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Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Financing Better Public Parks in Indian Cities

by Anirudh Burman.

Why urban parks present a public-finance problem

Parks provide places to walk, play and meet, while their trees and open spaces offer benefits beyond those who visit them. Keeping parks accessible requires continuing expenditure on gardeners, cleaning, water, repairs and the replacement of worn-out facilities. Municipal budgets must meet these costs alongside other infrastructure needs. Charging visitors can raise money, but may discourage use and exclude residents who cannot afford to pay.

Indian cities have already sought support through park adoption, donated facilities and commercial uses. They also pay contractors and community organisations to undertake maintenance. These arrangements perform different financial functions. Outsourcing changes who delivers a publicly funded service; mobilising private finance brings additional contributions towards improvements or upkeep. A donated facility or permission to operate a kiosk, however, does not by itself ensure that money will be available for continuing care.

I argue that public finance should help mobilise private resources through commitments that contributors, park managers and public authorities can honour. Contributors need defined benefits and clarity about their obligations. Managers need dependable funding, sufficient continuity and authority to use the receipts on which their maintenance plans depend. Public authorities must preserve access and provide for parks with limited prospects of attracting donations or commercial income. The objective is to increase the resources available for accessible, well-maintained parks while retaining a dependable public commitment to their care.

The essay develops this argument through comparisons with New York and London's Royal Parks and an examination of arrangements in Indian cities. It considers operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards to explain how private contributions can support continuing maintenance. The comparison leads to principles for public finance suited to parks with different costs, donor bases and commercial opportunities.

Principles for a financing architecture

First, I consider the option of free access. The case for public expenditure is straightforward. General revenues can flatten costs and benefits across those who do and do not use parks directly. Where available money falls short of the cost of acceptable care, the authority must increase funding or reduce service standards.

The other usual option is ticketed entry. Charges can contribute to upkeep where visitors are willing and able to pay. However, charging for every visit may discourage regular use and exclude poorer residents, and also leave wider environmental benefits unpaid.

A third option is to combine public and private financing. The city can fund basic maintenance while donors/ licensees of services pay for improvements or contribute to annual upkeep. Companies can support eligible work through corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. A licensed cafe can pay fees towards maintenance where commercial demand permits. Public ownership and free entry can continue. The Delhi Urban Art Commission's Park Design Guidelines already discusses such contributions and revenue sources.

This mix addresses the limits of the first two options. In Indian cities, public finances are often inadequate to fund park maintenance alongside competing infrastructure needs. Research on Chennai describes a municipal corporation with few internal resources and neglected parks in poorer neighbourhoods. Ticketing cannot reliably fill this gap. Affordable charges may raise too little, while higher charges exclude users and discourage visits. Where sufficient revenue depends on prices that residents cannot afford, ticketing is infeasible as the main source of maintenance funding.

A workable funding arrangement must meet two requirements. It must provide capital resources to rehabilitate a park and recurring resources to keep it in good condition. Capital resources pay for works such as repairing paths, installing toilets or replacing playground equipment.

Recurring resources must cover gardeners' wages, cleaning, water, electricity and repairs, with provision for eventual replacement of worn-out assets. A donated toilet illustrates the distinction. Its construction may be fully financed, while there may not be any plan or provision for its cleaning, water supply and repairs. This is a general phenomenon observed in Indian city infrastructure in general, and also in parks.

New York and London's Royal Parks illustrate how public payments, donations and commercial income can be combined to meet both requirements.

What New York and London demonstrate

The international and Indian cases were selected to show variation in financing arrangements and governance, not to represent all Indian parks or support a statistical comparison. The essay compares how these arrangements work on paper and in reported practice; it does not rank their performance.

New York

New York combines public ownership of parks with several forms of management. The city's parks department, NYC Parks, provides services directly and contracts with nonprofit organisations for specified responsibilities. The mayor and budget office prepare spending plans, and the City Council approves public expenditure. Nonprofit boards manage their own staff, budgets, fundraising and investments. Commercial concessions require separate public approvals, including review by the city's Franchise and Concession Review Committee where applicable. State law also protects parkland against diversion to non-park uses, generally requiring specific legislative authorisation. Delegating maintenance therefore leaves important decisions over money and land with public authorities.

The Central Park Conservancy which manages the Central Park is one such nonprofit. Formed in 1980, it developed from civic fundraising and restoration into a professional management organisation, with a formal city management agreement from 1998. It employs staff, maintains the park and plans improvements within its delegated role. The city retains ownership and regulatory authority. This continuing relationship enables the Conservancy to accept gifts and undertake obligations extending beyond individual restoration projects.

The city also pays the Conservancy for services. Termination is limited to specified contractual conditions. The Conservancy must raise and spend at least $16 million annually on specified services. In exchange, the city pays $16 million a year, reducible in proportion to cuts in the city's operating budget. This payment sits alongside private fundraising and separate public capital projects. It gives the organisation a defined public contribution against which to plan, while leaving it exposed to fundraising risk.

Within this institution, donors can support memberships, commemorative benches and trees, restoration projects or endowments. Recognition, experiences and negotiated project naming offer different reasons to give without conferring ownership or exclusive possession. The money has different uses. Unrestricted gifts can pay salaries and cleaning bills. Restricted gifts have to be used for their agreed purpose. Endowments invest donated capital and provide distributions under spending rules accompanied by a plan for subsequent care. Organised fundraising connects donors to a manager able to explain those obligations and account for their money.

New York's Bryant Park Corporation manages Bryant Park under city agreements, with concessions and business improvement district (BID) arrangements supplying revenue. Under New York's BID framework, a district management nonprofit spends compulsory property assessments on local services under an approved plan. Property owners, tenants and public officials are represented on its board, and the city collects and transfers the assessments. This gives nearby beneficiaries a collective financing arrangement. The assessment is distinct from a voluntary gift or a levy calculated on measured land-value appreciation.

Concessions give operators permission to earn money from specified activities in exchange for contractual payments or services. Public approval determines the permissible use and the how the receipts are allocated. A park manager cannot assume that permission to host a cafe includes permission to retain its income. Bryant Park's combination depends on commercial demand and the surrounding property economy.

These arrangements coexist with ordinary municipal maintenance. For neighbourhood parks, NYC Parks continues to provide core services, supplemented by local fundraising and volunteering. Partnerships for Parks, operated with City Parks Foundation, helps community groups organise, access grants and administer funds through fiscal sponsorship. Groups can therefore share administrative support without establishing a professional conservancy for every park.

London

London's eight Royal Parks, including Hyde Park and Richmond Park, form a Crown estate under the central government's Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), separate from ordinary municipal parks. A 2016 contracting-out order allowed DCMS to delegate its statutory management functions. In 2017, the functions of the government parks agency and a separate fundraising foundation were combined in a charitable company, The Royal Parks Limited. DCMS granted it a ten-year management licence and service contract. The charity manages the estate but cannot sell the parks. The reform addressed restrictions that had prevented the agency from accumulating reserves and retaining surplus receipts across years. Combining management and fundraising with these financial powers allowed the charity to plan beyond the annual budget cycle.

DCMS holds the public management powers and permits the charity to retain park income. Trustees approve budgets, staffing, investment, reserves and commercial strategy within the licence and charitable obligations. The senior managers handle daily operations within delegated financial limits. The Mayor of London appoints some trustees and has adjacent planning responsibilities, but neither general ownership nor annual budget responsibility. Regulators oversee compliance and auditors examine the accounts, while operational decisions remain with the charity.

The charity's wholly owned trading subsidiary conducts commercial activities and transfers available profits to the charity. Concession and event partners operate under approved contracts, park-use restrictions and relevant planning, conservation and safety requirements. Revenue retention allows the charity to keep authorised receipts and spend them on the parks. Carry-forward and reserves let it meet costs in later years. Managing the portfolio together also allows shared administration and planning across parks with different earning opportunities.

This structure supports a predominantly earned-income model. In 2024-25, trading activities generated about GBP 46.3 million, including events, catering concessions, property income, parking and filming. DCMS paid an GBP 11 million cash service fee, which did not meet the full cost of management. Donations and grants contributed about GBP 3 million. Other income included sporting and cultural activities. It supplied no cash for wages. Commercial receipts, philanthropy and the government payment therefore make different contributions to the operating budget.

The contract also allocates risk. The charity bears ordinary operating and asset-maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. Events income fell in 2024-25, showing why commercial receipts require a financial buffer. The trustees set general reserves at GBP 23 million, including GBP 15 million for working capital to meet current bills, while separately designating funds for restoration and maintenance projects.

This comparison explains five factors: operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards. New York's contracts and district arrangements, and London's licence and delegated powers, identify governance and accountability structures allowing for autonomy and diversification. They allow park managing organisations to hire staff, seek gifts and manage receipts while government retains control over public assets. Exceptional donor wealth, property values and visitor demand limit their transferability.

Indian cities already use multiple financing arrangements

Indian cities have also tried to combine public expenditure with community participation, donated facilities and commercial activity. The public bodies responsible for these arrangements differ across cities and sometimes within the same city. Their control over land, maintenance budgets and permissions determines what they can offer a contributor. The existing arrangements show both how public money supports delegated maintenance and how cities seek additional private resources.

Delhi

Delhi has separate arrangements for parks controlled by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD). DDA owns the parks offered for adoption, and its horticulture officers sign the agreements and supervise the adopters. MCD maintains municipal parks through its horticulture department and other service providers. A third institution, the Delhi Parks and Gardens Society (DPGS), administers government grants to residents' welfare associations (RWAs) and nongovernmental organisations. A community group using a DPGS grant spends public money, whereas a DDA adopter finances the agreed work from its own resources.

DPGS provides separate grants for routine maintenance, new parks and decentralised sewage-treatment plants. The application process requires permission from the land-owning agency, a tripartite agreement, inspections and utilisation certificates documenting expenditure. Residents organise the work using public grant money. Additional contributions from residents supplement that public funding.

MCD's Standing Committee approved the revival of its stalled RWA scheme in February 2026. The revival followed an earlier interruption and reports of unpaid dues. Under the scheme, the commissioner must approve each adoption, and horticulture staff are responsible for monitoring the work. Under the reported terms, MCD would pay RWAs INR 13,500 per acre each month for gardening, irrigation, mowing and cleaning. MCD retains responsibility for existing lights, gyms, shelters and play equipment. RWAs cannot undertake permanent construction or commercial activities. The arrangement separates routine care from municipal infrastructure obligations, without giving associations a commercial income stream.

DDA's adoption policy (2020), instead, requires adopters to meet the full cost of agreed improvements and maintenance. Adopters can upgrade and maintain a park, maintain an existing park or part of one, or install and maintain a facility. DDA approves improvements and retains control over the park, while adopters must preserve public access, meet prescribed maintenance standards and submit to inspection. The initial three-year term can be renewed with DDA approval in three-year periods up to twelve years, subject to the park remaining under DDA. DDA permits acknowledgement signs and approved public events for up to twenty days a year. The policy contemplates temporary kiosks but does not automatically entitle adopters to retain the receipts. Installed assets vest in DDA when the arrangement ends.

Mumbai

For Mumbai's municipal parks, the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) provides funding through its Garden Department and procures maintenance through ward-level contracts. BMC's 2025-26 budget proposed INR 220.12 crore for the department as a whole. The budget also recorded an invitation for volunteer agencies to participate in the proposed Mumbai Public Park without a financial commitment from BMC. The volunteer invitation sought contributions from outside the municipal budget.

BMC has also experimented with adoption and caretaker arrangements. However, this move was derailed due to objections. Public controversy centred on the mingling of private facilities, possession of parkland by the adopters and caretakers, and restrictions on access. A February 2024 report described BMC's withdrawal of a draft offering longer adoption terms after public objections. This history helps explain why the permissions offered to private participants have remained contested.

Kolkata

The Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) provides municipal park services through its Parks and Squares Department. KMC's budget combines parks, squares and urban forestation in one expenditure head. The corporation's published account of its park services identifies maintenance by a private horticultural company at Citizen's Park, or Mohar Kunja.

Commercial use has also occurred without a clear connection to maintenance funding. A report on Vivekananda Park described rentals by clubs, damaged paths, waste and restrictions on public use. It is unclear whther rental receipts accrued to the KMC or paid for upkeep. The Vivekananda Park example illustrates why permission to use public space, revenue collection and maintenance responsibility must be identified separately.

Bengaluru

Responsibility for Bengaluru's parks is divided among the municipal government, the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and the state Horticulture Department. The Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP) published a 2024 community-involvement policy for parks under municipal custody. The policy excludes Lalbagh, Cubbon Park and BDA parks. BBMP's 2024-25 performance report records contracted maintenance and Hasiru Mitra inspections, alongside separate provision for upgrades, fencing and new parks.

Under the community policy, companies, RWAs and other contributors can provide facilities and services such as benches, toilets, drinking water, cleaning and security. Contributors must obtain approval and enter into an agreement with BBMP. The municipality retains custody of the parks and supervises the work, while completed assets vest in the city. The policy specifies an eleven-month term and prohibits the direct acceptance of cash under this arrangement. BBMP separately reported 48 adopted parks and medians but did not report the value of adopters' contributions. Formal commencement of the policy and its application after municipal reorganisation remain unconfirmed. The published terms cannot therefore be assumed to govern all reported adoptions.

Chennai

The Greater Chennai Corporation (GCC) organises municipal park maintenance through its own labour force, contractors and adopters. Its City Action Plan records a snapshot of 702 parks: 76 maintained by GCC labour, 533 outsourced and 93 adopted. GCC pays contractors to undertake maintenance, while adoption can bring contributions from outside the municipal budget. These routes coexist within the corporation's portfolio, with different sources of funding and obligations.

GCC's 2023 proposals to improve contractor accountability included smaller maintenance packages and a payment structure with 75 per cent fixed and 25 per cent linked to inspections. A tender reported in December 2024 proposed a INR 46 crore maintenance package covering 595 parks over three years, with digital work logs, biometric attendance and user feedback. The proposals were intended to make work observable and connect public payments to contractors' performance. The tender and proposals do not establish whether monitoring subsequently produced deductions or better maintenance.

The Indian cases show that public agencies already use maintenance contracts, community grants and adoption to organise park care. Contracting and community grants rely on public funds, while adoption can require contributors to pay for both improvements and upkeep. Commercial use of park space raises separate questions about who receives the income and whether the receipts fund maintenance. Mumbai's caretaker disputes also show how private facilities and possession can create the perception, real or imagined, of threatenening public access. The next section compares Indian arrangements with those in New York and London on five grounds: operating funding, tenure, donor benefits, revenue rights and public safeguards. The comparison examines who can commit public funding, grant revenue rights and enforce maintenance and access obligations.

The successes and constraints of the current arrangements

New York and London show how public support can combine with other income to sustain park management. Central Park pairs city payments with organised fundraising. The Royal Parks charity receives a government payment and retains commercial income. Indian cities also use public contracts, community grants, adoption and contributed facilities. Accountability, clear service objectives and autonomy over authorised spending are relevant institutional conditions. Funding instruments, including maintenance contracts, adoption agreements, gifts and concessions, specify who contributes, what they receive and which obligations they assume. Day-to-day practices determine whether those commitments are fulfilled. A maintenance contract depends on timely payment and credible inspection; an adoption agreement depends on clear maintenance duties and follow-through when work falls short.

The five criteria follow from the need to finance both improvements and recurring maintenance while preserving public access. Operating funding identifies who pays wages, utilities and repairs, and who bears a shortfall. Tenure matters because the duration and renewal conditions affect whether a contributor can plan for the medium to long-term. A capital improvement may last much longer than the agreement under which it was installed.

Donor benefits matter because a contributor may value recognition, experiences or improvements to a public amenity. Revenue rights establish whether the park manager may collect, retain and spend income from permitted activities. A donor's willingness to give and an operator's ability to earn money require different arrangements. Public safeguards concern the controls needed to protect access, verify maintenance and recover control after a breach. The criteria therefore test whether the promised resources and rights can support continuing care while protecting the park's public use.

Table 1. Park financing and management: Central Park, the Royal Parks and DDA adoption

DimensionCentral ParkDDA adoptionRoyal Parks: authority
Operating fundingCity service payments alongside Conservancy fundraising.Adopter bears development and maintenance costs under the policy.DCMS pays a cash service fee; trustees budget retained income.
Tenure2023-2033 management agreement; further renewal requires agreement.Three years, renewable in three-year terms up to twelve, subject to DDA jurisdiction.DCMS licence began in March 2017 for ten years; later terms require confirmation.
Donor benefitsRecognition, experiences, memorials and negotiated project naming.Specified acknowledgement signs and conditional public-event permissions.Trustees manage fundraising within charitable and licence obligations.
Revenue rightsConcession income follows separate authorisations and agreements.Kiosk permission supplies no automatic right to retain proceeds.DCMS permits retention; trustees decide expenditure within the permitted purposes.
Public safeguardsCity ownership, public approvals and contractual service duties.DDA retains control, requires public access and provides termination and asset handback.Government retains public powers; managers implement use restrictions; regulators and auditors oversee compliance.

Central Park: 2024 audited disclosures and published donor arrangements. DDA: policy amended October 2020, not an evaluation of executed adoptions. Royal Parks: 2024-25 accounts and published governance disclosures.

Operating funding

Central Park's management agreement gives the park Conservancy a public service payment alongside its fundraising obligations. In contrast, DDA's adoption policy places the agreed improvement and maintenance costs on the adopter, without a comparable public payment. Both arrangements delegate work, but the adopter under DDA must secure funding for that work. The Royal Parks charity combines retained income with a government service fee. The charity bears ordinary maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. The allocation of costs therefore matters as much as the range of funding sources.

MCD's RWA scheme and Chennai's maintenance contracts involve public payment for services. Their financial credibility depends on whether the authority pays on time. MCD's earlier interruption of the RWA scheme documents this risk. Chennai's inspection-linked payment proposals address the other side of the contract: whether the supplier earns payment by delivering the required work. Both of these are however better described as outsourcing contracts rather than mobilising private revenues for supplementing private ones.

Tenure

The Central Park Conservancy and the Royal Parks charity both manage publicly owned parks under ten-year agreements. Central Park's agreement runs from 2023 to 2033. The Royal Parks charity received its ten-year licence in 2017; the available accounts leave its post-2027 terms unconfirmed. In both cases, the agreement gives the manager a period over which to organise staff, fundraising and maintenance, subject to contractual duties and public oversight.

DDA offers an initial three-year adoption, renewable in three-year periods up to twelve years while the park remains under its jurisdiction. Continuing for the full period therefore requires successive approvals. DDA can also terminate an adoption through the prescribed procedure, and installed assets vest in the authority on termination or expiry. BBMP's published text specifies an eleven-month term, although its implementation status remains unverified.

The difference concerns the period for which a contributor can rely on an agreed role. DDA's three-year renewal cycle requires more frequent decisions about continuation than the ten-year agreements used for Central Park and the Royal Parks. If a donor funds a facility whose upkeep extends beyond the current term, the donor and public authority must agree who will provide that care after expiry. Renewal conditions can protect the public against poor performance, but uncertainty about continuation can complicate long-term commitments.

Donor benefits

Central Park and the Royal Parks both offer donors recognition without transferring ownership or exclusive use of park facilities. Their bench programmes make the offer concrete through published donation amounts and dedication conditions. Central Park also offers memberships, tree memorials and negotiated project recognition. The Royal Parks' bench dedications depend on location, availability and approved inscriptions. The shared feature is a defined offer administered by the organisation responsible for the park, although the range of benefits differs.

DDA already offers acknowledgement signs and approved public-event permissions. BBMP's published policy also provides a route for contributors to supply facilities and services. However, a prospective donor may still need a specific offer linking the contribution sought, the duration of recognition and responsibility for subsequent repairs.

A defined offer lets a contributor assess what the gift will secure and lets the manager explain the associated care obligations. Indian cities could make those terms explicit without giving donors control over public space. The offer must also distinguish charitable giving, corporate sponsorship and commercial investment. An Indian company cannot assume that spending on publicity or employee-only activities qualifies as CSR expenditure. Recognition may help attract support, but neither a better catalogue nor a more generous benefit can guarantee demand where potential donors are scarce.

Revenue rights

In New York and London, public authorities specify the rights under which park managers receive and use commercial income. New York allocates concession rights and receipts through public approvals and separate agreements. The Royal Parks licence expressly permits the charity to retain park income, and trustees can hold reserves and spend across years. Both examples connect permitted commercial activity to a financial arrangement identifying who receives the money and how it may support the parks.

DDA's adoption policy contemplates temporary kiosks, but has no automatic entitlement to operate a concession or retain its proceeds. Kolkata's rental example leaves the recipient and use of receipts unclear. These gaps matter because a park manager cannot budget on the assumption that activity within the park will generate income available for its own bills. The agreement must identify who collects the receipts, what share reaches maintenance and which authority approves that use. The Indian examples establish permissions or rentals more clearly than a dependable flow of usable maintenance income.

Central Park uses restricted gifts and endowments with specified purposes and spending rules. The Royal Parks receives donations and grants alongside commercial income, and maintains reserves for future obligations. Although their funding mixes differ, both have an organisation able to hold money and apply it to park care beyond the year of receipt.

The Indian adoption arrangements described here provide a narrower route. BBMP's published scheme accepts assets and services but prohibits direct cash acceptance under that policy. DDA envisages adopter-funded work but under its scheme there is a risk that a donated facility may leave the authority with future repair bills unless continuing care is separately funded. Collecting cash gifts, investing them and using distributions for maintenance would require an authorised recipient and explicit financial rules.

Bryant Park adds a further source of revenue through compulsory district assessments collected under New York's BID framework. The reviewed Indian policies establish no equivalent park-specific assessment. Introducing one would require its own legal basis and district-governance arrangements, beyond an agreement with an individual donor or adopter.

Public safeguards

Mumbai's caretaker controversies concern control of public land and the risk of restricted access. New York and London retain public ownership and regulate commercial uses. DDA also specifies access, maintenance and handback obligations. The question is whether the responsible authority can inspect performance, require correction and recover control. Chennai's proposed monitoring tools and DDA's service standards do provide mechanisms for supervision. I am however, not able to provide data on enforcement.

Some caveats are necessary. Donor wealth and commercial demand help sustain New York and London parks, and cannot be manufactured by improving contract terms. The same business models do not work for all parks. Professional fundraising, accounts and supervision also have costs that may be difficult for a small park to bear. For some parks, shared support or ordinary municipal provision may be more suitable. Public finance must therefore support dependable care where private resources are scarce, while making payments, revenue rights and maintenance obligations credible where complementary finance is feasible.

What public finance should do

Parks need money for improvements and continuing care, while free access limits how much of that cost can be charged to users. New York and London combine public support with donations and commercial income through organisations authorised to manage those resources. Indian cities already use adoption, contributed facilities and commercial permissions alongside publicly financed maintenance. The comparison in section 5 identifies the terms that make these arrangements workable: dependable operating finance, sufficient continuity, defined contributor benefits, usable revenue rights and enforceable public safeguards.

The task is therefore to connect private contributions to maintenance obligations that public agencies and park managers can honour. Permission to adopt a park, install a facility or operate a kiosk leaves important financial questions unresolved. The contributor needs to know what it will receive and how long its role will continue; the manager needs money it can use for the work promised. The case for complementary finance depends on completing that agreement, while recognising that donor wealth and commercial demand will limit what different parks can raise.

If public finance can support such commitments, private resources could fund rehabilitation, improve facilities and sustain better horticulture, cleaning and repairs without charging for every visit. Continuing gifts or permitted commercial receipts could help meet annual bills, while invested funds and reserves could provide for future care. Public money could then support a larger or better-maintained stock of accessible parks than it could finance alone. Where additional income meets costs at commercially attractive parks, public resources could also support neighbourhoods with fewer donors. These gains depend on contributions reaching maintenance, covering their own administrative costs and preserving public use.

Outsourcing alone does not mobilise private revenue. When a municipality pays a contractor or an RWA to maintain a park, the money still comes from the public budget. Better procurement may improve service or reduce its cost, but a change in provider does not establish an additional source of finance. Mobilisation requires contributions from outside that budget, whether gifts, privately funded work or income from permitted commercial activities. Central Park illustrates how the two functions can coexist: the city purchases services from an organisation that also raises private money. Its public payment and its fundraising perform different financial roles.

Additional income available for recurring care

Public finance should help mobilise resources that can meet recurring bills. A large capital gift cannot pay a gardener unless its terms allow money to be used for wages. Likewise, a busy cafe contributes to upkeep only if the financial arrangement directs usable receipts to maintenance. Central Park's unrestricted gifts and London's retained income show why the permitted use of money matters. The relevant gain is the additional maintenance that private resources can finance after fundraising, administration and supervision costs, accounting also for any public spending or existing income they displace.

A dependable public contribution can make that financing arrangement more credible. It gives a manager a funded service commitment around which to seek supplementary gifts or commercial income. Public authorities must still support essential care where those receipts fall short. The division of risk matters here: London's charity bears ordinary maintenance risk, while DCMS retains major asset-failure risk. Asking a contributor to meet costs beyond its financial means can leave a park with unfunded obligations despite the apparent transfer of responsibility.

Capital contributions accompanied by continuing care

Public finance should mobilise both improvements and the resources needed to sustain them. A donated toilet brings cleaning, water and repair costs; a restored playground brings inspection and eventual replacement costs. The financial value of the gift depends partly on whether those obligations are covered. Central Park's endowments illustrate one way of supporting future work, while DDA's renewal terms and BBMP's published short term raise the question of who continues care after an agreement ends. Capital funding, recognition and maintenance commitments therefore need compatible durations. A long care commitment can coexist with public ownership and free basic access.

Contributions matched to what participants value

Public finance should enable different contributors to support parks on terms suited to their motives. A commemorative donor may value recognition and lasting care; a company may support eligible environmental work; a commercial operator needs a defined opportunity to earn revenue. Central Park and the Royal Parks make some donor offers concrete through published dedication terms. DDA's acknowledgement signs and event permissions provide an Indian starting point. The principle is to connect each contribution to a clear benefit and a funded public service, while keeping gifts, CSR, commercial sponsorship and concessions distinct. Public authorities must have the power to honour the recognition, income rights or payments they promise.

The ability to receive, manage and sustain contributions

Private finance also requires organisations capable of raising and using it. Central Park's professional Conservancy manages donor relationships and restricted funds alongside park operations. The Royal Parks charity can retain income and hold reserves across years. Public support for accounting, fundraising and supervision may therefore help sustain contributions beyond a single restoration campaign. For smaller parks, shared administration or fiscal sponsorship may be more affordable than a separate organisation. Effective practices can operate within existing institutions. More reliable payments, consistent inspection and clearer donor reporting can improve how existing arrangements function within their authorised powers. Experience with those practices may reveal constraints that justify later changes to delegated powers, financial rules or organisational form. Formal redesign is therefore one possible response to experience, and its value depends on whether it enables better practice at a justified cost.

Different financing models for different parks

Public finance should support different financing models for parks with different earning potential. Large destination parks with visitor demand may combine a public maintenance contribution with concession fees, event income and organised fundraising. Neighbourhood parks with a willing donor base may draw on recurring gifts or adopter-funded care alongside municipal services. Parks with little commercial demand or donor support will need predominantly public finance, whether maintenance is delivered directly or through contracts. For small parks, shared fundraising and accounting may cost less than separate organisations. Where lawful and compatible with donor restrictions, a multi-park arrangement could pool some income to support less commercially attractive sites. The choice must reflect each park's costs, earning potential and public uses. Public allocations should follow service needs, so a park's inability to attract donors does not become a reason for poorer care.

References

Jeet Mashru. 2023. "These Are Some of Our City's 'Parks'". Hindustan Times, 20 April. Opening budget paragraph and "Veer Abdul Hamid Maidan, Dharavi."

Sophiya Mathew. 2024. "Parks and (No) Recreation". The Indian Express, 19 July.

Kolkata Municipal Corporation. 2024-25. "Budget Estimates 2024-2025". Revenue-fund table, "Parks & Squares and Urban Forestation."

Delhi Urban Art Commission. 2020. "Park Design Guidelines". Printed pp. 65-72, sections 4.1-4.3.

Central Park Conservancy. 2024. "Financial Statements, June 30, 2024 and 2023". Note 11, printed p. 24 (PDF p. 25); fund and endowment disclosures.

Central Park Conservancy. n.d.. "Corporate Programme".

Central Park Conservancy. n.d.. "Adopt-A-Bench".

New York City Small Business Services. n.d.. "Business Improvement Districts". Sections on governance, funding and oversight.

The Royal Parks. 2024-25. "Annual Report and Accounts 2024-25". Pp. 65-67, 75-80 and 90-91; note 1(f).

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Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board. 2021.. "Action Plan for Control of Air Pollution in Million Plus City of Tamilnadu (Revised): Chennai U. A.". Section 14.1, p. 65.

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Delhi Parks and Gardens Society. 2021. "Application for Financial Assistance". September; application and payment workflow.

Drishti Jain. 2026. "Municipal Corporation of Delhi Brings Back RWA Partnership to Maintain Parks amid Staff Shortage". The Indian Express, 24 February. Opening approval and arrears paragraphs; final infrastructure and land-use paragraphs.

The Times of India. 2025. "MCD to Reintroduce PPP Scheme for Park Maintenance in Delhi".

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Sneha Priya Yanappa et al.. 2025. "A Park for All". Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, September. Pp. 76-89 and 91-105.

Delhi Development Authority. 2019. "Adoption of Parks Policy 2019". Amended 9 October 2020. Sections 2, 5-10 and 11-13, pp. 3-9; model agreement, pp. 12-23.

The Telegraph. 2025. "KMC's Bid to Stop Renting Out Space Inside Park". January.

The New Indian Express. 2023. "GCC to End Practice of Single Contractor Maintaining Many Parks". 29 April.

The New Indian Express. 2024. "Greater Chennai Corporation Floats Bids for Upkeep of 595 Parks". 22 December.

Sayli Udas-Mankikar. 2020. "Formulating Open-Space Policies for India's Cities: The Case of Mumbai". ORF Occasional Paper 241, April. "Open Spaces Policy" and conclusion.

Linah Baliga. 2024. "BMC Scraps Draft Policy on Open Spaces". Hindustan Times, 12 February.

Jon Kher Kaw, Hyunji Lee and Sameh Wahba, eds.. 2020. "The Hidden Wealth of Cities: Creating, Financing, and Managing Public Spaces". World Bank. Chapter 3, pp. 55-93.

Manisha Anantharaman, Marlyne Sahakian and Czarina Saloma. 2023. "Spatialising Degrowth in Southern Cities: Everyday Park-Making for (Un)Commoning". Urban Studies 60(7), pp. 1266-1284.

Central Park Conservancy. n.d.. "Our Story".

House of Commons. 2016. "General Committee Proceedings". 19 October.

London Assembly. 2024. "London's Royal Parks". October.

Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation. 2025. "Budget Estimates A, B & G, 2025-26". 4 February. P. 50, "Enhanced Open Spaces and Greenery."

Greater Chennai Corporation. 2022. "Council Resolution, 26 January 2022". Recital referring to Special Officer Resolution 1073/2020 and the adoption conditions.


Anirudh Burman is a researcher at the XKDR Forum.

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

Saul Kriger Wilson: "The Origins of Land Finance: Local Resistance and Top-Down Imposition": A review

by Anirudh Burman.

Indian public bodies use several distinct land-related instruments for generating revenues from land-use. The National Land Monetization Corporation supports the disposal or lease of non-core public assets; development authorities auction or lease land; planning authorities and municipal bodies collect development or floor-space charges. These activities raise questions about the designs of the precise mechanisms that must be used, and whether the correct mechanisms are in place.

Saul Kriger Wilson's article asks a different, more specific question about China: why did local governments fail to collect the public revenue available from land transfers, and what changed that practice? In his telling, local governments engaged in transfers of land-use that severely undercut public revenue interests until the central government made concerted efforts to ensure transparent, auction-based transfers of land-use rights.

Wilson argues that fiscal opportunity alone did not ensure public receipts. Central political pressure, inspections and consequences for local officials helped make market pricing and payment collection effective requirements. In this review of his article I analyse his account alongside scholarship on fiscal incentives, land as development and credit infrastructure, and political control.

Fiscal opportunity and collected revenue

Wilson's argument relies on a distinction between the revenue a public authority might potentially earn and the actual collection. According to him, land receipts in China remained limited until the early 2000s, although local governments had opportunities to raise more. Negotiated transfers could yield less than competitive transactions, and agreed payments were not always collected. Wilson traces how local resistance and central intervention shaped that gap. His evidence includes historical examples, local cases and accounts of inspections and disciplinary action.(Wilson, pp. 2-4 .)

The conventional explanation links the expansion of land finance to the 1994 tax-sharing reform, which increased local spending responsibilities while reducing some local revenues. Wilson does not deny the reform's fiscal consequences. However, he argues that it cannot by itself explain when market-priced transactions and reliable collection took hold. Guangzhou sought bids for development rights in 1986, and Shenzhen sold term-limited land-use rights in 1987. These precedents show that land transactions predated the reform, while later resistance suggests that fiscal pressure did not automatically align officials' conduct with the public owner's interests. (Wilson, pp. 5-7.)

Wilson's account also qualifies any simple claim that valuable land or a need for revenue would lead officials to maximize public receipts. During the 1992-1993 property boom, officials in Beihai and Haikou continued to make discounted deals. Wilson uses contemporary accounts and disciplinary investigations to describe how officials and their networks could benefit from those arrangements. This is evidence about the cases he examines, not proof that local officials everywhere preferred private gains to public revenue. It does show why fiscal incentives alone cannot stand in for an account of who controls transactions and how rules are enforced.

Changes in land acquisition, housing and bank finance during the late 1990s made profitable transfers more feasible. Yet Beijing's 2002 restrictions on negotiated sales retained broad exceptions, and local self-examination did not reliably discipline municipal leaders. Wilson identifies a shift in 2003, when local leaders were assessed on implementation and failed inspections could threaten construction-land approvals and quotas. He describes Guangxi's response to repeated inspections and the later pressure on Beijing to reject pending negotiated projects and reorganise district land bureaux. ( Wilson, pp. 11-15.)

Wilson reports that Shenzhen collected only 25 per cent of contracted land revenue in 1995. During the later reform campaign, authorities identified 25.2 billion yuan in late, reduced or illegally discounted payments and recovered 17.6 billion yuan. Subsequent audits reported collection rates of 90 per cent or more of fees due. He also reports a 977 per cent increase in land-sale revenue between 2000 and 2004.( Wilson, pp. 2, 4, 6, 15-16 .)

Wilson states that corruption continued nonetheless. Officials could manipulate auctions or accept bribes even as developers paid substantial sums to government. His narrower claim is that sustained central intervention shifted the balance toward public collection and made market pricing more routine. The article's contribution is to explain the political and administrative work behind that change, rather than to treat higher fiscal need as a sufficient cause. ( Wilson, pp. 16-17.)

Three debates around Wilson's account

Fiscal arrangements and incentives:

Fiscal accounts ask how intergovernmental revenue and spending responsibilities shape local incentives. The 1994 reform matters to that question, but Wilson's chronology complicates this account, in which fiscal deprivation alone produced market-oriented land transfers. His outcome is not simply the availability of land or the growth of local borrowing. He focuses on whether public authorities priced transfers accurately and collected payments. The evidence he presents suggests that fiscal need and valuable land created incentives, but did not ensure that officials acted on them. Wilson therefore qualifies fiscal explanations of the timing of collection.

Land as development and credit infrastructure:

Meg Rithmire treats land institutions as part of China's system for managing investment and economic expansion. She writes that municipal governments could convey urban land and plan development, while higher authorities retained controls over development permissions. This helps explain why land transactions mattered to central and local development strategies, but it does not by itself explain whether officials charged the intended prices or collected the amounts due. Wilson supplies that account of implementation. The two arguments address linked outcomes and complete each other's accounts. (Rithmire, working paper, pp. 7-20, 29-32; Wilson, pp. 3-4, 16 .)

Liu, Oi and Zhang examine how local governments financed development after fiscal recentralisation. Their "grand bargain" account describes how the central government offered the promise and creation of locally controlled banks, local government financing vehicles and land collateral as parts of a borrowing arrangement that supported investment. This complements Wilson's narrative by adding to it. Local governments negotiated for autonomy in running credit institutions, financing mechanisms, in addition to, and despite the fact that the central government was pushing them to maximise land revenue. The land-finance story is not merely about selling land, but also about creating mechanisms that helped create a financial market for land finance at the local level.(Liu, Oi and Zhang, pp. 12-22 ; Lin and Yi, pp. 50-79.)

Political control and implementation:

An important aspect of Wilson's contribution is that it shifts attention from formal authority to the officials who apply it. Auction requirements had limited force when local bureaux could not discipline the municipal leaders who appointed and paid them. Inspections, performance assessments, disciplinary pressure and control over construction-land approvals changed the cost of resistance. The mechanism is not merely the existence of a central rule, but the centre's ability to monitor implementation and attach consequences to non-compliance. Wilson's account qualifies institutional explanations that treat formal market rules as self-executing.

These debates are complementary. Fiscal arrangements help explain why local governments sought resources; land institutions and credit explain how land supported investment; political control helps explain why potential transfer proceeds became more reliably collected. Wilson's contribution lies chiefly in the third question and its link to the first.

Thinking about land-value capture using Wilson's account

Wilson's account suggests questions for Indian research. Any comparison of public land auctions, town-planning schemes, development charges or other instruments would need to establish who has authority and ownership; who can acquire land and approve plans; how transactions are priced and receipts collected; which government controls implementation; which body receives and may spend the proceeds; what liabilities accompany the arrangement; and who bears its distributional costs. These dimensions differ across instruments and jurisdictions.

References

Saul Kriger Wilson. 2026. "The Origins of Land Finance: Local Resistance and Top-Down Imposition." The China Quarterly, First View, pp. 1-20.

Meg Elizabeth Rithmire. 2017. "Land Institutions and Chinese Political Economy: Institutional Complementarities and Macroeconomic Management."Politics & Society 45(1), pp. 123-153.

George C. S. Lin and Fangxin Yi. 2011. "Urbanization of Capital or Capitalization on Urban Land? Land Development and Local Public Finance in Urbanizing China."Urban Geography 32(1), pp. 50-79.

Adam Y. Liu, Jean C. Oi and Yi Zhang. 2022. "China's Local Government Debt: The Grand Bargain."The China Journal 87, pp. 40-71. Published online 6 December 2021.

Madhu Bharti and Shagun Mehrotra. 2020. "Metropolitan Ahmedabad: Scaling Up with Contiguous Replication of Town Planning Schemes." In Greater Than Parts: A Metropolitan Opportunity , Volume II, edited by Shagun Mehrotra, Lincoln L. Lewis, Mariana Orloff and Beth Olberding. Washington, DC: World Bank. Financing discussion: printed p. 23, PDF p. 30.

OECD. 2022. Global Compendium of Land Value Capture Policies: India.


Tuesday, November 03, 2026

How courts choose arbitrators

by Animesh Bordoloi and Prashant Narang.

A court hearing an application under section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 must answer two questions. Should an arbitrator be appointed? If so, who should it be? Indian arbitration law has paid far more attention to the first than to the second.

Our new working paper, How courts choose arbitrators: Evidence from the Bombay and Madras High Courts, examines the second question. It codes 372 reported and retrievable section 11 orders from 2016 to 2024, naming 387 appointments among 201 individuals, and draws on 36 semi-structured interviews.

A question the Act leaves open

The Act regulates the person once in view, covering agreed qualifications, independence and impartiality, disclosure, and fees. It says little about how candidates enter consideration, whether alternatives are weighed, or why one eligible person is preferred over another. Beyond qualifications agreed by the parties, the Act prescribes no positive qualification or accreditation criteria. Those norms are left to regulations by the Arbitration Council of India, which the Government told Parliament in February 2026 had still not been constituted.

This creates an observability problem. Judges may draw on professional knowledge, party suggestions or informal inquiries that never appear in the order. The record shows who was appointed and which steps were recorded. It cannot necessarily reveal how the choice was made.

What the orders record

The process is largely court-driven. In 315 of 372 orders (84.7%), the court named the arbitrator without recording both parties’ agreement to that person; such agreement appeared in 50 (13.4%). Consent to arbitration, or to “a retired judge”, is not agreement on who should hear the dispute.

Retired judges received 63.3% of named appointments, and advocates and senior advocates 33.9%. Technically qualified persons received six appointments across the two courts over nine years; former bureaucrats or senior officials, five.

Orders rarely explained the choice. Only 18 (4.8%) recorded any reason bearing on it, mostly a category of person such as a retired judge or legal expert. Six (1.6%) gave a ground tied to the individual appointed, and none compared candidates.

Disclosure practice differed sharply. Bombay directed a section 12 disclosure in 115 of 123 orders; Madras in four of 249. Section 11(8) places disclosure before appointment, yet 111 of the 119 directions came after the arbitrator was named. Some appointments may have remained conditional on disclosure, and an order’s silence does not prove none was obtained.

The orders recorded fee frameworks rather than the amounts eventually charged. High Court rules appeared in 51.1% of orders; 22.8% left the fee to the arbitrator, and 15.9% recorded no basis. Interviewees described the difficulty of negotiating remuneration with a tribunal already chosen to decide one’s dispute.

Repetition was substantial, with 186 of 387 named appointments going to someone the same court had already appointed. The ten most frequently appointed individuals received 31.6% of Bombay’s appointments and 34.3% of Madras’s. In Madras, most repeats came from the same judge appointing the same person, however they are counted.

What the record cannot show

These patterns do not establish favouritism. Repetition may reflect expertise, availability, reputation or a thin alternative pool. But professional knowledge and professional familiarity look alike from outside, and the orders rarely contain enough to tell them apart. The limit cuts both ways, since an arbitrator appointed twenty times on merit has no published record capable of showing it.

The study covers two High Courts and reported orders only. It cannot say how other courts appoint, or whether institutions do better. Its argument is about information. Identifying candidates, checking conflicts, confirming availability and settling fees need records that persist across cases. An institution with a continuing caseload can keep them; a rotating section 11 roster does not itself provide that continuity. That favours parties choosing an institution, appointment method and fee framework when they contract, with institutional performance still open to scrutiny.

Where courts continue to appoint, a narrower step is available. High Courts could publish periodic aggregate figures on appointment numbers, professional backgrounds, unique appointees, repeat appointments and concentration, all compiled from the orders themselves. That would constrain no individual appointment. It would make a public function observable, and let competing explanations be tested rather than asserted.

References

Animesh Bordoloi and Prashant Narang, How courts choose arbitrators: Evidence from the Bombay and Madras High Courts, TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation Working Paper No. 25, 13 October 2026.

Prashant Narang and Vishnu Suresh, The Blind Spot in Indian Arbitration: Fees, Power, and Structural Oversights, The Leap Blog, 27 February 2025.


Animesh Bordoloi is Senior International Case Counsel at the Asian International Arbitration Centre, Malaysia. Prashant Narang is a researcher at the TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation, New Delhi. We thank Renuka Sane for comments on earlier drafts.

Thursday, October 22, 2026

A District-Level Dataset of Building Volume and Nighttime Lights

by Ayush Patnaik and Kapilan Mahalingam.

How fast is Pune growing, compared with Nagpur? Is Coimbatore catching up with Chennai? In India, these simple questions are surprisingly hard to answer.

The official statistics that describe the Indian economy are, for the most part, produced at state-level, once a year, often with a significant lag. Policy questions do not respect this. Infrastructure, industrial concentration and urbanisation play out at the district level, and the district is where the Indian statistical system is weakest. There is no official district-level measure of monthly economic activity. There is no official measure whatsoever of the stock of physical capital in a district, or of how fast it changes. For much of what we would like to know about a district, the source is still a census from fifteen years ago.

We have built a new dataset to address this very problem, using satellite data. For each of 640 Indian districts, it gives two measures. The first is nighttime lights, monthly, from 2014 onwards: a flow measure of economic activity. The second is building volume, annually, from 2016 to 2023: a stock measure of physical capital. Both are derived from satellite imagery, both are released as CSVs, and the code that produces them is public.

Satellites were not designed as instruments of economic measurement. But every few days they record the surface of the earth, and economic activity leaves traces on that surface. Buildings appear. Towns spread outwards. Settlements brighten or dim after sunset as activity ebbs and flows. Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2012) showed that the growth of nighttime lights tracks economic growth in places where the national accounts are weak, and Chen and Nordhaus (2011) worked out the conditions under which luminosity adds information to conventional statistics rather than restating them.

The difficulty is that raw satellite data is not usable as-is. It arrives in unfamiliar formats. It must be corrected for a long list of biases, and processing it at any scale requires serious computational heft. A researcher who wants a district-level series faces months of engineering before they can run their first regression. The purpose of this dataset is to do that engineering once, publicly, reproducibly, so that nobody has to do it again.

Nighttime lights: a measure of economic activity

Nighttime lights are the older of the two measures, and economists have been using them for more than a decade. The data comes from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) (Elvidge et al., 2021). We use the monthly series from 2014 onwards, at a resolution of 500 metres. For each pixel and month, VIIRS reports the average radiance and the number of cloud-free observations that went into it. Each district-month row in our dataset gives the sum of radiance across the district, the mean radiance per pixel, and the number of pixels.

Raw VIIRS data is messy. In earlier work at XKDR Forum (Patnaik, Shah and Thomas, 2022) we catalogued some of the more notable problems. Four, in particular. First, bloom: bright pixels spill light into their darker neighbours. Second, background noise: pixels with no lights at all do not report zero. Third, outliers: gas flares and fires produce readings that have nothing to do with economic activity. Fourth, and most important for India, seasonal attenuation: there is a marked and poorly understood correlation between the number of cloud-free observations and the measured radiance (Patnaik et al., 2021). Consequently, in the monsoon months, there are fewer cloud-free observations, and the recorded radiance is biased downwards. A new user of the data will not know to correct for this, and the seasonality of clouds shows up as spurious seasonalities of the economy.

Because lights have been studied for so long, solutions exist. We take the raw data and run it through the PSTT2021 pipeline of Patnaik et al. (2021), as implemented in NighttimeLights.jl, which corrects the bulk of these problems, and then aggregate to the district. The map below shows the result for 2021.

Nighttime lights by district, dark is dim

Lights are a flow. They respond quickly: a neighbourhood brightens as it becomes more active, and dims when activity slows. This is what makes them useful at a monthly frequency. Beyer, Chhabra, Galdo and Rama (2018) worked with cleaned VIIRS data at the district level and traced the effect of demonetisation on Indian districts month by month, an episode that annual, state-level data would have largely smoothed away.

A word of caution. As household and street lighting shifts to LEDs, measured radiance can fall even where activity is rising, because LEDs emit less in the band that VIIRS is sensitive to (Kyba et al., 2017). A dimmer district is not necessarily a slower one. Gibson, Olivia and Boe-Gibson (2020) survey this and the other traps in the economic use of nighttime lights, and are worth reading before treating radiance as a direct measure of output.

Building volume: a measure of the capital stock

The second measure is new. Google's Open Buildings 2.5D Temporal dataset (Sirko et al., 2023) is built from Sentinel-2 imagery at an effective resolution of 4 metres. It estimates not just where buildings stand but how tall they are, for every year from 2016 to 2023. Where the lights are high frequency, the buildings are high resolution. We resample the raw data to 100 metres, which is far quicker to process and is plenty for district-level work, and chunk the requests to stay within Google Earth Engine's limits. Each district-year row gives the total building footprint in the district, the mean building height, and the total building volume, which is the product of the two.

Building volume is a stock. It changes slowly, through the accumulation of investment in housing, industry and commerce. Buildings are rarely demolished on a scale that would show up at the district level, so in the ordinary course the series should rise, or stay flat, from one year to the next. The map below shows building volume per square metre of footprint in 2021, which is a rough measure of how tall a district builds rather than how much of it is built on. The dense corridors are visible without any further processing.

Building volume per square metre by district

These are the same districts in the same year, seen in concrete rather than in radiance. The densely built regions broadly match the bright ones, but not exactly. The Gangetic plain and the southern coasts are brighter than their building stock alone would suggest, and parts of the interior are dimmer. That gap is the reason for carrying both measures.

Here the contrast with nighttime lights is instructive. A decade of work has gone into understanding what is wrong with VIIRS data and how to fix it. For building volume, that literature does not yet exist. There are no papers cataloguing its biases and no established cleaning pipeline. We therefore release the building volume data as published by Google, without a cleaning pass of our own, and note its most significant problems in our appendix.

There is one respect in which building volume has more potential than lights, and it is the reason for optimism despite these problems. The height of a building is an objective, verifiable measure. Municipal building registers, property tax rolls and structures of known height give a ground truth against which the satellite estimate can be checked and corrected. Seth, Singh and Uday (2026) have begun to do this in Karnataka: working with building volume inside urban local body boundaries, they find that the summed volume of a body explains much of the variation in its property tax demand. There is no comparable ground truth for the radiance of a district. We are working on a bias correction for building heights that uses known buildings as anchors for the distribution, and we expect that the cleaning methodology for this data will develop in the coming years, as it did for lights.

Putting the two together

Each measure answers a straightforward question on its own. Together they answer a more useful one. Building volume is the stock of capital in a district; lights are the flow of activity running through it.

Across districts in a single year the two agree closely. In 2023 the correlation between log building volume and log radiance is 0.83, and the fitted slope is about 1.5: a district with twice the built volume of another is, on average, close to three times as bright. Some of that is size, since a larger district holds both more buildings and more lit pixels. What is useful is the spread around the line. The six districts furthest from it all lie on the same side, dim for what has been built, by factors of twenty to eighty, and five of the six are in the Himalayas or the Northeast.

Every district in 2023: building volume against summed radiance, both on log scales, with the fitted line. The named districts are the six furthest from it, all of them dimmer than their building stock would suggest

The difference in tempo is easiest to see when the two are drawn on the same axis. Building volume gives eight annual points across the period; lights give twelve times as many.

Mumbai Suburban, Pune and Surat: monthly radiance against annual building volume, both indexed to 2016

Sorting districts by whether the stock and the flow are rising gives four kinds of district. Where both are climbing, a district is likely in the midst of genuine, sustained growth. Where construction is rising but lights are flat, capital is being put in place ahead of use. This is what one sees in a place that is being built out, such as a new industrial area. It is also what one sees in a real estate bubble, where the buildings are made and nobody comes. Where lights are rising with little new construction, existing capital is being used more intensively. That is consistent with constrained land, with limited confidence in long-term growth, or simply with a choice to extract more from what is already there. Where both are falling, the district is in decline.

Every district, 2016 to 2023: the trend in building volume against the trend in nighttime lights. Most sit in the upper right; the named districts are the starkest case of each pattern, plotted in the next chart

Most districts sit in the upper right, where both measures are rising. The interesting cases are where the two disagree. Splitting each measure three ways, into rising, flat and falling, gives nine combinations, of which eight are occupied. The empty one is rising volume with dimming lights. The chart below shows the starkest district in each of the eight: Wayanad, where building volume and lights climbed together; Pithoragarh, where both fell; Central Delhi, where both are flat, as one expects of a district that is built out; Lucknow, where construction ran ahead of measured activity; and so on through the remaining four.

Building volume and nighttime lights, indexed to 2016, for the starkest district in each of the eight occupied combinations

Obtaining the data

This dataset is for public consumption. It is released with the generating code, so that every number in it can be reproduced. The data is available as CSVs (nighttime lights, building volume, and district boundaries). The processing pipeline runs end to end in two Colab notebooks, one for nighttime lights and one for building volume. One note: the nighttime lights CSV was computed at native resolution (500 metres), while the notebook downsamples in order to stay within Colab's usage limits. Point the notebooks at a different set of boundaries, whether another country or another administrative level, and the pipelines will run unchanged.

We built this for two audiences. The first is researchers working on regional inequality, urbanisation and the geography of growth, who have, until now, had to choose between district level data and time series data. The second is anyone in government who needs to know what is happening in a place where the official numbers arrive late, or not at all.

This is a first step. There is a great deal of work to be done: on the bias correction of building heights, on the LED problem in lights, and on validating both measures against ground truth wherever it exists. Economic development leaves visible traces on the landscape long before it reaches official databases. We hope that researchers will use this data, find its problems, and help us improve it.

References

Measuring districts' monthly economic activity from outer space, Robert Beyer, Esha Chhabra, Virgilio Galdo and Martin Rama, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8523, July 2018.

Using luminosity data as a proxy for economic statistics, Xi Chen and William D. Nordhaus, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 108, No. 21, May 2011.

VIIRS night-time lights, Christopher D. Elvidge, Kimberly Baugh, Mikhail Zhizhin, Feng Chi Hsu and Tilottama Ghosh, in Remote Sensing of Night-time Light, Routledge, 2021.

Night lights in economics: Sources and uses, John Gibson, Susan Olivia and Geua Boe-Gibson, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 34, No. 5, December 2020.

Measuring economic growth from outer space, J. Vernon Henderson, Adam Storeygard and David N. Weil, American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 2, April 2012.

Artificially lit surface of Earth at night increasing in radiance and extent, Christopher C. M. Kyba and others, Science Advances, Vol. 3, No. 11, November 2017.

But clouds got in my way: Bias and bias correction of VIIRS nighttime lights data in the presence of clouds, Ayush Patnaik, Ajay Shah, Anshul Tayal and Susan Thomas, XKDR Forum Working Paper No. 7, October 2021.

Foundations for nighttime lights data analysis, Ayush Patnaik, Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas, XKDR Forum Working Paper No. 19, December 2022.

Estimating property tax potential in urban local bodies using satellite imagery, Abhishek Seth, Manish K. Singh and Diya Uday, XKDR Forum Working Paper No. 47, March 2026.

High-resolution building and road detection from Sentinel-2, Wojciech Sirko, Emmanuel Asiedu Brempong, Juliana T. C. Marcos, Abigail Annkah, Abel Korme, Mohammed Alewi Hassen, Krishna Sapkota, Tomer Shekel, Abdoulaye Diack, Sella Nevo and others, arXiv:2310.11622, 2023.


The authors are researchers at XKDR Forum, Mumbai.

Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Better public procurement for IT in India

by Ashok Pal Singh, Karthik Suresh, and Susan Thomas.

Information technologies (IT) are now ubiquitous in government. The Government of India has more than tripled its expenditure in real terms on large-scale "mission mode projects" over the last fifteen years. Yet, we see persistent evidence of failures (see examples here, here, and here). Failures in IT services therefore affect not only convenience but also people's ability to comply with the law. At the same time, there is a wide gap between contracting volumes and contracting capabilities in the Indian state. This makes government IT systems particularly vulnerable to changes in scope, features, and scale that may happen during the course of a project. These problems pose challenges for contract design through which this flow of change requests is processed by private vendors without exorbitant monopolistic pricing. IT systems are not one-off jobs that is akin to building bridges or even repeat jobs like purchasing medicines. This is a tricky problem to address.

In our new paper, Better public procurement for IT in India, we delve into three cases of large-scale IT projects in India --- Aadhaar, Passport Seva, and MCA-21. We ask, what factors drive the performance of IT procurement by the Indian government? We answer the question by analysing the performance of contracts and the underlying factors driving this for IT projects using a contract life-cycle approach. This involves looking at six aspects of each project: (i) the vision, purpose, and objectives of the project which help the government write the specifications and delegate all the other aspects of the project; (ii) the project's governance structure, (iii) the project's contracting model, (iv) how each project dealt with change requests, (v) how did the project deal with closure and transition into newer versions of the IT system, and (vi) did the project reasonably abide by cost and time estimates.

Our general findings are that the Indian government finds it difficult to take on the IT project after the vendor has completed the contract. Further, the government is unable to communicate, handle, and account for change requests in IT projects efficiently. IT projects carry some level of inherent risk and they require some level of adaptive contracting. At the same time, government projects are conducted using public funds and there are rules against profligate spending. Therefore, IT contracts should be designed in such a way that they confine to the strictures of the rules on public spending, while at the same time they are flexible enough to allow the project managers to adapt to change requests, technological improvements, and other developments. On these lines, we suggest the following prescriptions:

  • Restricting the mandate of the project to a single goal/ outcome when multiple goals conflict with each other.
  • Sufficiently empowering the project leadership team in terms of skillsets, administrative competences, and spending capabilities.
  • An inter-disciplinary team that can complement each other's skills and allow for a space for deliberation, while also guarding against technological solutionism.
  • Evidence-based decision making that follows the scientific process of discovery, evidence, and analysis.
  • Government should take ownership of the project and use the services of consultants and experts for specific outcomes within the project framework.
  • Transition management is as important as project management --- a well-defined transition plan that is written into the project document for the first iteration itself.
  • Government's IT system should be available in the open source domain. There are significant positive spillovers when government IT systems are digital public goods i.e., open-source code on published websites which speak open APIs.
  • Highly specialized IT projects are susceptible to opportunistic hold-ups and sunk costs. Bidders in India therefore tend to price these costs ex-ante i.e., by overstating the bid. This in turn incentivizes the government to use state power to pay only the marginal production cost to the bidder. As a solution, the literature suggests that the government "owns" the system/ asset.
  • Contracts are differentiated on the basis of financial risks, operational risks, and ownership. In our view, the government should procure a working proof-of-concept, after which it can scale up the project.

Government IT projects can be thought of as being implemented in the following three phases: Phase 1 being the development of a system that demonstrates the proof of concept (PoC) ending in the delivery of a pilot implementation; Phase 2 where the pilot is scaled up to the state or national level; and Phase 3 where the project then moves into running an operational system. Successful implementations of public IT systems ideally are a mix of "make" and "buy" rather than just "buy". Phase 1 should done through "make" -- where the government itself builds the PoC and delivers a pilot implementation. Once the PoC is established, the IT system is like a well-defined product. With this in place, scaling up of the system over a state or the entire country can be optimally done through "buy", where private vendors can be contracted to deliver on a clearly defined output.


Ashok Pal Singh is a retired civil servant who served in various positions, including that of Deputy Director General with the Unique Identification Authority of India. Karthik Suresh is Assistant Professor at the National Law School, Bengaluru. Susan Thomas is Co-founder and Senior Research Fellow at XKDR Forum.

Tuesday, October 20, 2026

Spending as Planned: Efficiency of Drug Procurement in Tamil Nadu

by Pavithra Manivannan, Aakriti Narang, and Susan Thomas.

Introduction

A robust public financial management (PFM) system ensures that resources allocated in the budget are deployed as planned. One way to test this is the spending gap: the difference between what a state budgets for an item and what it actually spends. This gap offers a useful measure of a state's fiscal marksmanship. When looked further, a large spending gap may indicate that the state has either misestimated demand or struggled to manage suppliers, including ensuring timely delivery and payment. Both are critical to effective public procurement. The spending gap, therefore, offers one measure of a state's capability to procure well.

We apply this test to drug procurement. Tamil Nadu is widely regarded as the gold standard for drug procurement in India, and many researchers attribute this to the institutional design of its procurement agency, the Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation (TNMSC). Following TN's lead, many states have since set up similar bodies. In this article, we compare Tamil Nadu's spending gap in drug procurement with Karnataka, a state of comparable budget size, and population, that set up its own corporation in 2019. We ask - has Tamil Nadu's institutional development of its public healthcare system translated into capability in budgeting efficiency, for drug procurement?

Data and Methodology

We use the Detailed Demand for Grants (DDG) released by each state, to get the annual budgeted and actual expenditure numbers. "Drugs" include medicines, medical supplies and medical equipment1. Hence, to identify expenditure on drugs we extract each of these specific line-items from the Department of Health and Family Welfare's budget of both the states.

This is not a straightforward exercise. State budgets are published only as PDFs running into hundreds of pages, and the data in them is, therefore, not research ready. Without structured data, there is no practical way to trace a budget line item across years and states. We overcome this with the India Public Finance Lab Portal, developed by XKDR Forum, which uses LLM pipelines to convert these budget PDFs into granular, research-ready data. Every line item sits in neatly labelled columns, so the data can be sliced, filtered and manipulated as needed. This lets us isolate and aggregate the different heads for both states and follow them year by year.

The portal covers data of ten years for Tamil Nadu and nine for Karnataka. To keep the comparison robust, we start in 2018-19, the first year with data for both states. Additionally, the actual expenditure for a year appears in the budget documents with a two-year lag, so actuals for 2025-26 and 2026-27 are not yet available. Therefore, we stop our analysis at 2024-25.

For each state and year, we calculate the spending gap from 2018-19 to 2024-25 (Study Period) as:

Spending gapyear = 100 × (Actual Expenditureyear − Budgeted Expenditureyear) / Budgeted Expenditureyear

A positive gap means the state's actual spending is more than its Budgeted Estimates (BE), and a negative gap means it spent less. We then compute the average and the standard deviation of the annual gap for each state. This helps us test our hypothesis; if Tamil Nadu has greater state capability for drug procurement, its average spending gap and variability of spending gap must be lower than Karnataka's.

Finding 1: Tamil Nadu has a higher budget for drugs

In absolute figures, we find that Tamil Nadu budgets a higher amount for drugs than Karnataka in every year of the Study Period, and by more than twice as much in most years. In Figure 1, we report the per capita drug expenditure of both the states. We find that, over the Study Period, Tamil Nadu's per capita drug expenditure averaged to Rs. 114 per person, about 2.2 times that of Karnataka's average of Rs. 53.4 per person.

Figure 1: Per capita drug expenditure for Tamil Nadu and Karnataka

Finding 2: Tamil Nadu's spending stays closer to its budget

Tamil Nadu's actual spending on drugs tracks its budget far more closely than Karnataka's, with a spending gap that stays within a much narrower band around zero. Over 2018-19 to 2024-25, Karnataka's average spending gap is more than three times Tamil Nadu's. The variability differs even more. The standard deviation of the gap for Karnataka is about nine times higher than for Tamil Nadu. Karnataka's gap peaked at over 400% in 2020-21, while Tamil Nadu's highest gap was 48%, in 2018-19.

Figure 2: Spending gap for Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, BE v. Actuals

Average spending gap Standard deviation
Karnataka 56.1% 184.7%
Tamil Nadu 17.3% 21.2%

Finding 3: The difference is not just COVID

Plausibly, much of this volatility in spending may just be driven by the unanticipated shock of COVID-19. We therefore recalculate the summary statistics after excluding 2020-21 for both states.

Without the year 2020-21

Average spending gap Standard deviation
Karnataka -7.8% 81.7%
Tamil Nadu 13.4% 20.2%

Without 2020-21, Karnataka underspends on average, and its standard deviation falls by more than half. Although, it still remains about four times Tamil Nadu's. Tamil Nadu does not see as drastic a difference as Karnataka's. Figure 1 also shows that the two states responded differently to COVID. Tamil Nadu roughly doubled its drugs budget in 2020-21, while Karnataka raised its budget only gradually over the following years. This early increase may explain why the COVID year hit Tamil Nadu's spending gap far less: its budget absorbed the surge, whereas Karnataka's did not.

Finding 4: Karnataka corrects itself

We also know that the states publish revised estimates (RE), which update the budget estimate with more realistic figures. After looking at these numbers along with the budget and actuals, we see that Karnataka's revised estimates track its actual spending far more closely than its original budgets do.

Figure 3: Karnataka: BE vs RE vs Actuals

We also repeat the calculation against the RE:

(Revised) Spending gapyear = 100 × (Actual Expenditureyear − Revised Expenditureyear) / Revised Expenditureyear

Average spending gap (vs RE) Standard deviation (vs RE)
Karnataka -18% 24.4%
Tamil Nadu 0.38% 15.9%

Against its revised estimates, Karnataka's gap falls. It spends about 18% less than its revised estimate on average, and its standard deviation falls from 184.7% to 24.4%. However, Tamil Nadu still seems to do better. Its actual spending lands almost exactly on its revised estimates, with a lower deviation as well.

Discussion

The main finding of this article is that Tamil Nadu's average spending gap (17.3%) remains substantially lower than Karnataka's (56.1%). The difference becomes even more pronounced during a crisis, when procurement systems are tested hardest. In 2020-21, Karnataka's spending gap rose above 400%, while Tamil Nadu's remained below 50%. The ability to estimate expenditure requirements accurately and spend broadly in line with budget allocations, even amid unexpected shocks, is an important marker of state capability and procurement efficiency. The pandemic emerged in December 2019, while the budgets for 2020-21 were presented in February 2020. It is plausible that Tamil Nadu anticipated the increased demand for medicines and budgeted accordingly. Although the spending gap alone cannot establish whether this was the case, Tamil Nadu's performance during this period suggests a greater capacity to maintain alignment between budgeted and actual expenditure under uncertain conditions.

We conjecture that this capability rests on two complementary sets of institutional capabilities: the budgeting capability of the TN Department of Finance and the procurement capability developed within TNMSC. The former ensures that resources are budgeted and released in line with requirements, and the latter enables the state to estimate demand accurately and manage the supply of medicines effectively.

First, the Department of Finance must have the capability to budget and spend as planned. Even when a procurement agency estimates demand accurately, the treasury must translate those estimates into realistic budget allocations and ensure that funds are available for expenditure as and when they are needed. Tamil Nadu's consistently narrow spending gap suggests that its Finance Department's broader budgeting framework is effective at aligning planned expenditure with actual spending. The inverse is also true. That is, procurement efficiency depends not only on the capabilities of the agency procuring medicines but also on the state's ability to finance and execute its plans. The spending gap is therefore an outcome of both procurement and budgeting capabilities.

Second, TNMSC appears to have developed three institutional capabilities that support more accurate demand estimation and effective supply management:

  • First, is a rigorous approach to planning demand. Karnataka bases its demand on the requests raised by public healthcare institutions. TNMSC uses these requests too, but it also draws on a wider set of variables such as past consumption patterns, the changing demographics of the population served, the frequency of outbreaks and the disease profile of the population, and a 10% contingency stock on top of the estimated requirement.
  • Second, these practices are not left to the discretion of individual officials. They are written into TNMSC's manuals and policies, so the forecasting method survives changes in personnel. Karnataka, by contrast, does not have a drug procurement manual.
  • Third, Tamil Nadu's approach is also supported by technology. TNMSC uses a customised management information system, the Drug Distribution Management System (DDMS), which tracks stock and consumption at each warehouse and facility, and feeds it back directly into its demand estimates. Karnataka uses e-Aushadhi software, a standard platform used mainly for indenting and inventory management rather than for forecasting.

Tamil Nadu's experience suggests that procurement capability cannot be created through agencification alone. Establishing a dedicated procurement corporation modelled on TNMSC is an important first step, but it does not automatically confer the capabilities required to make the model work. These capabilities are built over time through experience, institutionalised procedures, and systems that enable decisions to be informed by reliable data. TNMSC, incorporated in 1994, has had considerably longer to develop these capabilities than Karnataka's Karnataka State Medical Supplies Corporation Limited (KSMSCL), established in 2019. This difference in institutional experience may help explain the gap in their performance, although it does not, by itself, establish causation.

This article compares two states, and the comparison could be extended in several directions. One, the same test could be applied to more states with different procurement models (such as long standing corporations vis-a-vis states that procure through their health departments) and varying information management systems. This would show whether the gap between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka reflects a broader pattern linked to institutional design, procurement planning and technology or experience and expertise. Second, states differ in how their health spending is funded. Where a larger share of drug spending depends on external funding, such as central schemes like the National Health Mission, the timing and size of fund releases are partly outside the state's control. The spending gap in these states may then reflect delays in funding as much as the state's own capability, and separating the two would sharpen the measure. Third, TNMSC procures only drugs, so a further question is whether Tamil Nadu's capability extends beyond them. How does Tamil Nadu perform on public healthcare procurement as a whole, and separately for goods, services and works?

Notes

1 Section 3(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, read with the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 and the Medical Devices Rules, 2017. ↩

References

Aggarwal et al (2025), Information Extraction from Fiscal Documents using LLMs, XKDR Forum.

Chitgupi, Gorsi and Thomas (2022), Learning by Doing, The Leap Blog, November 2022.

Hart, T., et al (2025), Rewiring public finance for the health sector, ODI Global Report, London: ODI Global.

Manivannan, Mehta and Thomas (2024), Improving supply chain management of medicines for public healthcare in India, XKDR Forum.

Manivannan (2026), Designing procurement information systems for improved access to public healthcare, Public Finance in the Digital Era: Emerging Themes 2026, ODI Global Report.

Parthasarathi, R. and Sinha, S. (2016), Towards a Better Health Care Delivery System: The Tamil Nadu model, National Library of Medicine.


Pavithra Manivannan, Aakriti Narang, and Susan Thomas are researchers at XKDR Forum. We thank Jay Kulkarni, Amrita Aggarwal, Ajay Shah and all the participants of the Roundtable on {X}ray of State Finances in India at XKDR Forum for their valuable suggestions and comments on this work.