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Friday, February 09, 2018

Working Titles: Property Rights for Slum Policy in India

by Jai Vipra.

This post argues that slum rehabilitation programs in India need to ask fundamental questions about which specific arrangement of property rights would be the most beneficial for all stakeholders, including the government, residents of slums, potential residents, and the rest of the city. It examines the option of providing less-than-complete titles to property as a slum rehabilitation strategy.

Urban informal settlements, largely slums, are a problem because they are squatter settlements, which means that the tenure is insecure and residents can be evicted at any time. The lack of legal tenure also affects access to services like water and electricity, and impedes the development of infrastructure such as roads and sewerage systems. Without proof of ownership of land, residents cannot mortgage or otherwise capitalise it. The lack of legality of land occupation is, of course, a problem in itself.

Slums sometimes crop up on public land, and can frustrate city planning objectives. This post does not examine the policy options for controlling the growth of new slums, which will include rural growth policy, job creation, public transport, overall land use management, etc. Here, I only focus on formalising existing slums.

Existing slum rehabilitation strategies

Sometimes, slum residents are relocated to city outskirts. This strategy has obvious problems, given that the main value proposition of slums is their location, and that relocation disrupts valuable social networks.

Mahadevia has classified slum rehabilitation strategies (other than relocation) in India into three buckets:

1. Basic Services Programs: for example, the Urban Community Development program that involved communities to reduce costs, the Slum Networking Program and the Urban Basic Services for the Poor program that integrated slum upgradation with social infrastructure.

2. Shelter and Services Programs: for example, the Slum Upgradation Program that provided land titles - leasehold or freehold - along with an optional housing loan. Another example is the Rajiv Awas Yojana, now discontinued, that provided for community participation at every stage and covered all slums, whether notified or not.

3. Special Programs: includes programs that aim to provide infrastructure and housing to cities and include slums in their strategy, for example, the Mega Cities Project.

Most of these schemes have included a provision to 'regularise' slums, and have excluded slums that could not be regularised, for example, those present on land owned by the Central government. Regularisation means that complete, or near-complete, legal tenure security is provided through full titles. Full legal tenure security means a title that grants the right to use, exclude from, inherit and alienate land through sale or transfer.

Such full titles create two kinds of problems:

1. Political economy problems: These include likely dispossession of land because of increased transaction value of property, and illegal subletting, among other issues. Dispossession occurs because full titles raise the commercial value of land, creating incentives to capture it, and thus decrease tenure security.

By some accounts, at least half of the people granted full titles in slum rehabilitation programs sublet their houses illegally.

Subletting or transfer of property rights is not an issue in itself. The issues arise either when titles are granted to non-residents pretending to be residents, or when residents, after acquiring titles, rent their properties out and move to another slum, simply shifting the issues with slums to another part of the city.

The first issue is one of monitoring and design. If community organisations play a role in determining who gets titles, their membership and conditions of membership must be rethought.

The second issue of title-holders moving to different slums indicates that a full title and a modern flat were not being demanded. Evidently some slum residents do not want these 'better' dwellings, and are using the titles to access capital. Perhaps our focus ought to be on increasing access to capital through other ways, while not losing sight of the need to improve living conditions in slums.

2. Public administration problems: Regularisation involves ascertaining original land ownership, resident status, identities, resolving disputes, etc. This process adds time and financial strain to already-strained state capacity. For example, the Slum Upgradation Program in Mumbai in the 1980s ran into problems even with a lease, because the private land would have to be acquired by the government first.

Property rights framework

We can already see that thinking of slum rehabilitation in terms of the kinds of property rights granted through titles helps us disaggregate issues. Some of the problems we saw above are caused by the peculiarities of full titling. They could presumably be solved by using less-than-full titles. Let us call such titles working titles. Working titles provide less-than-full tenure security. That means that they guarantee some, but not all, property rights. For example, a working title may guarantee the right to cultivate or occupy land, but not to alienate it. It may guarantee the right to construct non-permanent structures but not permanent structures. Working titles can avoid the need to amend the main state registry for every property transaction; they can be based on general demarcation of plots on makeshift maps; they can maintain ultimate state ownership of land when required.

They provide some tenure security, and because they do not give full ownership rights, they often skirt the need for the government to acquire private, encroached-upon land. Theoretically, they may reduce the moral hazard of encroaching on a property that will eventually be fully regularised. For this to be true, the property rights included in the working title have to be enough to provide tenure security to the urban poor but not enough for encroachment to become attractive.

There are many examples of programs providing working titles. The following table, derived from secondary literature, examines the objectives, effects, administrative design and issues of four such programs:


Working titles: Analysis of Case Studies
Area Purpose Instrument Rights Administrative design Coupled with Effects
Cape Town, South Africa | Source Violence Prevention Occupancy certificates Use Community register A project to upgrade infrastructure and state service provision Unclear effects on violence
Access to services Access to services Regular but voluntary updating of registry Improved access to services
Upgradation of infrastructure Social consultation process Upgradation delayed because of relocation requirement
High-level informal settlements working group Electrification
Dedicated, full time on site registration office
Brazil | Source Keeping public land public Concession of Real Rights to Use Use for a limited period of time, renewable Registration required in some areas Project to upgrade infrastructure and dwellings Public land remains public
Reducing disputes Transfer with municipal approval Monthly fee in some areas Services such as rubbish collection, water and electricity Unclear effects on dispute levels
Tenure security Decreased tenure security because it is perceived as a rental
contract due to program design and inadequate communication
Namibia | Source Less strain on state capacity Starter title Use Parallel registry Only been piloted, but legal framework important
Poverty reduction Sell, transfer Para professionals
Inherit Community involvement
Landhold title Use
Sell, transfer
Inherit
Mortgage
Botswana | Source Reducing strain on state capacity Certificate of Rights Use General plans for demarcating boundaries Services such as earth roads, water, toilets Did not reduce strain on state capacity
Access to services Inherit Similar to customary system Housing loan Improved access to services
Too much urban land state-owned because of historical reasons; need to transfer rights to squatters Transfer with municipal approval Monthly service charge Effectively transferred rights in public land to residents
Mortgage Dispute resolution system High level of disputes
No registration at deeds registry Unauthorised structures

Conclusion

We can draw some preliminary inferences from these case studies of working titles. Working titles seem to improve access to services by formalising rights. They also avoid the legal issues of registration in the main registry of a country, by using parallel processes and structures. They help with identifying actual residents because communities are heavily engaged in mapping processes. They can provide tenure security if their purpose and characteristics are communicated well.

While programs that provide working titles aim to also improve infrastructure, in reality, it seems as if the infrastructure provision increases community involvement and may end up making the working titles easier to implement, and an attractive option for the poor. The hypothesis is that when coupled with infrastructure provision, services and housing loans, working titles seem to have increased take-up and easier implementation.

While working titles reduce the need for state capacity in some ways, they increase it in others, particularly with the need to involve communities intensively. They require high commitment from the administration and the community towards solving issues of tenure insecurity. They may not reduce the strain on the state's dispute resolution system. The pilots have been small, and their effects in larger contexts are unclear. They also uniformly do not increase the mortgage-ability of land; however, as the same case studies and other sources show, neither do stronger titles in these and other countries.

While there is some research on such titles, more research is required on the optimal administrative design for such programs, so as to reduce the strain on state capacity and disputability among the community. It would also be beneficial to undertake systematic research on the suitability of working titles for India.

 

Jai Vipra is reasearcher at National Institute of Public Finance an Policy. The author thanks Anirudh Burman, Suyash Rai and Devendra Damle for useful discussions. The two anonymous reviewers also contributed very helpful insights.

Wednesday, February 07, 2018

Interesting readings

Can Planet Earth Feed 10 Billion People? by Charles C. Mann in The Atlantic, March 2018.

How best to play Finance SEZs by Ajay Shah in Business Standard, February 5, 2018.

Selfies for India: These long-term bonds can fund India's infrastructure needs and improve retirement security by Robert C Merton and Arun S Muralidhar in The Times of India, February 5, 2018.

Why stop at Hindi? in Business Standard, February 4, 2018. English as lingua franca is a multilateral disarmament treaty.

Budget 2018-19: Reading between the lines by Ajay Shah in Business Standard, February 1, 2018.

How Do We Explain This National Tragedy? This Trump? by T.J. Stiles in Literary Hub, January 31, 2018.

A game of chicken: how India's poultry farms are spawning global superbugs by Rahul Meesaraganda and Madlen Davies in The Hindu, January 31, 2018.

Resurrection of TPP - A wake-up call for India by Jayanta Roy in Business Standard, January 31, 2018.

The Shallowness of Google Translate by Douglas Hofstadter in The Atlantic, January 30, 2018.

(Not) the way to promote digital payments by Amol Kulkarni on 50p Blog, January 29, 2018. Also see: Subsidies are the last refuge of a failed policy maker by Ajay Shah in Ajay Shah's Blog, April 16, 2016.

Why E and V bands in telecom can solve a lot of connectivity issues by Surajeet Das Gupta in Business Standard, January 27, 2018.

Elephants Are Very Scared of Bees. That Could Save Their Lives by Karen Weintraub in The New York Times, January 26, 2018.

Do we want to keep the Republic? by Suhas Palshikar in The Indian Express, January 26, 2018.

Privacy shouldn't be the price of progress. Here's how to keep your data safe by Angus Hervey in Quartz, January 26, 2018.

Most unhappy people are unhappy for the exact same reason by Jean Twenge in Quartz, January 26, 2018, and Facebook should be 'regulated like cigarette industry', says tech CEO by Alex Hern in The Guardian, January 24, 2018, and This Is Serious: Facebook Begins Its Downward Spiral by Nick Bilton in Vanity Fair, January 23, 2018. Elite flight will make facebook and twitter uncool; it will be like cigarette smoking.

An interesting debate about the opacity of statistical algorithms and the opacity of human experts: Artificial Intelligence's 'Black Box' Is Nothing to Fear by Vijay Pande in The New York Times, January 25, 2018, Optimization over Explanation by David Weinberger in Medium, January 28, 2018.

Is Bay of Bengal the next BRICS? by Sourajit Aiyer in NIPFP YouTube Channel, January 25, 2018.

Announcements

IBBI-IGIDR Insolvency and Bankruptcy Reforms Conference

3rd and 4th August, 2018
Venue: New Delhi, India

Call for papers

The Finance Research Group at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) is inviting papers for the IBBI-IGIDR Insolvency and bankruptcy reforms conference. The conference aims to cover presentations and discussions across the following set of themes:

  • Enterprise value of firms in insolvency
  • Creditor and debtor incentives in insolvency
  • Measurement of probability of default and loss given defaul
  • Stressed assets industry
  • Incentivising creditors towards resolution
  • Economic impact of insolvency - an international perspectie
  • Interface with existing laws and
  • Institutional development for bankruptcy
The audience for the conference is expected to comprise academics, participants from the legal and financial industry, policy makers from government and regulators.

Timelines

  • Paper submission deadline: 16th March 2018
  • Expected date for notification of acceptance: 5th May 2018
  • Dates of the conference: 3rd - 4th August 2018

Submission instructions and review

  • The papers can have a quantitative, theoretical or policy research focus
  • The papers must be sent as PDF files to Jyoti Manke at jyoti@igidr.ac.in.
  • Submitted papers will be reviewed by the Program Committee, which includes:
    • Bindu Ananth, Dvara Research Foundation
    • Sumant Batra, Kesar Dass B. & Associate
    • Prof. Vikas Chitre, President, Indian School of Political Economy
    • Omkar Goswami, Chairperson, Corporate and Economic Research Group Advisory Pvt. Ltd.
    • M. S. Sahoo, Chairperson, IBBI
    • Ajay Shah, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy
    • Cyril Shroff, Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas
    • I. Srinivas, Secretary, MCA
    • Suresh Sundaresan, Columbia Business School
    • Susan Thomas, IGIDR
    • Bahram Vakil, AZB & Partners
    • T. K. Viswanathan, Director (ADR) International Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution and Chairman of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee.
  • 10 papers will be selected for the conference
Accommodation at the conference venue for 2 nights (2nd to 3rd August 2018) will be provided to academic presenters and discussants.

Contact details

For clarifications, please contact Jyoti at +91-22-28416592 (office) or +91-98205-20180 (cellphone).

About the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI)

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) is the regulator constituted under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. It was established on 1st October 2016, and is responsible for the implementation of the Code, through creating regulations and suggesting amendments to thelaw to ensure the economic outcomes visualised under the Code. URL http://www.ibbi.gov.in

About the Finance Research Group, IGIDR

The Finance Research Group at IGIDR works in the area of quantitative finance, financial sector laws, regulation and policy. Research undertaken by the group spans questions about securities markets, household and corporate finance, insolvency and bankruptcy laws and land and access to finance. The group seeks to play a role in the policy issues and debates in India, both through papers and focused policy and technical notes. In the last two years, teams from the FRG have been the research secretariat for the Standing Council on the competitiveness of the Indian financial system, and the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee. The work of the group can be seen at the URL: http://www.ifrogs.org

Friday, February 02, 2018

Announcements

Positions at the Finance Research Group, IGIDR

The Finance Research Group at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR), Mumbai is looking for researchers interested in financial regulation.

IGIDR is a PhD and Masters granting research institution set up in Bombay in 1989, and funded by the Reserve Bank of India. The Finance Research Group is a group of researchers (economists, lawyers and data scientists) working on the economics, policy and regulation of financial markets, household finance, firm financing and the land market.

The person will be required to support research in law and economics on a full-time basis. The position will involve working with persons from various disciplines. It will require working with data-sets, analyses and designing policy and regulatory interventions. It will provide exposure to cutting edge research in finance. Ideal candidates are persons having a degree or experience in law, finance, economics or public policy.

Specifically, we are recruiting researchers to work in the following areas:

Policy research in payments


The legal framework of the payments and settlement systems, Indian and global, clearing processes in payments systems of different kinds, optimal competition policy in payments, policy issues and market barriers in payment systems, and how to design policy to ensure a vibrant fintech ecosystem.

The work profile will include studying contemporary policy
developments, developing a point of view on the required reforms, writing policy papers and blog articles, running policy roundtables, etc.

Impact of interventions in financial markets


Our research program on financial markets will involve studying the impact of changes in regulations on market quality, evaluation of proposed regulations, and development of a cost-benefit analysis of the same.

The office functions on free and open source softwares like Linux, LaTeX, R and others. Previous experience in Linux is not required. However, if appointed, the candidate will be required to learn and use this software. The candidate must be willing to adapt to technology and work long hours.

Contact us


Please get in touch with Jyoti Manke at careersatFRG@gmail.com

Announcements

IGIDR Household Finance Research Workshop

24th February, 2018
Seanza Conference Hall, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai

Call for papers

The Finance Research Group at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research (IGIDR) is inviting papers to be submitted for the workshop on Household Finance Research. The research focus is on:

  • Long term participation of investors and households in equity and debt markets.
  • How investors change trading and holding patterns in response to news and information.
  • The role of financial market intermediaries in improving access to finance.
  • FinTech innovations in financial inclusion.
  • The regulatory strategy to foster the optimal use of modern finance by firms. What should the law say? What should the regulations say? How should they be enforced?
  • Implication of macro-economic policies on household savings and investment behaviour

Dates

  • Paper submission deadline: 10th February 2018.
  • Notification of acceptance: 15th February 2018.

Support

Accommodation at the conference venue for 2 nights (23rd February and 24th February, 2018) will be provided for speakers at the workshop.

Contact

Submissions must be sent, as PDF files, to Jyoti Manke at jyoti@igidr.ac.in

For any clarifications, please contact Jyoti at +91-22-28416592 (office) or +91-98205-20180 (cellphone).

Tuesday, January 30, 2018

Bank recapitalisation: the allocation challenge

by Rajeswari Sengupta and Anjali Sharma.

The government has announced its plans to allocate the first round of recapitalisation funds to the public sector banks (PSBs). While the recapitalisation announcement was received by the market with great enthusiasm, the allocation has received mixed reviews (link, link). Nearly 60% of the Rs. 0.88 trillion being infused in the first round will go to the weakest 11 banks that are under the RBI's Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework. As part of the plan, IDBI Bank, the lender with the most stressed assets gets Rs. 0.10 trillion, the single largest amount. State Bank of India and Indian Bank, the relatively better performing banks, get Rs. 0.08 trillion and no allocation respectively.

In this article we look at four questions with regard to the allocation plan:

  1. Is this recapitalisation adequate?

  2. Why has more capital been allocated to the highly stressed banks?

  3. Could the government have adopted an alternate, more growth oriented allocation strategy?

  4. What objectives can recapitalisation fulfill?

Is this recapitalisation adequate?

No. The recapitalisation funds committed are far less than what the banks need.

In September 2017, the PSBs had stressed assets to the tune of Rs. 8.9 trillion. Against these, they held provisions of Rs. 3.4 trillion, which translates into a provision cover ratio (PCR) of 38%. PCR is an effective measure of what the banks expect to recover from their stressed assets. For example, if they expect to recover 40% of the value, they will provide for the remaining 60%. A PCR of 38% could mean one of two things. Either the PSBs expect to recover 62% of the value of their stressed assets, or they are under-provisioned. In an earlier article, we gave our reasons for believing that anything more than a 30% recovery rate is optimistic. Early indications from the corporate resolution plans submitted under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) support this belief. Further, the true extent of PSBs' stressed advances is still not clear. Analysts are pointing out that stressed advances are set to grow further.

Given this, a 38% PCR indicates under-provisioning rather than expectations of recovery. Table 1 shows the additional provision required to increase PCR to various levels.

Table 1: Additional provision required at different levels of PCR

T1 capital required*

For PCR 50% 1.1
For PCR 55% 1.5
For PCR 60% 1.9
For PCR 70% 2.8

Source: Authors' estimates; PSBs Q2-18 Analyst
Presentations
* to maintain T1 CRAR of 9.5%.

PSBs currently have a Tier 1 capital base of Rs. 5.6 trillion. This is just adequate to meet the 9.5% Tier 1 capital adequacy requirement (CAR) imposed by RBI on the banks. This means that for every rupee of additional provision required, a rupee of Tier 1 capital will need to be infused in these banks. There is little hope that the PSBs' profits will reduce the need for recapitalisation. In the last two quarters, these banks have incurred losses, with Q2 losses being higher than that in Q1.

To reach a PCR of 70%, PSBs need to make additional provisions of Rs. 2.8 trillion. This is also the amount of additional capital they need. Since the IBC resolution process imposes a 270 day timeline, a large part of this requirement for capital will show up in PSB balance sheets in FY 18-19.

Against this, the government is committing Rs. 1.53 trillion, over two years. With this the PSBs will get to a PCR of 55%. This is low. The two year phasing, with Rs. 0.88 trillion being infused in FY 18-19 and the remaining Rs. 0.65 trillion in FY 19-20, is also a problem. It will ensure that: (1) PSBs will continue to be capital starved in FY 18-19, and (2) all the additional capital will get consumed for stress resolution, with no room left for supporting any growth in credit.

Why has more capital been allocated to the highly stressed banks?

There is no other choice. The stressed banks need additional capital today, without which their condition will worsen.

To understand this we look at bank level data. We classify the 21 PSBs into three categories, based on what their Tier 1 capital position would be if they were to increase their PCR to 70%, with no additional capital being infused.

  • Category 1: Banks whose Tier 1 CAR will be at 7% or more.

    Under Basel III norms, banks need to hold Tier 1 CAR of at least 7%. RBI requires Indian banks to hold a Tier 1 CAR of 9.5% (7% Tier 1 Capital + 2.5% Capital Conservation Buffer).

  • Category 2: Banks whose Tier 1 CAR will be positive but less than 7%.

  • We further divide category 2 banks into two sub-categories:

    • Category 2a: Banks whose Tier 1 CAR will be more than 3.5% but less than 7%.
    • Category 2b: Banks whose Tier 1 CAR will be between 0% and 3.5%.

    Within category 2, category 2a are the relatively less stressed banks, and 2b are the more stressed ones.

  • Category 3: Banks whose Tier 1 CAR will be negative.

In Table 2, we present details of the asset quality, capital adequacy and profitability of these categories as at September 2017. We also look at the additional Tier 1 capital that each of these categories needs in order to reach a PCR of 70%, while maintaining Tier 1 CAR at 9.5%.

Table 2: Category level analysis of PSBs

Unit Category 1 Category 2a Category 2b Category 3
(T1 ≥ 7%) (3.5% ≤T1 ≤ 7%) (0% ≤ T1 ≤ 3.5%) (T1 ≤ 0%)

Number of banks 2 7 8 4
Banks in RBI-PCA - 1 6 4
Names of banks SBI, Vijaya Bank, BoB, Allahabad Bank, Andhra Bank, IDBI Bank, IOB,
Indian Bank Syndicate Bank, OBC, UCO Bank, J&K Bank. Dena Bank
Union Bank of India, Central Bank, Corporation Bank, United Bank of India
BoI, PNB, Canara Bank Bank of Maharashtra

Sept-17 performance
Stressed advances/Total advances % 11.5 13.8 18.5 28.4
PCR % 39.8 38.5 38.1 34.3
T1 CAR % 11.1 9.2 8.1 8.5
H1 Net Profit Rs. trillion 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.04
Additional T1 capital needed* Rs. trillion - 0.07 0.22 0.10

At PCR of 70%
T1 CAR (without capital infusion) % 7.7 4.6 2.1 -0.9
Additional T1 capital needed** (A) Rs. trillion 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.6
Share of additional capital % 14 37 29 20

Phase I capital infusion
Allocation (B) Rs. trillion 0.09 0.35 0.24 0.21
Allocation/Requirement (B/A) % 24 32 29 40
PCR after Phase 1 allocation % 43.5 46.7 42.3 45.1

Source: Authors' estimates; Q2 analysts' presentations of
PSBs
* To bring T1 CAR to 9.5%, at a existing level of
PCR.
** To bring T1 CAR to 9.5%, at a PCR of 70%.

We find that banks in categories 2 and 3 are short of their Tier 1 capital requirement even today. They need around Rs. 0.39 trillion of additional capital in FY 18-19 just to meet the regulatory requirement of 9.5% Tier 1 capital, with no improvement in their PCR. The 12 most stressed banks, those in categories 2b and 3 need close to 80% of this additional capital.

Unless the most stressed banks get additional capital, they will not have the ability to take the haircuts that the IBC outcomes will require them to take. Most stressed corporate loans are through lending consortia which include both the less stressed and the highly stressed PSBs as members. If these weak banks do not receive capital, they will stall the IBC resolution process, thereby affecting the recovery from stressed assets for all banks involved.

Since the most stressed banks are also the ones incurring losses, over time their capital position will worsen. The first phase of capital allocation reflects this reality and allocates the largest share to these banks.

With the Phase I infusion, after meeting the regulatory capital requirements, the overall PCR will increase from the Sept-17 level of 38% to 44.5%. Even at these levels, given that recovery rates are likely to be far lower, PSBs will remain significantly under provisioned.

Could the government have adopted an alternate, more growth oriented allocation strategy?

Not really. Capital for dealing with stress has to precede growth capital.

Table 2 highlights the challenge of allocating the recapitalisation amount among the 21 PSBs. All PSBs are stressed, some less and others more so. Even the relatively less stressed banks like SBI and Indian Bank will require capital infusion to shore up provisions to levels where they can deal with their stressed assets while meeting the regulatory capital requirement. As long as the aggregate supply of capital is less than the Rs. 2.8 trillion that is required (Table 1), there is no allocation scenario under which all PSBs will be able to meet their regulatory capital requirement and also grow their advances.

Within the constraint of the capital committed, we consider some scenarios to evaluate whether any alternate allocation strategies could have prioritised growth.

  1. Scenario 1: The entire Rs 0.8 trillion of capital is given to the two banks in category 1 and the less stressed banks in category 2a. The banks in categories 2b and 3 get nothing.

    Theoretically, this scenario can generate some credit growth. The trade-off being that the most stressed banks do not get any additional capital. In reality, this is not a scenario that the government can implement for various reasons:

    • There is a public perception problem. If the government chooses the less stressed banks over the highly stressed ones, it will push the ones that are not chosen into further distress. These stressed PSBs will not be able to raise capital from the market, sell their non-core assets at reasonable valuations, or make recoveries from their stressed assets. It is possible that such an action may cause panic among the investors and depositors of these banks.

    • The highly stressed PSBs, like other PSBs, have raised capital by issuing AT1 or T2 bonds. In most cases these bonds have also been subscribed to by foreign investors. For these banks, a fall in the level of capital below regulatory thresholds will tantamount to a technical default. Since PSBs are owned by the government, their bonds carry the implicit guarantee of the government. A technical default on these bonds would be equivalent to a sovereign default.

    • There is also a question whether some banks can be kept in a state of non-compliance with regulatory capital norms on an ongoing basis. This can only happen if the RBI relaxes its regulatory standards on a selective basis for the most stressed banks. Such an action would be undesirable, from the perspective of systemic risk, and macroeconomic stability.

    • If the highly stressed banks are kept capital starved, they will derail the stressed asset resolution process for other banks in the system as well, as discussed earlier.

  2. Scenario 2: The entire Rs. 0.8 trillion of capital is allocated to the 12 highly stressed banks in categories 2b and 3.

    The banks in these categories need Rs. 1.4 trillion of capital infusion (Table 2) to bring T1 CAR to 9.5%, at a PCR of 70%. While their health will somewhat improve with this infusion, the capital gap will continue to exist. Under this scenario, there will be no growth in credit for the next two years. Given that the capital gap will persist, the PSBs may continue to delay recognition and resolution of their stressed assets.

  3. Scenario 3: The government merges the highly stressed banks with the less stressed ones, or closes down the highly stressed banks.

    The need for additional capital to deal with stressed assets will not go away with a merger between PSBs. It will continue in the merged entities. Since most PSBs are very similar to each other in the composition of their assets and their liabilities, a linear addition of their balance sheets is not a solution to their stressed assets problem.

    The same holds true even if some of the most stressed banks are closed down. Their assets, including the stressed assets, will need to be transferred or sold to another bank or financial institution at some value. If this sale/transfer takes place at face value, the entities that buy these assets will need the additional capital required to take haircuts and resolve stress. If the sale/transfer takes place at a discount to face value, the banks being closed down will need additional capital to meet all their liabilities and obligations prior to being closed down.

The government does not have a real choice in allocation strategy as long as the capital supplied is less than the capital required for dealing with the PSBs' stressed assets. The requirement for additional capital remains, irrespective of the banking sector strategy that is adopted.

What objectives can recapitalisation fulfill?

The Indian banking system currently faces two big challenges:

  1. The banking system is burdened by stressed assets and its existing capital base is inadequate to deal with this problem. Banks need additional capital to take the necessary haircuts to resolve these stressed assets.

  2. Bank credit to the industrial sector has stagnated over the last few years. In the last six quarters, quarter-on-quarter bank credit growth has been negative. Non-bank credit sources such as the corporate bond market remain under developed. While there are demand side constraints owing to stressed corporate balance sheets, for an economy growing at 6-6.5%, there are many other segments which are in need of credit. These segments remain credit-starved because of the slowdown in the banking sector. This will have adverse consequences for the overall growth of the economy going forward.

The bank recapitalisation program could be an important step to address both these challenges. It could provide PSBs with the capital required to deal with their stressed assets, and it could revive bank lending, to the extent that demand for credit exists or picks up going forward. However, this can happen if the PSBs hold adequate levels of capital to meet both the objectives.

Our analysis shows that the additional capital that is required for dealing with stress far exceeds what has been committed so far. Only after this capital gap is addressed, can there be a possibility of re-starting credit growth. At the current level of recapitalisation commitment, PSBs will reach a provision cover of 45% on their stressed assets. This implies that they need to recover 50-60% of the value of these stressed assets. This seems highly optimistic given the status of resolution efforts currently underway as part of IBC proceedings.

In the first phase of recapitalisation, the government has decided to inject bulk of the Rs. 0.88 trillion of capital into the most stressed PSBs. Our analysis shows that the government does not have a choice to adopt an alternative allocation strategy that would have revived credit growth. To do that, the overall supply of capital needs to be increased to levels that are in excess of what is required for dealing with the PSBs' stress.

Given that the government has chosen to solve the banking crisis through a recapitalisation program, we have empirically analysed the objectives that such a program may fulfil. The larger issue at hand is the use of taxpayers' money to repeatedly bail out failed banks. Recapitalisation is not the solution to the problems of Indian banking. This needs wide ranging structural and regulatory reforms. The question that needs to be asked is that in absence of such reforms, how wise is it to keep throwing public money at a recurrent problem?

 

Rajeswari Sengupta and Anjali Sharma are researchers at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai. The authors thank Joshua Felman and Harsh Vardhan for useful comments and suggestions. We also thank Utso Pal Mustafi of IGIDR for assistance with the data.

Monday, January 29, 2018

Analysing the National Medical Commission Bill: Composition

Shefali Malhotra and Shubho Roy.

The Parliament referred the National Medical Commission Bill, 2017 (NMC Bill) to the Standing Committee on 2 January, 2018. This is the thirteenth legislative attempt (bills and amendments) to reform the Medical Council of India (MCI). Due to concerns about its functioning, the MCI has required interventions by the legislature and the judiciary. In this series, we analyse some provisions of the NMC Bill in light of what the experience of professional regulation teaches us.

Composition of NMC (Section 4)

Section 4 of the NMC Bill lays down the composition of the proposed NMC. In comparison with the 104-member board of the MCI, the new NMC board will have only 25 members. This is a welcome move. Literature shows that smaller deliberative bodies are more efficient than larger bodies (Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, 2011; Klimek et. al., 2009). However, the other problem, which persists, is the domination of doctors in the regulator (20 out of 25 members will be from the health profession). Only three members will be experts from other fields, not representing the health profession. Just like the MCI, there is a high probability of regulatory capture of the NMC leading to poor outcomes for patients.

Of the 25 members, there will be twelve ex-officio members, eleven part-time members, a Chairperson and a Member Secretary.

The twelve ex-officio members will be:

  1. Four presidents (doctors) of other subordinate boards of NMC (which will carry out core functions of the NMC)
  2. Six directors from medical institutes, like AIIMS, Tata Memorial Hospital and PGIMER
  3. The Director General of DGHS
  4. A representative from MoHFW

The eleven part-time members will be:

  1. Three representatives from the Medical Advisory Council (an advisory body under the NMC Bill, dominated by doctors)
  2. Five practising doctors
  3. Three experts in other fields, like law, consumer or patient rights and economics

The Chairperson will be a doctor with 20 years of work experience, and the Member Secretary will be selected by the government.

Conservatively, 20 out of 25 members of the NMC will be doctors. This number may vary if the Member Secretary is a doctor as well. Only three part-time members will be experts from other fields.

There are additional ways in which doctors will dominate the functioning of NMC. As an example, all decisions of the NMC will be taken by a majority vote. In the event of a tie, the Chairperson (doctor) will have a casting vote (S. 9). The four subordinate boards under the NMC, which will carry out its core functions of setting and enforcing standards, will be composed of doctors predominantly (S. 17).

Evolving role of regulator

Professional regulators, around the world, have sought to restrict the supply of practitioners, thereby benefitting the existing practitioners. At the time of its inception, the primary objective of the MCI was also to control entry of doctors. Hence, the MCI was entrusted with two functions: (a) recognition of medical qualifications, which entitled individuals to practice the profession; and (b) maintaining a register of doctors to prevent unregistered individuals (or quacks) from practicing medicine. Since, doctors were considered best-placed to carry out the task of regulating entry, the MCI board comprised solely of doctors. Similarly, medical regulatory boards in other jurisdictions, like the UK and California, were also composed of doctors.

During the 1960s, there was growing criticism of the health profession due to increasing instances of poor clinical performance. For example, errors in diagnoses, errors in performing a procedure, under-informing or misinforming patients, use of outmoded tests or procedures, failure of peer networks to report poor practice, etc. Arrow, 1963, observed that medical care was plagued with market failures in the form of information asymmetry. Due to the complexity and uncertainty of medical treatment, patients were unable to evaluate the quality of service being provided. In turn, doctors exercised undue influence over patients. The academic understanding of regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971), public-choice theory (Black, 1948), and special interest groups (Grossman and Helpman, 2001) led to changes in legislation in the 1970s and 80s. From protecting the profession, the objective of legislation shifted to protecting and promoting patient safety. The Medical Act, 1983, in the UK, and the changes to the Medical Board of California in 1975 are examples of legislatures incorporating the academic understanding of professional regulation.

Removing regulatory capture

The new role also entailed a shift in the composition of the medical regulatory boards. A doctor-dominated board, designed to serve the interests of its peers, was no longer desirable. The new role entailed a fair, impartial and independent body to prosecute and adjudicate violations of minimum standards. This led to the demand for increasing representation of patient interest in medical regulatory boards (Baggott, 2002).

Over the years, health profession regulators started including representation from public members. For example, the General Medical Council (GMC) in the United Kingdom comprises equal number of doctors and public members. Seven out of fifteen members of the Medical Board of California (MBC) are public members. At least one-third of the members of the Medical Board of Australia(MBA) must be public members.

MCI remained outdated

In India, some attempt was also made to hold doctors responsible for malpractice and negligence. The Indian Medical Council (Second) Amendment Act, 1964 empowered the MCI to set up standards of medical profession. However, the MCI persisted with its outdated design. Other than eight members (to be nominated by the Central Government), the remaining members of the MCI must have medical qualifications. As of today, the MCI comprises of 104 members, all of whom are doctors (including the 8 nominated members). This has led to the regulatory capture of MCI.

The regulatory capture is reflected in MCI's reluctance to discipline doctors. The 1964 amendment empowered the MCI to prescribe the professional code of ethics. The first regulation were enacted in 2002: a gap of 38 years. The MCI has also shown a poor track record in investigating and punishing doctors accused of malpractice or negligence. A public interest litigation in 2000, revealed that there was no system for maintaining an updated database of complaints against doctors; some complaints were pending for more than 42 years; and not a single doctor's license had been permanently cancelled. A 2016 Parliamentary Committee report reviewing MCI, noted that between 1963-2009, just 109 doctors were blacklisted by the Ethics Committee of the MCI. In contrast, in 2016-17 alone, the MBC revoked or required surrender of 143 licenses and issued 86 public reprimands. Similarly, the GMC issued 11 warnings, suspended 93 licenses, and permanently debarred 70 doctors in 2016.

NMC will not change much

The proposed NMC is more diverse than the MCI. However, compared to other jurisdictions, the NMC has low representation of public members (See Table 1). Even the NMC as proposed by NITI Aayog was more diverse (10 out of 20 members were from the health profession).

Table 1: Composition of medical regulatory boards
Jurisdiction Regulator Professional Public Govt. Total
India   MCI 104 -- -- 104
  NMC 20 3 2 25
  NMC-NITI 10 5 5 20
California (USA)   MBC 8 7 -- 15
UK  GMC 6 6 -- 12
Australia   MBA 8 4 -- 12

Inclusion of government representatives is unique to NMC; other medical regulatory boards don't include government representatives, neither does the incumbent MCI. This raises some concern as the government plays an active role in health care delivery, through direct provision, as well as financing of health care in India.

Way forward

Modern professional regulators are like the state, in so far as they incorporate legislative (by setting standards), executive (by enforcing prescribed standards) and judicial (by adjudicating violations of prescribed standards) functions. In the case of health professions, the regulator ought to be statutory. The statutory regulator should be designed with the same internal safeguards and processes as the state (OECD, 2014; Shah et. al., 2013; Price, 2002). One of these safeguards is a fair, independent and impartial regulator. The proposed NMC violates this basic principle, in so far it is dominated by health professionals. Consequently, doctors will continue to act as judges in their own cause. Like its predecessor, NMC will likely be a poor enforcer of minimum standards in the health profession.

Any regulator is the child of its constituent document. World over, professional regulators dominated by members of the profession are on their way out. This is also reflected in the composition of some other professional regulators in India. For instance, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, constituted under the Bankruptcy Code, 2016, regulates insolvency professionals. It includes zero representation from insolvency professionals. A doctor-dominated MCI has functioned in an opaque and unaccountable manner. This has also eroded public confidence in the profession. In light of India's experience with MCI, the composition of NMC should not be dominated by doctors. A board with parity between professional and non-professional members (maybe even a slight majority of non-professionals) is a superior institutional design.

References

Ajay Shah et. al., From clubs to States: The future of self-regulating organisations, Ajay Shah's blog, December (2013).

Anirudh Burman, Building the institution of Insolvency Practitioners in India, Ajay Shah's Blog, December (2015).

Anirudh Burman and Shubho Roy, Building an institution of insolvency practitioners in India, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, December (2015).

Business and Professions Code, Division 2, Chapter 5 (California).

Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, Board size and effectiveness: advice to the Department of Health regarding professional regulators, September (2011).

David Price, Legal Aspects of the Regulation of the Health Professions, In: Regulating the Health Professions, SAGE Publications (2002).

Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-making, Journal of Political Economy, February (1948).

Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Special Interest Politics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2001).

General Medical Council (Constitution) Order, 2008 (UK).

George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science (1971).

Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) No. 86a (Australia).

Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.

Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002.

Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, The American Economic Review, December (1963).

Linda A. McCready and Billie Harris, From Quackery to Quality Assurance: The First Twelve Decades of the Medical Board of California, Medical Board of California (February, 1995).

Medical Act, 1983 (UK).

National Medical Commission, 2017 (as introduced in the Lok Sabha).

NITI Aayog, A Preliminary Report of the Committee on the Reform of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (August, 2016).

OECD, The Governance of Regulators, OECD Publishing, Paris (2014).

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare, The Functioning of Medical Council of India, Ninety-Second Report, March (2016).

Peter Klimek et. al., Parkinson's Law Quantified: Three Investigations on Bureaucratic Inefficiency, Journal of Statistical Mechanics Theory and Experiment, August (2008).

Rob Baggott, Regulatory Politics, Health Professionals and the Public Interest, In: Regulating the Health Professions, SAGE Publications (2002).

Shyama Nagarajan and Shubho Roy, Concerns about how the Medical Council of India thinks about medical malpractice, Ajay Shah's Blog, July (2017).

Siddhartha P. Kar, Addressing underlying causes of violence against doctors in India, The Lancet (May, 2017).



The authors are researchers at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.