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Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Bangalore safety is not the job of banks

A PTI story about the attack on a woman at an ATM in Bangalore says:
... Karnataka government today bluntly told banks to close down such kiosks unless they provide security. As the shocking episode continued to grab media attention in Bangalore and across India, with the CCTV footage of the gory act being beamed into homes and offices on TV and the net, Home Minister K J George held a high-level meeting to discuss measures to curb such incidents.

George said more than 600 of the total 2,580 ATMs in the city have no security guards.
"We want them to deploy security guards immediately or close down the things until suitable arrangements have been made... that's why the Police Commissioner (Raghavendra Auradkar) will take appropriate action," he told reporters.
This is an appalling cop-out.

It is convenient and comfortable for the police to not take responsibility for safety. It is convenient and comfortable for the police to impose restrictions on citizens to make their job convenient. But we should not organise society in a way that's convenient for the police. The job of the police is difficult, and we should hold them accountable for delivering on it.

Look at any civilised country. Do banks put a guard on every ATM? Or does the government produce an umbrella of safety over society as a whole? The criminal justice system produces a public good called safety. Safety is non-rival and non-excludable. It is a public good. Mr. George and Mr. Auradkar are wrong when they want to transfer this responsibility down to citizens, asking them to produce safety as a private good.

In economic policy, when a central banker says the central bank cannot control inflation, I say that the person should resign. If you can't deliver low and stable inflation, please leave the central bank, and let someone else try to do your job better. In similar fashion, when a policeman says that the police cannot deliver safety, I would suggest that the policeman should resign. If you can't deliver safety, don't be in the police.

Thursday, November 14, 2013

India macro policy review

On 19 November, we have a day-long meeting, India Macro Policy Review at NIPFP. All are welcome.

Seminar on Collateral and monetary policy

Manmohan Singh of the IMF will do a talk at NIPFP on 18 November titled Collateral and monetary policy. We start at 4 PM. It will be followed by coffee and snacks. All are welcome.

The spirit of the NPS

In continuation of my blog post Implications of the Pensions Act (4 September), and the collection of links NPS: The day after (16 September), I have an article in the Economic Times today titled The spirit of the NPS. This is about rebooting the NPS with a focus on its founding principles.

Sunday, November 10, 2013

Interesting readings

A most interesting speech by P. Chidambaram: text, and a web page with an audio recording of the speech and the discussion.

The price of a tiger, an editorial in the Business Standard.

Adil Rustomjee on Firstpost on the elaborate racket that is Indian banking.

Clarifying RBI's role and purpose by Ila Patnaik in the Indian Express.

Remove restrictions on foreign investment in rupee denominated debt by Ila Patnaik in the Financial Express.

RBI gears up to try to do interest rate futures again by Ila Patnaik in the Financial Express.

Forcing managers of firms to gift away 2% of the money belonging to their shareholders is a bad idea. It is depressing, how comfortable the Indian State is in using its coercive powers to interfere in the right to property and right to contract of private citizens. In the Business Standard today, Shekhar Shah wonders how we can salvage some sense out of this.

Ullekh NP in the Economic Times tells a story of an extremely important new project: the Delhi-Bombay Industrial Corridor.

Response to SEBI's Discussion Paper: Review of policy for trade cancellation/annulment by Nidhi Aggarwal and Chirag Anand of IGIDR FRG.

Impact of restrictions on currency derivatives on market quality by Rajat Tayal of IGIDR FRG.



New research by Biggerstaff, Cicero, Puckett on unethical CEOs.

People who are steeped in Europe of the 20th Century know that social and political catastrophes are always possible. Accominotti and Eichengreen look back at the end of the First Globalisation, and find that the sudden stop that hit Austria, Germany and Hungary (1925-1932) was similar to what hit Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland (2006-2012).

Jon Krakauer in the New Yorker resolves a mystery involving the outdoors, rooted in plant biology and linking back to World War II.

A video with a discussion with Frank Dikotter on the early days of the Chinese revolution, which helps us better understand the notion of `land reform'.

A great story by Colin Dickey in the most excellent Lapham's Quarterly, about the early explorations of the seas and of the Arctic Circle, and the conquest of scurvy.

Why Microsoft Word must Die: a nice explanation of why people who know about computers have a problem with Microsoft Word, by Charlie Stross.

The Nazi Anatomists by Emily Bazelon on Slate.

Sunday, November 03, 2013

Macroeconomic and financial policy challenges of China and India: A special issue of the Journal of International Money and Finance

Joshua Aizenman, Kees Koedijk and I co-edited a special issue of the Journal of International Money and Finance, December 2013, which has:

  1. Overview: Macroeconomic and financial policy challenges of China and India; Joshua Aizenman, Ajay Shah.
  2. Is China or India more financially open; Guonan Ma, Robert N. McCauley.
  3. Why do emerging markets liberalize capital outflow controls? Fiscal versus net capital flow concerns; Joshua Aizenman, Gurnain Kaur Pasricha. Summary.
  4. The investment technology of foreign and domestic institutional investors in an emerging market; Ila Patnaik, Ajay Shah. Materials.
  5. How do foreign investors impact domestic economic activity? Evidence from India and China; Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Christian Lundblad, Tarun Ramadorai.
  6. The financing and growth of firms in China and India: Evidence from capital markets; Tatiana Didier, Sergio L. Schmukler. Summary.
  7. The financial crisis and Indian banks: Survival of the fittest? Barry Eichengreen, Poonam Gupta.
  8. Macro-prudential policies to mitigate financial system vulnerabilities; Stijn Claessens, Swati R. Ghosh, Roxana Mihet.
  9. China's financial linkages with Asia and the global financial crisis; Reuven Glick, Michael Hutchison.
  10. The growth of a shadow banking system in emerging markets: Evidence from India; Viral V. Acharya, Hemal Khandwala, T. Sabri Oncu.
  11. Impact of exchange rate movements on exports: An analysis of Indian non-financial sector firms; Yin-Wong Cheung, Rajeswari Sengupta. Summary.

Thursday, October 24, 2013

The investment technology of foreign and domestic institutional investors

Ila Patnaik and I have a recent paper in the Journal of International Money and Finance on the investment technology of foreign and domestic institutional investors.

The question


Do the firms chosen by FIIs do well? What is the stock market performance, and the operating performance, in the period after a firm has been selected for investment by FIIs?

This is an important question for many reasons. Investors (both foreign and domestic) would like to know the information content of seeing an FII or DII present in the shareholding of a firm. If, hypothetically, domestic financial regulation hampers DIIs, there may be a special role for FIIs in rationally allocating capital and alleviating financing constraints. If FIIs fare poorly in security selection, as has often been the case in the international finance literature, these mistakes have consequences for the allocation of capital and the incentives of entrepreneurs. Perhaps what India requires is policies that foster deep engagement with international capital, through which FIIs would achieve better information and thus fare better in security selection.

The opportunity for measurement


There is strong evidence of home bias: foreigners own too little of most Indian firms with an ownership of 0 for most firms. Less than a thousand companies have over 1% investment by FIIs. This is true for DIIs also. This opens up the opportunity to see how the chosen companies fare against those that were not chosen. To construct a quasi-experiment, we identify three groups of firms: 
  1. Those chosen by FIIs but not DIIs
  2. Those chosen by DIIs but not FIIs
  3. Those chosen by neither.
On the 31st of each year, it is possible to make these three lists of firms. An examination of future performance would give us insights into the investment technology of FIIs and DIIs. Specifically, if the firms chosen by FIIs but not DIIs (i.e. Group 1) do much better than those in Group 3, then we would think that FIIs have a valuable investment technology.

Pitfalls in measurement


Institutional investors are different. Institutional investors are different from individual investors. Hence, a fair comparison is between FIIs and DIIs.

Treatment effects or selection effects or both. Why might a firm fare well after FII investment? There can be two channels. There can be a `selection effect' where FIIs identify better firms. There can be a `treatment effect' where FIIs exert governance, and push firms to behave better. Investment technology is about the overall effect, i.e. the reduced form outcome. The economists' perennial quest for separating out selection effects from treatment effects is inappropriate here.

Asset allocation versus security selection. It is well known that the firms chosen by foreign investors are different in many dimensions such as beta, size, liquidity, etc. This hampers comparison. As an example, when Nifty fares well, high beta firms tend to do well. In such times, the portfolio held by foreign investors will look good as they have loaded up on high beta firms.

In order to address this, we utilise the three Fama-French empirical asset pricing factors: size, B/P and beta. For each firm chosen by the FII (but not DII), we find the partner firm (that was chosen by neither FII nor DII) where the Mahalanobis distance in size, B/P and beta is the lowest. If a good match cannot be found, the firm is dropped. This gives us a series of pairs of firms, which are alike in size B/P and beta, where one got FII (but not DII) investment and the partner got neither.

Holding a money manager accountable for security selection after controlling for asset allocation is an old idea in finance. However, the application of this idea into the question of investment technology of FIIs and DIIs is new, as is the matching-based quasi-experimental strategy through which we control for the asset allocation.

Results


We find that the firms chosen by FIIs have exuberant growth in fixed assets in the following 3 years. But their output growth is not commensurately strong; there is some evidence of a decline in productivity. In terms of stock market performance, these firms under-perform over the three years after observation date.

Firms chosen by DIIs are strikingly different. They seem to be firms that are retrenching: both capital and labour drop slightly. But output grows. There is productivity growth. In terms of stock market performance, these firms outperform by 18 percentage points over three years.

These results suggest that foreign investors have a weak investment technology. Their access to information, and their ability to process information, adds up to poor security selection. In contrast, DIIs -- who are present in India and are likely to have ample information about portfolio companies -- fare better.

Implications


Implications for persons analysing Indian securities. A firm which has FII investment but not DII investment is probably going to grow assets but not give strong results. Conversely, a firm which has DII but not FII investment is likely to have slow growth but improve productivity and deliver stock market returns.

Implications for foreign investors. The results of this paper are about the average foreign investor, and there are surely many foreign investors who fare very well on security selection. However, on average, foreign investors need to be more cautious about their activities in India. They need to either amplify their efforts in security selection, so as to achieve strong information and information processing on Indian firms, or not attempt security selection.

How can a foreign investor improve security selection? Two paths are visible: To establish operations in India, and hold the team accountable for security selection using the methods of this paper, or contract-out to money managers who have deep roots in India.

How can a foreign investor harness asset allocation to India without attempting security selection? It is possible to setup index funds for the three Fama-French factors and thus replicate the bulk of the desired portfolio characteristics.

Implications for policy makers. Many of the pathologies of international finance are rooted in asymmetric information and the lack of deep engagement of foreign investors. These results are a reminder that even a large emerging market like India suffers from these problems. It is in India's interest to have a deep engagement with foreign capital, so as to obtain higher allocative efficiency. This suggests a re-examination at the constraints placed against deep engagement by foreign capital:
  1. It is difficult for foreign investors to contract-out money management to locals.
  2. `Permanent establishment' rules by the tax authorities have encouraged foreign investors to not open offices in India. This hampers deep engagement. Offices in Singapore or London will not be able to match the information and information processing that can be done in India.
  3. Source-based taxation, capital controls, and taxation of transactions, give incentives for foreign investors to avoid transacting in India. It is cheaper for a foreign investor to invest through the PN and NDF markets. However, not being in India hampers deep engagement.

How might this change over time?


In my opinion, in the 2000s, a certain kind of Indian entrepreneur started producing companies that look good to foreign investors. But you can't fool all the investors all the time. I think many investors are now more circumspect. Wall Street is changing course, and this is changing incentives for entrepreneurs. When finance rewards honest businessmen, more honest businessmen will show up asking for capital from the financial system. Many years from now, we might say that the results of this paper described a moment in time in the evolution of Indian capitalism.