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Monday, December 09, 2024

Announcements

A course: Political Economy of Development

by Abhinav Singh.

Political economy of development is an 8-module course that combines theory with historical evidence to help you understand economic development.

When studying economic development, people often struggle because:

  • They can't find a clear learning path
  • The concepts can be tricky
  • Many discussions jump to solutions without examining why good ideas often fail

This course offers a structured way to work through these challenges.

We explore one central question: why do so few countries achieve rapid economic growth, even though some have shown us how? At independence, India had modern institutions, a diverse industrial structure, and a committed leadership. Yet it grew more slowly than Taiwan and South Korea. We try to understand why.

Course Structure

We start with the basics of economic growth, examine India's development path, and compare it with Taiwan, one of the rare success stories of the 20th century.

The course runs for 2 weeks with:

  • 4 live weekend lectures
  • 4 self-paced modules on our learning platform

The December 2024 cohort starts December 21. You can learn more at the course webpage.

About polekon

Polekon's mission is to make political economy more accessible for non-experts. We run focused courses on big questions and organize discussion-based seminars for deeper learning. If you'd like updates about future courses and seminars, please sign up for our mailing list.

Judicial overreach: Bypassing expert tribunals in the electricity sector

by Natasha Aggarwal and Bhavin Patel.

A 2023 decision of the Supreme Court (The Southern Power Distribution Company of Telangana State v. Agarwal Foundaries Private Limited and Another, SLP (C) No. 14047-14066/2019) underscored the importance of judicial deference to expert bodies, stating that the High Court should have remanded a technical matter to the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) instead of adjudicating it itself.

The Electricity Act, 2003 establishes a framework under which appeals from orders of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERCs) may be filed before the APTEL. In 2021-22, only 12 appeals from the Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission (TSERC) were filed before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL), while 85 appeals were filed before the Telangana High Court (that is, more than seven times the number of appeals before the APTEL). Therefore, a large number of challenges to the TSERC's orders were filed before the High Court, and not the APTEL, a sector-specific expert body. Notably, this problem is not unique to Telangana and exists in other states from time to time. For example, in 2019-20, 21 appeals from the Odisha Electricity Regulatory Commission were filed before the APTEL while 34 writ petitions were filed before the High Court.

The trajectory of the TSERC's orders, from the TSERC to the Telangana High Court, raises questions on the grounds and scope of judicial review of these orders and their adherence to well-established principles of administrative law. These principles caution against judicial overreach in reviewing regulatory decisions. Over time, the Supreme Court of India has established the circumstances in which judicial review is permitted as well as the considerations that may be relevant in deciding to exercise judicial review.

In a recent paper, Bypassing expert tribunals through writs: Judicial overreach in review of the Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission's orders, we study 179 writ petitions and 181 writ appeals involving the TSERC before the Telangana High Court between 2014-2022 and examine whether judicial review of the TSERC's orders by the High Court is within the permitted limits in administrative law.

Our study reveals that 52.5% of the writ petitions in our subset and 58% of the writ appeals in our subset fall squarely within the scope of the matters for which the Electricity Act provides an appellate mechanism through the APTEL. Therefore, the largest number of writ petitions and writ appeals relate to 'substantive matters', which we identify as those that the Electricity Act contemplates as falling within the scope of TSERC's quasi-judicial powers and APTEL's appellate jurisdiction.

The existence of an efficacious alternative remedy, such as an appeal before the APTEL is not a complete bar on judicial review. However, well-established principles of administrative law limit the situations in which courts should entertain matters when such an alternative remedy exists, particularly because specialised tribunals and appellate authorities have the technical expertise to examine the facts and merits of a case. Moreover, the rationale for providing such an appellate mechanism is the requirement of technical expertise, and the APTEL has such expertise while the High Courts may not, and therefore the exercise of judicial review in such situations undermines the objectives of the Electricity Act.


The authors are researchers at TrustBridge Rule of Law Foundation.

Sunday, October 20, 2024

Early evidence from the personal insolvency framework in India

by Karan Gulati, Chitrakshi Jain, and Anjali Sharma.

In 2016, India enacted an insolvency and bankruptcy law, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which included corporate and individual insolvency provisions. However, except for a narrow use case, the insolvency of personal guarantors (PG) to corporate debtors, the provisions for personal insolvency are yet to be notified. These provisions for PG insolvency were notified in November 2019 and were upheld as constitutional in November 2023.

PGs represent a unique and narrow category of individual debtors. They are often promoters, key shareholders, or directors of corporate entities and thus provide guarantees for loans taken by these entities. Lenders can invoke these guarantees when the corporate entity defaults, making PGs liable for the loans. The terms of these personal guarantees may allow lenders to seize and liquidate the assets of the PGs to recover their debts. As per the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (BLRC), it is common practice that Indian banks take a personal guarantee from the firm's promoter when they enter into a loan with the firm.

In this article, we examine the data on PG insolvency cases to understand two key issues: (i) can such cases serve as proof of concept for the broader implementation of personal insolvency provisions under the IBC?; and (ii) what feedback loop is emerging for lenders from enforcing personal guarantee contracts through insolvency proceedings? However, we restrict this examination to the outcome of PG insolvency cases (approval of a repayment plan) and exclude the input (the insolvency process itself). Thus, we do not attempt to explain the gap between the applications filed and those admitted or between the applications filed and the appointment of resolution professionals.

Importance of personal guarantees

Limited liability protects a firm's shareholders from personal liability for its debts during distress, allowing them to retain their assets and wealth even during debt recovery or insolvency proceedings. This protection encourages entrepreneurship and risk-taking. Individuals often choose to incorporate to benefit from limited liability. However, when a firm faces distress and the value of its shares falls, two things can happen: (i) limited liability can encourage risky business decisions, and (ii) the firm's promoters may alienate its assets in their favour. One way to balance limited liability with accountability for the firm's promoters is through personal guarantee contracts. If promoters enter into personal guarantee contracts with lenders, lenders can seize the promoters assets if the debts of the incorporated entity remain unpaid. These contracts can moderate risk-taking by making guarantors internalise the costs of default and disincentivise the firms promoters from alienating its assets in their favour.

The interplay between limited liability and personal guarantees affects creditor rights during firm distress. Personal guarantees widen the pool of assets available to lenders when a firms assets are insufficient to cover its debts. In this context, guarantees offer lenders additional collateral for loans to corporate debtors while preserving the principles of limited liability and enhancing the debtors creditworthiness.

Given the role of promoter-owners in managing firms in India, personal guarantees have become a common feature of corporate lending. These guarantees are often used alongside other forms of collateral. RBI guidelines also encourage personal guarantees when lending to closely held or higher-risk firms to enhance loan security and ensure management continuity. Additionally, the RBI has incorporated personal guarantees into its restructuring debt framework. While data on the proportion of corporate loans secured by personal guarantees is unavailable, disclosures by the largest five public-sector and four private-sector banks as of 31 March 2023 suggest that guarantees cover 4% of the advances extended by these banks (authors' calculations).

PG insolvency as a lab for personal insolvency implementation

As per provisions for personal insolvency under the IBC, PGs propose repayment plans based on their ability to honour the guarantee. A resolution professional submits this plan to the committee of creditors, as defined under section 79 (11) of the IBC. Once creditors vote in favour of the repayment plan, it is then approved by the NCLT. Generally, from admission to approval of the repayment plan, this process takes a little over a year.

As of June 2024, 3134 PG insolvency applications involving claims of approximately Rs. 2 trillion have been filed across National Company Law Tribunals (NCLTs) and 50 such applications have been filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs). Of these, 468 applications were admitted, and the NCLT approved repayment plans in 26 cases. Although overall data for the number of corporate debtors that correspond to PG applications is not available, the 26 cases studied in the article correspond to 4 corporate debtors.

In the 26 cases in which the NCLT has approved repayment plans only one featured a joint application for resolution filed by the corporate debtor and its PGs. In the remaining cases, actions against PGs were initiated near or after the conclusion of the corporate debtors insolvency resolution process. In one case, the PG also acted as the resolution applicant in the corporate debtors insolvency process. Table 2 summarises the outcomes of the PG insolvency processes (PGPs) alongside those of the corresponding corporate resolution processes.

Table 2: Outcomes of personal guarantor and the corporate debtor resolution processes

Corporate debtor

No. of PGs

Date of Admission of PGP

Amt. claimed against PGs (Rs. cr.)

Recovery against PGs (%)

Amt. claimed against Corporate Debtor (Rs. cr.)

Date of Liquidation/Resolution (Corporate Debtor)

Outcome of the Corporate Debtor case

Recovery against Corporate Debtor (%)

Bluefern Ventures

2

30-09-2021

30.3

39.6%

38.7

Unclear

Liquidation

NA

Vishwa Infrastructures 

12

15-2-2022

1441.6

0.8%

1318.5

14-06-2019

Liquidation

4.3%

Chadalavada Infratech

7

21-09-2022

278.1

24.5%

440.4

11-04-2022

Liquidation

2.4%

Pradip Overseas

5

27-04-2022

3017.5

0.4%

2663.0

14-10-2021

Resolution

4.8%

Total

26

-

4767.5

2.2%

4460.6

-

-

4.1%

Source: IBBI Quarterly Newsletters, NCLT Orders in cases

Personal guarantees are meant to hold promoters accountable. Table 2 shows that, despite variations in the number of guarantors and the amounts claimed, PGPs have yielded an average recovery rate of 2.2%. However, these recovery rates should be viewed in the context of the poor outcomes in the corporate debtor insolvency process and the extent to which these debts have devolved on the PGPs. In three cases, the corporate resolution processes resulted in liquidation. The average recovery rate for the four cases was 4.1%.

The purpose of a personal insolvency framework is to provide the debtor with a way to exit a debt contract. Of the 3184 applications which have been filed, only 468 have been admitted. The tribunals have approved the repayment plans in only 26 out of the 468 admitted cases (till June 2024). These gaps cannot be explained by merely looking at the outcomes in the PGPs which have been completed. The next section underscores how the insolvency process may just be a costly detour, for a substantial number of PGs are unable to honour their obligations under the repayment plan. While the outcomes can only be studied for 26 cases, they are underwhelming and it would be useful to conduct an evaluation of both the process and outcomes in the PGPs before extending the coverage to all classes of individual debtors under the IBC framework.

A feedback loop from PGPs

Since lenders may turn to personal guarantees due to poor value realisation in recovering debts extended to firms, enforcing personal guarantee contracts is important to provide creditors with an efficient means of recovery and to ensure that debtors can discharge their obligations. Before the notification of personal insolvency provisions for PGs to corporate debtors under the IBC, creditors relied on frameworks under the SARFAESI Act, the RDDB and FI Act, and the Indian Contract Act. These frameworks did not allow creditors to collectively enforce their rights.

Most corporate lending in India is secured by collateral, enforceable through the corporate debtor resolution process under the IBC. Enforcing personal guarantees under the IBC offers an additional recovery mechanism. The BLRC also recognised the importance of enforcing these guarantees and recommended establishing a framework to ensure the completeness of the corporate insolvency process. While the IBC extends the recovery process to include personal guarantees and provides a pathway to discharge an individual debtors obligations, it remains to be seen whether the framework is effective and represents an improvement over previous statutory recovery frameworks.

However, early evidence from the outcomes under this framework provides valuable inputs to lenders, helping them to make informed decisions about the value of personal guarantee contracts and their utility as collateral security for credit to firms. In two cases, the repayment plans of PGs resulted in better outcomes 24% and 39.6% compared to nil and 2.4% in the respective corporate processes. However, out of the 468 admitted PGPs, 108 were closed due to the non-submission or rejection of a repayment plan (IBBI Newsletter, Apr-June 2024).

Our analysis of 26 cases in which the NCLT has approved repayment plans reveals that these cases have not yet been marked as disposed of. A closer reading shows that this is because the PGs have failed to fulfil their obligations under the plans. Data on the implementation status of the repayment plans of PGs is available for 19 of the 26 cases (corresponding to two out of corporate resolution processes). Their details are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Status of implementation of the repayment plans for PGs.

Vishwa Infrastructures (CD)

Chadalavada Infratech (CD)

No. of PGs

12

7

No. of PGs that have defaulted on plan

7

5

Value of default (in Rs. cr.)

8.0

47.5

No. of PGs discharged

5

2

Value realisation from discharged PGs (Rs. cr.)

3.1

20.6

Total liability devolved on PGs (Rs. cr.)

1441.6

278.1

Recovery rate total

0.8%

24.5%

Recovery rate from discharged PGs

0.2%

7.4%

Average time to default after approval of repayment plan (in days)

274.0

81.4

Average time to discharge after approval of repayment plan(in days)

126

83

Source: Orders of the NCLT, Hyderabad

As of June 2024, of the 12 PGs associated with Vishwa Infrastructures, only 5 have fulfilled their obligations under the repayment plan. The remaining PGs have either been declared bankrupt or are in the process of filing for bankruptcy. Similarly, of the 7 PGs associated with Chadalavada Infratech, only 2 have been discharged from their obligations. The remaining have either been declared bankrupt or have filed for bankruptcy.

Feibelman and Sane (2020) also recognised the challenge of defaults in repayment plans within personal insolvency, noting that adhering to the requirements of the plans might just be a detour for some individual debtors. They recommended standardising repayment plans to identify debtors who should proceed directly to bankruptcy. Our examination of PGPs supports their recommendation.

According to the IBBI, 56 bankruptcy applications for PGs have been filed across DRTs and NCLTs as of June 2024. Completing these bankruptcy proceedings will provide a complete picture of how the IBC operates in personal insolvency cases. However, The low recovery rate and the failure of PGs to submit viable repayment plans suggest that the realisable value from guarantee contracts may be minimal, mirroring the declining fortunes of the corporate debtor. Thus, the likelihood that personal guarantees will cover the shortfall in recovering corporate debts is low. This should prompt lenders to reconsider the role of guarantees in corporate credit contracts.

Conclusion

In 2015, the BLRC had insisted that corporate insolvency provisions are incomplete without a personal insolvency framework. The PGPs that have resulted in approved repayment plans under the IBC have shown limited effectiveness as a value discovery mechanism for lenders and guarantors. Given that many PGs have been unable to fulfil their obligations under the repayment plan and have subsequently filed for bankruptcy, it remains to be seen how extending the coverage of the personal insolvency framework will balance the interests of the debtors and creditors. A careful evaluation of the process of insolvency should be conducted before the IBC framework is extended to all classes of personal debtors.

References

Designing a Personal Insolvency Regime: A Baseline Framework, by Feibelman A and Sane R , 2020, IBBI, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Regime in India - A Narrative.

Velvet Bankruptcy, by Hahn D, 2006, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Volume 7 Number 2, pp. 523:554.


At the time of writing, the authors Karan Gulati and Anjali Sharma were researchers at TrustBridge. Chitrakshi Jain is currently a researcher at TrustBridge. We are grateful to Adam Feibelman and Renuka Sane for their comments. Views are personal.

Monday, September 23, 2024

Do court vacations matter: evidence from the Bombay High Court

by Tushar Anand, Pavithra Manivannan, and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah.

Introduction

Court vacations are often invoked as a problematic feature of the Indian judiciary. The discourse on this includes blaming court vacations for case delays, petitions to reduce the length of court vacations, and substituting them with staggered leave for judges. This discourse is characterised by the classic divide that cuts across most Indian discourse on court reforms. Lawyers and judges emphasize the importance of court vacations for overall judge productivity. Often, they perceive the criticism of court vacations as being politically motivated or as an attack on judicial integrity. Other stakeholders underscore the problems of delays and pendency, and compare the courts' calendar with that of other public organisations. In the event, neither side is able to support their argument by demonstrating the extent of delays attributable to court vacations. The puzzle on how much do court vacations actually affect case durations and disposal continues to remain unanswered. This article presents some first estimates on the impact of court vacations on these outputs.

During the vacation period, courts function with minimal capacity. This allows us to compare the functioning of a court during its vacation and non-vacation periods. Using a dataset of civil and commercial cases filed over about six years at the Bombay High Court, we evaluate the extent to which vacations at the court affected its productivity, measured in terms of case disposal rates and the lifecycle of cases.

Unsurprisingly, we find that there is a significant drop in the daily number of cases filed and disposed by the Bombay High Court during vacations, compared to the non-vacation periods of the year. However, this gap shrinks over time. Second, the fact that a case is filed during the vacation period affects its initial phases, but does not affect the duration within which it will get disposed of. In sum, while court vacations affect the initial phase of a case schedule, dispensing with court vacations will not make a significant difference to the disposal rates or the disposal duration of cases at the Bombay High Court.

Court vacations

Indian courts, such as the supreme court, high courts and district courts, and most tribunals, are scheduled to take three vacations - summer, festive, winter - each year. The summer vacation lasts for a little more than a month and the festive and winter vacations last for a little more than week. While the concept of court vacations is traceable to the colonial origins of the Indian judicial system, they eventually became a part of the rules governing the functioning of the Supreme Court and High Courts. The practice is not unique to India and is followed in several developed countries, such as the United States, Australia and Singapore.

During vacations, Indian courts function with vacation benches of judges to hear urgent matters that come up during this time, and a lower staff at the court registry. A comparison of the sitting list of judges for the Bombay High Court shows that, on a non-vacation day, 27 courtrooms are functional. On the other hand, on vacation days, not more than four courtrooms are functional. A reduced number of judges will likely affect the scheduling and eventual disposal of cases filed during vacations. A reduced registry capacity will likely affect the filing of new cases and scheduling of proceedings for existing cases. To be sure, court vacations affect not only the working hours of courts, but also the entire ecosystem around it. For instance, it is generally hard to find lawyers to appear for litigants before vacation benches during this time, further slowing down proceedings. Since these changes are endogeneous to court vacations, it is hard to isolate the impact of lower judges from that of the absence of lawyers willing to work during the vacation period, on the lifecycle of a case. Finally, what cases are construed as 'urgent' varies across judges' interpretation of urgency.

In this institutional setting, we ask the following questions to evaluate the impact of court vacations on overall case durations at the Bombay High Court:

  1. Do case filings and disposals drop during vacation periods?
  2. Do cases filed during court vacations take longer to get their first hearing?
  3. Do cases filed during court vacations take longer to get disposed of?

Data and Methodology

We collect and analyse the data of cases involving all civil suits and commercial suits, which were filed at the Bombay High Court during the seven year period from January 2017 to December 2023 (Study Period). For each of these cases, our dataset captures information on the entire life-cycle of the case available on the respective courts' websites. This includes the date of filing, the dates on which hearings were conducted, and the date of disposal. Table 1 shows the total number of cases in our dataset and their status, that is, whether the cases were pending or disposed, at the time of data collection. We then count the number of days on which these courts were on vacation during our Study Period, using the vacation dates published on their websites. On an average, the Bombay High Court has 52 days of vacation per year and the average number of working days is 235.

Table 1: Data description

Cases
Disposed 1379
Pending 2529
Total 3908

One caveat. Our results account for select case-types (civil suits and commercial suits), as our dataset comprises such cases. Given that criminal cases or writ petitions, particularly those pertaining to questions of liberty or reliefs pre-empting State actions, have a higher element of urgency, it is possible that the findings for these case types will differ from our findings for civil and commercial cases.

Impact of court vacations on case filing and disposal

We begin by comparing the daily average number of cases filed and disposed before the Bombay High Court during the vacation and non-vacation period (Table 2). At the Bombay High Court, on an average, the number of cases filed during non-vacation days is thrice the number of cases filed during vacation days. Further, the Bombay High Court is able to dispose four times the number of cases on non-vacation days, compared to the vacation days.

Table 2: Average number of cases filed and disposed per day

Vacation days Non-vacation days
Cases filed 0.67 2.23
Cases disposed of 0.21 0.88

We examine whether the difference between the number of cases filed during vacation and non-vacation periods or between the number of cases disposed of during these two periods, is statistically significant. The standard t-test and z-test used for determining statistical significance assume a normal distribution of the underlying data. However, our data is not amenable to this test for two reasons. One, the number of observed cases in non-vacation period is five times than that in the vacation period. Second, the distribution of the per day number of cases filed and disposed of is right-biased, with a long tail. We used a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to confirm that the two samples come from different distributions. In the absence of the standard tests (t-test and z-test), we use a bootstrapped sampling method to estimate the statistical significance of the difference in means of the two sets (vacation and non-vacation) of our data. This method allows us to create a normal distribution of the data by repeatedly drawing random samples from each of the two sets. This approach shows that the difference in means for the number of cases filed and disposed during vacation and non-vacation days is statistically significant at the five percent level.

At first glance, these findings might suggest that had the court not been on vacation, case disposals would have increased by a factor of four. However, this disposal rate is likely not linear. For instance, a quarter-wise analysis of cases filed and disposed of shows that these differences reduce (Table 3). That is, the difference in the number of filings and disposals in Quarters 2 and 4 that are affected by vacation days (Apr-Jun and Oct-Dec) and Quarters 1 and 3 that are not affected by vacation days (Jan-Mar and Jul-Sep), are much smaller.

Table 3: Quarter-wise average of cases filed and disposed

Q1 Q2* Q3 Q4*
Cases filed 162.57 128.29 134.86 132.58
Cases disposed of 51.29 38.71 58.43 46.00

*Denotes quarters affected by vacation days.

Impact of vacations on case timelines

The analysis in the previous section would reflect the impact of court vacation on the overall productivity of the court. However, what is the impact of court vacations for an individual litigant? In this section, we examine whether the timelines for important milestones in a case vary for a litigant who filed her case during the vacation period, compared to a litigant who filed her case during the non-vacation days.

We estimate the time taken for cases to be scheduled for its first hearing and time taken for them to be disposed of. These estimations are made using the survival analysis approach used by Manivannan et al, 2023. This approach is a useful measure of individual case life cycles. It shows the likelihood of a case awaiting an important milestone, such as a first hearing or disposal, at different points in time.

Table 4: Probability of first hearing

Vacation days Non-vacation days
1 month 6.47% 7.24%
3 months 25.10% 23.35%
6 months 49.39% 47.20%

Table 4 shows the probability of a case getting its first hearing within one month, three months and six months of filing. The table compares these probabilities for cases filed during vacation days and non-vacation days. The probability of a case filed during the non-vacation period getting its first hearing within one month of filing is only slightly higher than the corresponding probability of a case filed during the non-vacation period. As time progresses, this difference disappears. In fact, after the first month of filing, cases filed during the vacation period have a marginally higher probability of getting their first hearing than cases filed during the non-vacation period. In sum, our analysis suggests that the "vacation effect" on case scheduling persists for not more than a month.

Similarly, we estimate the probability of a case getting disposed of within one to two years of its filing. Table 5 compares these probabilities for cases filed during vacation days and non-vacation days. At the Bombay High Court, there is about 5-6% higher disposal probability for cases filed during the non-vacation days. Overall, the "vacation effect" is marginal and temporary, and does not seem to affect the case duration for a litigant.

Table 5: Probability of disposal

Cases filed on
Vacation days Non-vacation days
6 months 6.95% 11.03%
1 year 11.62% 17.95%
2 years 22.59% 27.11%

Conclusion

Our analysis provides the first estimates on the impact of Indian court vacations on some measurable elements of a court's functioning. Historical data from the Bombay High Court for civil and commercial cases shows that court vacations have a statistically significant impact on the number of cases filed and disposed of on a daily basis. While this finding is perhaps unsurprising, these differences disappear over time. Further, they do not substantially affect the overall duration of the case, even as they have a small effect on the initial phases of cases filed during court vacations.

A key limitation of our analysis is that it does not account for the impact, if any, of court vacations on a judge at the individual level. That is, it does not capture the possible intangible productivity gains that accrue from a holiday. It is possible, for instance, that when a judge goes on a vacation, she writes more judgements, reads more jurisprudence or returns with boosted productivity. The data available in the public domain does not allow us to measure these impacts on judge productivity. Besides, if there were such impacts on a judge, they are not a powerful explanation for a court vacation where all the judges go on vacation simultaneously. These benefits would accrue even where judges take leave as per their own convenience during the calendar year. Therefore, while measuring such impacts is important for its own sake, it does not add to the vacation-related discourse which our analysis speaks to.

Finally, several scholars have started adopting the empirical approach in evaluating Indian courts and tribunals, using a variety of tools ranging from simple summary statistics to more advanced analyses grounded in statistics, and using the tools of natural language processing and artificial intelligence. We provide yet another demonstration that questions pertaining to the impact of interventions in the Indian court system are amenable to empirical research. Expanding such analyses to other courts will strengthen the discourse on court vacations by shifting from pure normative perspectives to empirically grounded questions on whether vacations actually increase the productivity of a court.

References

Pavithra Manivannan, Susan Thomas and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah (2023), Helping litigants make informed choices in resolving debt disputes, The Leap Blog, 15 June 2023.

Law Commission of India (2009), Reforms in the Judiciary: Some suggestions, Report No. 230, August 2009.

Alex Tsun (2020), Chapter 9, Applications to Computing, Probability & Statistics with Applications to Computing, 2020.


Tushar Anand and Pavithra Manivannan are researchers at XKDR Forum and Bhargavi Zaveri-Shah is a doctoral candidate at the National University of Singapore. The authors thank Susan Thomas and Geetika Palta for useful discussions.

Thursday, September 19, 2024

Who is "innovative"? Unpacking the process of tax exemption grants to startups

by Aneesha Chitgupi, Karthik Suresh, and Diya Uday.

When private individuals spend resources on innovation, the ideas and benefits that arise spread to society at large. An underspend on innovation results in the market failure of "positive externalities". The state has an important role to play in solving this market failure by encouraging spending on activities that generate innovation (Mashelkar et al., 2024). In India, the government did so by: (i) building research organisations like CSIR and ISRO and hiring career scientists, and (ii) providing tax exemptions. The Income Tax Act, since its inception in 1961, has exempted expenditures on scientific research. Since 1996-97, goods used for R & D have been exempt from customs and excise duties.

In the last ten years, both the Union and various state governments have perceived "startups" as major drivers of innovation. A host of incentives have been put in place for them. These include: (i) reduced fees and priority in processing patent and design applications; (ii) full exemptions on income tax for the startup following approval from an Inter-ministerial Board (IMB); (iii) priority during public procurement, etc. However, in a previous article (Chitgupi et al., 2023), we analysed Indian patent filings and grants and found that, despite enjoying government incentives, the overall share of startups in patent filings and grants --- a proxy for innovation --- remains small. Moreover, only a few startups receive income tax exemptions aimed at spurring innovation (see Table 1).

Table 1: Overview of the landscape of startups
Startups 2023 2024
Total (registered and unregistered) 2,49,107 3,14,492
Registered as startups by DPIIT* 90,939 (36.5) 1,31,191 (41.7)
Granted tax exemptions by the IMB** 1,100 (1.2) 2,976 (2.3)

Table notes: * fraction of total startups;
** fraction of DPIIT registered startups.
Source: Authors' compilation and analysis

The income tax exemption for startups

Section 80-IAC of the Income Tax Act allows a one hundred per cent tax deduction for eligible startups. The aim is to reduce the tax and compliance burden in the initial years of incorporation. A startup is eligible if (i) it is a new business incorporated after 1 April 2016 and is not a reorganisation of an old business with old machinery; (ii) its total turnover does not exceed INR 100 crores; and (iii) it is "engaged in innovation, development or improvement of products or processes or services or a scalable business model with a high potential of employment generation or wealth creation". The body tasked with determining the eligibility of a startup is the IMB. It was set up by the DPIIT in April 2016 with three members, and it is an executive body with delegated powers.

In this article, we study the institutional design and functioning of the IMB under Section 80-IAC. Our findings suggest that the IMB's process is not optimised to deliver the statutory intent of tax exemptions to startups. We identify the bottlenecks that must be targeted for change and question the current incentive structure for startups to innovate.

Methodology

There is a perception that staffing an organisation with technocrats will solve the problems of the organisation. This is not a recipe for lasting success (Kelkar and Shah, 2022). It is instead important to draft rules and procedures that work within and beyond the administrative system and that provide the right incentives to bolster the purpose of the organisation, i.e., promoting innovation. We view the IMB as an executive body tasked with an executive function --- to determine whether a startup is eligible for an exemption under Section 80-IAC. We rely on principles of administrative law while examining the processes and workings of the IMB. In particular, we focus on (i) institutional design, (ii) transparency, (iii) administrative discretion, and (iv) accountability (see Table 2).

We integrate this framework with Adam Smith's Canons of Taxation which sets out design principles for efficient tax administration. These are: (i) the maxim of equality, i.e., the tax must be collected with equality before the law; (ii) the maxim of certainty, i.e., the time, manner, and amount of tax to be paid ought to be clear and plain to the taxpayer, (iii) the maxim of convenience, i.e., the tax ought to be levied at the time and in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the taxpayer and (iv) the maxim of economy, i.e., the tax ought to be so contrived that it takes from the taxpayer as little as possible. Smith's canons are routinely used by Indian courts to test the constitutionality of actions by tax administrations. For example, in South Indian Bank Ltd. vs. CIT AIR 2021 SC 4266, the Supreme Court applied Adam Smith's canons to examine the tax exemption to income arising from interest paid by banks.

Table 2: Our framework for analysing the process of tax exemptions to startups
Parameter Administrative principleSmith's canons
Institution designClarity of purpose and processEquality, certainty, convenience.
Composition of the board
Reporting of conflicts of interest
Process transparency Publication of rules and processesCertainty
Administrative discretionIssue of reasoned ordersEquality, certainty
Administrative accountabilityProcedure for appeals from orders Equality, certainty
Audit oversight mechanism

We hand-collected and evaluated a sample of the minutes of the IMB meetings published on the Startup India portal to determine the eligibility of startups for tax exemptions. Our dataset comprises 52 decision documents out of the 72 available on the portal from 2016 to 2023, with the most recent document being from February 2023. There have been no additions to the IMB decisions since February 2023. Table 3 summarises our sample and provides insights into the total number of cases heard and the corresponding board decisions, forming the foundation of our study. Of the 72 IMB decisions published on the IMB website from May 2016 to February 2023, we have hand-collected data from 52 of these meetings, covering a total of 2,102 cases (72.2 per cent) each representing a startup.

Table 3: Overview of the sample data of IMB meetings
Year No. of meetings* No. of startup applications
Granted Rejected Deferred Total
2016 6 9 265 35 309
2017 3 21 201 141 363
2018 3 6 126 17 149
2019 8 109 1 57 167
2020 8 73 10 15 98
2021 10 80 13 9 102
2022 13 651 97 52 800
2023 1 112 2 0 114
Total 52 1061 715 326 2102
Table notes: *No of meetings from which data was used for this article.
Source: Authors' compilation from the Startup India website.

Results

Institution design

Clarity of purpose and process: The IMB has to decide whether a startup is eligible for the tax exemption. We find that the substance of the criteria to be applied by the IMB to determine eligibility for startup tax exemptions overlaps with the DPIIT criteria to register a startup. The need for a body like the IMB to reassess a startup on the same criteria is unclear. Despite this, only a small percentage of firms that have qualified the DPIIT's criteria meet the IMB's criteria. This violates Smith's canons of certainty and convenience because of the uncertainty of receiving the exemption despite having met the DPIIT's criteria. Table 4 compares the criteria for the IMB and the DPIIT to determine the eligibility of a startup for registration and grant of tax exemption. The criteria are substantially the same.

Table 4: Mandate of the IMB compared with the mandate of DPIIT for startups
IMB (for startup tax exemption) DPIIT (for startup registration)
Criteria 1 The entity's business involves innovation, development, deployment or commercialisation of new products, processes or services driven by technology or intellectual property Entity is working towards innovation, development or improvement of products or processes or services, or if it is a scalable business model with a high potential of employment generation or wealth creation.
Criteria 2 The entity was incorporated on or after 1 April 2016 but before 1 April 2025. Upto a period of ten years from the date of incorporation/ registration, if it is incorporated as a private limited company (as defined in the Companies Act, 2013) or registered as a partnership firm (registered under Section 59 of the Partnership Act, 1932) or a limited liability partnership (under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008) in India.
Criteria 3 The entity's turnover does not exceed one hundred crore rupees. Turnover of the entity for any of the financial years since incorporation/ registration has not exceeded one hundred crore rupees.
Criteria 4 The entity has not been formed by splitting up, or the reconstruction, or using more than 20% by value of machinery, of a business already in existence. The entity shall not be formed by the splitting up or the reconstruction of an existing business
Source: DPIIT notification dated 19 February 2019 and Section 80 IAC of the Income Tax Act 1961

This is further highlighted through our analysis of the reasons for rejection of exemption claims. We map the reasons that are recorded in the minutes of IMB's meetings to the eligibility criteria set out in Table 4. We find that in 65 per cent of cases, a startup fails to get an IT exemption from IMB despite having met the same criteria for the DPIIT's requirement. Table 5 presents the percentage of exemption applications rejected based on previously assessed criteria. Further, 51 per cent of cases were rejected because the IMB determined that the startup was incorporated before 1st April 2016. At the outset, this is an objective criterion that the DPIIT and IMB should be able to agree on. Further, the cases in the Others category, which make up nearly 15 per cent of rejections, comprise criteria not specified under the law, such as shareholding patterns or other reasons said to be privately communicated to the startup.

Table 5: Overview of the reasons for rejection of applications for the IT exemption
Reasons for rejection No. of rejections Rejections as a fraction of total rejections (where reasons are given) (%)
Criteria 1 Lack of innovation, scope of scalability, and wealth generation 91 12.7
Criteria 2 Incorporated before April 2016 366 51.2
Criteria 3 Turnover exceeds hundred crore rupees 0 0
Criteria 4 Reconstruction of existing business 12 1.7
Others* 105 14.7
Rejection without reasons 141 19.7
Total 715 100

Table notes: * "Others" includes reasons not part of Criteria 1 to 4 in Table 4 above.
Source: Authors' compilation and analysis

Composition of the board: It is not apparent how the composition of the IMB is relevant for the purpose of the IMB. Since its constitution, the IMB has had a Joint Secretary from the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), a scientist from the Department of Science and Technology, and a scientist from the Department of Biotechnology. For a year, between 2018 and 2019, the IMB also included representatives from SEBI, RBI, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, the Ministry of Electronics and IT, and the Central Board of Direct Taxes. The IMB also has a "technical consultant". This consultant is an employee of the National Research Development Corporation (NRDC), a public sector undertaking owned by the Government of India. We are unable to find documentation that highlights the selection process and requisite qualifications of these members. All of them are ex-officio members. The role of the NRDC consultant has also not been clearly defined.

Process transparency

Publication of rules and processes: The rules or guidelines on the IMB's processes are not available in the public domain. For example, there are no guidelines on the basis of which the most important phrase in section 80-IAC, "innovation, development, deployment or commercialisation of new products, processes or services driven by technology or intellectual property" is determined. The lack of guidelines also violates Smith's canons of certainty and convenience. Guidelines are necessary for predictability for firms and greater accountability from the government. Other departments of the Indian government that carry out similar certification processes, such as the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research which certifies whether an applicant qualifies for tax exemptions for scientific research and R & D under Section 35(2AB) of the IT Act, have prescribed guidelines that companies can use to evaluate their chances of success.

Administrative discretion

Issue of reasoned orders: A central tenet of administrative law is that an order that carries negative consequences for an assessment should be well-reasoned. Unfortunately, non-speaking orders are frequently issued by Indian tax administrations (example, example). We do not have access to the text of the orders that are issued to individual applicants, so it is unclear whether detailed reasons are provided by the IMB while rejecting applications. However, from the minutes of the IMB meetings, we note that many companies are not provided with adequate and specific reasons for why their applications were rejected. This violates Smith's canons of certainty and equality. All deferred or rejected cases must be provided with reasons for their deferment or rejection. Published decisions help other startups better understand and comply with the eligibility criteria.

Figure 1 demonstrates whether the IMB communicated the reasons for the decisions taken on granting or rejecting the IT exemption for startups. We find that not all decisions are published with reasons. Even where applications are rejected, we do not see reasons being provided in every case. Of the 715 startups that were rejected, 19.7 per cent (141 startups) were not given reasons for rejection by the IMB. We further find that of the total 2,102 cases (Table 3) in our sample, deferred cases accounted for 15.5 per cent of them. Nearly 38.7 per cent of such cases were deferred without providing any reasons. Among the 1,061 startups granted the tax exemption, 67.9 per cent were granted without reasons being published. This creates ambiguity. In 15 per cent of cases, the IMB rejected applications for reasons other than those stated in the law (Tables 4 and 5).

Figure 1: Reason provided by application status across IMB decisions as a share of total cases

Figure 2, presents the share of cases where reasons were published across the decisions taken (whether granted, rejected, or deferred) by IMB from 2016 to 2023 across 52 decision documents. Since its inception, the IMB has published reasons for the majority of its decisions --- 67.3 per cent, 61.2 per cent and 73.2 per cent for 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively. Across the years 2019, 2020, and 2021, IMB published reasons for all of its decisions. However, in 2022 and 2023, IMB published reasons for only 25.7 per cent and 1.8 per cent of decisions, respectively.

Figure 2: Reasons provided by year as a share of total cases

One may argue that since 2019, the IMB decision in favour of grants has increased from 65 per cent in 2019 to 98 per cent by 2023 and that the lack of reasons provided for the grant of IT exemption is not a major administrative challenge. We believe this has happened as the scheme gained maturity and there was a rise in the number of startups incorporated after 2016 that are applying for exemption under Section 80-IAC. It is important to note here that the cases brought to the IMB are recognised as startups by DPIIT, which follow similar criteria for establishing an entity as a startup with differences in the incorporation date, which is restricted to 'after April 2016' for IMB classification. This has been the major reason for rejections in the early years of the scheme (Table 5).

Administrative accountability

Procedure for appeals from orders: The right to appeal is another core tenet of administrative law. Judicial review of an administrative action ensures the lack of arbitrariness and improves administrative accountability. The IMB does not appear to have an appellate or review mechanism. It is unclear whether the decision of the IMB, not being one taken by the Income Tax Department, is appealable under the Income Tax Act. Moreover, this contravenes Smith's canon of equality. Startups that are aggrieved with the IMB's decision have to directly approach the High Court under a writ petition (example from Delhi HC). A case should lie before the High Court only if it involves a substantial question of law (Datta et al., 2017). This is because it is inefficient and costly to bring routine cases such as challenges to IMB's exemption decisions that do not involve a substantial question of law. This only adds further strain on the high courts' already burdened docket.

Audit oversight mechanism: The IMB is subject to audits by the CAG. However, no such audit of its functions has been carried out so far.

Discussion

Our findings indicate that the 80 IAC tax exemption is not working as desired. There are some core challenges in both the design of the exemption and its implementation.

Substantive challenges: The eligibility criteria to become a startup recognised by DPIIT and the eligibility criteria to be granted a tax exemption by the IMB are substantially the same (Table 4). However, startups are being granted recognition by the DPIIT but are being rejected for the tax exemption on the very same criteria by the IMB. If the criteria are substantially the same, a registered startup must automatically gain a tax exemption grant by virtue of qualifying as a startup by DPIIT. It is unclear why a separate application must be made involving both cost and time. Further, conversations with startup founders revealed that the 80-IAC exemption is not the impetus they need to spur innovation.

Implementation challenges: A key challenge is that rules and process guidelines on the grant of the IT exemptions are not available in the public domain. This has two drawbacks: (i) a startup applying for the exemption will not have a full picture of the process, and (ii) it allows room for administrative discretion, reducing the predictability of the outcomes of the applications. Further, the IMB does not publish reasons for rejection of applications consistently. This is imperative, as it will bring about transparency in the working of the IMB and also give potential applicants a sense of the reasons for rejection, acceptance, or deferment. The IMB process must also have a published procedure for appeals. Lastly, the composition of the IMB must be commensurate with its purpose. It is unclear why, for example, SEBI and RBI officers were part of the panel to determine "innovation". Our findings are in line with the recent observations of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce on the lack of clarity in the process for granting these exemptions. In response, DPITT has proposed to take steps to make the process of granting tax exemptions more "transparent" and "user-friendly".

Alternative strategies to encourage innovation

Building better supply-side incentives: Supply-side incentives are effective strategies to encourage spending on innovation. Tax exemptions could be one way forward, but not in their current form. We compared the Indian scenario to other countries to get some guidance. We find that while tax incentives are common for startups in many countries, and are the recommended way forward, the mechanism by which they are granted is different from the IMB. In the United Kingdom, "knowledge-intensive" companies can avail of tax benefits. Whether a company is knowledge-intensive or not is determined by HM Treasury under Section 252A of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2015. The provision defines a "knowledge-intensive" company as one that: (i) spent at least 15 per cent of OpEx on research and development or innovation in at least one of the previous 3 years, or spent 10 per cent of OpEx in each of the previous 3 years, and (ii) is either likely to exploit intellectual property that it has created in the previous 3 years, or at least 20 per cent of the company's full-time employees (FTEs) are engaged in research and development or innovation. These FTEs must have at least a masters' degree. In Ireland, under Section 496 of the Taxes Consolidation Act, 1997 there is a negative list of industrial sectors and companies that do not qualify for the Startup Relief for Entrepreneurs (SURE) scheme if their main activities of business are in the specified sectors. Companies self-certify their applicability for the scheme, and there are stiff penalties in case they misinform the Revenue department. In Germany, the INVEST scheme of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action mentions that companies must (i) either hold a patent issued to them in any of the EU member states in the previous 15 years, or (ii) must be "innovative". "Innovation" is proved in a manner opposite of the Irish method, i.e. the company demonstrates that it is in fact working in the specified sector. The German Federal Tax Office may carry out random checks on whether a company is "innovative" by hiring an audit firm to independently assess whether it is truly generating output in its stated sector.

In all these countries, the government does not enter into the question of which firm is "innovative". The main reason for this is the difficulty in determining who is "innovative". Instead, countries identify priority sectors and grant incentives to all startups within the sector. That aside, in the Indian context, given the significant overlaps between the eligibility criteria for being a registered startup vis-a-vis the eligibility criteria for tax exemptions by registered startups, the government may consider a single window clearance system in which an eligible startup is registered and then is automatically given a tax-exempt status on account of being registered with the DPIIT. In doing so, the state will free up valuable state resources and capacity, which may be deployed for other purposes aligned with the intention of promoting innovation among startups.

Demand-side interventions through government contracting: As an alternative, some literature suggests that demand side strategies through public procurement will encourage innovation (Rothwell et al. 1981).

While the creation of the IMB and the government's focus on startups appears to be in response to a market failure, the design of the intervention has flaws. We note that "startups" are not necessarily major drivers of innovation in India. Firm size has no role to play in how innovative it can be. Therefore, tax exemptions for startups, even if they are "innovative", have little measurable effect on innovation in Indian society as a whole. Mashelkar et al (2024) recommend that the government "buy" i.e. contract out more research and innovation functions to firms in the private sector. The spillovers this can generate would be substantive and would have a multiplier effect. We already have many examples of the government choosing to do so e.g. the New Millennium Indian Technology Leadership Initiative (NMITLI) program of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Department of Space's (DoS) contracting with companies like L & T and Tata Elxsi to build rocket engines and recovery modules for the all-important Chandrayaan and Gaganyaan missions. These kinds of contracts should be done more often and frequently with all kinds of companies to build innovation and production capacity. Our recommendation in all cases is to pursue innovation by contracting out.

References

  1. Adam Smith, The wealth of nations, Fingerprint Classics, 2024.
  2. Aneesha Chitgupi, Karthik Suresh and Diya Uday, Are startups engaging in innovation in India?, The Leap Blog, 25 April 2023.
  3. Pratik Datta, Surya Prakash B.S., and Renuka Sane, Understanding judicial delay at the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in India, Working Paper, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, 13 October 2017.
  4. Ramesh Mashelkar, Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas, Rethinking innovation policy in India: Amplifying spillovers through contracting-out, Working Paper, XKDR Forum, 21 March 2024.
  5. Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah, In Service of the Republic: The Art and Science of Economic Policy, Penguin, 2022.
  6. R Rothwell and W Zegweld. Industrial Innovation and Public Policy: Preparing for the 1980s and the 1990s. In: London: Francis Pinter Publications (1981).

Aneesha Chitgupi, Diya Uday and Karthik Suresh are researchers at XKDR Forum. The authors thank Ajay Shah and two anonymous referees for their comments and inputs.

Saturday, August 24, 2024

Who lends to the Indian state?

by Aneesha Chitgupi, Ajay Shah, Manish Singh, Susan Thomas and Harsh Vardhan.

Public finance researchers in India have paid great attention to debt and deficits. By now, the main messages of the field have started sinking into common knowledge: that it is good to run primary deficits in most years, so as to create space to surge the deficit once in a while when faced with a crisis. There is an adjacent field of public debt management that is equally important. Here, the strategic question is: How should the government borrow? From whom? Debt management strategy has not received the required level of interest.

Strategic thinking in debt management

A sound public debt management strategy must cater to three objectives:

  • The mechanism for borrowing must not induce economic distortions upon the domestic economy.
  • It must create strategic depth of being able to borrow on a very large scale when faced with great challenges, once every few decades.
  • It must induce sustainable mechanisms for reasonably low cost borrowing, at reasonably predictable rates, for the long term.

There are four main pathways to choose from in debt issuance:

  1. Monetisation of the deficit. Here, the central bank distorts the monetary base with `fiscal dominance’ where it buys the bonds issued by the government.
  2. Coerced borrowing from financial firms. These are typically regulated firms, who are coerced using the tools of financial regulation.
  3. Borrowing from voluntary participants (domestic or foreign). This is done through local currency bonds issued domestically, possibly nominal and possibly inflation indexed.
  4. Borrowing abroad using foreign currency denominated bonds. As an example, this could involve Yen denominated bonds issued in London.

As with many other countries, we started out in India with the first method (monetisation of the deficit). This induces an economic distortion: the loss of monetary policy autonomy. A long journey of monetary policy reform took place, from the Ways and means agreement of 1993, to the Monetary policy framework agreement in 2015 that ushered in inflation targeting. This freed up monetary policy from the limitations imposed by debt management. In 2015, there was an attempt at institutional reform, in the form of the establishment of the Public Debt Management Agency (freeing up the Reserve Bank of India of the responsibility of issuing public debt), but this did not come to pass.

From 1993 onward, the main strategy for public debt management in India has involved method 2 in the list: a system of `financial repression’ where the government borrows from coerced financial firms. This is a tax upon financial intermediation. The interest rates discovered through government borrowing are important prices that impinge upon the economy. But these rates are distorted owing to the presence of coerced buyers of government debt. The lack of voluntary lenders creates the lack of strategic depth. The government is limited in how it can expand its borrowing when faced with special situations.

From the late 1990s onwards, economists and thinkers have sought to enhance fiscal prudence in India through the mechanism of fiscal responsibility law. It is increasingly clear that this does not work. In recent work, Datta et. al. 2023 show that the Indian constitutional arrangements frustrate the possibility of Parliamentary law imposing fiscal discipline upon the union government. Once this idea is internalised, there is one main path towards fiscal responsibility: market discipline. This requires removing the system of financial repression.

Who lends to the Indian state?

In this context, the question Who lends to the Indian state? attains importance. A recent paper by Aneesha Chitgupi, Ajay Shah, Manish Singh, Susan Thomas and Harsh Vardhan examines this question. For a period of 10 years, we assemble information from multiple sources, which were all available in the public domain, to examine the nature of lenders to the Indian state. Some discoveries that we make are:

  • The SLR went down in the last decade. This meant that the extent of bank funds mandated for the government decreased. However, the actual investments by banks in government debt securities was higher than what was mandated.
  • Simultaneously, there was major growth in the role of insurance and pension funds lending to the government. While de jure financial repression of banks declined, there has been no such retreat with pensions and insurance.
  • All the three groups of financial firms bought a lot more government bonds as compared with the de jure requirements. Excess ownership went from about 0 in 2011 to Rs.30 trillion in 2021.
  • How did the government increase borrowing over the last decade, while simultaneously elongating the maturity profile? The answer lies in (a) Strong growth in insurance and pensions industries, and (b) Excess ownership of government bonds by coerced industries.
  • The voluntary lenders are the private firms, MFs and FIIs, who are 4.8% of investors in the government debt market for 2021. India (along with China) remains an outlier in having very low borrowing from international debt markets.

Important questions for the future

This field is target rich with interesting questions, some of which are:

  1. Why do financial firms lend so much to the government?
  2. What will the structure of lenders to the government look like, 10 years out into the future?
  3. If a big surge in borrowing is required, where will it come from?
  4. How are households and firms changing their behaviour in response to the financial repression tax?
  5. What is the path to fiscal responsibility?

Conclusion

The field of public finance in India has studied deficits and debt. There has been work on the institutional arrangements for debt management (i.e. the establishment of the Public Debt Management Agency). There has been relatively little work on the economic reasoning, the strategic thinking for debt management. In this paper, we offer novel insights and facts for this journey. More research is required, at the interfaces between public finance, finance and public administration, to grow knowledge on the important field of debt management strategy.

Tuesday, August 13, 2024

Announcements

Positions for researchers in the field of working of courts

XKDR Forum is looking for two researchers to work on a project on the working of courts in India.

About XKDR Forum

XKDR Forum is a Mumbai-based inter-disciplinary group of researchers working in the fields of courts, household and firm finance, public finance management and land. In these fields, the group engages in academic and policy oriented research, and advocacy. The new recruits will come into an active research program in the field of working of courts.

Researchers at XKDR Forum have been working in the field of legal systems development for the last decade. Their work in this field includes developing unique case-level datasets from public sources; statistical analyses to establish stylised empirical facts; and studying institutional arrangements of the judicial branch. The work published by their researchers in this field can be found here.

As a research associate at XKDR Forum, you will work on project deliverables under the supervision of a senior researcher. You will be expected to work in person at the office premises in Mumbai.

Eligibility

The project involves building and/ or working with large databases of court data. The eligibility requirements for these two positions are:

  1. Masters in Public Policy or Economics, along with skills or an interest in the coding languages of R and Python; or
  2. Masters or bachelors in Data Science, along with an interest in questions of public policy or public administration.

Candidates with work experience of 1-2 years are preferred, but if you have a Masters degreee, the absence of this attribute is not a barrier to applying for these positions. They must be comfortable working in an inter-disciplinary research environment with people from varying backgrounds such as economics, public policy and law. They must be curious and passionate about research and must be willing to work on independent outputs as well as in teams.

The remuneration offered will be commensurate with your skill and experience and will be comparable with what is found in other research institutions.

Interested candidates must fill in the application form by 31st August, 2024.