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Saturday, June 07, 2014

My experiments with truth in the Indian capital markets

by C. B. Bhave.

Thank you, Bangalore International Centre, for the invitation.

I joined SEBI in 1992. SEBI was given statutory status in that year and was facing huge hostility from brokers. They thought that their freedom would now be curbed by the new regulator. In any case, they did not think that SEBI knew anything about the markets. Some parts of Government were also hostile to SEBI since they thought that their turf was being encroached upon. In 2014, SEBI is a respected regulator nationally as well as internationally. You must have recently read that according to a study carried out by IOSCO and BIS, Financial market regulation in India was rated among the top 6 in a study of 27 top markets.

In 1996, I quit SEBI and the administrative service to set up NSDL - a depository for keeping share ownership records electronically and for facilitating easy settlements. In 1998, the magazine Global Custodian described the Indian market settlement system as the worst in the world (in a study of more than 80 markets) but facing stiff competition from the Russian market for the last place! By 2001, the same magazine placed India in the top 10 markets in the world. These rankings are in sharp contrast to India generally being placed between 100-120 when 150 countries are compared internationally whether it be on health parameters or on poverty or on corruption. The examples of SEBI and NSDL show that we don’t always have to be among the worst, even though we may be starting there. SEBI’s journey from being a fledgling institution to an internationally respected regulator is both fascinating and instructive. It tells us first and foremost that notwithstanding the enormous challenges, reform and overhaul of huge structures is possible in India.

It appears to me that our resistance to change is on account of our being a risk averse society. We are quick to agree that the existing state of affairs in a given area is no good, but each suggestion for change meets with such a multitude of objections that the status quo appears to be the best option. We need to develop tolerance for failure. By trying to keep away from failure, we miss out on valuable learning. We overdo this to an extent that we lose faith in ourselves. We persuade others as well to lose faith in us.

In 1996, I made the decision to give up the administrative service and set up NSDL, the depository. It was an exciting challenge and it was crucial to further reforms in the market. It is amusing to recall what people said to me then. There were many who believed that the depository would fail in India. The conversation would run like this: "The US and Europe have depositories: we cannot be compared with them. That is a developed world. Singapore has a depository: Oh, it is also more developed and is just a city-state. Even Sri Lanka has a depository. It is a developing country. Yes, but it is again just a small island nation. China is setting up a depository. Where does China have democracy? How can you compare China and India?"

India seemed to be in a peculiar place where the problems associated with paper certificates could not be handled. At least do not give up the Service was the last argument. I had a problem there. If the depository was so likely to fail, how would I carry any conviction with the people I was to recruit? Would they be comfortable with a boss who had a safe harbor or one who would sail and sink with them? I had to burn my boats. The irony was that these were my well wishers telling me why the depository would not work. We, in India believe that we have a problem for every solution. There is a lot of truth in this humour. There is hope, however. Young people are an exception by and large. The India we see today is different from the India of 1996. We seem to be well on our way to `can do' from a position of `cannot happen'.

In July 1993, I was invited to a seminar to be on a panel that was to discuss some fundamental changes that the panelists expected to see in their respective areas. One CMD of a nationalised bank was presiding over the panel. I was the last person on the panel before lunch. As is usual in our seminars, I had very little time because earlier panelists had been generous with their interpretation of the time allotted to them. NSE was expected to start its operations that year and automation of trading was, to my mind the most exciting thing that would change the shape of things in the capital market. I was barely five minutes into describing the changes and the presiding officer declared that I needed to wind up in the next two minutes. I was disappointed but wound up saying that time does not permit me to say more. While the rest of the audience and the speakers made their way to lunch, a group of 15-20 youngsters sat me down and said they wanted me to complete what I was saying and wanted to interact with me. There is hope in the young.

Let me give you another example of how young minds work. We needed to set up our mainframe in September 1996 in order to meet our deadline of starting depository operations in November 1996. This was to be done in a building that was still incomplete. We needed to take the mainframe to the fourth floor. The lift was installed but did not have the lift inspector’s permission to be made operative. We did not want to bribe anyone. The mainframe could not be carried via the staircase. Youngsters in NSDL found a solution. We operated the lift mechanically to load the mainframe. We did not break the law and yet kept to our principle.

Reform can be a long and painstaking process. It is almost never a one shot exercise. SEBI identified `Badla' (a particular method of carrying forward the settlement of a trade by getting a lender to intervene) as one of the structural issues in the trading system in India. SEBI’s initial attempts to do away with Badla met with fierce resistance. So much so that the then SEBI Chairman was moved out! Badla was eventually reintroduced. Most people thought that the issue had been buried forever. It appeared that there would be no way that the Indian Market would ever be rid of Badla. However, there were many reasons why the Badla system was popular. These related to lack of many other legitimate facilities needed in the market. SEBI kept working on these issues. Finally, when Badla was done away with eight years later, there was hardly any murmur. Reforms need persistence.

The proponent of a new idea must take into account the reasons why the existing idea came about in the first place. It may have come into place because something else did not work. These linkages are important. If we act to take care of those aspects as well, reform will be so much the easier. Our market used to have very long settlement periods. Long settlement periods introduce avoidable risk in the market. Despite SEBI’s best efforts we found that delays could not be reduced to less than ten days. A modern depository system was a must before any further reduction could be attempted. Today India has a settlement system that matches with the best in the world. There are less than ten countries in the world that settle as fast as the Indian Market.

In capital market regulation, the regulators find that they will not hear the voice of the retail investors unless the regulator makes a specific attempt to hear them. The big corporations have access to media and the powers that be. They can make sure that their difficulties reach your ears. The intermediaries and the institutional investors are similarly placed. If special efforts are not made to reach out to non-institutional investors, there is a danger of missing out an important piece. This is a difficult job. The non-institutional investors are not very well organized. There are investor associations that serve as a fair proxy for this work. It can sometimes be a thankless job. If, in the process of securing the interests of investors, market intermediaries are hurt, you can face a lot of criticism and voices would be so loud that it would appear that your judgment was altogether wrong. It is important not only to stand firm but communicate your view effectively.

Acting for investors can be a difficult task sometimes. Let us say I am serving one lakh clients and I find a clever way of charging my clients Rs. 10 extra every month. The clients do not feel the pinch of that extra money and if I am clever they do not even know about it. In any case what does Rs 10 buy today? But my gain is Rs 10 lakhs a month. Now if a regulator comes along and stops this practice, I have a huge incentive to cry foul. I would brand the regulator market unfriendly, would advise it not to interfere in small matters and focus on issues of policy. What is the incentive for the man who gained Rs 10 to argue the opposite? Very little. So this may appear a thankless thing to do. Regulators need the will to go the extra mile and do it all the same. When we questioned banks about the float money in IPOs and tried to eliminate it, the situation was similar.

The intermediaries act as agents of investors. One would imagine that their interests would be aligned. That need not be the case. The regulator has to be alert to this. Once interests are misaligned, there will be mis-selling. Brokers routinely take the power of attorney from clients to trade in the clients' account and to debit their accounts when required. The broker gives an incentive fee to his employee based on the brokerage revenue generated by the employee. It is easier to maximise brokerage by churning a client portfolio, than by acquiring new clients and convincing them to invest in the market. This is not in the client’s interest. One might argue that regulators should not micro-manage by getting into the nitty gritty of incentive structures of the employees of an intermediary. It is a good argument, but fails to address the issue of misaligned interests. If the regulator does not address this issue, there is little chance that investors will be able to do much about it.

At times there is confusion about the role of agents. Let us look at mutual fund agents. Whose agents are they? They are agents of the fund manager because they earn their commission from the fund manager and the fund manager appoints them. They claim that they are also agents of the investor because they give advice to the investor on the appropriate scheme to invest in. But the investor does not appoint them nor does the investor control their payment on the basis of quality or quantity of service delivered. When you are the agent of both the investor and the fund manager, and the fund manager has appointed you, in whose interest will you act? It was clear that the whole theory of the agents acting in the interest of investors was just a theory. When SEBI abolished the entry load, we faced criticism even to the extent that we were killing the mutual fund industry. We had thousands of schemes, and constantly new schemes were being floated. This whole operation definitely worked well for the agents and the fund managers. It was not in the interest of the investors. It was like churning a client portfolio for generating brokerage.

One of the lessons we learned in NSDL was that changes like a depository system affect different elements in the market in varying ways. Unless one listens to these carefully and understands the affected party, we may end up with wrong answers. We used to address investors seminars all over the country to explain demat to them. One question used to come up frequently: "If your system is good and will provide excellent audit trail, why will people who have bought shares with unaccounted money join you?" Our initial reply used to be that we were setting up the system for law-abiding citizens of the country. We did not care if people who employed unaccounted money could not use the system. This reply satisfied us but some how did not seem to satisfy the audience though they would keep quiet. We decided we needed a better answer. We brainstormed. Our reply in the next seminar was that if all people with clean money came to the depository the tax department will just have to ask the companies the list of those shareholders who still have shares in paper form. They would be sitting ducks. This drove the point home. One has to speak the language of the consumer to win him over.

We quickly realized that while implementing such a large scale system you cannot achieve your ultimate goals by following a predetermined path. While you need to have an idea of how you intend to get to your goal, you must have the flexibility and humility to change course. On reaching one lakh accounts, when we analysed the pincodes in the addresses of the investors, we found that a vast majority was from Kerala. This was counterintuitive. Mumbai or the state of Gujarat would have been the logical candidates. We realised the reason. We changed the language of our literature and seminars from being merely in English to Hindi and eight regional languages as well. In a couple of years the balance was restored.

The moneyed and the powerful form a cozy club in India. The first rule is that you should mouth the principle of equality before law but must understand that this does not apply to the members of this club. If you act tough with small fry, there will be all round appreciation. If you, however, try to enforce the rule of law on the members of this club, there will be public appreciation and private anger. Retribution will follow. Lack of ethical values and morality in our public life has degenerated so much in the recent decades that it threatens our very core. Citing examples of aberrant behavior in other countries is just fooling ourselves to believe that here the problem is not all that severe. Earlier the unethical needed a place to hide. They carried out their activities covertly. Now, any talk of morality or ethics is seen as a mere fetish, an impractical virtue, an impediment in the path of the getting things done. It is not just that. We first transited from tolerating the corrupt to tolerating the honest. The corrupt are now saying that the honest are too much of a nuisance in this cozy world of give and take. Let us harass the honest. Even if they are foolish enough to fight back and win, the dishonest would still have achieved their goal. After seeing the harassment caused to these honest people, they hope that the succeeding people will not entertain any thoughts of behaving in this odd honest manner, Am I exaggerating? No. Things are so bad that one of the Supreme Court judges who recently retired had this to say:

There are matters pending with the court, but the pressure, tension and strain both of us have undergone is unimaginable. I can't explain. The pressure was reflected on my wife and family. I can't speak much on the Sahara case.

What would one's reaction be, when one hears this? We would be shocked, horrified and wonder `How dare anyone do such things vis-a-vis a Supreme Court judge?' Not one eminent lawyer. His comment was that the judge should not have said this!

A two judge bench had delivered a judgment in that case just a few days prior to this. The entire judgment is instructive and should be read in full. I am just referring to para 147 of the judgment:

The number of similar litigants, as the parties in this group of cases, is on the increase. They derive their strength from abuse of the legal process. Counsel are available, if the litigant is willing to pay their fee. Their percentage is slightly higher at the lower levels of the judicial hierarchy, and almost non-existent at the level of the Supreme Court. One wonders, what is it, that a Judge should be made of, to deal with such litigants, who have nothing to lose. What is the level of merit, grit and composure required, to stand up to the pressures of today’s litigants? What is it, that is needed to bear the affront, scorn and ridicule hurled at officers presiding over Courts? Surely one would need superhumans to handle the emerging pressures on the judicial system. The resultant duress is grueling. One would hope for support for officers presiding over Courts, from the legal fraternity, as also, from the superior judiciary upto the highest level. Then and only then, will it be possible to maintain equilibrium, essential to deal with complicated disputations, which arise for determination all the time, irrespective of the level and the stature, of the Court concerned. And also, to deal with such litigants.

If Supreme Court judges are saying this, you can imagine the circumstances under which regulators work.

That brings me to the point of the recent investigation launched by the CBI regarding the license granted by SEBI to MCX-SX for running an exchange to trade in currency derivatives. They say it is a preliminary enquiry so there are no charges; they are merely investigating. When I asked them what they meant by `a PE against Bhave and Abraham', they said it is an unfortunate use of words. Unfortunate indeed, but by whom and for whom? They leak news all the time. The only time they have come on record is to say `Why all this fuss when there have been no arrests or raids!' Do we expect the citizens of a free country to protest only after they are raided or arrested? The second statement on record is `Thousands of crores of investor money have been swindled by MCX and it was incumbent on the agency (CBI) to look at the very procedure of registration of MCX' by SEBI. This is ill informed and if not ill informed then ill intentioned. The money was lost in NSEL and not in the entity licensed by SEBI. To date, CBI has not revealed whether they are investigating anyone who sanctioned NSEL, the exchange in which people actually lost those thousands of crores. What is our remedy against this arbitrary behavior of an investigating agency? What does one do when they publicly say that the PE is against Bhave and Abraham and privately tell me that it is an unfortunate use of words?

I believe there is no remedy because CBI is an autonomous investigator and no one can question them. In our effort to free CBI from the clutches of the political executive have we gone too far and forgotten the issue of accountability? At last count, CBI’s rate of successful conviction on launching prosecutions is less than 5 per cent. Who questions them about this? We cannot, in a democracy, have an institution exercising coercive powers of the State without any accountability. This question needs the attention of the Government as well as the judiciary.

Is investigation and successful punishment to wrongdoers such a difficult thing? At SEBI we found that investigation and successful conviction is not a rocket science. Robust common sense, and an unbiased evaluation of the material gathered, can help you reach the right conclusion. We need to proceed not because we want to fix someone but because the evidence is against the entity concerned. I do not believe that competence is an issue. People can be trained. It is usual to blame the courts: that they are unreasonably strict in terms of the standard of proof required. That was not our experience. We did not lose a single high profile case launched by SEBI in those years. The inevitable conclusion is that lack of will and objectivity, and not the lack of skill, is the problem.

With such low conviction rates, the general public has lost any faith that the moneyed and the powerful will ever be punished. They, therefore, rejoice when raids are conducted and arrests are made. The society has come to see raids and arrests as a proxy for convictions. In the process we do not realize that if the agency raids or arrests an innocent person, he or she will also be seen as a black sheep by all of us. A raid or an arrest is only an aid to gathering credible evidence and not an end in itself. The agency has to be accountable for the rationale and the timing of the raid or the arrest. Such questions are rarely asked. The NSEL scam came out in the open in August 2013. CBI raided NSEL in March 2014. Our anger against the scam is such that, to us, the raid was the right thing to happen. Nobody asked the question as to what was gained by raiding an entity 8 months after the scam. Was CBI of the belief that the entity would have preserved incriminating documents for full 8 months so that CBI would discover them in a raid?

The whole system is so vitiated that pendency is used as a potent weapon. As long as CBI is investigating something the concerned person better not speak up, otherwise he will face the consequences. He will be denied promotions. If it is an entity there will be no permissions or licenses for the entity. If the government finds some officers’ honesty or outspokenness too uncomfortable, why not start a CBI enquiry or an income tax investigation against him? The chances are that the officer will keep shut. Attempts have been made and they continue even today to harass my colleague Abraham. Fortunately, he has spoken up, refusing to be cowed down. The investigation can remain pending for months or years and no one is answerable for the delay. Procrastinating is not only the norm today but CBI seems to be taking it to a new level. One of the questions they have of us is `Why did we not keep license pending when an income tax raid had been conducted against a related entity'! They want to elevate procrastination from a level of the tool of the timid or the crooked, to being a virtue. They suspect criminality when you do not procrastinate!

There is a section in the Prevention of Corruption Act that is the cause of most of the mischief. The government's attention has been drawn to it. There was some attempt at amending this section. Let us hope that the newly constituted Parliament will take it up as a priority.

Such is our fascination with raids and the details of what was found that we do not see beyond the raid itself. About a decade ago, there was a raid on a senior officer of the central excise department. There were details about how much cash was found in the raid and how it was difficult for the raiding party even to count the cash. There was also description of the moveable and immoveable property discovered in the raid. The officer was suspended. This is not uncommon. We needed to go beyond that. Firms had obviously paid off this officer for getting illegitimate concessions. How about reviewing the major cases decided by the officer in (say) five prior years and getting the firms to pay up what was legitimately due to the public exchequer? I made this suggestion to who ever I could approach in the Government. (I was not in the Government at the time). There was no appetite for this. Why? Your guess is as good as mine. Should we give up? I have not. I still make this suggestion to who ever will hear me. You are my captive audience today, so I am making this point to you.

When you are in authority and people appreciate you for meeting them at the appointed time, when they thank you for returning their calls and when they compliment you for your honesty and for owning up responsibility for your decisions you might feel happy. But may I submit to you, that these things should be a cause for deep reflection. The first two tell you how feudal our mindset is and how free citizens of this country still expect to be treated with disdain by the authorities. They are surprised and thankful that normal courtesy is extended to them! The other two make us wonder if our expectation of ethical behavior is so low that what should be normal behaviour is treated as a great virtue. Should public servants not normally be honest and ready to own up responsibility?

Despite all the gloom around us there are many in the country that have not given up. The recent appointment of the SIT on black money is a case in point. There were some people who did not give up the idea of bringing the tax evaders to book. They used the PIL route to get the attention of the Supreme Court. After some dithering and a change of Government we have an SIT in place. Notwithstanding some pundits who have already declared that nothing worthwhile will come out of this, I have no doubt that a process has been set in motion that will solve at least a part of the problem.

To sum up, ladies and gentlemen, I have tried to make the following points. The state of ethical standards and moral behavior in our society is really down in the dumps. We are in bad shape but we do not have to be that way. There is no reason for us to give up. Reform and improvement is possible. The progress made by us in the area of capital market regulation and infrastructure shows that things can be changed dramatically. Reform is a long and painstaking process. We can make our contribution by standing up for the right causes.

This talk was based on my own experience and observations. The challenge was to talk about my own experience but stay focused on ideas and issues. If I had talked merely about issues and ideas it would have sounded like homilies. If I had talked excessively about my own experience I would have committed the mistake of self-projection. I have tried to achieve a balance. I leave it to you to decide if the balance was right. Thank you for your attention.

Wednesday, May 28, 2014

The treason of the learned

I was reading John Gray in the New Statesman on Mao Zedong:
... the collection has the shortcomings that are to be expected in a book of essays by academic authors. The prose style is mostly stodgy and convoluted, and the contributors seem anxious to avoid anything that might smack of a negative attitude towards the ideas and events they describe. “As a group,” the editor continues, “we are diverse with respect to age, gender, ethnicity and political sympathies.” He is right that, judged by prevailing standards, it is a well-balanced group. All of the relevant disciplines are represented – history, area studies, literature, political science and sociology – and although ten of the 13 contributors teach in the US, the collection is representative of the range of views of China that you will find in universities in much of the world. However, the fact that it reflects the present state of academic opinion is also the book’s most important limitation.

Reading the essays brought together here, you would hardly realise that Mao was responsible for one of the biggest human catastrophes in recorded history. Launched by him in 1958, the Great Leap Forward cost upwards of 45 million human lives. “When there is not enough to eat, people starve to death,” Mao observed laconically. “It is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can eat their fill.” He did not specify how those condemned to perish would be made to accept their fate. Ensuing events provided the answer: mass executions and torture, beatings and sexual violence against women were an integral part of a politically induced famine that reduced sections of the population to eating roots, mud and insects, and others to cannibalism. When Mao ordered an end to the horrific experiment in 1961, it was in order to launch another.
There is a Principal-Agent problem going on with academic authors. You may think that academics should seek the truth and do things that matter, but what most academics do on most days is worry about what journal editors and referees would think about their work if X was done. This generates all kinds of distortions. It's more like the fashion industry than most of us care to admit: will blue look better than black? The journal editors define what is fashionable and hordes scurry after that. It's bad enough in economics (link, link). It's much worse in the humanities where the anchor to empirical evidence is weaker than the weak link to reality that's found in economics.

Gray's article also reminded me of the famous essay by Omar Ali (link, link) on the Indian and Pakistani Left. I often get struck by the odd subset of persons that write on India in the New York Times.

Saturday, May 24, 2014

Living within the Handbook: One recent example

by Arjun Rajagopal.

We recently ran a workshop for India's financial sector regulators, providing a walk-through of the Handbook on adoption of governance enhancing and non-legislative elements of the draft Indian Financial Code. Despite its catchy title, the Handbook is a serious document, outlining the commitments made by India's financial regulators at the Eighth Meeting of the Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC).

The Handbook places great emphasis on the role of Boards of regulators:

  • Boards are to engage in careful deliberation supported by staff research.
  • Proceedings are to be transparent and participatory.
  • All decisions are to be clearly communicated through one type of legal instrument.

At the same time Boards are supposed to be responsive and decisive. Taking these requirements together, the implication is that Boards ought to meet more often, and that regulators should make fewer rules. The rules that are made, however, should be detailed and forward-looking, and should derive legitimacy from the fact that the public was consulted as part of the rule-making process.

All very well, we were told. But what does all this look like in action?

For a live example, we might step out of the world of finance for a moment, and look at the contentious and highly technical debate surrounding `net neutrality' in the US. The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC), is the regulator charged with making rules governing the use of the internet, and is in the process of deciding whether it will be permissible for transmission of some users' data to have priority over others'. The issue goes to the heart of the architecture of the internet, and has important implications for rights and commerce in the digital realm. The "Board" of the regulator is made up of five Commissioners; according to the news coverage of the issue, the Commissioners voted 3-2 to open up their proposed rules to extended public debate and commentary. A closer look at this decision, and the public's engagement with the rulemaking process, is a fascinating demonstration of the sound regulatory process in action.

The Notice


The Commission's decision and the proposed rules were published in the form of a comprehensive Notice of Proposed Rulemaking made available on its website. The document begins with a simply stated question: "What is the right public policy to ensure that the Internet remains open?" This is followed by a detailed treatment of the various issues it has identified, as well as the substance of the proposed rules. The document makes detailed reference to prior proceedings, government reports, academic treaties, and of course to the existing legal and regulatory framework, and relevant case law. It is certainly a lot more detailed than than many of the regulatory documents we work with here in India.

Detailed dissent


Statements from all five Commissioners have been published alongside the notice. The statements present the Commissioners' own viewpoints and their arguments. Strangely enough, one of the dissenting statements harshly criticizes the detailed, cogent Notice, saying that it is not detailed or cogent enough! The statement articulates substantive disagreements on the legal and economic issues. According to dissenting Commissioner Michael O'Rielly:

...before taking any action on any issue, the Commission should have specific and verifiable evidence that there is a market failure. The Notice does not examine the broadband market much less identify any failures.

Crucially, he also claims that there have been deficiencies in the rulemaking process:

...to say the cost-benefit "analysis" is woefully inadequate is an understatement. The Notice devotes several pages to a wish list of disclosures, reporting requirements, and certifications that will impose new burdens and carry real costs, but may not even be meaningful to end users... However, there is no attempt to quantify and compare the costs of the proposed new requirements against the supposed benefits - just a single paragraph seeking comment on ways to reduce the burdens. Proposed rules should be accompanied by a fulsome cost-benefit analysis that includes a detailed and extensive review of current law, especially as it applies to other federal agencies that we seek to imitate. The Commission's short-shrift approach to cost-benefit analysis cannot continue, and I intend to spend time improving this important function.

Regardless of the actual merits of the argument, it is nice to see a live debate over rulemaking and cost-benefit analysis (Chapter 4 of the beloved Handbook, for those who are following along) being carried out in public by the Board itself.

Engagement with the public


As with finance, regulation of telecommunications is an area in which sophisticated practitioners and academics have a rich history of commentary and advocacy. Industry groups, as well as advocacy organisations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation pick apart and scrutinise rules and rulings in this sphere. What is most interesting here, is the way that transparency has enabled a broader audience to get into the guts of the debate, nuanced as it is. The tech site "The Verge" has used footage from the open meetings of the Committee to create a video encouraging the public at large to engage directly with the regulator through its public comments submission page. Does this make life miserable for the Commission? Maybe, but this kind of highly public engagement gives disparate and opposing forces a fair chance to make their best arguments.

Links


Background:
Handbook Chapter 4 - Framing Regulations:
Handbook Chapter 7 - Transparency in Board Meetings:

Conclusion


Justice Srikrishna's Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, which drafted the Indian Financial Code, worked on two tracks. The first element was writing down the market failures in finance which require a government to do something. The second was establishing good governance practices for how financial agencies should work. Both steps are novel by Indian standards. It is, however, quite easy to obtain intuition on how these things actually work by looking at advanced economies, particularly in contentious episodes such as the net neutrality debate.
The working of regulators is not specific to finance; the IFC and the Handbook can easily scale to other regulators.

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

Rebooting commodity futures

Once the subject of commodity futures moved into DEA, there was an opportunity to start afresh on all policy questions in this field. The first step towards that is a DEA committee report which got released today. This forms the intellectual framework through which regulation-making at FMC can be redone as is required for the implementation of the Handbook.

Sunday, May 18, 2014

Making the central government more manageable and effective

by Ajay Shah.

For the government to work, cabinet meetings must work well. For a meeting to work well, it can't have more than 15 persons. That gives you a real meeting, a conversation, an argument. If big groups are assembled then people just do speeches at each other and nothing is accomplished.

Fragmentation of inter-related functions into separate ministries has hampered work. We have shiny electricity generation plants that haven't been switched on as there is no coal -- this is the failure of cooperation between the Ministry of Coal and the Ministry of Power.

The US Cabinet consists of 15 ministries. The UK Cabinet has 22 members in all. In India, we have 33 ministers and then we have a long list of others who are cabinet members. The failure of the bloated Cabinet to work as a mechanism for arguments and planning has given rise to the proliferation of GoMs, and mini-Cabinet structures like CCEA, where the actual work gets done. These coping mechanisms have their own problems.

Why did we get a bloated cabinet structure?

  1. Operating a vast socialist State requires much more government. As we pull back the State from indiscriminate meddling to the narrow goal of addressing market failures, this requires fewer building blocks. As an example, when India's objective was to cut off trade integration into the world, we needed a big machinery in the Ministry of Commerce.
  2. Coalition politics gave us the pressure to invent more ministries, more ministers of state, etc. With that compulsion behind us, we can now come back to a tight and simple design. There is no reason to have a single Minister of State.

Once you start questioning the status quo, we see numerous opportunities for change, with ministries that don't need to exist, as Ila Patnaik has argued.  In some cases, all that's going on is an ownership function of a PSU -- e.g. Steel (SAIL) or DFS (PSU finance companies). For these, all that's required is a mechanism with multiple holding companies that will perform the ownership/governance function. The British ran India from Raisina Hill and we don't require a whole lot more than that. A sensible compact design would consist of:

  1. Finance
  2. Home
  3. External affairs
  4. Defence
  5. Transportation
  6. Energy
  7. Justice
  8. Agriculture
  9. Commerce
  10. Labour
  11. Health
  12. Education
  13. Urban development
  14. Poverty alleviation

That would give a 15-man Cabinet including the Prime Minister. This would be a tight and coherent body that would be able to talk with each other in depth, coordinate and plan.

It would also generate improved leadership by the PM and accountability to the PM. In the field of management, we have a thumb rule: One person should not have more than 7 persons reporting to him. In similar fashion, if the Indian PM has an 80-person Cabinet, he almost surely knows nothing about what most of them are doing. In contrast, with this 14-person Cabinet sketched above, the PM would have the capacity to have a sense about what each minister is doing, which would generate enhanced accountability and thus performance.

Moving to such a compact structure requires carefully analysing all existing departments of government, shutting down some, placing PSUs into holding companies, and putting others under the above 14 heads.

Thursday, May 15, 2014

Fixing the Indian capital controls against DR issuance by Indian firms

by Pratik Datta and Arjun Rajagopal.

Yesterday, the Ministry of Finance accepted the report of the Sahoo Committee on depository receipts. Depository Receipts, also known as DRs, are financial instruments that are issued on the back of domestic securities, for sale to investors abroad: Indian securities are deposited with a custodian in India, after which a depository institution in a foreign jurisdiction may issue corresponding DRs. Each DR represents one or more underlying Indian securities. In this way, issuers of Indian securities can access the international capital markets and foreign investors can gain exposure to Indian securities without directly holding the Indian securities.

Before we plunge into the details, here are the key links:


The importance of DRs


Investors around the world generally over-invest in their home country and under-invest in overseas securities. This is a phenonemon known as home bias. Despite improvements in financial infrastructure and communications technology, it can still be expensive and complicated to invest in foreign securities. DRs help to alleviate the problem of home bias: Though the underlying securities are foreign, the investor can take comfort in the fact that the DR itself is issued in her own jurisdiction, in her own currency and subject to her own jurisdiction's laws and regulations. DRs are thus attractive to investors because they offer a combination of simplicity, protection and flexibility as compared to direct investment in a foreign market.

DRs are also an important mechanism by which an economy can achieve competitive neutrality. The principle of competitive neutrality is a key component of a liberalised trade system. The principle mandates that foreign and domestic inputs be treated identically. India made large steps towards competitive neutrality in its real economy when it allowed domestic firms to purchase inputs from international markets at competitive global prices. When an Indian firm issues a DR abroad to be puchased by a foreign investor, it is seeking to procure another input - capital - at a competitive global price.

Why regulate DRs, and how?


In a market economy, any intervention by the State must be justified by the identifying market failures, and demonstrating that the proposed intervention addresses the identified market failure. The FSLRC report and the IFC identify four areas where regulation is legitimate: consumer protection, micro-prudential regulation, (regulation of individual firms), systemic risk regulation and resolution (orderly exit of failing firms). None of these four problems are present with DR issuance by Indian firms.

The investors in DRs are not participants in the Indian securities market. These investors are protected by the authorities and laws of the jurisdiction where the DRs are issued. For example, for an American DR (ADR) issued in the US against Indian securities, US laws provide for protection of investors in such ADRs in US. Indian laws need not provide additional protections to such investors for three reasons. First, such protection is already being provided by US laws. Second, Indian laws do not require an Indian regulator to protect foreign investors in foreign securities in a foreign country. Third, additional protection, if provided by Indian laws, will impose additional costs on the Indian issuer.
However, the DR mechanism can be utilised as part of a conspiracy to achieve market abuse and money laundering in the Indian securities market. This requires learning how to handle such problems through effective law enforcement. This approach has informed the Committee's decision to permit issue of DRs only in IOSCO and FATF compliant jurisdictions. (See Table 5.1, page 60, Sahoo Committee Report).

The need for reform


Prior to the Sahoo Committee, DRs are primarily regulated by the FCCB and Ordinary Shares (Through Depository Receipt Mechanism) Scheme 1993. In addition, DRs are subject to:

  • the existing capital controls regime (under FEMA) as administered by RBI;
  • regulations administered by SEBI;
  • companies law as administered by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs; and
  • the laws on taxation as administered by the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance.

In 2013, the Government felt the need to review the Scheme, primarily because of vast changes to the legislative landscape affecting the financial sector since 1993. Three new pieces of legislation had been introduced: the Companies Act, 2013; the Securities Laws Ordinance, 2013; and the Takeover Regulations, 2011. Along with these legislative developments, the macroeconomic and financial landscape had changed as well. The thinking underpinning the 1993 Scheme was no longer well-suited to the needs of Indian firms. The existing framework was riddled with interventions that could not be justified by the objective of identifying and addressing market failures. Further, two decades of incremental modifications to the Scheme had resulted in increased legal risk.

The Sahoo Committee's Recommendations


The report calls for the government and the other regulators to clarify certain critical aspects of the current regulations, in particular the fact that non-capital raising DRs, and both listed and unlisted DRs are all to be permitted. The report also recommends important changes such as:

  1. Unsponsored DRs should be allowed;
  2. There will be no restrictions under Indian law on who can serve as a foreign depository;
  3. DRs on the back of Indian securities must only to be issued in FATF and IOSCO compliant jurisdictions;
  4. A broader category of Indian securities should be allowed to serve as the underlying for DRs; and
  5. Listed voting DRs on the equity shares of a listed Indian company are to form part of the minimum public shareholding of the Indian company under Indian law.

The report is clarifies that it is not the government's job to promote the use of DRs but merely to remove impediments to their efficient use in the market based on the decisions made by private players. However, given the size of the DR market around the world, and the variety of strategic benefits that DRs provide to firms and investors, it is likely that these reforms will expand choice and liquidity in the market.

Participatory process, coherent output


Much of India's policy work is done behind closed doors, with the final recommendations or decisions being tersely communicated through press releases or circulars. Opacity and low public participation diminish the quality of policy outputs, and the legitimacy of any resulting regulations. In order to avoid these problems, the Sahoo Committee drew its members from the public and private sectors, as well as from academia, and held several in-depth consultations with market participants.
The report endeavours to provide a concise overview of the legal and economic context of its work, as well as an outline of the intellectual framework from which its recommendations flow. The report presents holistic recommendations in an accessible Q&A format that is targeted at practitioners and at a wider public who may not be familiar with the intricacies of the subject matter. It also provides a list of recommended specific technical changes to current laws and regulations, and presents these in the form of a draft Scheme that is ready for implementation.

Peering into the future


The Sahoo Committee report has been accepted by the Ministry of Finance. The changes to regulations that are required in implementing this are likely to take place in coming months. Once fully implemented, we may conjecture:

  • Legal risk surrounding DRs will go down.
  • Employees of government and financial agencies will spend less time on interventions which lack an economic justification.
  • The cost of doing business in India will go down.
  • The income of lawyers per unit DR issuance will go down.
  • More Indian firms will issue DRs.
  • The domestic Indian securities market will face greater competitive pressure as Indian firms and their investors will have a choice of meeting each other through exchanges outside India.
  • Home bias against Indian firms will go down.
  • Indian firms will obtain a reduction in the cost of capital for both equity and debt.

    Saturday, May 10, 2014

    Going from vote share estimates to seat estimates

    by Rajeeva Karandikar, Director, Chennai Mathematical Institute.

    My previous blog posts (link, link), showed that opinion polls help us predict the vote shares of major parties (or alliances). This leads us to the next question: converting estimates of vote share into estimates of seats. This is much harder than meets the eye. Sampling is not done in all constituencies. In constituencies where we have respondents in our sample, the sample size is not large enough to predict the winner in these constituencies in isolation.

    Hence, we have to build a mathematical model of voting behavior. It is widely believed that an individual's identity (caste, religion, economic status, gender, age) plays a role in his/her vote. Moreover, this behavior varies from state to state. So if one were to build a model incorporating these parameters, we will end up having a large number of free parameters, particularly as these correlations are likely to change from state to state. Data on these parameters at the constituency level is not available, as census data is compiled and reported at the district level. Thus, this approach is unlikely to yield a good result.

    To get a tractable solution, we do not need to build a model for voting intention of an individual voter- it suffices to build a model for voting behavior of a constituency. One can assume that the socio-economic composition of a constituency does not undergo a major change in 5 years (this is true for most constituencies). We assume that the change in vote share for a given party in a constituency, from the previous election to the current one, is constant across a state, or a smaller geographic sub-region of a larger state. We call this the uniform swing assumption.

    If the sample size at the state level, or a sub-region in a large state is adequate, we can estimate these vote shares via a methodologically proper poll.

    Then using the uniform swing assumption described above, using actual data from the previous election and estimating vote shares of parties across a state or a sub-region of a state enables us to estimate vote shares of major parties in every constituency.

    This is a crude model! In the historical experience, the reality has diverged from the uniform swing assumption. However, it turns out that with some further work, this model yields fairly good estimates of seats at the national level.

    Consider a scenario where in one constituency, out of a sample of size 101, Candidate A gets 52 votes while candidate B gets 49 and in an adjacent constituency also on sample size 101, Candidate C gets 59 votes while candidate D gets 42. While we can be fairly confident that C will win, the same cannot be said of A. What is the best case scenario for B? The scenario is that A and B are almost neck-to-neck with B having a slight edge and yet a sample of size 101 shows B to be behind A by 3 votes. The probability of this happening is the same as the probability of seeing 49 or less heads in 101 tosses of a fair coin, which is 0.42. We assign B a winning probability of 0.42 and A a winning probability of 0.58. On the other hand, the probability of 42 or less heads in 101 tosses of a fair coin is 0.06. Thus, we assign a winning probability of 0.06 to candidate D while 0.94 to C.

    This analogy can be extended to 3 or more significant candidates. We have been using this for the top three candidates: first the best case scenario for the third candidate, then the best case scenario for the second candidate and the remaining for the first candidate. This needs an assessment of the standard deviation of the vote estimates.

    To summarise, based on an opinion poll (or our day-after poll), we obtain statewide vote shares and vote shares in sub-regions of a state and build vote estimates for all major parties in each constituency. Then we convert the vote share estimates in each constituency to predicted win probabilities for the top three candidates. Finally, we add up the probability of wins for a given party across all the 543 constituencies and this yields an estimate of the seats for the party.

    This methodology, developed over 15 years ago, has yielded useful seat estimates. Of course, this element also has an errting to seat estimates go in opposite directions, which is lucky. Sometimes, the two errors conspire to go together and give bad results.

    From October 2005 onwards, CNN-IBN, CSDS-Lokniti and I have done numerous poll projections. Most of these are based on post poll surveys, but occasionally these are also based on pre-election polls. Here is the listing of all such occasions: a comparison of what we said and what happened. I am giving vote share estimates and my seat estimate corresponding to that and the actual vote share and seats.

    BIHAR(October, 2005)


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    JDU-BJP3637127-137147
    RJD+313172-8065
    Others333229-3931

    ASSAM 2006


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    Congress313152-6053
    BJP111210-1510
    AGP222025-3124
    Others363726-3539

    TAMIL NADU 2006


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    AIADMK+354064-7469
    DMK+4545157-167163
    DMDK1082-61
    Others107-1

    KERALA 2006


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    LDF5149107-11798
    UDF414325-3142
    Others880-10

    WEST BENGAL 2006


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    LF5350230-240235
    INC161517-2324
    TMC+272932-4031

    PUNJAB 2007


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    SAD-BJP414550-6068
    Congress414150-6044
    Others18143-95

    UTTARAKHAND 2007


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    Congress313021-2721
    BJP343233-3935
    Others35388-1214

    UTTAR PRADESH 2007


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    SP252599-11197
    BSP2930152-168206
    BJP+221880-9052
    Congress11925-3326
    Others131821-2726

    GUJARAT 2007


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    BJP474992-100117
    Congress423977-8562
    Others11123-73

    KARNATAKA 2008


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    BJP303479110
    Congress35358680
    JDS21194528
    Others1412146

    LOK SABHA 2009


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    UPA3636210-225262
    NDA2824180-195159
    Left-830-4024
    BSP-624-3221
    Others-26-77

    BIHAR 2010


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    JDU-BJP4639185-201206
    Congress986-124
    RJD-LJP272622-3225
    Others18279-198

    ASSAM 2011


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    Congress363964-7278
    BJP9117-115
    AGP181616-2210
    AIUDF131311-1718
    Others242112-2015

    KERALA 2011


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    LDF364569-7768
    UDF454663-7172
    Others9900

    TAMIL NADU 2011


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    DMK+4439102-11431
    AIDMK+4652120-132203
    BJP Front32--
    Others77--

    WEST BENGAL 2011


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    Left404160-7262
    TMC+5048222-234227
    Others1011-5

    UTTARAKHAND 2012


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    Congress393431-4132
    BJP323322-3231

    PUNJAB 2012


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    SAD+BJP414251-6368
    Congress404048-6046

    MANIPUR 2012


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    Congress304224-3242
    TMC14177-137

    UTTAR PRADESH 2012


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    SP3429232-250224
    BSP242665-7980
    BJP+141536-4447
    Congress121228-3828

    GUJARAT 2012


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    BJP4848129-141116
    Congress+363937-4560
    Others16134-106

    HIMANCHAL PRADESH 2012


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    Congress414329-3536
    BJP403829-3526

    KARNATAKA 2013


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    BJP232039-4940
    Congress3737117-129122
    JDS202034-4440
    Others202314-2221

    MADHYA PRADESH 2013


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    BJP4145136-146165
    Congress353667-7758
    Others241913-217

    RAJASTHAN 2013


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    BJP4345126-136162
    Congress333349-5721
    Others242212-2016

    CHHATISGARH 2013


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    BJP424145-5549
    Congress+384032-4039
    Others20197-132

    DELHI 2013


    Vote EstimateVote ActualSeat EstimateSeat Actual
    BJP333432-4231
    Congress23249-178
    AAP273013-2128
    Others17121-53