by Natasha Aggarwal, Amol Kulkarni, Bhavin Patel, Sonam Patel, and Renuka Sane.
Insider trading is considered to undermine the fairness of the market and erode investor confidence. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has, in recent years, increased its focus on, and intensified its enforcement of, insider trading cases. Expanding enforcement actions should prompt a deeper examination of how effectively SEBI is performing this function vis-a-vis the "rule of law". Adherence to the rule of law by the regulator promotes transparency, creates a stable and predictable environment for businesses and individuals and builds public trust in the regulatory system. Regulatory actions need to be evaluated on benchmarks grounded in legal theory and the extant legal framework.
In a new working paper, Balancing Power and Accountability: An Evaluation of SEBI's adjudication of Insider Trading, we evaluate SEBI's orders on insider trading cases over a 15-year period (2009 - 23) as well as the performance on these orders in appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT). We develop an evaluation framework based on elements of the rule of law applicable to regulatory adjudication, with 56 indicators for SEBI orders, and 82 indicators for orders of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT).
This paper addresses three critical questions:
- What do SEBI's enforcement actions look like, and how have they evolved over the years?
SEBI's annual reports provide some broad data about the total number of enforcement actions undertaken in a year, but do not provide details of the type of enforcement actions taken for each type of violation, the particular legal or regulatory provision alleged to have been violated, or the impact of successful enforcement actions in reducing instances of insider trading.
Our dataset comprises 320 SEBI orders - 255 orders are by Adjudicating Officers (AOs) and 65 are by Whole-Time Members (WTMs). Each order can contain cases against multiple entities - we call them alleged violators. The 320 orders contain a total of 912 alleged violators. SEBI officers have imposed sanctions on 565 of the 912 alleged violators (62% of the alleged violators). AOs and WTMs have imposed penalties in 336 cases and 82 cases respectively. The median penalty amount for AOs is about Rs. 7.8 lakh, and for WTMs is about Rs. 15 lakh. Only WTMs, and not AOs, have the power to impose debarment and disgorgement. We observed that they have imposed disgorgement in 144 cases, and debarment in 192 cases. The average disgorgement amount is Rs. 46 crore, while the median is only Rs. 1 crore. The average period of debarment is 3 years, and a median of 1 year.
Our paper illustrates the number of insider trading orders issued between 2010 and 2022. This shows that a spike in orders on insider trading from 2017, and then again in 2019. There has been a slight drop in the number of WTM orders in 2022. This is consistent with statements in the SEBI annual reports, which suggest that insider trading has been high on the regulator's agenda.
- Are SEBI's orders consistent with the requirements of procedural and substantive rule of law requirements?
The procedural rule of law measures are based on administrative law and natural justice principles, and deal with how SEBI has been performing in terms of procedural fairness while adjudicating insider trading matters. One aspect of procedural fairness is that the orders should include certain basic information. We find several shortcomings in providing factual information on basic rule-of-law indicators. First, several orders do not mention basic facts about the case such as the date of show cause notice (7%), period of investigation (17%), period of UPSI (27%), and a description of UPSI (20%). Second, orders do not cite precedent. We find that about 87% of orders do not cite any previous AO or WTM order. Finally, the orders do not specify the full details of the sanctions imposed. In 12% of cases where disgorgement was ordered, the time period for payment was not specified. Similarly, for both penalties and disgorgement, interest rate was not specified in a large number of cases.
The substantive rule of law measures are based on the law relating to insider trading. These dive a bit deeper than the procedural requirements, and examine whether the orders satisfy the requirements of applicable law and regulation. For example, a key component of a good order on insider trading should be that SEBI has been able to clearly demonstrate that the violator is an insider. We find that SEBI has identified a clear insider relationship in only 335 (60%) of its orders. In the remaining 230 orders, it has described a connection in 152 (66%) orders. Describing a connection is not as clear as specifying the connection. If we were to give SEBI the benefit of the doubt and consider it as an acceptable description, even then, in 14% of the cases SEBI has failed to provide any explanation on how a person is an insider
- How do SEBI's insider trading orders stand up to challenge before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT)?
Our analysis resulted in a set of 119 cases in the SEBI and SAT datasets. These cases result in 183 appeals (32%) out of the total 565 cases with sanction. Out of these, 97 (53%) were allowed, partly allowed, or remanded, while 86 (47%) were dismissed. This suggests that once appealed there is a 50% chance that the SEBI order will not hold in appeal.
We find that the higher the sanction, the higher the proportion of appeals. 38% of AO cases and 17% of WTM cases with a penalty amount higher than Rs. 10 lakhs resulted in an appeal, relative to 22% of AO cases and 5% of WTM cases below Rs. 10 lakh. This is more pronounced in the case of debarment and disgorgement, where appeals are present for more than half the cases with higher sanctions. We also find that it is less likely that an AO or WTM case with penalty above Rs. 10 lakh or debarment for more than one year will be modified in appeal. 79% of WTM cases involving higher disgorgement amounts and all WTM cases involving a penalty below Rs. 10 lakh were modified in appeal.
Regulatory enforcement actions are necessary to ensure that those who violate the law face consequences, and may also have a deterrent effect on others. However, there are adverse consequences if these actions emerge from a flawed process, or if the actions taken are arbitrary or disproportionate. SEBI is ahead of other Indian regulators such as the Reserve Bank of India in at least publishing its orders. An appeal rate of between 30-38%, and a win rate of 50% at the SAT could be further improved by investments in order writing, and by re-evaluating the regulations on insider trading.
The authors are researchers at the TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation.