Search interesting materials

Saturday, August 24, 2024

Who lends to the Indian state?

by Aneesha Chitgupi, Ajay Shah, Manish Singh, Susan Thomas and Harsh Vardhan.

Public finance researchers in India have paid great attention to debt and deficits. By now, the main messages of the field have started sinking into common knowledge: that it is good to run primary deficits in most years, so as to create space to surge the deficit once in a while when faced with a crisis. There is an adjacent field of public debt management that is equally important. Here, the strategic question is: How should the government borrow? From whom? Debt management strategy has not received the required level of interest.

Strategic thinking in debt management

A sound public debt management strategy must cater to three objectives:

  • The mechanism for borrowing must not induce economic distortions upon the domestic economy.
  • It must create strategic depth of being able to borrow on a very large scale when faced with great challenges, once every few decades.
  • It must induce sustainable mechanisms for reasonably low cost borrowing, at reasonably predictable rates, for the long term.

There are four main pathways to choose from in debt issuance:

  1. Monetisation of the deficit. Here, the central bank distorts the monetary base with `fiscal dominance’ where it buys the bonds issued by the government.
  2. Coerced borrowing from financial firms. These are typically regulated firms, who are coerced using the tools of financial regulation.
  3. Borrowing from voluntary participants (domestic or foreign). This is done through local currency bonds issued domestically, possibly nominal and possibly inflation indexed.
  4. Borrowing abroad using foreign currency denominated bonds. As an example, this could involve Yen denominated bonds issued in London.

As with many other countries, we started out in India with the first method (monetisation of the deficit). This induces an economic distortion: the loss of monetary policy autonomy. A long journey of monetary policy reform took place, from the Ways and means agreement of 1993, to the Monetary policy framework agreement in 2015 that ushered in inflation targeting. This freed up monetary policy from the limitations imposed by debt management. In 2015, there was an attempt at institutional reform, in the form of the establishment of the Public Debt Management Agency (freeing up the Reserve Bank of India of the responsibility of issuing public debt), but this did not come to pass.

From 1993 onward, the main strategy for public debt management in India has involved method 2 in the list: a system of `financial repression’ where the government borrows from coerced financial firms. This is a tax upon financial intermediation. The interest rates discovered through government borrowing are important prices that impinge upon the economy. But these rates are distorted owing to the presence of coerced buyers of government debt. The lack of voluntary lenders creates the lack of strategic depth. The government is limited in how it can expand its borrowing when faced with special situations.

From the late 1990s onwards, economists and thinkers have sought to enhance fiscal prudence in India through the mechanism of fiscal responsibility law. It is increasingly clear that this does not work. In recent work, Datta et. al. 2023 show that the Indian constitutional arrangements frustrate the possibility of Parliamentary law imposing fiscal discipline upon the union government. Once this idea is internalised, there is one main path towards fiscal responsibility: market discipline. This requires removing the system of financial repression.

Who lends to the Indian state?

In this context, the question Who lends to the Indian state? attains importance. A recent paper by Aneesha Chitgupi, Ajay Shah, Manish Singh, Susan Thomas and Harsh Vardhan examines this question. For a period of 10 years, we assemble information from multiple sources, which were all available in the public domain, to examine the nature of lenders to the Indian state. Some discoveries that we make are:

  • The SLR went down in the last decade. This meant that the extent of bank funds mandated for the government decreased. However, the actual investments by banks in government debt securities was higher than what was mandated.
  • Simultaneously, there was major growth in the role of insurance and pension funds lending to the government. While de jure financial repression of banks declined, there has been no such retreat with pensions and insurance.
  • All the three groups of financial firms bought a lot more government bonds as compared with the de jure requirements. Excess ownership went from about 0 in 2011 to Rs.30 trillion in 2021.
  • How did the government increase borrowing over the last decade, while simultaneously elongating the maturity profile? The answer lies in (a) Strong growth in insurance and pensions industries, and (b) Excess ownership of government bonds by coerced industries.
  • The voluntary lenders are the private firms, MFs and FIIs, who are 4.8% of investors in the government debt market for 2021. India (along with China) remains an outlier in having very low borrowing from international debt markets.

Important questions for the future

This field is target rich with interesting questions, some of which are:

  1. Why do financial firms lend so much to the government?
  2. What will the structure of lenders to the government look like, 10 years out into the future?
  3. If a big surge in borrowing is required, where will it come from?
  4. How are households and firms changing their behaviour in response to the financial repression tax?
  5. What is the path to fiscal responsibility?

Conclusion

The field of public finance in India has studied deficits and debt. There has been work on the institutional arrangements for debt management (i.e. the establishment of the Public Debt Management Agency). There has been relatively little work on the economic reasoning, the strategic thinking for debt management. In this paper, we offer novel insights and facts for this journey. More research is required, at the interfaces between public finance, finance and public administration, to grow knowledge on the important field of debt management strategy.

Tuesday, August 13, 2024

Announcements

Positions for researchers in the field of working of courts

XKDR Forum is looking for two researchers to work on a project on the working of courts in India.

About XKDR Forum

XKDR Forum is a Mumbai-based inter-disciplinary group of researchers working in the fields of courts, household and firm finance, public finance management and land. In these fields, the group engages in academic and policy oriented research, and advocacy. The new recruits will come into an active research program in the field of working of courts.

Researchers at XKDR Forum have been working in the field of legal systems development for the last decade. Their work in this field includes developing unique case-level datasets from public sources; statistical analyses to establish stylised empirical facts; and studying institutional arrangements of the judicial branch. The work published by their researchers in this field can be found here.

As a research associate at XKDR Forum, you will work on project deliverables under the supervision of a senior researcher. You will be expected to work in person at the office premises in Mumbai.

Eligibility

The project involves building and/ or working with large databases of court data. The eligibility requirements for these two positions are:

  1. Masters in Public Policy or Economics, along with skills or an interest in the coding languages of R and Python; or
  2. Masters or bachelors in Data Science, along with an interest in questions of public policy or public administration.

Candidates with work experience of 1-2 years are preferred, but if you have a Masters degreee, the absence of this attribute is not a barrier to applying for these positions. They must be comfortable working in an inter-disciplinary research environment with people from varying backgrounds such as economics, public policy and law. They must be curious and passionate about research and must be willing to work on independent outputs as well as in teams.

The remuneration offered will be commensurate with your skill and experience and will be comparable with what is found in other research institutions.

Interested candidates must fill in the application form by 31st August, 2024.