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Friday, November 20, 2026

Concentration in the market liquidity of Indian equities

by Hasita Pattipaty, Atibhi Sharma, Susan Thomas.

Indian equity markets are some of the most active in the world today. According to the World Federation of Exchanges, order-book trades at the National Stock Exchange (NSE) grew from 1.6 billion in 2010 to 8.2 billion in 2025 (NYSE grew from 2.1 billion to 4.7 billion in the same period). But this trading is strongly linked to the identity of the stock.

For stocks that have a large market capitalisation (market cap) like Infosys, there are always a large number of traders to buy and sell. Traders come with different trading impulses -- speculative, liquidity-motivated or those that want to take out arbitrage -- but their presence generates market liquidity for the shares of that stock. But there are fewer people who want to trade small market cap stocks. Instead, such stocks are traded in response to news or viral events, and mispricing is not easy to correct (Shah and Sharma, 2026). Their order book is often empty, i.e. liquidity is poor. Policy makers see small and medium enterprises as drivers of employment and growth, and exchanges have set up separate platforms for such stocks, but liquidity there remains stubbornly low (Aggarwal and Thomas, 2017).

Economic underdevelopment and low state capability could exacerbate this problem. For example, Shah and Thomas (2003) find that the large firms had 3X the liquidity of small firms on the NASDAQ in 2001, but that on the NSE, large firms had 34X the liquidity of small firms in the same year. With lower trading costs in India, trading firms should be more willing to allocate trader time to small stocks. Algorithmic trading is expected to reshape this problem in a positive direction (Aggarwal and Thomas, 2014). While a small traded product may not justify placing employees, a human controlling computer software may direct trading attention on a large number of small firms.

In this article, we use public data for equity market liquidity, to measure and analyse the evolution of cross-sectional variation in market liquidity in India.

Measuring liquidity

Measuring liquidity is not simple, because it varies across multiple dimensions -- price, quantity, time. A good measure of liquidity is constructed from the limit order book, where hypothetical trades can be simulated and the price impact measured as a function of quantity and time. This was a key innovation that was used in the construction of Nifty. However, this measure requires continuous time snapshots of the limit order book which is not readily available. The poor man's liquidity measure is the `turnover ratio', which is the ratio of the latest one year's traded value divided by today's market cap.

For variation by size, we classify firms by market cap, in each year. Small firms are those at, or below the 10th percentile of market cap, and Large firms are above the 90th percentile. We calculate the market liquidity measures separately for the spot and derivatives, for both the aggregate market as well as for individual stocks.

We select five years across a 20 year span: 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2025. During this period, some events are likely to positively impact liquidity. At the start of this period, single stock futures and options (SSFnO) was thinly traded, but increased subsequently from 2010 onward; the pandemic in 2020 triggered a surge in retail investors trading using mobile phones.

Our analysis draws on two primary data sources. We use daily firm-level data from CMIE Prowess, covering all firms listed on both the NSE and BSE, for spot market data. A total of 6,494 firms in Prowess, traded on the spot market, at least in one of the five years selected for the analysis. Data for single stock derivatives is collected from archived NSE daily Bhavcopy data. For single stock futures, we use the traded value reported in the Bhavcopy, which equals the number of contracts traded x lot size x Bhavcopy price. For single stock options, we calculate traded value the same way, with the price taken as the strike price plus the option premium.

Our SSFnO sample only includes securities whose Bhavcopy ticker matches a firm in CMIE Prowess.1 Out of the 6,494 firms with trading on the spot market, 382 firms trade SSFnO in at least one of the selected five years. Of these, 138 firms stopped trading SSFnO in a later selected year, even though they continued to trade on the spot market. 21 of these 138 firms later started trading SSFnO again.

Table 1: Market cap characteristics of the samples (in nominal Rs. bln)

No. of firms Min 25th 50th 75th Max
Panel A: all firms in the sample
2005 2619 0.0007 0.05 0.18 1.01 1,103.45
2010 3106 0.0008 0.12 0.48 2.70 3,289.68
2015 3495 0.0032 0.14 0.60 4.18 4,829.48
2020 4202 0.0004 0.08 0.38 3.36 8,566.75
2025 5015 0.0002 0.41 1.97 15.41 18,659.96
Panel B: firms with SSFnO trading
2005 43 4.37 52.41 105.79 168.82 1,103.45
2010 213 3.64 24.69 54.61 173.00 3,289.68
2015 133 24.89 103.16 235.39 557.80 4,829.48
2020 186 6.82 92.36 228.12 546.02 8,566.75
2025 239 91.98 379.07 748.11 1,366.95 18,659.96
Panel C: small and large firms by market cap
2005 (Small ≤ Rs.0.02 bln; Large > Rs.4.86 bln)
Small 144 0.0007 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Large 290 4.86 7.46 12.54 32.64 1,103.45
2010 (Small ≤ Rs.0.04 bln; Large > Rs.15.58 bln)
Small 206 0.0008 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
Large 332 15.65 26.18 45.12 124.48 3,289.68
2015 (Small ≤ Rs.0.03 bln; Large > Rs.22.02 bln)
Small 183 0.0032 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Large 397 22.14 34.52 63.59 171.39 4,829.48
2020 (Small ≤ Rs.0.03 bln; Large > Rs.30.77 bln)
Small 372 0.0004 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
Large 432 31.02 52.29 109.43 238.84 8,566.75
2025 (Small ≤ Rs.0.12 bln; Large > Rs.106.31 bln)
Small 499 0.0002 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12
Large 502 107.08 171.91 311.60 780.48 18,659.96

Panel A in Table 1 shows that the full sample started with around 2500 firms, but this increased to more than 5000 in 2025. From 2010 to 2020, more than half the firms had market cap of Rs.0.5 billion, or more, but a quarter of the firms have market cap less than Rs.140 million.

Firms trading SSFnO (Panel B) are consistently larger. More than 50 percent have market cap more than Rs.200 billion throughout the sample, since 2015. But they are also fewer in number -- typically less than 250 firms each year -- suggesting that there has been limited growth in the number of large firms in the country.

Panel C describes small vs. large firms. In 2005, small firms were 1000 times smaller than large firms. This difference has steadily increased, with small firms being more than 5000 times smaller in 2020, and 2025. Large firm market cap grew faster than small firm market cap.

Our sample captures relative size in a year: small and large firms are the bottom and top market cap deciles of each year. One argument could be that the definition of what are small and large firms will be very different from the start to the end of a 20-year period. As a robustness check, we identify a sample of large vs. small firms by constant real size. This then refers to `small' and `large' firms of the same real size of firm in every year. For this, we first take the median market cap of the bottom and top deciles of the 2026 sample. We deflate these median values to the prices of each of 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020 and 2025. For a given year, small firms are those with market cap that fall within 0.95-1.05 times the real bottom decile market cap value for the year, while large firms are those that fall within 0.95-1.05 times the real top decile market cap value. This gives a smaller count of both large and small firms. There are between 25-51 small firms each year, with a median market cap Rs.0.02 billion in 2005 and Rs.0.07 billion in 2025. There are even fewer large firms (4-17 each year), with median market cap of Rs.79 billion in 2005, Rs.282 billion in 2025.

Findings

  1. How has aggregate market liquidity evolved over the last two decades?
  2. Figure 1: Aggregate market turnover ratio (TR) for all firms in the sample, split into spot and SSFnO, selected years

    Figure 1 shows that aggregate market TR increased from 1.99 to 4.45 in the entire 20 year period. Almost all of this rise came after 2015: TR hovered around 2 until 2010, dipped to 1.69 in 2015, and then rose to 2.36 in 2020 and 4.45 in 2025. By itself, spot market TR decreased from 1.13 to 0.67, with most of the fall between 2010 and 2015. Over the same period, SSFnO TR rose more than four-fold, from 0.86 to 3.78. The much lauded growth in market liquidity comes from SSFnO liquidity.

  3. Has spot market liquidity become more or less concentrated?
  4. Figure 2: Box plots of spot turnover ratio (TR) for large and small firms, selected years, with the values on the vertical axes in log scale.

    Relative size

    Constant real size

    Liquidity evolved differently for the small and large stocks. In the top panel (relative size), the median TR of large stocks fell from 0.67 in 2005 to 0.40 in 2020, and recovered to 0.63 in 2025. Small stocks fared much worse: their median TR fell from 0.076 in 2005 to 0.002 in 2020, before a sharp increase to 0.106 in 2025.

    The bottom panel uses constant real size, so that "small" and "large" refer to the same size of firm in every year. The pattern is similar, and sharper for the large firms. The median TR of large firms rose from 0.29 in 2005 to 0.86 in 2020, and then fell to 0.56 in 2025. The median TR of small firms fell from 0.06 in 2005 to 0.004 in 2020, and then rose to 0.12 in 2025. Both groups are small samples (4-17 large firms and 25-51 small firms in each year), so the medians should be read with caution.

    Table 2: Comparison of the large vs. small stock liquidity, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025

    Large firm TR/Small firm TR    2005    2010    2015    2020    2025
    Relative size 9 17 25 163 6
    Constant real size 5 4 34 235 5

    Table 2 shows that in 2005, a typical large firm turned over its market cap about 9 times as much as a small firm. The ratio of large to small stock TR increased steadily between 2005 and 2020, i.e. liquidity grew more concentrated in large firms, but by 2025, this had reverted to 6 times. By constant real size, the liquidity ratio changes in value, but the trend shows the same pattern: that the liquidity differences between large and small firms worsened in 2015 and in the pandemic period of 2020, but in 2025, it has reverted to 2005 values.

Discussion

Liquidity of large firms has grown at a consistent, slow pace while the growth in liquidity of small stocks is volatile. Small stock liquidity dropped sharply compared to a small decline in large firm liquidity between 2010 and 2020. The gap has narrowed in 2025, but it remains to be seen if this is a temporary or a permanent feature of the market. In the meantime, large stocks continue to dominate liquidity in the spot market, and the primary venue for price discovery for these large stocks has moved from the spot market to their derivatives.

Our analysis shows where liquidity is going, but does not, by itself, explain why. We point to two channels that are consistent with the patterns observed.

  1. The first channel is the positive spillover from derivatives to the underlying spot. A stock with actively traded futures and options can be hedged and arbitraged at low cost. These benefits carry over to spot market transactions. This positive spillover has been documented in international markets (Black, 1975; Kumar, Sarin and Shastri, 1998; Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew, 2004), and holds for India as well (Aggarwal and Thomas, 2019). Small stocks do not have the benefit from a similar spillover effect, and suffer from a persistent low market liquidity.

  2. A second channel is algorithmic trading (AT). AT binds SSFnO and spot markets together with higher speed and lower costs, attracting arbitrageurs and hedgers alike. Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) find that AT narrows spreads and reduces adverse selection in large US stocks, but find no significant effect in small stocks. Aggarwal and Thomas (2014) find that SME stocks with higher AT have higher liquidity and lower price volatility, than comparable stocks with less algorithmic trading.

The concentration of liquidity makes for fragile equities markets. It reduces the ability to diversify investments in the economy for returns at lower volatility. A healthy equity market enables firms to move from small to mid to large caps, by enabling access to deeper pools of liquidity. For the majority of firms outside the large firms, liquidity remains thin and growth through equity financing in public markets slim. There is the added dead weight of passive investing. As capital flows into index-tracking instruments, liquidity is directed automatically toward the large firms by weight. This creates a feedback loop: higher market cap attracts passive flows, which raise liquidity, which strengthens the firm's dominance. For policymakers, the concern is that the equity market becomes less a broad barometer of the Indian economy and more a reflection of a few large firms.

Given robust exchange institutions that have become entrenched with the '90s reforms and tested through multiple exogenous shocks since then, it may be time to extend the derivatives channel to cover a larger set of Indian equities, if this mechanism can aid the transition for more firms to grow larger and bring a more diversified pool of equity investments to Indian households.

Conclusion

On paper, the Indian securities markets have a lot of modern features, such as electronic limit order books, single stock futures, a clearing corporation, etc. Under the hood, many features of financial economic policy, tax policy and capital controls have hindered the emergence of a liquid and efficient market (Shah, 2026). While the number of listed firms has grown, and their market cap has grown greatly, spot market turnover has not kept up. About 85% of spot traded value and more than 90% of market cap sit in the large 10% of firms. The concentration of liquidity in large firms during the last 20 years has often been worse than what it was in 2005.

The pattern is consistent with algorithmic trading and cross-market arbitrage deepening price discovery in derivatives, with liquidity spilling over to the underlying stocks that have derivatives. There are benefits to develop a more liquid market beyond a narrow set of existing, large firms. Measures that widen access to liquidity for mid and small firms, such as extending derivatives eligibility, supporting market-making or improving the quality of data on smaller firms, deserve attention. A direct test of the derivatives-to-spot spillover is the next step.

Notes

1 Some SSFnO securities cannot be matched because the ticker in the NSE Bhavcopy differs from the one in CMIE Prowess, which maintains the latest symbol for each firm. Firms that were later renamed or merged appear under their older ticker in the Bhavcopy. For example, of the 247 stocks with SSFnO trading in 2010, 213 can be matched to the spot dataset by ticker. The trading in the unmatched securities is left out of our analysis, which makes our estimate of derivative liquidity conservative. For most years studied, the traded value of the unmatched stocks is small (less than 10% other than in 2005, where it is 24%). ↩

Bibliography

Algorithmic trading and the NSE equity markets: Has the market changed for the better?, Nidhi Aggarwal and Susan Thomas, IGIDR, December 2014.

Response of firms to listing: Evidence from SME exchanges, Nidhi Aggarwal and Susan Thomas, IGC Working Paper F-35313-INC-1, March 2017.

When stock futures dominate price discovery, Nidhi Aggarwal and Susan Thomas, Journal of Futures Markets vol. 39, no. 3, March 2019.

Fact and Fantasy in the Use of Options, Fischer Black, Financial Analysts Journal vol. 31, no. 4, 1975 (pp. 36–41, 61–72).

Informed Trading in Stock and Option Markets, Sugato Chakravarty, Huseyin Gulen and Stewart Mayhew, Journal of Finance vol. 59, no. 3, 2004.

Does Algorithmic Trading Improve Liquidity?, Terrence Hendershott, Charles M. Jones and Albert J. Menkveld, Journal of Finance vol. 66, no. 1, 2011.

The Impact of Options Trading on the Market Quality of the Underlying Security: An Empirical Analysis, Raman Kumar, Atulya Sarin and Kuldeep Shastri, Journal of Finance vol. 53, no. 2, 1998.

Securities market efficiency, Ajay Shah and Susan Thomas, in Globalization and national financial systems, ed. James A. Hanson, Patrick Honohan and Giovanni Majnoni, The World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003 (chap. 6, pp. 145–175).

The Journey of Indian Finance, Ajay Shah, in The Cambridge Economic History of Modern South Asia vol. 2, ed. Latika Chaudhary, Tirthankar Roy and Anand V. Swamy, Cambridge University Press, 2026 (chap. 6).

Chinks in market efficiency: A Melody story, Ajay Shah and Atibhi Sharma, The Leap Blog, 4 June 2026.


Hasita is a research assistant at IIM Ahmedabad. Atibhi is a research associate, and Susan is a senior research lead and senior research fellow at XKDR Forum. We thank Rounak Hande for enthusiastic help and participation in discussions about securities markets liquidity, and Ajay Shah for comments on an earlier draft of the article. All errors remain our own.

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