Words and deeds in the Indian exchange rate

by Rajeswari Sengupta and Ajay Shah.

The most important price in any economy is the exchange rate. In India's case, this is the price of the Indian rupee against the US dollar. By default, the exchange rate is controlled by market forces. The policy stance of the government, towards the exchange rate, is termed 'the exchange rate regime'. This is one of the most consequential economic policy choices.

In most advanced economies, the answer is straightforward: the exchange rate is set by financial markets, and the government stays out. In India, it is more complicated. The RBI regularly intervenes in the foreign exchange market. India's exchange rate regime needs to be deciphered from the data using statistical tools.

At any point in time, to understand the Indian economy, knowing the present exchange rate regime is central. Looking back at economic history, knowing the dates and characteristics of the changing exchange rate regime is central.

Inferring the true exchange rate regime from the data

We now have mature tools for deciphering the exchange rate regime using exchange rate data, without requiring information about the actions taken by the government. This runs in two steps: the first is a sweet linear regression called 'the exchange rate regression' and the second is the econometrics of structural change through which structural breaks in the regression coefficients and the residual standard deviation are detected. This idea for structural breaks in linear regression models where the residual standard deviation can also change is taken from Zeileis, Shah and Patnaik (2010) and implemented in the R package fxregime which now has numerous applications into fields well beyond exchange rate regimes and structural change.

In this article we will first rev up this tool chain for the Indian rupee, offering measures of the present exchange rate regime and of the history of Indian macroeconomic policy. We will offer ready access to reproducible research so that everyone can perform these calculations. We will then turn to a comparison against RBI and IMF statements about the Indian exchange rate regime.

Reading the data: six distinct regimes since 2000

The exchange rate regression estimates how much of the movement in the rupee is explained by movements in the world's major floating currencies - the US dollar, the euro, the British pound, and the Japanese yen. The greater the role of these foreign currencies in explaining the rupee's movement, the less independently the rupee is floating. Alongside this, we get the residual standard deviation: the extent to which the movements of the rupee reflect none of the above. The dates of structural breaks mark the boundaries between different exchange rate regimes.

We apply this method to weekly exchange rate data from the BIS from January 2000 to December 2025, and it shows six distinct exchange rate regimes. This gives us an updated version of the knowledge in Patnaik and Sengupta (2022) and Pandey, Patnaik and Sengupta (2024).

Figure 1: USD/INR exchange rate with structural breaks.

Figure 2: Annualised volatility of USD/INR (6 month rolling window) with structural breaks.

The six periods are as follows:

Regime 1 (January 2000 - March 2004): This was a tight peg to the dollar. The rupee moved very little independently. The annualised INR-USD volatility averaged just 2.2%.

Regime 2 (March 2004 - March 2007): This was a move towards greater flexibility. The rupee was moderately pegged to a basket of currencies. The volatility rose to 4.1%.

Regime 3 (April 2007 - December 2013): This was the most flexible period in the 25 years under examination. This was the era when India came closest to a genuinely market-determined exchange rate. The USD/INR volatility was 8.8%. There were many months in this period where RBI trading on the currency market was 0. This gives us an interesting conjecture: If the rupee were to float, it would have an annualised vol of about 9%.

Regime 4 (January 2014 - September 2023): This was a retreat to greater currency management. This was the longest single regime in our sample - nearly a decade. The INR-USD volatility fell back to 5%, and the RBI's interventions in the foreign exchange market grew steadily. It is ironic that inflation targeting came into India in February 2015, with the signing of the Monetary Policy Framework Agreement. This was roughly the same time that rupee flexibility was in retreat.

Regime 5 (October 2023 - December 2024): A remarkable de-facto peg; the lowest volatility in 25 years. For this 15-month period, INR-USD volatility was just 1.5%: the lowest in our 25-year sample, lower even than Regime 1 which reflected the macroeconomics knowledge of long ago. The rupee barely moved against the dollar, even as other emerging market currencies fluctuated.

Regime 6 (December 2024 - December 2025): Finally, we got a partial retreat from the peg. Volatility has risen to around 4.4%, comparable to Regime 2.

What the RBI says

In 1993, India officially moved towards a "market-determined exchange rate". The RBI website states that its "exchange rate policy focuses on ensuring orderly conditions in the foreign exchange market" - implying that it intervenes only to prevent excessive volatility, not to target any particular level of the rupee.

The empirical evidence, however, shows that the Indian economy experienced six different exchange rate regimes without any changes in official statements, announcements, or rationale.

What the IMF says

The International Monetary Fund, which classifies every member country's exchange rate regime every year, had long described India's regime as "floating", noting that the rupee is "largely market determined" and that the RBI intervenes only to manage "excessive volatility". The IMF classification does not see the six regimes that the data reports.

Figure 3: USD/INR exchange rate with regime classification from IMF AREAER.

The econometrics of structural change shows the recent nearly-fixed exchange rate regime as running from October 2023 -December 2024. This event was so large and remarkable that the IMF picked it up. In its 2023 Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (released in December 2024), the IMF reclassified India's de-facto exchange rate regime retroactively:

"Since December 2022, the exchange rate stabilized within a 2% band against the US dollar, with one realignment in August 2023. Therefore, the de facto exchange rate arrangement was reclassified retroactively to 'stabilized' from 'floating', effective December 6, 2022."

The structural change econometrics picks up different dates compared with these statements. The statistical techniques isolate precise dates for structural breaks down to the week, in contrast to the IMF classification, which is updated annually.

The centrality of the exchange rate regime in the Impossible Trinity

The Impossible Trinity is a foundational concept in economics. It states that a country can achieve at most two of the following three objectives simultaneously: an open capital account (allowing money to flow freely in and out of the country), a fixed or managed exchange rate, and an independent monetary policy. It is impossible to have all three at once.

India adopted inflation targeting in February 2015, which means it chose to have autonomy in domestic monetary policy with the legal mandate to keep CPI inflation at 4%. India also has a substantially open capital account after three decades of gradual liberalisation. According to the Trilemma, these two choices leave no room for a managed exchange rate. India cannot simultaneously target 4% inflation, maintain an open capital account, and stabilise the rupee against the dollar.

Yet the data show that from late 2022 to late 2024, that is what the RBI attempted to do. In this period, India's nominal anchor - what the monetary system was supposed to be anchored to - quietly shifted from the inflation target to the exchange rate. In effect, RBI's legal mandate under IT was temporarily displaced by an unannounced exchange rate objective. These attempts induce many difficulties; financial restrictions impeded economic growth, and inflation was excessively volatile owing to the pursuit of extraneous objectives.

Macroeconomic stability requires credibility of monetary policy. Under inflation targeting, the authorities must say what they will do, and then do what they just said. Even if all the right things are done immediately, it would take decades for private persons to learn to trust that there is a stable framework of macroeconomic policy.

It is easy to do these calculations

We have made this analysis a self-contained Google Colab notebook, which can be used by you to do runs or classroom teaching.

The authors thank Rounak for excellent research assistance with the data and analysis, and Anjali Sharma for valuable discussions and comments.

References

Radhika Pandey, Ila Patnaik and Rajeswari Sengupta (2024) "The journey of inflation targeting in India," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2024-022, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.

Patnaik, Ila and Rajeswari Sengupta (2022) "Analyzing India's Exchange Rate Regime," India Policy Forum, National Council of Applied Economic Research, vol. 18(1), pages 53-85.

Zeileis, Achim, Ajay Shah and Ila Patnaik (2010) "Testing, monitoring, and dating structural changes in exchange rate regimes", Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, Volume 54, Issue 6.

The authors are researchers at IGIDR, Bombay and XKDR Forum, Bombay, respectively. The authors thank Rounak for excellent research assistance with the data and analysis, and Anjali Sharma for valuable discussions and comments.

Market Reaction to Insider Trading: Evidence from Regulatory Orders in India

by Arjun Gupta, Sonam Patel, and Renuka Sane.

Introduction

Market integrity depends on effective enforcement against market abuse. When regulators credibly sanction violations, they reinforce investor confidence and reduce the risk premiums that markets impose for uncertain governance. In developed markets, evidence suggests that enforcement achieves this objective: SEC enforcement actions in the United States produce abnormal stock price declines of $-0.5\%$ (Persons, 1997), and UK sanctions trigger reputational losses that far exceed the direct penalties (Armour et al., 2017). This is especially true for insider trading enforcement: Persons (1997) documents significant negative abnormal returns following the SEC's announcements of insider trading enforcement actions. (Engelen, 2012) finds that a clear negative abnormal return on the day of even newspaper coverage of the illegal insider trading practice of CEOs.

An open question, however, is whether this pattern extends to India. We investigate this by examining stock price movements around two types of insider trading enforcement actions in India: final SEBI adjudicatory orders and appellate decisions by the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). We focus on insider trading orders as they can be a signal about the quality of the firm's internal governance. If insiders are trading on privileged information, it suggests that boards, compliance functions, and internal controls are weak, leading to investors discounting the stock accordingly. Further, when the firm and its executives face potential penalties, disgorgement, or other sanctions, these can impose direct costs on the firm and may affect its ability to attract capital and talent. The insider trading laws in India are quite expansive, and cover not only connected persons, but also those who just have access to unpublished price sensitive information, or if there have been some minor disclosure violations. All orders, therefore, may not signal governance issues within a firm. We therefore also look at orders by violation severity and type of insider relationship.

Empirical Strategy

We use an event-study methodology to test whether Indian stock markets react to SEBI enforcement actions and outcomes challenged before SAT. We compile a list of individuals and entities against whom an insider-trading order was issued, then identify the companies whose scrip was alleged to have been insider traded, map them to their corresponding order dates (event dates), and use these firm-event pairs to check for market reaction.

Estimation Procedure

We estimate each firm's normal return using the market model over an estimation window of 210 trading days ending 11 days before the event ($t = -210$ to $t = -11$):

\( R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{mt} + \varepsilon_{it} \)

where $R_{it}$ is the daily return of stock $i$ on day $t$ and $R_{mt}$ is the daily return on the Nifty~50 Index. The Abnormal Return (AR) on event day $t$ is the difference between the actual return and the predicted normal return:

\( AR_{it} = R_{it} - \left(\hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\beta}_i R_{mt}\right) \)

Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are computed by summing $AR_{it}$ over a 21-day event window centred on the insider trading announcement date:

\( CAR_i = \sum_{t=-10}^{+10} AR_{it} \)

We test whether the cross-sectional average $\overline{CAR}$ is statistically different from zero using a $t$-test; a negative $\overline{CAR}$ indicates an adverse market reaction to the announcement.

Data and Sample

Our sample is drawn from the data set used by Aggarwal et al., (2025). It comprises two types of regulatory actions from 2009 to 2023, restricted to firms listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE). After removing duplicates and cases with missing stock price data, our final sample contains:

1. SEBI Orders: Final adjudicatory orders; $N = 176$ firm-event pairs.
2. SAT Orders: Appellate Tribunal decisions; $N = 42$ firm-event pairs.

We further look for heterogeneity in market reactions by partitioning the sample along four dimensions of interest:

• Sanction status: Sanctioned ($N = 119$) vs. not sanctioned ($N = 57$). An order may or may not result in a sanction. Here, we examine a reaction based on whether an order resulted in a sanction.

• Violation severity: Major violations ($N = 74$) vs. minor violations ($N = 122$). We classify insider trading violations as Major (e.g., sharing or using unpublished price information for trading) or Minor (e.g., code-of-conduct breaches, delayed disclosures).

• Insider relationship: Connected persons ($N = 44$), deemed connected ($N = 21$), and those with access to UPSI ($N = 19$). Connected persons are loosely defined as those associated with a company (contractual, fiduciary, or employment), while those deemed to be connected persons include their relatives or cohabitants. UPSI access refers to knowledge of information materially impacting the stock price.

• Monetary outflow: Above-median ($N = 59$) vs. at-or-below-median ($N = 60$) alleged illegal gains. Monetary outflow is the total penalty and disgorgement paid to SEBI. We analyze market reaction based on the magnitude of this outflow to see if the amount paid affects the reaction.

Results

Baseline Event-Study Findings

Our event-study results indicate that Indian stock markets exhibit no statistically significant reaction to any type of insider trading enforcement announcement. CARs are indistinguishable from zero across all two regulatory action types at the 95% confidence level, with point estimates close to zero in magnitude. For comparison, SEC insider trading enforcement actions in the US produce average CARs of $-3.47\%$ (Muradoglu and Clark Huskey, 2008).

Figures display the CAR trajectories. In all two cases, the CARs fluctuate around zero with no discernible trend before, during, or after the announcement date.

Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around SEBI final order announcements ($N = 176$). The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

The result for SEBI final orders is striking: these orders contain explicit findings of misconduct and penalties, yet markets do not react. We discuss four candidate explanations below: high appeal and reversal rates, long enforcement delays, low penalty amounts, and pre-existing credibility discount.

Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around SAT order announcements ($N = 42$). The shaded region represents the 95% confidence interval.

SAT orders, on the other hand, are more final in nature. They may affirm, modify, or overturn SEBI sanctions, and should lead to a market reaction. In our dataset, they also produce no detectable market reaction. However, this result should be interpreted with caution, given the small sample size. With only 42 events, our test has limited statistical power to detect abnormal returns. It is possible that these may be further appealed at the Supreme Court, but given the small sample size, we do not test for the impact of those decisions.

Subsample Analysis

We examine whether the aggregate result masks heterogeneous effects by partitioning the sample along the four dimensions described above. Across all subsample splits, CARs remain statistically and economically insignificant. Even for high-severity cases, directors trading on confidential information, monetary outflows above the median of Rs.~12.83 lakh, and third quartile of Rs.~5.27 crore, abnormal returns remain proximate to zero. Also, there is no evidence of a significant market reaction even in the subsample of cases where the insider relationship is more direct (connected persons). This suggests the null result is not an artefact of averaging across heterogeneous effects; rather, it is pervasive across subgroups.

One caveat to our analysis is if the true information release occurred earlier (e.g., via media leaks), our tests measure the reaction to information from informal sources rather than to the announcement itself.

Interpreting the results

One interpretation of this result is that markets may rationally discount the significance of SEBI enforcement actions. Several institutional features of Indian capital markets lend support to this interpretation:

1. High appeal and reversal rates: Aggarwal et al., (2025) find that a substantial fraction of SEBI orders (30-41%) are appealed to SAT, and around 50% result in modifications or reversals. Investors who have learned that sanctions are frequently overturned will rationally discount any announced penalty. This is probably compounded by the fact that several SEBI orders are not able to demonstrate the unfair gains or loss avoided, or provide reasons for imposing sanctions as debarment, reducing the credibility of its enforcement actions (Aggarwal et al., 2024).
2. Long enforcement delays: Damle and Zaveri (2022) find a median of over three years between violation and SCN, and a further 18 months to a final order. This is reinforced by the findings of Aggarwal et al., (2025), who find similar timelines for insider trading orders. By the time enforcement is announced, investors may have already moved on.
3. Low penalty amounts: The median penalty is Rs 12.83 lakhs, with approximately 40 cases involving amounts under Rs 10 lakhs. Such low penalties suggest a lower perceived severity of the offense, and consequently signal the market to treat this news as immaterial.
4. Pre-existing credibility discount: If years of weak or delayed sanctions have already led investors to assign a low probability to effective enforcement, individual announcements convey little new information, and markets have stopped paying attention.

Another possibility is that markets receive the enforcement information but do not regard insider trading as material to firm valuation. Under this view, it reflects an investor judgment that insider trading by management is not indicative of broader governance failure or future cash-flow risk.

Conclusion

Indian stock markets exhibit no statistically significant response to insider trading enforcement, in contrast to the negative abnormal returns documented in the US and UK. This result is robust across SEBI final orders and SAT appellate decisions, and persists even for high-severity violations involving senior insiders and large monetary outflows.

The functioning of SEBI entails considerable public expenditure, and the Board has, over time, sought progressively wider powers - including expanded surveillance capabilities. Given this, the question of what is actually being achieved warrants serious scrutiny. A stock price reaction to an enforcement order is one observable signal of whether the market believes the enforcement actions carry some significance. A null result across many orders suggests the market does not view these actions as conveying meaningful new information. It is, therefore, worth questioning if enforcement actions are advancing the goal that justified the expenditure in the first place.

The authors are researchers at Trustbridge Rule of Law Foundation.

Announcements

Call for papers: Alt Data Workshop 2026

Date: 21st & 22nd August 2026

Organisers: Chennai Mathematical Institute and XKDR Forum
Venue: XKDR Forum, Mumbai, India

Mode: In-Person

Overview

The Alt Data Workshop 2026 focuses on the use of "alternative data" -- the remarkable world of novel and clever data sources bubbling up outside the traditional official statistical machinery.

We seek to bridge the gap between STEM researchers (Computer Science, Statistics, Engineering) and domain experts in Economics, Public Policy, and Law. We will de-prioritise data from one-off field experiments and emphasise the use of widely available datasets that are predictably updated through time thus permitting long-term longitudinal research and the development of a research community surrounding each dataset. Examples of this include satellite imagery, digital footprints, high-frequency transaction data, and large-scale web-scraping to solve complex problems in the Indian context. Some examples are at https://www.xkdr.org/field/statistics-computer-science

The Scope of Alternative Data

For the purposes of this workshop, alternative data refers to non-traditional datasets that are, in principle, accessible to the broader research community on a sustained basis over the years, through which a literature can emerge on one dataset at a time.

We prioritise papers that address:

• Methodological Rigor: Novel approaches to ground-truthing, signal extraction from noisy data, and bias correction.

• Scalability: Techniques that can be applied across regions or time periods rather than isolated case studies.

• Substantive Applications: Practical use in agricultural monitoring, urban heat stress, fiscal analytics, or market microstructure.

Themes and Topics

We welcome submissions from STEM and social science researchers on topics including, but not limited to:

• Remote Sensing: Applications of satellite imagery for economic activity or environmental monitoring.

• Digital Footprints: Analysis of transaction, payment, or transport data.

• Automated Data Collection: Large-scale web scraping and crowdsourcing frameworks.

• High-Frequency Proxies: Using alternative indicators to track fiscal or macroeconomic variables in real-time.

• Computational Infrastructure: Engineering challenges in processing and storing large-scale alternative datasets for public policy.

Submission Guidelines

We invite both formal academic papers and industry-led technical talks.

• Abstracts: Maximum 500 words. Must clearly state the research question, data sources, methodology, and results.

• Full Papers: Maximum 10,000 words.

• Format: Submissions should be in PDF. Include a separate cover page with author names, affiliations, and contact details.

• Submission Portal: Submission Form

Review Process

Submissions will be reviewed for originality, technical rigor, and relevance. We value work that is reproducible and contributes to the public discourse on data-driven governance.

Review Committee

• Sourish Das - Chennai Mathematical Institute

• Rajeeva Karandikar - Chennai Mathematical Institute

• Ayush Patnaik - XKDR Forum

• Ajay Shah - XKDR Forum

• Susan Thomas - XKDR Forum

• Akhilesh Tilotia - Thurro

• Mahesh Vyas - Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy

Travel Funding

We will fund authors and discussants to stay in Mumbai for two nights.

Important Dates

• Submission Deadline: 15 May 2026

• Notification of Acceptance: 15 June 2026

• Full Paper/Presentation Submission: 31 July 2026

• Workshop Date: 21 August 2026

Contact

Email: outreach@xkdr.org

Web: https://www.xkdr.org/event/alt-data-workshop-2026

Announcements

Call for Papers: Cross-Border Flows and Frictions in India

Dates: 03-05 July, 2026
Venue: Goa, India
Mode: In-person

Overview

XKDR Forum invite submissions for its upcoming conference on “Cross-Border Flows and Frictions in India” The conference aims to bring together academics, market participants, legal experts and policymakers to examine the empirical, institutional, and legal foundations shaping the case for a more open and resilient capital account in India. It proceeds from the view that cross-border flows are central to India’s financial development. The conference will feature original research papers, thematic talks, and panel discussions.

Submissions are encouraged that advance theoretical, empirical, legal, or policy-oriented debates on the nature, sources, and consequences of cross-border frictions. Interdisciplinary approaches and comparative perspectives are particularly welcome.

Themes and Topics

The conference will focus on, but is not limited to, the following themes:

• International Capital & Investment: Capital flows, home bias, push/pull factors; EM flow maladies; capital controls; corporate finance, and internationalisation of high-productivity firms, cross-border payments.
  
• Exchange Rates & Currency Markets: Currency markets, risk, and institutions; exchange rate regimes; costs and benefits of managed rates.
  
• Financial Stability & Crisis: Contagion from international crises; the impossible trinity; conventional Indian crisis management; systemic risk under open capital accounts.
  
• Regulation, Compliance & Governance: Laws, rule of law, and public administration for capital controls; tax policy and administration; CFT/PMLA/FATF.
  

Submissions beyond these themes that align with the overall scope of the conference will also be considered.

Submission Guidelines - Only Abstract Essential

• Abstract:
  • 300 - 500 words
    
  • Should clearly state the research question, methodology, and expected key findings/arguments.
    
• Full Paper (if available):
  • No word limit.
    
• Submission Portal:
  • https://forms.gle/iPBmDBcCiidQXdQG6

Review Process

All submissions will undergo a review by the program committee of the conference. Selection will be based on originality, rigor, and relevance to the conference themes.

Program Committee

• Shubho Roy, Shiv Nadar University
  
• Renuka Sane, TrustBridge
  
• Rajeswari Sengupta, IGIDR
  
• Manish Singh, IIT Roorkee
  
• Ajay Shah, XKDR Forum
  
• Susan Thomas, XKDR Forum
  
• Harsh Vardhan, Independent
  
• Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah, The Professeer
  

Funding

Paper presenters and discussants will be provided with travel support.

Important Dates

• Abstract submission deadline: 15 May, 2026
  
• Notification of acceptance: 31 May, 2026
  
• Full paper & presentation slides submission: 15 June, 2026
  
• Conference dates: 3-5 July, 2026

Contact

For queries, please contact:
E-mail: outreach@xkdr.org
Web: xkdr.org

Announcements

Call for Papers: 17^th Emerging Markets Conference

13^th - 16^th December, 2026

XKDR Forum in collaboration with Vanderbilt law School is inviting papers to be submitted for the 17^th Emerging Markets Conference, 2026. In the past, the audience for these events has comprised of academics, participants from the legal and financial industry, policy makers from government and regulators.

Details of the previous conferences can be viewed at https://emergingmarketsconference.org/. The conference aims to cover presentations and discussions across the following set of research topics:

• The sources of economic success or failure in EMs.
• Finance in EMs (households, financial markets, financial intermediaries, firms and finance, finance and growth).
• Political economy, law, public administration, regulation in EMs.
• The impact of populism upon the possibility of sustained growth.
• Insights into large EMs that matter in and of themselves.
• Insights from narrow research projects that illuminate EMs in general.
• The new phase of globalisation and its consequences for international trade, international finance and the nature of the EM firm.
• Features of a society that enable or disable convergence into the 'normal' package of high levels of freedom and prosperity.
• The puzzles faced by all kinds of decision makers: individuals, civil society actors, firms, all levels of government.
• Grand challenges such as climate change: implications for EMs and ramifications of choices made in EMs.
• State capability in EMs.
• The interplay of military affairs, foreign policy and economics for EMs.

The ideal papers for EMC shed light on the great questions of the age, while being analytically sound and persuasive.

Conference design

For EMC 2026, we intend to bring on board a wider research papers, panels on contemporary policy and keynotes by experts in the area of finance, economics and law. The conference this year will be completely in - person mode.

Best Discussant Award

Each year, we award the Emerging Markets Conference discussant award for the best discussant and the first runner up discussant of the papers presented on each day of the EMC. The discussants are selected by an audience poll.

Program Committee

• Adam Feibelman, Tulane University
• Ajay Shah, XKDR Forum
• Bidisha Chakraborty, Saint Louis University
• Dan J Awrey, Cornell Law School
• Harsh Vardhan, Independent
• Indradeep Ghosh, Dvara Research
• Joshua Felman, J. H. Consulting
• Kose John, NYU Stern
• Kumar Venkataraman, SMU – Cox School of Business
• Marios Panayides, The University of Oklahoma
• N. Prabhala, Johns Hopkins University
• Pab Jotikasthira, SMU - Edwin L Cox School of Business
• Pradeep Yadav, The University of Oklahoma
• Rambhadran Thirumalai, ISB
• Rajeswari Sengupta, IGIDR
• Renuka Sane, TrustBridge
• Sanjay Kallapur, ISB
• Susan Thomas, XKDR Forum
• Tanika Chakraborty, IIM Calcutta
• Vimal Balasubramaniam, Queen Mary University of London
• Yesha Yadav, Vanderbilt University

Important dates

• Paper submission deadline: 24^th August 2026.
• Expected date for notification of acceptance: 30^th September 2026.
• Dates of the conference: 13^th - 16^th December 2026.

Support

Academic authors whose papers have been accepted for the conference will be provided accommodation at the conference venue for three nights (13^th to 16^th December).

Registration and contact details

Submissions: Please submit your papers in pdf format by following this link here
For any clarifications, please reach out to Jyoti at announcements@emergingmarketsconference.org

Author: Natasha Aggarwal

Natasha Aggarwal is a researcher at TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation.

On this blog:

• Comments on the Securities Market Code Bill, 2025, 1 April 2026.
• Can technology augment order writing capacity at regulators?, 14 December 2025.
• Return to sender: The misuse of remand orders by appellate tribunals, 2 October 2025.
• Balancing Power and Accountability: An Evaluation of SEBI's Adjudication of Insider Trading, 2 April 2025.
• A guide to writing good regulatory orders, 13 March 2025.
• Mapping insider trading laws: A database for SEBI’s Prevention of Insider Trading Regulations, 14 February 2025.
• Judicial overreach: Bypassing expert tribunals in the electricity sector, 9 December 2024.
• The exercise of discretionary powers: The case of debarment and restraint from capital markets, 20 July 2024.

What happens when arbitration deadlines are missed

by Prashant Narang and Renuka Sane.

Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 was introduced to deal with delays in arbitration. It sets a time limit for making an award. If that time runs out, parties have to go to court to extend it. The court can also impose consequences for delay, such as reducing fees, awarding costs, or replacing the arbitrator.

Our new working paper studies how this works in practice. It looks at 202 reported orders of the Delhi High Court between 2015 and 2024.

It finds that the Court almost always grants extensions and almost never imposes sanctions.

What the data shows

Out of 202 cases, the court granted extensions in 198 (98%). Only 4 cases were dismissed, and those were on technical grounds. Sanctions were rarely imposed.

• Fee reduction: 0 out of 202 cases
• Adverse costs: 6 out of 202 cases (about 3%)
• Replacement of arbitrators: 4 out of 202 cases (about 2%)

Repeat extensions are not unusual. There are 30 cases where parties came back for a second or later extension. The court granted 29 of them (96.7%). There are no sanctions in these repeat cases.

These petitions also move quickly.

• Median time to decide: 3 days
• Median number of hearings: 1
• About 63% of cases are decided in a single hearing

So the delay is not in the court process. Courts dispose of these matters quickly. But they usually extend time without imposing any consequence.

Why extensions are common

Part of the answer lies in how Section 29A is structured.

For the Court, giving an extension is easy if both parties agree. The court can dispose of the case quickly.

Imposing a penalty is harder as the Court has to find out who caused the delay. It may have to look at the record in detail. It also has to hear the arbitrator before cutting fees. All this is likely to take more time and effort.

It is not surprising that consensual extensions are more common.

What this means for the law

Over time, this pattern shapes how the law works.

Section 29A was meant to push arbitrations to finish on time. It often works as a way to formally extend time after the deadline has passed.

If parties expect that extensions will be granted without much difficulty, the deadline may lose its force.

This does not mean the provision has no value. But it suggests that deadlines work best when consequences are easy to apply.

Looking ahead

If deadlines are not backed by predictable consequences, do they change behaviour?

The paper does not answer this fully. It focuses on what courts do once parties come for an extension. But the pattern is clear. Extensions are routine and sanctions are exceptional.

That may matter for how arbitration timelines are taken in practice.

You can read the working paper here.

The authors are researchers at TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation.