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Saturday, March 23, 2013

FSLRC gives the draft Indian Financial Code

The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission closed its journey yesterday with the delivery of a report and the draft Indian Financial Code (IFC). Here is the report and here is the draft law. Here is commentary in the press on the subject:

The signing:


And a subset of the team that did it:


Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Important work by cobrapost that illuminates high-powered incentives

The investigative journalism by cobrapost, their videos, and Monika Halan in Mint add up to an important story.

Most of us have enormous respect for the achievements of Axis Bank, HDFC Bank and ICICI Bank. But as Monika emphasises, there are also genuine problems there. We saw it first with the hard-driving mis-selling in recent years, particularly with ULIPs, and now we see it here, with staffpersons supporting illegal activities.

Ordinarily, a media outlet in India bringing such information out has to worry about brazen strong-arm tactics being deployed against them, such as filing of criminal cases. In this case, luckily, there is a certain decency about these three organisations which precludes such concerns. It is ironic that the Indian media vigorously reports on the misdeeds of civilised people, and tends to be silent about uncivilised people.

In India, most of us are reverential about the power of incentives. To make people work, we think, you have to have high powered incentives. We revere incentive packages, stock options, stock grants, which whip the staffperson into a frenzy of hard work.

Economists led this charge, starting with Jensen and Murphy, 1990. The notion that high powered incentives are a good thing came out of academia and went into the real world. But increasingly, it has become clear that there are problems. By 2004, Jensen and Murphy themselves were saying that we should be more circumspect about using high powered incentives.

A person facing high powered incentives tends to focus on one thing. There is an excessive pursuit of that one thing, and all other considerations tend to evaporate. Similarly, when there are quantitative goals alongside qualitative goals, high-powered incentives will generate a focus on quantitative goals and tend to crowd out qualitative goals. Employees of a bank that are given powerful incentives to hit targets for deposit growth (sacked if you don't, given a 100% bonus if you do) are more likely to try to pull in that deposit growth by hook or by crook. If the internal controls of an organisation are weak, then employees are likely to achieve their targets by dubious means.

For all of us in India, coming from a backdrop of socialism and State, it is natural to have extreme hostility to the absence of incentive for a civil servant to do his job. We have seen how private organisations have triumphed by giving employees more incentive. But it's easy for us to overdo this message. In many situations, I feel it's better to go from no incentive to low-powered incentives, but not all the way to high powered incentives.

These issues are widely discussed in the global debate. When we transplant these ideas into India, a big difference lies in the weak governance environment. Super-charged employees in private firms seem to be willing to break laws in their pursuit of profit. Since CEOs weigh the costs and benefits of unethical behaviour, we may argue that when, in a weak governance environment, the expected punishment is small, an increase in the gains from unethical behaviour (through high-powered incentives) results in reduced fairplay. 

This suggests two things. First, HR managers needs to be more sophisticated in how the objectives of an employee are defined. If we could be more nuanced in clarifying what the employee is to maximise, this could yield better results. The second issue is about internal controls. When internal controls are strong, they become a non-negotiable constraint within which growing sales or profit has to be done. Unfortunately, once the top managers of an organisation are really hard-driving, chasing growth and profitability, these kinds of niceties (of both kinds) tend to fall by the wayside.

One of the most important mechanisms through which we get high powered incentives is : an entrepreneur who manages a company with family members, and who has dominant shareholding. The one area where this gets us into the most trouble is: Finance. A series of papers that have analysed the Great Recession have found that financial firms where CEOs had more high powered incentives got into more trouble. I am a great advocate of less public sector and more private sector in finance, but we have to be cautious about high powered incentives e.g. those that go with dominant entrepreneurs in a family business.

A prominent example of this debate has been `financial market infrastructure institutions' (FMIIs), a category that comprises organisations like exchanges, depositories, clearing corporations, all of which produce public goods for the financial system. In all these areas, the organisation is unique in that, alongside the goal of maximising profit, there is a regulatory function. This tiny handful of firms is unique, when compared with essentially any other part of capitalism, in that some government functions of regulation and supervision are placed in private, profit-maximising hands. High powered incentives to produce profit or valuation will lead to a dilution or worse of regulatory and supervisory functions. If profit-seeking owners/managers of these organisations under-emphasise or abuse the regulatory and supervisory functions in the quest for profit, this has far-ranging externalities. Failures of regulation and supervision at exchanges have given macroeconomic crises in India in 1992 and 2001. Hence, even though the revenues and profits of these firms is truly tiny on the scale of the economy, this conflict of interest is an important issue for policy makers.

Similarly, there has been a vigorous debate about entry by private banks. As a working approximation, we have to assume that RBI supervision is less than perfect. In this case, I feel that we should be quite circumspect about banks led by entrepreneurs.

Monday, March 11, 2013

Unanticipated consequences of Finance Bill provisions on securitisation

by Bindu Ananth and Kshama Fernandes

Over 2006-12, RBI and SEBI have created a strong and conducive regulatory environment for securitisation, listing of securitised debt instruments, and standards of transparency and reporting. Securitisation volumes have picked up and we recently witnessed the first listed transaction.

In October 2011, the income tax authorities issued a claim on certain securitisation special purpose vehicles (SPVs), stating that the gross income of such SPVs was liable to tax. The matter is presently under sub judice with the Bombay High Court. Several industry participants approached the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to seek clarity and reinforce the "pass through" status of a securitisation SPV.

The Finance Bill, 2013, has sought to clarify the tax position by stating that securitisation SPVs are not liable to pay income tax. However, the Bill also states that trustees of such SPVs must pay tax on distributed income.

The above amendment has an unintentional and significantly negative implication, on account of which taxable investors would be disincentivised from participating in securitisations.

This memo explains the issues and the unintended implications caused by the present draft of the Finance Bill in relation to securitisation SPVs, and provides a possible solution for addressing these issues.

Objectives of the MoF with respect to taxation of Securitisation SPVs

The Finance Minister (FM) in his speech presenting the Budget for the year 2013-14, set out his intent in presenting the proposed changes to the taxation of Securitisation SPVs: "In order to facilitate financial institutions to securitise their assets through a special purpose vehicle".

The depth and vibrancy of the asset securitisation market is an essential building block in transfer of risk and transmission of capital from well capitalised investors to high quality originators. The framework for a well-functioning securitisation market has been laid down in considerable detail by the Reserve Bank of India (in 2006, further strengthened in 2012) and the Securities and Exchange Board of India (detailed guidelines in 2008 and listing guidelines in 2011).

It is our understanding that the objective of the Ministry of Finance in providing the basis of taxation of securitisation SPVs, is to clarify and establish the pass-through status of securitisation.

Changes proposed by the Finance Bill, 2013

Given below is the text proposed to be introduced into the Income Tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Bill, 2013:

CHAPTER XII-EA

SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAX ON DISTRIBUTED INCOME BY SECURITISATION TRUSTS

115TA

  1. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of the Act, any amount of income distributed by the securitisation trust to its investors shall be chargeable to tax and such securitisation trust shall be liable to pay additional income-tax on such distributed income at the rate of--
    1. twenty-five per cent. on income distributed to any person being an individual or a Hindu undivided family;
    2. thirty per cent. on income distributed to any other person:

    Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply in respect of any income distributed by the securitisation trust to any person in whose case income, irrespective of its nature and source, is not chargeable to tax under the Act.
  2. The person responsible for making payment of the income distributed by the securitisation trust shall be liable to pay tax to the credit of the Central Government within fourteen days from the date of distribution or payment of such income, whichever is earlier.
  3. The person responsible for making payment of the income distributed by the securitisation trust shall, on or before the 15th day of September in each year, furnish to the prescribed income-tax authority, a statement in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner, giving the details of the amount of income distributed to investors during the previous year, the tax paid thereon and such other relevant details, as may be prescribed.
  4. No deduction under any other provisions of this Act shall be allowed to the securitisation trust in respect of the income which has been charged to tax under sub-section (1).

115TB.

Where the person responsible for making payment of the income distributed by the securitisation trust and the securitisation trust fails to pay the whole or any part of the tax referred to in sub-section (1) of section 115TA, within the time allowed under sub-section (2) of that section, he or it shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of one per cent. every month or part thereof on the amount of such tax for the period beginning on the date immediately after the last date on which such tax was payable and ending with the date on which the tax is actually paid.

115TC.

If any person responsible for making payment of the income distributed by the securitisation trust and the securitisation trust does not pay tax, as referred to in sub-section (1) of section 115TA, then, he or it shall be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the amount of tax payable by him or it and all the provisions of this Act for the collection and recovery of income-tax shall apply.

Explanation. -- For the purposes of this Chapter,--

  1. "investor" means a person who is holder of any securitised debt instrument or securities issued by the securitisation trust;
  2. "securities" means debt securities issued by a Special Purpose Vehicle as referred to in the guidelines on securitisation of standard assets issued by the Reserve Bank of India;
  3. "securitised debt instrument" shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (s) of sub-regulation (1) of regulation 2 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Public Offer and Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2008 made under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956;
  4. "securitisation trust" means a trust, being a-
    1. "special purpose distinct entity" as defined in clause (u) of sub-regulation (1) of regulation 2 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Public Offer and Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2008 made under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, and regulated under the said regulations; or
    2. "Special Purpose Vehicle" as defined in, and regulated by, the guidelines on securitisation of standard assets issued by the Reserve Bank of India, which fulfils such conditions, as may be prescribed."

The following additions of Section 10 (23DA) and Section 10(35A) are also proposed to exempt from income tax certain income related to Securitisation SPVs:

(23DA) any income of a securitisation trust from the activity of securitisation.

Explanation."For the purposes of this clause,"

  1. "securitisation" shall have the same meaning as assigned to it -

    1. in clause (r) of sub-regulation (1) of regulation 2 of the Securities an<>d Exchange Board of India (Public Offer and Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2008 made under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956; or
    2. under the guidelines on securitisation of standard assets issued by the Reserve Bank of India;
  2. "securitisation trust" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Explanation below section 115TC;"
    And
    "(35A) any income by way of distributed income referred to in section 115TA received from a securitisation trust by any person being an investor of the said trust"

Unanticipated implications of the proposed text

Securitisation of assets by financial institutions requires the existence of a wide range of investors for whom investment in Securitisation SPVs is a viable option. Currently, predominant investors in the securitisation market in India (particularly in the securitisation related to financial inclusion) are banks. Banks are sophisticated investors and sit on large pools of capital that they must deploy appropriately. Securitisation has been an important way for banks to efficiently and effectively deploy capital where it is needed.

Other investors in securitisation, such as Mutual Funds and private investors currently provide significant but far less capital through securitisation. Yet other investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds, are yet to join the market.

However, it appears that the proposed changes would make the investment in Securitisation SPVs unviable for all but a certain class of income tax exempt investors (such as Mutual Funds). To elaborate on this, given below is a brief synopsis of the tax position of an investor in such SPVs, along with that of the SPVs themselves, as well as the issues arising out of the proposed amendments in the Finance Bill:

  • The current language of the proposed provision states that "any amount of income distributed by the securitisation trust to its investors shall be chargeable to tax and such securitisation trust shall be liable to pay additional income-tax on such distributed income" but as SPVs are designed to be mere mechanisms to route payments. It is not clear how its "income distributed" will be determined for the purpose of Section 115TA.
  • The language used in Section 115TA clearly indicates that the liability to pay "additional" income tax is placed upon the SPVs. It is not clear what this tax is in addition to.
  • Howsoever its income may be determined, as a result of Section 14A, no deduction will be permitted for expenses out of its total income.
  • Income under Section 10 (23DA) or under Section 10 (35A) is income not includable in total income.
  • In terms of Section 14A, no deduction is permitted with respect of income described in Section 10 (23DA) or Section 10 (35A).
  • Investors, other than "any person in whose case income, irrespective of its nature and source, is not chargeable to tax under the Act", however, often do have incomes and incur expenses in raising money to invest in securitisation transactions.

Illustration:

  • A bank uses Rs. 1,000 of money it has accepted as deposits at the rate of 7.5% to invest in PTCs with a principal amount of Rs. 1,000 with a term of one year.
  • The PTC offers a yield of 13%, translating into a sum of Rs. 1,130 of which (assuming the taxable "income distributed" is Rs. 130) Rs. 39 will be deducted as tax in terms of Section 115TA leaving Rs. 1,091
  • But the bank has to return INR 1,075 to the depositors. Under Section 14A, the interest cost of Rs 75 is not deductible
  • For a pre-tax profit of Rs 55, the post-tax profit of the bank is Rs. 16 i.e. a profit of 1.6 percent. The tax paid in this transaction is Rs. 39. Effectively, the rate of taxation relative to income in the hands of the investor is over 70%.

For the investor, Section 10(23DA), Section 10 (35A) and Section 14A have an effect similar to the taxation of revenue rather than taxation of income.

On the other hand, if the investment in the SPVs was treated, as it was traditionally, as pass-through, the bank would treat the income from investment as any other income and pay tax on its net income (in the example above: Rs 130 - Rs 75 = Rs 55), with an effective rate determined by the net income of the bank, which would be far less than the 70 percent indicated by the proposed language of the Finance Bill, 2013.

Therefore, the unanticipated consequences of the present draft of the Finance Bill are:

Higher effective rate of taxation of income from securitisation, when compared to other sources of income of an investor

Tax paying investors will stay away. Banks, NBFCs etc. may not be willing to invest in securitised debt instruments, unless compensated for the higher tax payable

Severe impact on market depth and liquidity. Banks are presently the largest investors in securitisations and their absence would severely inhibit the growth of the market

No incentive for new investor classes to participate. Investors such as private wealth, corporate treasuries, AIFs etc. may find securitisation an unviable investment option

An alternative draft

It may be noted that the taxation of private trusts is well understood and has been relatively stable for a significant period of time. If we wish to avoid the unanticipated consequences as outlined above, we would require reinforcement and restatement the existing position of law.

Attention may also be drawn to the provisions of Section 160, relating to representative assessees, which would also apply to trustees of private trusts, including Securitisation SPVs. The proposed addition of Section 10 (23DA) and Section 10 (35A) should be removed and no changes must be made to Section 10 in this regard.

It may be beneficial if the proposed Section 115TA read (in a restatement of the existing law) as follows:

CHAPTER XII-EA

PROVISIONS RELATING TO INCOME FROM INVESTMENT IN SECURITISATION TRUSTS

115TA.

(1) Any amount of income received by an investor from a securitisation trust shall be chargeable to tax as part of the total income of such investor.

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply in respect of any income distributed by the securitisation trust to any person in whose case income, irrespective of its nature and source, is not chargeable to tax under the Act.

Explanation.--For the purposes of this Chapter, --

  1. "investor" means a person who is holder of any securitised debt instrument or securities issued by the securitisation trust;
  2. "securities" means debt securities issued by a Special Purpose Vehicle as referred to in the guidelines on securitisation of standard assets issued by the Reserve Bank of India;
  3. "securitised debt instrument" shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (s) of sub-regulation (1) of regulation 2 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Public Offer and Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2008 made under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956;
  4. "securitisation trust" means a trust, being a-
    1. "special purpose distinct entity" as defined in clause (u) of sub-regulation (1) of regulation 2 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Public Offer and Listing of Securitised Debt Instruments) Regulations, 2008 made under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, and regulated under the said regulations; or
    2. "Special Purpose Vehicle" as defined in, and regulated by, the guidelines on securitisation of standard assets issued by the Reserve Bank of India, which fulfils such conditions, as may be prescribed."

Sunday, March 10, 2013

The Internet changes everything: Indian higher education edition

The old triusm `never let school interfere with your education' is particularly relevant in India, where most schools, colleges and universities are pretty bad. For almost every young person in India, the option of being institutionalised and on auto-pilot, of letting the curriculum and examinations define you, is a bad one.

The contours of a better world are increasingly clear. Over the web, the person can plug into the likes of Udacity, edUx, Coursera, and M.I.T. Open Courseware, and get a world class education. The trouble is, there are no examinations and no degrees.

I get a lot of resumes of people who ask me for a job. In most cases, a glance at the resume shows me that the person is underskilled. A viable path for young people and for employers lies in the following steps:
  • The student must envision what life he wants to lead and construct a set of classes and books that take him in this direction. This requires analysing websites of courses in top 10 universities to get a sense of what would happen there. 
  • It would help greatly if the student is able to find persons around her or him who can play a mentoring role in this stage. What are the available lifestyle choices? What knowledge is important? E.g. I would always encourage the construction of broad intellectual capabilities and not narrow job-specific knowledge. E.g. an economics undergraduate should learn enough to understand this blog.
  • The student should then turn to the web course offerings and construct a program for self-study. Every few months, this program needs to be re-evaluated because the life plan can change and because the offerings available on the web are changing quite rapidly. Here also, mentoring would help greatly in constructing these plans.
  • This process should be continued until the person has done courses and mastered books that yield rough parity with a person who graduates from one of the global top 10 universities.
  • The resume of the student should show a specific checklist of courses with URLs which have been done, and books that have been mastered. This is just a claim by the student, because there is no diploma.
  • The student would say to the employer: I am willing to face an interview where you test my knowledge of these things.
  • Employers should welcome students who have resumes which exhibit this approach of choosing a way of life, and of connecting into the best educational resources in the world.
  • Employers should run video interviews through which they test the capabilities of the student.
From the viewpoint of students, this is a great thing because it is an opportunity to escape the low quality of colleges and universities immediately available. For employers, this is a great thing because it is an opportunity to do better than the low quality of students that can be recruited through conventional channels.

This approach requires more work for students and more work for employers. It was easy for a student to say "I have started a Bachelor's in English Literature and now I'm on autopilot". It was easy for an employer to say "I only take in IIT grads; apart from that I am on autopilot". The new world is absolutely wonderful, but it requires that both students and employers need to think more about what they're doing. Read Meeta Sengupta on this.

Thursday, February 28, 2013

The changes in taxation of transactions in futures on equity and commodity underlyings

Taxation of transactions in India began with the equity market in 2004. Prior to 2008, the securities transaction tax (STT) was allowed as a rebate against tax liability against Section 88E of the Income Tax Act. This treatment was withdrawn by the 2008 Budget announcement. After that, STT became a substantial influence on the equity market. In understanding the consequences of the STT, there is an absolute perspective and there is a relative perspective.

In absolute terms, suppose you embark on a spot-futures arbitrage and do an early unwind. In this, you buy shares (pay 10), sell futures (1.7) and then reverse yourself (10). Your tax burden is 21.7 basis points. This is a lot of money when compared with the typical bid-offer spread of the Nifty futures which is around 0.5 basis points. The dominant cost faced in doing spot-futures arbitrage is taxation.

In relative terms, there are two issues. The first is an intra-India comparison between equities and commodities. When activity on the equity market was taxed, eyeballs and capital moved to commodities trading. Commodity futures trading has grown by 3.5 times after 2008, while equities activity has stagnated. Most policy makers think this was an undesirable effect, particularly given the fact that India can free ride on global price discovery for non-agricultural commodities but must foster liquid markets in its own equities.

And then, there is an international dimension. When the activities of non-residents in India are taxed in any fashion, they favour taking their custom to places like Singapore, which practice `residence-based taxation' where the tax base comprises the activities of residents only. We got a sharp shift in equities activity towards locations outside India.

Putting these absolute and relative perspectives together, from 2008 onwards, equity market liquidity has fared badly. This yields an elevated cost of equity capital.

The budget speech has done two things. First, it has dropped the STT rate on futures on equity underlyings from 1.7 basis points to 1 basis points. This is helpful for certain kinds of trading strategies but not for others (e.g. the spot-futures arbitrage described above will gain little). HF strategies that do not involve the spot market will particularly benefit - e.g. imagine an options market maker who does delta neutral hedging on the futures market. Second, it has introduced taxation for non-agricultural commodity futures on an identical basis to the equity futures (i.e. at 1 basis points).

This will have the following interesting implications:

  1. Capital and labour in securities firms will be less inclined to be in non-agricultural commodity futures. It will tend to move towards agricultural commodity futures, currency futures and equity futures.
  2. The comparison between offshore venues and the onshore market will move in favour of the onshore market for certain kinds of trading strategies.
  3. The bias in favour of equity options will reduce; some business will move to equity futures.
  4. The pricing efficiency of futures will go up.

In this environment, there seems to be a fair arrangement between the equity futures and commodity futures. Conditions seem to be unfair with the equity spot (too high), equity options (too low) and currency derivatives (too low). The next moves on this may appear in July 2014 when the new government unveils its next budget.

One more announcement of the budget speech concerns currency futures: it was stated that FII activity on currency futures will commence. This will also give more activity on currency futures; we now have two reasons for expecting more activity on currency futures (the taxation of commodity futures and the entry of FII order flow). However, the shifting of FII order flow will be a slow process, and a lot of time will be lost on their due diligence of the exchange, safety of the clearinghouse, and so on. While, in the long run, removing capital controls against FII order flow in India is a good thing, it is not an effect that will kick in quickly. Apart from this, most of the action will take place fairly quickly, in early April.

Future finance ministers will need to navigate the difficult landscape of gradually scaling down taxation of transactions while retaining low taxation of capital gains (which has unfortunately come to be seen as a linked issue in the Indian discourse). Along this path, the first priority should be to remove distortions. Our first priority should be to achieve a low rate, a wide base, and the minimal distortions. Reduced rates will always yield welfare gains. The Budget 2013 announcement makes progress on two things (reduction from 1.7 to 1, and reduced distortions between equities and non-agricultural commodities). There is much more waiting to be done: integrating currencies and fixed income, bringing sense to options, and getting away from the very high rates on the equity spot market.

Friday, February 22, 2013

Interesting readings

The liberal DNA by Pratap Bhanu Mehta in the Indian Express.

Kanika Datta in the Business Standard on how Narendra Modi is becoming more accepted.

Ashoka Mody and Michael Walton interpret India's new willingness to accept high and unstable inflation.

In continuation of my posts Activism and wonkery are the yin and yang and Law and order: How to go from outrage to action, see The power of populists and naysayers by N. C. Saxena in the Indian Express.



Spreadsheets considered harmful.

Bank for the buck by Ila Patnaik in the Indian Express.

Nandini Raghavendra in the Economic Times about the global success of Indian television shows. Also see Alessandra Stanley in the New York Times.

A finer balance by Ila Patnaik in the Indian Express.

Nidhi Nath Srinivas in the Economic Times on the Commodities Transaction Tax.

All states in India, other than West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala, had shifted their civil servants into the New Pension System. Now Kerala has moved! Oommen Chandy, the Chief Minister of Kerala, has been evangelising this.

Quick fix failures by Pratap Bhanu Mehta in the Indian Express.

An editorial in the Indian Express on proposals to tax the rich.

Rajesh Abraham and Manju AB in the Financial Chronicle on the rise of rupee trading overseas.

In an interview in the Business Standard, Percy Mistry worries about the entry of business families in banking. We have seen the fit-and-proper process go wrong with stock exchanges, and must worry that strange characters will now become banks.

Emre Deliveli writes an interesting blog on Turkish economics as part of Roubini Global Economics. He has a post where he gets struck by a phrase by the Turkish central bank governor: `short-term capital flows could disrupt price and financial stability by causing excess volatility in lending and exchange rates'. As with a lot of what India's RBI says, it sounds like plausible mumbo jumbo and passes muster in the conventional low quality economic discourse, but actually betrays a lack of knowledge of monetary economics.

It has been an impressive set of weeks in the recent past for the intellectual life in Delhi.



William Gerrity on Slate on the experience of being attacked by Chinese hackers.

Sweden is often held up as the model of the welfare state. What is not widely known is that they are turning away from this. Read Adrian Woolridge in the Economist says The streets of Stockholm are awash with the blood of sacred cows. The think-tanks are brimful of new ideas.

John McAfee has an amazing post about how he penetrated the security of the government of Belize - and found mind-blowing secrets. Both elements -- how he broke in, and what he found out -- are worth pondering.

The US White House responds to a petition to Secure resources and funding, and begin construction of a Death Star by 2016. The cost has been estimated at 2012 US GDP for 56666 years. But all is not lost. A mere 500 years at 3% GDP growth will turn this estimated cost of building Death Star into 2.16% of projected US GDP. The trouble is, there may be basic constraints to the notion of 3% GDP growth for 500 years.

I decided not to watch Zero dark thirty.

We knew that T. gondii hacks you to change your risk aversion. Now we find that the flu hacks you to make you more social.

I knew of a driver at MoF who sub-contracted the work of driving to someone else and kept the difference between the government wage and the market wage. Here's a similar labour arbitrage.

Nicholas Carr reminds us that to experience life is to break the shackles of the self.

A great note by Timothy Burke on the notion of investing in social network companies, and why facebook has this great proclivity to go bad on you.

Like Arduino, the Raspberry Pi seems to be working great. Pete Lomas has a great story in Wired magazine about the tradeoffs which went into it. Available in India for Rs. 3500. Can these trigger off a next revolution in knowledge?

In continuation of the ipad 2 having more power than the Cray 2, the computational capabilities of Curiosity are worse than a typical smartphone today.

Adam Gopnik has a beautiful article about Galileo's world, in New Yorker magazine, that makes us think about our own.

Sunday, February 17, 2013

How to improve freedom of speech in India

Most of us in India understand that there is a huge problem with freedom of speech in India. India now ranks at the bottom of the world on freedom of speech. Here is some interesting discussion on such facts.

For a sense of the zeitgeist, see an editorial and Lawrence Liang in the Economic Times. R. Jagannathan on FirstPost reminds us that judges in India are not intellectuals who will lead the way on this.

Public shaming

There are two ways through which things are getting better. The first area of importance is public outrage. Even if India has laws that hinder free speech, we should all speak up and establish social norms in favour of free speech, where the use of existing laws that support attacks on freedom of speech is just not done.

As an example, Vodafone embarked on legal bullying against one person, but backed away when faced with outrage.

A splendid example of this push back is IIPM. Recent events (link, link) should make IIPM regret having gone down this route. Speaking for me, I have not accepted and will not accept invitations from IIPM for speaking or writing in their publications, and I will be quite circumspect about resumes that carry the name IIPM. (This is my standard operating procedure for left tail organisations in India). If enough of us do this, it will establish deterrence.

Outrage matters. We should be naming and shaming the offenders and maintaining a hall of shame.

Fixing the laws

The real problem is the laws. Modifications are required -- large and small. We need to shift away from proscribing defamation, obscenity, blasphemy to a stance of supporting freedom of expression. Restrictions on freedom implemented through government control on the Internet need to give way to accepting freedom of the Internet. What is new in recent months is that the outrage has bubbled up to the point where many people are saying Let's go fix the laws:

  • An excellent television conversation between Shashi Tharoor and Karan Thapar.
  • Pratap Bhanu Mehta in the Indian Express talks about the unusual response of Omar Abdullah and a delicious quotation from Manish Tewari.
  • Suketu Mehta in the New York Times says that we must fix the Constitution.
  • Jay Panda, Lok Sabha MP, has begun working on private members bills that will fix the laws.

Small modifications of the laws will constitute elements such as: shifting defamation from criminal to civil liability, and having a provision where costs are always paid to the defendant if the accusation does not hold. Fundamental change will constitute fixing the Constitution.

Conclusion

Capitalism and freedom reinforce each other. Both require the ability to think (freedom of speech, freedom of thought) and the ability to act (to vote, to transact, to conduct business, to live). Achieving freedom requires pushing on both fronts -- on establishing a vibrant and open `marketplace for ideas' and on establishing freedom to act.

IIPM reminds us that apart from being a question of high ideas, this is a question of simple consumer protection. When a person thinks of getting a degree, he should have full information about the choices, and IIPM is trying to block that information. Similarly, consumer protection requires that for any publicly visible financial product or service, there should be an unrestricted marketplace of ideas, otherwise the ability of consumers to make wise choices is impaired.

In the best of times, liberal democracies suffer from too little criticism. If we are to make progress on dealing with the problems of corruption and runaway governments, the most important channel is high quality, pointed, trenchant criticism. The present laws are grossly out of touch with the principle of freedom of speech. We need to go fix that: first as a matter of social custom, and then as a matter of law. It appears that there is some movement on both fronts.