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Showing posts with label author: Megha Patnaik. Show all posts
Showing posts with label author: Megha Patnaik. Show all posts

Saturday, November 21, 2026

Who owns frontier technologies?

by Mohd Shadab Danish and Megha Patnaik.

Governments around the world are subsidising frontier technologies such as chips, computer hardware and software, and the systems used to train and run artificial intelligence (AI). In June 2026 the European Commission proposed a Chips Act 2.0, as part of what it calls a "Technological Sovereignty Package". Other large economies are doing the same. The United States set aside US\$52.7 billion for chip manufacturing and research under the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. India's semiconductor mission had approved 12 chip projects by June 2026, with planned investment of about Rs.1.64 lakh crore.

Governments promote these programmes to improve technological sovereignty, a term that now frames much of industrial and innovation policy (Edler et al, 2023). Technological sovereignty is the idea that a country can rely on the technologies its economy and its security depend on, without depending on one foreign supplier or government that controls them and could cut them off. Two recent events highlighted the importance of technological sovereignty. In 2021 a shortage of chips stopped car production around the world. An estimated 70% of the microprocessors used in cars' electronic control units came from a single chipmaker, TSMC in Taiwan. Since October 2022 the United States has restricted exports of advanced chips and chip-making equipment to China, cutting Chinese firms off from technology they had relied on.

Measuring technological sovereignty

Technological sovereignty is hard to measure because it has several parts. A country needs the capability to develop critical technologies. Capability is usually tracked with R&D spending, patent counts and research output. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Critical Technology Tracker, for example, ranks countries by high-impact research in 44 critical technologies. A country also needs reliable access to the inputs these technologies are made from, such as chips, components and critical minerals, without depending on one or a few external suppliers. The European Commission measures this dependence from trade data, and in 2021 identified 137 products in sensitive sectors for which the European Union depends heavily on foreign suppliers. A country also needs control over the technologies used at home, which depends on who holds the rights to them. Control has had the least attention. The OECD's statistics on the foreign ownership of inventions come closest, but they follow where an invention is made rather than where its rights apply (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001). A country can host many innovative facilities built by foreign firms, and its firms and inventors can file many patents at the national patent office, but the rights to the most advanced technologies used in the country could still be largely held abroad.

Measuring who owns frontier technologies

In a new paper, Measuring technological sovereignty: Who owns frontier technologies? (Danish and Patnaik, 2026), we propose a measure of technological sovereignty based on ownership. For country $c$, with $R_c$ frontier patents granted to residents and $N_c$ granted to non-residents at the country's own office,

\[ \text{Ownership}_c = \frac{R_c}{R_c + N_c} \]

Ownership is the share of frontier patents granted by a country's patent office that go to residents of that country. The share tells us how much of the frontier technology protected in a country is controlled by its own residents.

The data used are the counts of grants to resident and non-resident applicants by office, year and field of technology, published by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). We take Computer technology as the frontier. It covers computing, data processing, memory and machine learning. It has been the largest of the 35 technology fields worldwide in every year since 2004. We compute the measure for 53 economies over 1996-2022. When we rank countries we keep the offices that grant at least 100 frontier patents a year. The members of the European Patent Convention patent mostly through the European Patent Office, so we treat them as one bloc.

The measure counts the local subsidiary of a foreign firm as a resident, so it could overstate domestic ownership. We checked the measure against two other sources. Among the 13 largest patent offices, countries rank similarly on our measure and on OECD data on the foreign ownership of domestic inventions, with rank correlations of 0.56 to 0.70. For six offices we traced each Computer-technology patent granted in 2019 to its ultimate parent company. Counting patents by the parent's country lowers the share by less than five percentage points at every office. Host economies therefore own slightly less than the measure shows.

Fact 1: Japan, Korea and the US patent a lot and own most

Table 1: Ownership and world share, large patent offices

Notes: Data are from WIPO patent statistics for 1996-2022. The table covers the 11 large patent systems, the offices that grant at least 100 Computer-technology patents a year, with the members of the European Patent Convention as one bloc. Ownership is the share of Computer-technology patents granted at a country's own office that go to its residents, averaged over the years in which the office granted such patents. World share is the country's share of all Computer-technology patents granted to residents worldwide, ranked among the 50 economies whose offices granted such patents. Frontier grants per year is the average number of Computer-technology patents granted at the office each year.

Table 1 compares ownership with the usual way of ranking countries, by their share of the world's frontier patents. Japan, Korea and the United States rank high on both. They are in the top four by world share. Their residents hold most of the frontier patents granted at home: 81% in Japan, 68% in Korea and 63% in the United States. At Europe's patent offices taken together the figure is 44%.

Fact 2: Canada, India and Australia patent a lot but own little

Canada, India and Australia rank in the top 15 of 50 economies by world share. That ranking mostly reflects the size of a country's patent system. Across 50 economies, the rank correlation between world share and the total number of patents an office grants is 0.87. For ownership the rank correlation is 0.08. Yet their residents hold only 14%, 12% and 8% of the frontier patents granted at home, the lowest shares among the large patent systems. The pattern is the same outside computing. In each of eight technology fields, including digital communication and pharmaceuticals, their residents hold between 1% and 25% of the patents granted at home.

All three are open economies with large markets. Foreign technology firms sell and produce in Canada, India and Australia. They also patent their technology at each country's patent office to stop domestic firms from imitating it. If anything, these shares overstate domestic ownership, because the local subsidiaries of foreign firms count as residents. In Canada, counting patents by the country of the parent company lowers the resident share from 10% to 7% in 2019, mostly because of subsidiaries of American firms. In India the same correction lowers the share by 1.2 percentage points, mostly because of subsidiaries of Korean firms.

Fact 3: China and India now own more of their frontier technology

Figure 1: Resident share of frontier patents, 1997-2021

Notes: The share of Computer-technology patents granted at each country's own patent office that go to its residents, as a three-year moving average. Data are from WIPO patent statistics.

The ownership shares for China and India show that ownership can rise quickly (Figure 1). Chinese residents held 29% of the frontier patents granted in China in 1996-1999, and 91% in 2020-2022. India's share rose from 7% in 2017 to 28% in 2022, as grants to Indian residents rose tenfold between 2016 and 2022. Japan, Korea and the United States stayed above 60% throughout. Canada and Australia stayed below 25%.

Fact 4: Ownership is higher with more R&D and better institutions

Many of the subsidised plants described at the start belong to foreign firms. One of the largest American awards, of up to US\$6.6 billion, went to the Arizona subsidiary of TSMC, a Taiwanese firm. Japan agreed to pay up to 476 billion yen towards a TSMC plant in Kumamoto. India's first approval went to Micron, an American firm, for a plant at Sanand. In each case the host country becomes a production site in a value chain run by a foreign firm.

Development policy often treats participation in global value chains as a route to technology transfer (World Bank, 2020), and Javorcik (2004) argues that foreign affiliates raise the productivity of their local suppliers. We test whether joining value chains brings ownership, using World Bank data on participation and comparing each economy with itself over time.

Across all economies we find no clear link between participation and ownership. In middle-income economies, ownership is lower when an economy supplies more inputs to other countries' exports. The association is large. When an economy's role as a supplier grows by a typical amount (one standard deviation), its resident share is about 17 percentage points lower. The fall comes from more foreign patents rather than fewer domestic ones. With the same increase, grants to foreign applicants rise almost fourfold, while grants to residents stay about the same. The pattern is consistent with lead firms keeping the intellectual property while suppliers get the production contracts (Gereffi et al, 2005).

In the same economies, ownership is higher where domestic capability is stronger. A typical increase in R&D intensity (R&D spending as a share of GDP) is associated with a resident share about 37 percentage points higher. A typical improvement in institutional quality, measured by the World Bank's governance indicators, is associated with a resident share that is also about 37 percentage points higher. China's rise in ownership came with a sustained rise in domestic R&D, from about 0.9% of GDP in 2000 to 2.6% in 2022.

Implications for industrial policy

The findings have three implications.

  1. Governments should add ownership to the way they measure technological sovereignty. Governments already track capability, through R&D spending and patent counts, and dependence on foreign suppliers, through trade data. The resident share of frontier patents adds a measure of who holds the rights to the technology used at home. Patent offices already publish the data needed to compute the resident share every year. Subsidy programmes are now judged by the investment, plants and jobs they bring. A rising resident share would also show whether they build domestic ownership.
  2. Governments that aim at technological sovereignty should fund design and research as well as production. A plant built by a foreign firm adds production at home, but the patents on its technology stay with the firm. Funding for design and research by domestic firms and universities creates patents held by residents. The European Commission is putting about EUR 500 million into a European Chip Design Platform, and India's design-linked incentive scheme supports chip design by Indian start-ups and small firms.
  3. Middle-income economies are more likely to gain ownership through domestic R&D and better institutions than through supplying foreign firms. In these economies, ownership is higher where R&D and institutions are stronger. Ownership has fallen as these economies became larger suppliers to firms abroad.

References

Danish, Mohd Shadab and Megha Patnaik. Measuring technological sovereignty: Who owns frontier technologies? CESifo Working Paper No. 13140 (2026).

Edler, Jakob, Knut Blind, Henning Kroll and Torben Schubert. Technology sovereignty as an emerging frame for innovation policy: Defining rationales, ends and means. Research Policy (2023).

Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon. The governance of global value chains. Review of International Political Economy (2005).

Guellec, Dominique and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. The internationalisation of technology analysed with patent data. Research Policy (2001).

Javorcik, Beata Smarzynska. Does foreign direct investment increase the productivity of domestic firms? In search of spillovers through backward linkages. American Economic Review (2004).

World Bank. World Development Report 2020: Trading for development in the age of global value chains. World Bank (2020).


Mohd Shadab Danish is faculty at the Indian Institute of Management Raipur. Megha Patnaik is at LUISS University and CEPR, and is cofounder of LEAP Insights and India Productivity Lab.

Tuesday, August 27, 2019

Policy uncertainty in Indian e-commerce

by Megha Patnaik.

Reduced investment in India by private persons is a key part of the present growth challenge. Investment is shaped by macroeconomic uncertainty, sectoral uncertainty, and regulatory risks that firms face. In this article, we think about the risks that an E-commerce firm such as Amazon perceives in India. These include the changing FDI rules, unresolved issues of data localisation and code disclosure, the multiple reports on technology-related activities that various government agencies are releasing, and the problems of rule of law in licensing and investigation.

Economic policy uncertainty


Shrinking investment in the Indian economy is a concern. Investments in new projects fell to a 15 year low in the last quarter according to the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) Capex data which tracks large investment projects.

Firms are deterred from investing by policy uncertainty (Bloom, 2009). When firms are unclear about the future economic environment, they hold back on investing till uncertainty declines. This delays the pickup of the investment cycle, where firms generates jobs and business for linked firms, fueling aggregate economic activity. Uncertainty particularly affects long-term investments that are irreversible in nature, and for which horizons for cost recovery run into years. These can be investments in new technologies or market segments, or investments in infrastructure. Such investments are particularly important, as they can benefit other firms in the economy, fueling productivity and long-term growth in addition to their business cycle effects.

Private sector investment is adversely affected by three kinds of policy uncertainty - macroeconomic uncertainty, sectoral policy uncertainty, and regulatory risk. The role of Economic Policy Uncertainty at the macroeconomic level has been measured globally (Baker et al, 2016). In the original measure, an index is created by quantifying newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty mentions in the national newspapers, through combinations of keywords related to policy and uncertainty. Macroeconomic policy uncertainty has been applied to understand global events. Brexit-driven policy uncertainty in the UK moved closely with the GBP Real Exchange Rate in recent times, and the uncertainty surrounding US trade policy affected importing firms. This measure of macroeconomic policy uncertainty correlates strongly with stock market volatility.

Firms face much more than macroeconomic uncertainty. They also face uncertainty at sectoral, geographical and individual levels. Sectoral-level policy uncertainty can be measured through surveying firms sampled across sectors, asking them about expectations about future growth and costs at various horizons (Altig et al, 2019). For example, firms can report not just their expectations about future profits, but the distribution across the possible profit outcomes that they can expect.

An additional source of uncertainty that firms operating in India face is regulatory risk. Even when regulations are formulated, there is a lack of predictability, and excessive executive discretion, in how a stated regulation will be enforced. For example, the licensing by the RBI of 11 payment banks from 41 applicants who wanted to start payment systems was a non-transparent process inconsistent with the rule of law (Roy and Shah, 2015). Another example is the Copyright Board order of 2010 on statutory licensing fees paid by Radio stations. This order arose out of nine one-on-one disputes between radio stations and music producers, but was applied as an in rem order rather than an in personem order. Thus, music producers who weren't part of the original disputes also became governed by the order, despite the appeals by T-Series and SIMCA against the Copyright Board order applying to them. Aggarwal and Zaveri (2019) show the uncertainty induced for private persons through executive discretion in enforcement at SEBI.

Drivers of uncertainty in the E-commerce sector


In the recent Q2 earnings announcement, the Amazon CFO Brian Olsavsky mentioned uncertainty in India's e-commerce policy. He expressed hope for `stable' and `predictable' policy, for the company to continue with its investments in technology and infrastructure in India. This explicit mention about policy uncertainty in India is a unusual moment, and requires attention by policy thinkers. What is the uncertainty associated with investing in India, as seen by Amazon?

  1. India's draft e-commerce policy rules earlier this year preventing firms from influencing prices or selling products in which they hold stakes disrupted business plans for e-commerce companies. It bring companies back to the drawing board to ensure they can comply with the current regulations while limiting losses that rose from lack of clear direction from the start. The final e-commerce policy has been held back for another year, putting existing investments of firms in this sector at risk during the interim months, and deterring further investments.
  2. The uncertainty around data localisation is another deterrent. The recent announcement by a high-level government panel to do away data localisation for non-critical data, and the upcoming announcement of the position of the Prime Minister's Office on data localisation are policy announcements that drive sentiments on this debate, though none are legal instruments. Under data localisation requirements, companies would need to redesign internal algorithms to access data locally, pay up for new servers, and face costs to protect data in less-secure environments. The predictive power of firms' algorithms would weaken with fewer data points to train models on. The due process of discussions with various government bodies and stakeholders on this issue is still in process. The RBI's requirement for financial data localisation despite existing provisions (Bailey and Parsheera, 2018) for access under the Payments and Settlements Act (2007) suggest that any Indian regulator can step in with special requirements at unforeseen times.
  3. A related issue is the disclosure requirement of source code under the draft e-commerce policy. E-commerce firms depend on data-driven marketing and use of collaborative filtering for customer recommendations. A code submission requirement is a coercive technique aimed at achieving `the transfer of technology and local needs' described under the proposed e-commerce policy. Technology transfers cannot and should not be coerced: they happen in an organic and legitimate manner through managers and employees developing skills and passing them onward in data communities or by workers moving across companies (Bloom et al, 2019). It is also doubtful how technological transfers can be achieved with segments of code without underlying data. Will code disclosure requirement be combined with data localisation to pass on core business value to competitors? Will companies need to invest in staff and technologies to find workarounds to be able to mask their key assets? Whether such a code disclosure requirement will come into effect remains unresolved. In mid-2020 the final e-commerce policy will describe the stand of the government on this issue, but this is not definitive either.

Multiple guidelines on the same subject can cause delays in the resolution of uncertainty. The RBI Report of the Working Group on FinTech and Digital Banking includes E-aggregators, Robo advisors and Big Data all under Fintech. E-commerce firms, which are data intensive and provide multiple services, will be included under this description. The fintech steering committee report of the Ministry of Finance is still pending. Each of these reports is a statement about how government agencies are likely to move in the future but these are not legal instruments. Government reports can only suggest but not surely state how future laws will change.

Infirmities of the regulatory processes in India also exacerbates uncertainty. As an example, data localisation requirements by RBI for payments firms were translated from an early idea into an enforced law within a matter of days. There was no due process surrounding how officials could change the law.

The last leg of the legal system -- how laws are enforced -- also suffers from concerns about non-equal application of law, as shown in the examples from RBI (Roy and Shah, 2015) and SEBI (Aggarwal and Zaveri, 2019). For a prospective investor, the risk of investing in India lies in how the law might change in the future through an undemocratic process, and in how the law will be applied to her.

Conclusion


For India to have a stable investment environment, we need to provide firms a stable and predictable policy environment. Investments from firms in various sectors will boost the investment cycle for India. Resolving policy uncertainty both at the macroeconomic level as well as in different sectors, and reducing regulatory risk through better rule of law is critical for India in the current investment scenario as well as for long term growth.

References


Aggarwal, Nidhi and Zaveri, Bhargavi. Problems with evidentiary standards for proving securities fraud in India, The Leap Blog, 23 August 2019.

Altig, David, Jose Maria Barrero, Nicholas Bloom, Steven J. Davis, Brent H. Meyer and Nicholas Parker. Surveying Business Uncertainty University of Chicago Working Paper (2009)

Bloom, Nicholas. The impact of uncertainty shocks. Econometrica (2009)

Bloom, Nicholas, Erik Brynjolfsson, Lucia Foster, Ron Jarmin, Megha Patnaik, Itay Saporta-Eksten, and John Van Reenen. What Drives Differences in Management Practices? American Economic Review (2019)

Baker, Scott R., Nicholas Bloom and Steven J. Davis. Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2016)

Bailey, Rishab, and Smriti Parsheera. Data localisation in India: Questioning the means and ends, The Leap Blog, 22 February 2018.

Roy, Shubho, and Ajay Shah Payment bank entry process considered inconsistent with the rule of law, The Leap Blog, 1 September 2015.



Megha Patnaik is faculty at the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi and Fellow at the Esya Centre. The author thanks Radhika Pandey and Ajay Shah for useful inputs.