Examining grievances and redress for banking products

by Vimal Balasubramaniam, Aishwarya Gawali, Renuka Sane and Srishti Sharma.

Banks are witnessing persistent consumer complaints. These range from high service charges, lack of transparency in pricing and mis-selling. The regulatory system is currently not designed to capture the total number as well as nature of grievances. Without this information, it becomes difficult to design a policy solution.

We examine the grievance and redress experience for a heterogeneous set of consumers, with a large scale survey in five major states of India. Through this survey, we map the journey of a consumer's experience-- from usage and grievance to resolution. We also study the impact that a grievance has on subsequent usage of the product. In this article, we present information on the consumer's experience for a comprehensive set of banking and payment products that fall under the regulatory ambit of the Reserve Bank of India. These include:

1. Banking deposits.
2. Bank credit.
3. ATM/Debit Cards.
4. Net banking/ Phone Banking(including NEFT/IMPS/RTGS).
5. NBFC.
6. UPI Wallets.
7. Microfinance institutions.
8. Co-operative credit societies.

The evidence from our study can form the basis of a more responsive system of grievance redress for retail consumers.

The survey design

Our survey was conducted in Maharashtra, Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. We used a multi-stage stratified sampling method to draw the sample of households. The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) were the villages for rural areas and census enumeration blocks (CEBs) for urban areas. The Ultimate Sampling Units (USUs) were the households from these PSUs.

The 2011 Census served as the sampling frame for the identification of the districts within each state. All the districts in a state were divided into terciles on the basis of distribution of households using banking deposits, curated from the RBI data across four quarters of 2020-21. To ensure proportionate distribution in each tercile, two districts were picked from each tercile using systematic random sampling. This exercise was repeated for each of the five states. In states such as Maharashtra, Bihar & Haryana where one district held a substantially high proportion of deposits, it was treated as two districts and over sampled to account for the large proportion of deposits. Accordingly, we got a sample of six districts each from Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, and five districts each from Maharashtra, Bihar and Haryana which gave us a total of 27 districts.

Within the district, the allocation of the sample between villages and CEBs was proportional to the rural-urban distribution of the population. Villages in a district were stratified on the basis of distance from district headquarters and CEBs were stratified on the basis of share of CEB in the district's urban population. Three strata were created on the basis of the above mentioned criteria, for both villages and CEBs. The number of households from each strata was selected in proportion with the population share of each strata. So if one village strata has 40% of the rural population, then 40% of the rural sample of the district came from that strata.

We collected information on the demographics, physical and financial assets, and liabilities of the household. The core module of the questionnaire focused on experience of consumers with grievances & redress regarding financial products. The total sample size was 21,355 respondents.

Measuring grievances in the banking system

According to the current grievance redress system for banks, NBFCs and Prepaid Payment Instruments, consumers must first lodge a complaint with their service provider. If the service provider is unable to provide resolution in a satisfactory manner in 30 days, the consumer may escalate the complaint to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsmen for banks, NBFCs and digital payments have been harmonised under the Integrated Ombudsman Scheme in 2021. Consumers can lodge their complaints with the Ombudsman using the Complaint Management System (CMS) portal or by using a complaint form. We asked the following questions to understand the consumer's experience at each step of the grievance redress process:

• First we asked if the respondent is using/has ever used the mentioned product. This ensures that we also capture past users of a financial product.
• We asked if they have faced an issue with the mentioned financial product in the last 12 months. This helps us capture the grievances faced by consumers.
• We then asked the respondent what their latest/most recent issue was for the mentioned financial product.
• We also asked them their first course of action after encountering the grievance. Through this question, we understand how many people complain after facing a grievance. We consider that a respondent has complained if they went to the service provider or regulator with their issue. We do not include complaints to the police or consumer courts as this is not in the ambit of the regulatory grievance redress system.
• Additionally, we asked if their issue was resolved after their first complaint.
• For those who did not receive resolution at this stage, we asked if they escalated the complaint to a higher authority.
• For those who escalated their complaint, we asked if they finally received resolution.
• To all those who faced a grievance, we asked what the impact of the grievance was, on their usage of the product.

Overview of grievances in the banking system

In Table 1, we describe the extent of usage and grievance for the various banking and payment products. Columns (1) and (2) provide the number and percentage of the sample who have used a particular financial product. Columns (3) and (4) describe the number and proportion of users that reported that they faced an issue/grievance related to the financial product in the last 12 months.

Table 1: Usage and incidence of grievance

Product	Usage		Incidence of grievance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	N	%	N	%
Banking deposits	17407	81.51	2112	12.13
ATM/Debit Card	8625	40.39	1279	14.83
Netbanking (IMPS/NEFT/RTGS)	3161	14.80	503	15.91
UPI Wallets	2825	13.23	531	18.80
Bank credit	1640	7.68	242	14.76
MFI	961	4.50	104	10.82
NBFC	448	2.10	82	18.30
Cooperative credit society	386	1.81	72	18.65

Banking deposits were the most used product, followed by ATM/Debit cards. Netbanking was the third most used product, followed closely by UPI wallets. All the others were used by less than 10% of the sample each. Co-operative credit societies had the smallest share of users.

The incidence of grievance ranged between 10% to 19%. Even though bank deposits were the most used product, they had the second lowest incidence of grievances. The highest grievance rate was for UPI wallets, at about 19%. Co-operative credit societies had the second highest incidence of grievances, even though the usage of these products was the lowest in our sample. The same is true for NBFCs as well - only 2% of the sample used NBFC products, but 18% of these had faced a grievance.

Nature of grievance

In Table 2, we describe the nature of grievances faced by consumers. We select the top 3 grievances for each product and present the number and proportion of consumers who faced the given issue.

For banking deposits, 28% of those with a grievance had an issue related to transaction failure. 26% of the issues were related to charges being deducted without information. More worryingly, 12% of the issues were related to difficulties with opening a bank account. This has implications for financial inclusion as such issues may dissuade people from participating in the formal financial system.

Table 2: Nature of grievances

Product	N	%
Banking deposits
Failures or delays in transactions	585	28
Deductions or charges without information	555	26
Difficulty in opening bank account	244	12
Bank credit
Loan/interest rates	130	54
Fraud, hidden charges etc	102	42
Other, specify	10	4
ATM/Debit card
Lack of cash in ATM	490	38
ATM closed/non functional	259	20
Server down	156	12
Netbanking
Server down	204	44
Delays in services	92	20
Money deducted but transaction failed	85	18
UPI Wallets
Server down	188	35
Delays/Failure of transactions	115	22
Transaction failed, but money debited	99	19
NBFC
Complex terms and conditions/no adequate notice	36	44
Non transparency in contract/ loan	23	28
No communication about loan sanctioned	7	9
MFI
Charged higher interest rate than informed	56	54
Threat to increase interest rates	27	26
Painful recovery process	12	12
Co-operative credit society
Charged higher interest rate than informed	42	58
Threat to increase interest rates	23	32
Painful recovery process	6	8

For bank credit, the dominant issues were interest rate related, however, 42% of consumers reported having faced fraud which is a far more serious nature of grievance.

For ATM cards, 38% of the issues are related to lack of cash in ATMs, 20% were related to dysfunctional ATMs and 12% of the issues came up because the server was down. 44% of netbanking issues were also because the server was down. While transaction, server and service infrastructure related issues dominate in case of payment products such as UPI and net banking, interest rate and loan contract related issues are significant for credit products.

From grievance to complaints and resolution

In Table 3, we report the number of people who complained to either the service provider or regulator when faced with the grievance. Column 2 presents the total number of grievances for the given product. In Column 3, we report the number of users who complained to either their service provider or regulator. In Column 4, we report the number of consumers whose complaint was resolved at the first stage itself. In column 5, we report how many of those who escalated their complaint reported that their issue was resolved.

Table 3: Complaining, resolution, escalation and final resolution

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Product	Had a grievance	Complained to FSP	Resolved by FSP	Escalated to higher authority	Resolved upon escalation
Banking deposits	2112	1064	661	88	47
Bank credit	242	201	104	61	6
ATM/Debit Card	1279	521	410	39	22
Netbanking(IMPS/ NEFT/RTGS)	503	252	180	24	13
NBFC	82	72	43	8	4
UPI Wallets	531	187	141	9	6
MFI	104	69	34	8	4
Cooperative credit society	72	64	37	7	5

Out of the 2112 consumers who faced a grievance regarding banking deposits, 1064 (50%) complained, which is how we define the complaint rate. Of these, 661 (62%) reported that their problem was resolved after their first complaint, which is how we define the resolution rate. This suggests that 403 users' complaints were not resolved in the first instance. Of these, only 88 (21%) escalated the complaint. Of these 88, 47 (53%) reported that their problem was resolved after escalation. The other half of the complaints that were escalated remain unresolved.

Banking deposits have the highest number of complaints. However, co-operative credit societies had the highest complaint rate at 88% followed by NBFCs at 87%. ATM card complaints have the highest rate of resolution at the first stage -- 410 out of 521 complaints (78%) got resolved at the first stage. This is followed by UPI wallets at 75% and netbanking at 71%. High resolution rates suggest that grievance redress at the first point of contact, which is usually the Financial Service Providers (FSPs) is performing efficiently. MFIs have the lowest resolution rate (49%) at the first stage, and points to the deficiencies in the redress system.

Reasons for not complaining

In the previous section we examined what happens to the complaints that enter the official grievance redress system. However, it is evident that not all grievances turn into complaints. What about the users who do not lodge a complaint?Table 4 shows the reasons why people do not complain when faced with a grievance. The rows show the number of users who did not complain for the reason given in the column.

For banking deposits, the main reason for not complaining was that users did not know the process of grievance redress. 38% of those who did not complain, did so because they did not know the process. For bank credit, the costly and complex nature of the process was the main reason for not complaining with 34% users not complaining due to this reason. 36% ATM/debit card users who did not complain did so due to the complicated and expensive nature of the grievance redress process. 26% did not complain because they did not know the redress process. Another 15% did so because they were not sure about whether their problems would be resolved. For netbanking and phone banking, 33% users did not complain because the redress process is too costly and complex, 15% did not complain because they were not sure about their issue being resolved and 17% because they didn't know the process.

Product	Did not complain to FSP	Costly and complex process	Did not know validity of complaint	Do not know/wish to answer	Fear of retribution	Resolution unlikely	Unknown process	Was advised not to by friends family
Banking deposits	1048	177	88	96	38	188	408	19
Bank credit	41	14	6	-	2	6	5	2
ATM/Debit card	758	278	71	31	17	120	198	17
Netbanking	251	85	25	18	7	43	39	12
UPI wallets	344	114	41	9	5	60	94	15
NBFC	10	1	-	-	2	2	2	-
MFI	35	-	1	3	2	8	19	-
Co-operative credit society	8	-	-	1	1		2	-

In the case of UPI wallets, the expensive nature of the process, lack of information about redress procedures and the prospect of resolution being unlikely, were the main reasons for not complaining. For NBFCs, 20% of users who did not complain, did so because of the fear of retribution, another 20% did not complain because they were not sure about whether their problems would be resolved. Finally, 20% did not complain because they did not know the process. For MFIs, 54% of users did not complain because they were unaware of the process and for co-operative credit societies, this number was 25%.

Impact of grievance on usage

The experience of having faced a grievance is bound to have some impact on the consumer's usage of the product. In Table 3, we present the number and proportion of people who either changed their provider, reduced usage of the product or stopped using the product after facing a grievance. These actions indicate that the grievance had an adverse impact on the user. Grievances related to deposit or payment products lead about 30% of consumers to take some action. The response by consumers is higher for credit related products.

Table 4: Changed provider/reduced/stopped usage

Product	Had a grievance	Took action
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	N	N	%
Co-operative credit society	72	63	88
NBFC	82	65	80
MFI	104	65	62
Bank credit	242	129	52
Netbanking	503	166	34
UPI Wallets	531	173	31
Banking deposits	2112	666	31
ATM/Debit card	1279	388	29

In the case of co-operative societies, 88% of those who faced a grievance either changed their provider or reduced or stopped using the product as a result of it. This indicates the co- operative society members who faced a grievance may not have had a satisfactory experience with the grievance redress process. This number stands at 80% for NBFCs and at 62% for MFIs. The impact of grievances for non-bank lending institutions is far more adverse than for any of the other products.

Conclusion

Improving outcomes for consumers is one of the core goals of finance. It is important to understand how the system deals with grievances of consumers, and where there is scope for improvement. Our results present a heterogenous picture. We find that the usage of deposit and payment products is higher than credit products, while the grievances are higher for credit products. Deposits are the most used product but have an incidence of grievance of 12%. Co-operative societies are used by less than 2% of the sample, yet almost 19% of its users have faced a grievance. NBFCs are used by just about 2% of the sample, and have an incidence of grievance of 18%. Deposit and payment related services are able to resolve grievances faster - more than 70% of the complaints were resolved in the first instance. This is not true of credit related products - for example, only 49% of the complaints were resolved for MFIs. Further research could explore the possible reasons for this heterogeneity.

Renuka Sane and Aishwarya Gawali are researchers at NIPFP. Vimal Balasubramaniam is a researcher at Queen Mary University, London. Srishti Sharma is a PhD student at Texas A&M University.

Author: Pavithra Manivannan

Pavithra Manivannan is a Senior Research Associate at XKDR Forum and Chennai Mathematical Institute.

On this blog:

• Do court vacations matter: evidence from the Bombay High Court, 23 September 2024.
• Survey-based measurement of Indian courts, 13 January 2024.
• How substantial are non-substantive hearings in Indian courts: some estimates from Bombay, 6 December 2023.
• Helping litigants make informed choices in resolving debt disputes, 15 June 2023.
• Delays in government contracting: A tale of two metros, 23 December 2022.
• The litigant perspective upon courts, 28 November 2022.
• Timeliness in government contracting: Evidence from the country's largest metro-rail network, 22 August 2022.
• How did courts respond to the pandemic lockdowns: evidence from the NCLT, 27 March 2022.
• How large is the payment delays problem in Indian public procurement?, 22 March 2021.

Delays in government contracting: A tale of two metros

by Anirudh Burman and Pavithra Manivannan.

A state entity undertaking a procurement exercise must meet prescribed timelines throughout its procurement pipeline. Delays in one or more milestones adversely affect all parties involved: the procuring entity (increase in expenditure beyond the budget and disputes), the contracted vendors (uncertainty and delays in payment) and the public (delays in utilising public goods and services). At the outset, we recognise that the indicator of a successful procurement exercise are multi-fold: achieving required quality, adhering to timeline and limiting spending gap. Our approach employs the lack of delays as the indicator of a successful procurement exercise.

In a recent article, we examined the extent to which DMRC's (the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation) competence in timely project execution was borne out by data. We found that (a) DMRC is able to meet the Government of India's and its own stipulations in two stages of its procurement process, that is, contract award and vendor payments; and (b) In spite of this exemplary performance, DMRC has faced delays in overall project implementation that have gradually increased over time. This article seeks to understand the underlying factors that potentially contributed to DMRC's prompt performance in its procurement process.

It is not possible to understand DMRC's success in isolation. Instead, we analyse it relative to its predecessor, the Calcutta metro-rail system (Calcutta metro). The Calcutta metro was India's first metro-rail system to be implemented. It was plagued by delays and cost overruns. Such a comparative analysis of a successful public project to one that fared worse in execution is revealing. First, it shows the learning curve of the state in building capacity to execute public projects. Second, it helps to understand what works and what does not, when a state entity conducts a procurement exercise. The analysis can serve to provide valuable feedback in procurement reform policies.

Delays in execution of metro-rail systems

Formerly, the Ministry of Railways was responsible for the construction of mass rail services, including metro-rail systems in metropolitan cities. The Ministry undertook the construction of the Calcutta metro in 1971. In 1986, the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 was amended to shift the responsibility of the urban transport system to the Ministry of Urban Development (now the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs). In contrast to the Calcutta metro, the construction of the Delhi metro-rail system (Delhi metro) was undertaken by the Ministry of Urban Development as the nodal union ministry. The role of Railways was limited to providing technical assistance.

We study the annual reports of the Delhi metro and the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee Reports (1981; 1989; 1992) on the Calcutta metro, to estimate overall delays in both these projects. We source this data from the website of DMRC and the Parliament of India, respectively. Our data consists of six time periods during which there was significant procurement of works. The data includes the date of completion and submission of the detailed project report (DPR), the date on which the project received Union Cabinet approval, the date of commencement of works, the scheduled date of completion of the project, and the actual date of completion of the project, in part and full. These are presented in Table 1 below, as a timeline of events for the first line of the Calcutta metro and the first phase of the Delhi metro.

Table 1: Timeline of events

Event	Calcutta Metro Line-1	Delhi Metro Phase-1
Completion of Detailed Project Report (DPR)	1971	1995
Project sanction	1972	1996
Project commencement	1978	1997
Scheduled completion	1978	2005
Partial commission (one section)	1984	2002
Project completion (fully operational)	1995	2006

We find that the gap between estimated and actual date of completion is a little more than a year for the Delhi metro. This gap was close to two decades for the Calcutta metro. Further, the lag between the date of sanction of the project to the date of commencement of works for the project is wider for the Calcutta metro (4 years) than for the Delhi metro (about a year).

This suggests that, from 1971 to 1995, there appears to be much improvement in the way procurement was undertaken for Indian metro-rail systems. We posit that the Delhi metro's success was shaped by the challenges faced and the experiences gained in implementing the Calcutta metro. Our analysis attributes learnings from the Calcutta metro to the following structure and list of processes adopted by DMRC: its institutional design, its financing and revenue models, global transfer of technical know-how, and expertise of its early leadership. In the subsequent sections we analyse how each of these features enabled the Delhi metro to avoid inordinate delays.

The institutional design of the procuring entity

What motivated the institutional design of DMRC? To answer this we look at various Parliamentary Committee reports, CAG reports and literature on the subject. Our review suggests that there were three main institutional constraints faced by the Ministry of Railways in implementing the Calcutta metro.

1. The lack of coordination with the West Bengal State Government and the local agencies in Kolkata. There were delays in land acquisition, problems in utility diversions such as transport, water and sewage, and detection of uncharted utilities after commencement of works. These instances had a direct impact on the contracting process, such as frequent interruptions of works, revisions to scope of work, and change in construction methodology (Public Accounts Committee, 1981).
2. Frequent changes and vacancies within the Ministry of several important personnel such as the General Manager and Chief Engineer. This was due to the administrative process of the Ministry. The Railways had to follow the conditions laid down by the Appointment Committee of the Cabinet with respect to retirement, superannuation and promotion (Public Accounts Committee, 1981). This resulted in loss of experience and expertise within the procuring entity.
3. Inadequacy of financial powers delegated to the General Manager. From the year 1974 to 1982 the General Manager had the power to sanction tenders up to Rs. 1 crore only. This was increased to Rs. 2 crores in 1983 and Rs. 5 crores in 1985. This limited power of the General Manager meant, approvals for sanctions of higher value tenders had to be received from the Railway Board. This procedure was time consuming and caused delays in finalisation of contracts by up to 3 years (Public Accounts Committee, 1989).

We speculate that the above constraints prompted the authorities undertaking the Delhi metro project to adopt a different approach. The Calcutta experience provided two guides for the organisational structure of DMRC. One, to build institutional capabilities for executing a metro-rail system outside the Ministry of Railways. Second, to have a separate corporate entity with independent decision making authority. Thus, DMRC was set up with two distinguishing features which worked in its favour: It was formed as a limited liability company under the Companies Act, 1956 and the ownership of the entity vested equally in the Union and the State Government. The board of directors of DMRC constituted representatives from the Union Ministry of Urban Development, Department of Transport of GNCTD and the Delhi Development Authority. Such an institutional arrangement, by aligning incentives for all the stakeholders, enabled better coordination with the local government and ensured that the management had the backing of both the State and the Union Government. Further, functional directors appointed for distinct functions such as, project and planning, works, electrical, finance, business development and the like, had sufficient powers delegated to them under the Schedule of Powers (CAG, 2008). This facilitated quick decisions in expenditure approvals, qualification of bidders, finalisation and acceptance of contracts. Finally, the long tenure of key personnel such as the Managing Director, enabled the organisation to retain domain experience and expertise.

Financing and revenue models

For prompt execution and sustenance of any infrastructure project, timely flow of funds is essential. Metro-rail systems are capital-intensive projects. The Calcutta metro was fully funded by the Ministry of Railways. One of the main reported reasons for delay in the project was lack of funds and improper utilisation of allocated funds. Up until 1980, the Railways had not fully utilised the funds allocated for the project. Further, for subsequent years, sufficient funds were not made available for the construction. This resulted in shortage of raw materials, such as steel and signaling equipment, and delayed payments to vendors (Standing Committee on Railways, 1993; Public Accounts Committee, 1981). For the DMRC project, the Calcutta experience prompted the authorities to explore other avenues for funding such as, equity, external agency loans, subordinate loans from centre and state, property development revenue and central government grants. Most significant was the official development assistance (ODA) loan from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Nearly 54-55 per cent of the first three phases of the DMRC projects was funded by JICA as a low-interest and long-term concessional loan. The funding pattern for each phase of the project sourced from the DMRC website is as set out in Table 2. Smooth flow of funds into DMRC enabled timely payment to vendors and ensured that the project was not delayed due to uncertainty in financing.

Table 2: Funding pattern for DMRC projects

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
JICA loan	60%	54.47%	48.57%
Equity from GoI	14%	16.39%	10.04%
Equity from GNCTD	14%	16.39%	10.04%
Loans from Union/States	5%	6.56%	13.39%
Grants from States	-	0.59%	10.62%
Property Development	7%	5.59%	7.34%

Another lesson came from the fact that the Calcutta Metro was not financially viable (Singh, 2002). The traffic earnings were inadequate to cover the operating expenses of the metro-rail system. This not only burdened the exchequer in the form of subsidies but also affected the public as the fare per trip that was charged had to be increased to sustain operations (Public Accounts Committee, 1989). Decrease in cash flow meant stalling of procurement of raw materials, and delays in payments to vendors.

The financial crunch faced by Calcutta Metro encouraged DMRC to generate revenue through non-conventional sources. DMRC adopted the examples of well-performing international metro-rail systems and sought to increase its non-farebox revenue. Table 3 below shows the revenue model of DMRC for 10 years (FY2011-FY2020) obtained from its annual reports. Revenue from traffic operations is categorised as fare-box revenue and revenue from real estate, consultancy and external projects are categorised as non fare-box revenue.

Table 3: DMRC Revenue Model (as percentage of total revenue)

Description	Fare revenue	Non fare revenue
FY20	65.49	34.51
FY19	62.92	37.08
FY18	55.22	44.78
FY17	45.69	54.31
FY16	53.35	46.65
FY15	60.34	39.66
FY14	55.74	44.26
FY13	62.93	37.07
FY12	65.74	34.26
FY11	65.05	34.95

On an average 58.49% of DMRC's revenue is from traffic operations (fare-box revenue) and 41.51% of the revenue is through other sources (non-fare box revenue). This is in line with international practice. For instance, the non-farebox revenue of some of the better performing metros in the world (in terms of ridership and network length), such as London, Singapore and Hong Kong, ranges from 25-60% of its total revenue. DMRC's capacity to source funds and remain financially viable has helped it to make timely payments to its contractors, repay its debts, and expand its network line.

Human capacity and technical know-how

Building human competence within the government is paramount to do procurement well. This includes both functional as well as technical competence. In India, the technical know-how to build metro-rail systems was lacking. The Calcutta metro was the first ever underground railway project undertaken in India. Despite this, global tenders were not invited for construction of the work. Neither the construction firms in the country nor the Railway Administration possessed the experience to construct underground structures for a rapid transit system. The lack of expertise led to frequent abandonment of works and changes in scope of work, resulting in huge financial implications in addition to time overruns (Public Accounts Committee 1989 and 1992). Thus, when the idea of a metro-rail system in Delhi was born, the need to rope in personnel with prior expertise and experience, such as, B.I. Singal and E. Sreedharan, was recognised.

Mr. B.I. Singal was the former Director General of the Institute of Urban Transport and the then Managing Director of RITES (Rail India Technical and Economic Service). Mr. Singal came in with 11 years of experience in the planning and building of some of the finest metro-rail systems in the world, such as the Hong Kong MTR (known for completing the project within time and budget) and Taipei metro-rail network. RITES prepared the feasibility study on building a metro-rail system for Delhi. Mr. Singal made sure that his RITES team had a few professionals who had previous experience of working with the Calcutta metro. Mr. E. Sreedharan, the first Managing Director of DMRC, had served as the Chairman and Managing Director of Konkan Railways. He brought in his domain experience of working with the Railways as well as the management experience of heading an autonomous entity. Studies document some effective practices adopted by Singal and Sreedharan which we speculate had an impact on the organisation's procurement practices. They insisted on independence in decision making, speed, and global exchange of knowledge and expertise (Ashokan, 2015; CPI, 2017). This resulted in creation of DMRC as a separate legal entity and in transfer of Japanese technology and know-how in building metro-rail systems.

After the failed attempt at indigenisation by the Calcutta metro, the authorities felt the need to tap in to global expertise for the Delhi metro project. In addition to funding from JICA, Japanese Consultants were also brought on board. This ensured transfer of foreign technological knowledge, skills and expertise to DMRC. DMRC engineers developed technical skills such as tunneling technologies, and functional skills such as management ethos, and value for time from their Japanese counterparts (Onishi, 2016). This enabled DMRC to build in-house capacity, which now helps other metro-rail networks in the country.

Discussion

Our work shows how the Indian state attempts to achieve better outcomes by identifying lessons from its past shortcomings. The challenges faced by the Calcutta metro shaped the Delhi metro's institutional design, financial structure, and human resource competence. Our article highlights the importance of these three factors in enabling desirable procurement outcomes.

A key insight from our analysis is that these factors do not work in isolation. Autonomy in decision making, efficient and experienced personnel, adequate financing, and right institutional choice are all inter-operable and go hand in hand. If a procuring entity seeks to realise better outcomes, procurement reforms must not merely pick the lowest hanging fruit of these factors. Instead, a sector-specific approach of studying the past experiences must be employed to act as feedback into future projects. Our research provides a framework to assess such past successes and failures, and demonstrates the potential of deploying such research.

References

Public Accounts Committee, Fifty-fifth Report, 1981, Hundred and Forty-second Report, 1989 and Ninth Report, 1991.

Standing Committee on Railways, Second Report, 1993 and Thirty-fourth Report, 2007.

Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report No. Performance Audit 17, 2008.

Pavithra Manivannan, Lessons from the Delhi Metro, Business Standard, July 2021.

Anirudh Burman and Pavithra Manivannan, Timeliness in government contracting: Evidence from the country's largest metro-rail network, The Leap Blog, August 2022.

Yumiko Onishi, Breaking Ground: A Narrative on the making of Delhi Metro, JICA, 2016.

Centre for Public Impact, The Construction of the Delhi Metro, November 2017.

Saurabh Singhal, Non Farebox Revenue for Metro - A Global Perspective, Business World, May 2022.

The International Association of Public Transport (UITP), World Metro Figures, 2018.

M.S. Ashokan, Karmayogi - A biography of E. Sreedharan, Penguin, 2015.

Anirudh Burman is an Associate Research Director and Fellow at Carnegie India. Pavithra Manivannan is a Senior Research Associate at XKDR Forum and Chennai Mathematical Institute.