24 February. Opening approval and arrears paragraphs; final infrastructure and land-use paragraphs.

The Times of India. 2025. "MCD to Reintroduce PPP Scheme for Park Maintenance in Delhi".

Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike. 2024. "Community Involvement for Park Conservation Policy". Part I, sections 1-2; Part II, sections 1-4; MOU, sections 3-5.

Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike. 2024-25. "Performance Report 2024-25". Pp. 29-30, paragraphs 28-33.

Sneha Priya Yanappa et al.. 2025. "A Park for All". Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, September. Pp. 76-89 and 91-105.

Delhi Development Authority. 2019. "Adoption of Parks Policy 2019". Amended 9 October 2020. Sections 2, 5-10 and 11-13, pp. 3-9; model agreement, pp. 12-23.

The Telegraph. 2025. "KMC's Bid to Stop Renting Out Space Inside Park". January.

The New Indian Express. 2023. "GCC to End Practice of Single Contractor Maintaining Many Parks". 29 April.

The New Indian Express. 2024. "Greater Chennai Corporation Floats Bids for Upkeep of 595 Parks". 22 December.

Sayli Udas-Mankikar. 2020. "Formulating Open-Space Policies for India's Cities: The Case of Mumbai". ORF Occasional Paper 241, April. "Open Spaces Policy" and conclusion.

Linah Baliga. 2024. "BMC Scraps Draft Policy on Open Spaces". Hindustan Times, 12 February.

Jon Kher Kaw, Hyunji Lee and Sameh Wahba, eds.. 2020. "The Hidden Wealth of Cities: Creating, Financing, and Managing Public Spaces". World Bank. Chapter 3, pp. 55-93.

Manisha Anantharaman, Marlyne Sahakian and Czarina Saloma. 2023. "Spatialising Degrowth in Southern Cities: Everyday Park-Making for (Un)Commoning". Urban Studies 60(7), pp. 1266-1284.

Central Park Conservancy. n.d.. "Our Story".

House of Commons. 2016. "General Committee Proceedings". 19 October.

London Assembly. 2024. "London's Royal Parks". October.

Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation. 2025. "Budget Estimates A, B & G, 2025-26". 4 February. P. 50, "Enhanced Open Spaces and Greenery."

Greater Chennai Corporation. 2022. "Council Resolution, 26 January 2022". Recital referring to Special Officer Resolution 1073/2020 and the adoption conditions.


Anirudh Burman is a researcher at the XKDR Forum.

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Saul Kriger Wilson: "The Origins of Land Finance: Local Resistance and Top-Down Imposition": A review

by Anirudh Burman.

Indian public bodies use several distinct land-related instruments for generating revenues from land-use. The National Land Monetization Corporation supports the disposal or lease of non-core public assets; development authorities auction or lease land; planning authorities and municipal bodies collect development or floor-space charges. These activities raise questions about the designs of the precise mechanisms that must be used, and whether the correct mechanisms are in place.

Saul Kriger Wilson's article asks a different, more specific question about China: why did local governments fail to collect the public revenue available from land transfers, and what changed that practice? In his telling, local governments engaged in transfers of land-use that severely undercut public revenue interests until the central government made concerted efforts to ensure transparent, auction-based transfers of land-use rights.

Wilson argues that fiscal opportunity alone did not ensure public receipts. Central political pressure, inspections and consequences for local officials helped make market pricing and payment collection effective requirements. In this review of his article I analyse his account alongside scholarship on fiscal incentives, land as development and credit infrastructure, and political control.

Fiscal opportunity and collected revenue

Wilson's argument relies on a distinction between the revenue a public authority might potentially earn and the actual collection. According to him, land receipts in China remained limited until the early 2000s, although local governments had opportunities to raise more. Negotiated transfers could yield less than competitive transactions, and agreed payments were not always collected. Wilson traces how local resistance and central intervention shaped that gap. His evidence includes historical examples, local cases and accounts of inspections and disciplinary action.(Wilson, pp. 2-4 .)

The conventional explanation links the expansion of land finance to the 1994 tax-sharing reform, which increased local spending responsibilities while reducing some local revenues. Wilson does not deny the reform's fiscal consequences. However, he argues that it cannot by itself explain when market-priced transactions and reliable collection took hold. Guangzhou sought bids for development rights in 1986, and Shenzhen sold term-limited land-use rights in 1987. These precedents show that land transactions predated the reform, while later resistance suggests that fiscal pressure did not automatically align officials' conduct with the public owner's interests. (Wilson, pp. 5-7.)

Wilson's account also qualifies any simple claim that valuable land or a need for revenue would lead officials to maximize public receipts. During the 1992-1993 property boom, officials in Beihai and Haikou continued to make discounted deals. Wilson uses contemporary accounts and disciplinary investigations to describe how officials and their networks could benefit from those arrangements. This is evidence about the cases he examines, not proof that local officials everywhere preferred private gains to public revenue. It does show why fiscal incentives alone cannot stand in for an account of who controls transactions and how rules are enforced.

Changes in land acquisition, housing and bank finance during the late 1990s made profitable transfers more feasible. Yet Beijing's 2002 restrictions on negotiated sales retained broad exceptions, and local self-examination did not reliably discipline municipal leaders. Wilson identifies a shift in 2003, when local leaders were assessed on implementation and failed inspections could threaten construction-land approvals and quotas. He describes Guangxi's response to repeated inspections and the later pressure on Beijing to reject pending negotiated projects and reorganise district land bureaux. ( Wilson, pp. 11-15.)

Wilson reports that Shenzhen collected only 25 per cent of contracted land revenue in 1995. During the later reform campaign, authorities identified 25.2 billion yuan in late, reduced or illegally discounted payments and recovered 17.6 billion yuan. Subsequent audits reported collection rates of 90 per cent or more of fees due. He also reports a 977 per cent increase in land-sale revenue between 2000 and 2004.( Wilson, pp. 2, 4, 6, 15-16 .)

Wilson states that corruption continued nonetheless. Officials could manipulate auctions or accept bribes even as developers paid substantial sums to government. His narrower claim is that sustained central intervention shifted the balance toward public collection and made market pricing more routine. The article's contribution is to explain the political and administrative work behind that change, rather than to treat higher fiscal need as a sufficient cause. ( Wilson, pp. 16-17.)

Three debates around Wilson's account

Fiscal arrangements and incentives:

Fiscal accounts ask how intergovernmental revenue and spending responsibilities shape local incentives. The 1994 reform matters to that question, but Wilson's chronology complicates this account, in which fiscal deprivation alone produced market-oriented land transfers. His outcome is not simply the availability of land or the growth of local borrowing. He focuses on whether public authorities priced transfers accurately and collected payments. The evidence he presents suggests that fiscal need and valuable land created incentives, but did not ensure that officials acted on them. Wilson therefore qualifies fiscal explanations of the timing of collection.

Land as development and credit infrastructure:

Meg Rithmire treats land institutions as part of China's system for managing investment and economic expansion. She writes that municipal governments could convey urban land and plan development, while higher authorities retained controls over development permissions. This helps explain why land transactions mattered to central and local development strategies, but it does not by itself explain whether officials charged the intended prices or collected the amounts due. Wilson supplies that account of implementation. The two arguments address linked outcomes and complete each other's accounts. (Rithmire, working paper, pp. 7-20, 29-32; Wilson, pp. 3-4, 16 .)

Liu, Oi and Zhang examine how local governments financed development after fiscal recentralisation. Their "grand bargain" account describes how the central government offered the promise and creation of locally controlled banks, local government financing vehicles and land collateral as parts of a borrowing arrangement that supported investment. This complements Wilson's narrative by adding to it. Local governments negotiated for autonomy in running credit institutions, financing mechanisms, in addition to, and despite the fact that the central government was pushing them to maximise land revenue. The land-finance story is not merely about selling land, but also about creating mechanisms that helped create a financial market for land finance at the local level.(Liu, Oi and Zhang, pp. 12-22 ; Lin and Yi, pp. 50-79.)

Political control and implementation:

An important aspect of Wilson's contribution is that it shifts attention from formal authority to the officials who apply it. Auction requirements had limited force when local bureaux could not discipline the municipal leaders who appointed and paid them. Inspections, performance assessments, disciplinary pressure and control over construction-land approvals changed the cost of resistance. The mechanism is not merely the existence of a central rule, but the centre's ability to monitor implementation and attach consequences to non-compliance. Wilson's account qualifies institutional explanations that treat formal market rules as self-executing.

These debates are complementary. Fiscal arrangements help explain why local governments sought resources; land institutions and credit explain how land supported investment; political control helps explain why potential transfer proceeds became more reliably collected. Wilson's contribution lies chiefly in the third question and its link to the first.

Thinking about land-value capture using Wilson's account

Wilson's account suggests questions for Indian research. Any comparison of public land auctions, town-planning schemes, development charges or other instruments would need to establish who has authority and ownership; who can acquire land and approve plans; how transactions are priced and receipts collected; which government controls implementation; which body receives and may spend the proceeds; what liabilities accompany the arrangement; and who bears its distributional costs. These dimensions differ across instruments and jurisdictions.

References

Saul Kriger Wilson. 2026. "The Origins of Land Finance: Local Resistance and Top-Down Imposition." The China Quarterly, First View, pp. 1-20.

Meg Elizabeth Rithmire. 2017. "Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy: Institutional Complementarities and Macroeconomic Management."Politics & Society 45(1), pp. 123-153.

George C. S. Lin and Fangxin Yi. 2011. "Urbanization of Capital or Capitalization on Urban Land? Land Development and Local Public Finance in Urbanizing China."Urban Geography 32(1), pp. 50-79.

Adam Y. Liu, Jean C. Oi and Yi Zhang. 2022. "China's Local Government Debt: The Grand Bargain."The China Journal 87, pp. 40-71. Published online 6 December 2021.

Madhu Bharti and Shagun Mehrotra. 2020. "Metropolitan Ahmedabad: Scaling Up with Contiguous Replication of Town Planning Schemes." In Greater Than Parts: A Metropolitan Opportunity , Volume II, edited by Shagun Mehrotra, Lincoln L. Lewis, Mariana Orloff and Beth Olberding. Washington, DC: World Bank. Financing discussion: printed p. 23, PDF p. 30.

OECD. 2022. Global Compendium of Land Value Capture Policies: India.


Tuesday, November 03, 2026

How courts choose arbitrators

by Animesh Bordoloi and Prashant Narang.

A court hearing an application under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 must answer two questions. Should an arbitrator be appointed? If so, who should it be? Indian arbitration law has paid far more attention to the first than to the second.

Our new working paper, How courts choose arbitrators: Evidence from the Bombay and Madras High Courts, examines the second question. It codes 372 reported and retrievable section 11 orders from 2016 to 2024, naming 387 appointments among 201 individuals, and draws on 36 semi-structured interviews.

A question the Act leaves open

The Act regulates the person once in view, covering agreed qualifications, independence and impartiality, disclosure, and fees. It says little about how candidates enter consideration, whether alternatives are weighed, or why one eligible person is preferred over another. Beyond qualifications agreed by the parties, the Act prescribes no positive qualification or accreditation criteria. Those norms are left to regulations by the Arbitration Council of India, which the Government told Parliament in February 2026 had still not been constituted.

This creates an observability problem. Judges may draw on professional knowledge, party suggestions or informal inquiries that never appear in the order. The record shows who was appointed and which steps were recorded. It cannot necessarily reveal how the choice was made.

What the orders record

The process is largely court-driven. In 315 of 372 orders (84.7%), the court named the arbitrator without recording both parties’ agreement to that person; such agreement appeared in 50 (13.4%). Consent to arbitration, or to “a retired judge”, is not agreement on who should hear the dispute.

Retired judges received 63.3% of named appointments, and advocates and senior advocates 33.9%. Technically qualified persons received six appointments across the two courts over nine years; former bureaucrats or senior officials, five.

Orders rarely explained the choice. Only 18 (4.8%) recorded any reason bearing on it, mostly a category of person such as a retired judge or legal expert. Six (1.6%) gave a ground tied to the individual appointed, and none compared candidates.

Disclosure practice differed sharply. Bombay directed a section 12 disclosure in 115 of 123 orders; Madras in four of 249. Section 11(8) places disclosure before appointment, yet 111 of the 119 directions came after the arbitrator was named. Some appointments may have remained conditional on disclosure, and an order’s silence does not prove none was obtained.

The orders recorded fee frameworks rather than the amounts eventually charged. High Court rules appeared in 51.1% of orders; 22.8% left the fee to the arbitrator, and 15.9% recorded no basis. Interviewees described the difficulty of negotiating remuneration with a tribunal already chosen to decide one’s dispute.

Repetition was substantial, with 186 of 387 named appointments going to someone the same court had already appointed. The ten most frequently appointed individuals received 31.6% of Bombay’s appointments and 34.3% of Madras’s. In Madras, most repeats came from the same judge appointing the same person, however they are counted.

What the record cannot show

These patterns do not establish favouritism. Repetition may reflect expertise, availability, reputation or a thin alternative pool. But professional knowledge and professional familiarity look alike from outside, and the orders rarely contain enough to tell them apart. The limit cuts both ways, since an arbitrator appointed twenty times on merit has no published record capable of showing it.

The study covers two High Courts and reported orders only. It cannot say how other courts appoint, or whether institutions do better. Its argument is about information. Identifying candidates, checking conflicts, confirming availability and settling fees need records that persist across cases. An institution with a continuing caseload can keep them; a rotating section 11 roster does not itself provide that continuity. That favours parties choosing an institution, appointment method and fee framework when they contract, with institutional performance still open to scrutiny.

Where courts continue to appoint, a narrower step is available. High Courts could publish periodic aggregate figures on appointment numbers, professional backgrounds, unique appointees, repeat appointments and concentration, all compiled from the orders themselves. That would constrain no individual appointment. It would make a public function observable, and let competing explanations be tested rather than asserted.

References

Animesh Bordoloi and Prashant Narang, How courts choose arbitrators: Evidence from the Bombay and Madras High Courts, TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation Working Paper No. 25, 13 October 2026.

Prashant Narang and Vishnu Suresh, The Blind Spot in Indian Arbitration: Fees, Power, and Structural Oversights, The Leap Blog, 27 February 2025.


Animesh Bordoloi is Senior International Case Counsel at the Asian International Arbitration Centre, Malaysia. Prashant Narang is a researcher at the TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation, New Delhi. We thank Renuka Sane for comments on earlier drafts.